A

# GRAMMAR

OF THE

# English Tongue,

With NOTES,

Giving the Grounds and Reason of

## *Grammar in General.*

To which are now added,

The Arts of *Poetry*, *Rhetoric*, *Logic*, &c.

Making a Compleat System of an

## *English Education.*

For the Use of the

# SCHOOLS

OF

GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND.

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The Second Edition, with Improvements.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO THE

# QUEENS

Moſt Excellent Majeſty.

MADAM,

IT is the truly Royal Aſſertion of a very great Monarch, That it is one of the moſt glorious Signs of the Happineſs of a State, to have *Arts* and *Sciences* flouriſh, and that *Letters* ſhould be in as great Honour as *Arms*, becauſe thoſe are the principal Inſtruments of Virtue. Your Majeſties *Arms* have ſtruck a Terrour into your Enemies, where-ever they came; but the great WITS of our Nation, for want of public Encouragement, have all been rough Diamonds, and want the poliſhing of Art, which adds all the Luſtre, if not Value, to the Jewel.

The Politer ARTS have here been confin'd to Languages unknown, and ſo the briſker Spirits, averſe to the Formalities of the SCHOOLS, have choſen rather to deſpiſe what they cou'd not attain, than ſeem to allow they wanted any Meritorious Qualification.

# *The Dedication.*

The Book now presented to Your Majesty endeavours to open the Doors to all *Englishmen*, to learn the ARTS in their own Mother-Tongue; as the *Greeks*, and the *Romans* did of old, and the *French* Nation does at present. The Language of YOUR KINGDOM, Madam, is more capable of Perfection than that of any of those about us: And there is no manner of reason to doubt, but the *Royal Smiles* of Your Majesty would have as good an Effect here, as those of the *French King* in *France*; in Hopes of which, this Volume is most humbly laid at Your Majesties Feet, by

MADAM,

*Your Majesties most Dutiful*

*and most Loyal Subject,*

JOHN BRIGHTLAND.

The

# A GRAMMAR OF THE English Tongue.

## Part I.

### CHAP. I.

[1] GRAMMAR *do's all the Art and Knowledge teach,*
*According to the Use of every Speech,*
*How we our Thoughts most justly may express*
*In Words, together join'd, in Sentences.*

[2] *Into*

### NOTES.

[1] The modern, as well as old Grammarians, have given us various Definitions of this very useful Art. That of a certain Author seems defective, when he says, *Grammar is* the Art of *Speaking*; since 'tis plain a Mastery of it, is of more Consequence in Writing; the Solecisms of Vulgar Discourse passing unheeded, tho' they would be monstrous in Writing. Of this Opinion we find the great Mr. *Lock*.

I cannot omit the Learned and Judicious Mr. *Johnson*'s Definition, *Grammar is the Art of expressing the Relations of Things in Construction, with due Accent in Speaking, and Orthography in Writing, according to the Custom of those, whose Language we learn.* If he had said of *Words*, not *Things*, and *Quantity* for *Accent*, (which is a Thing or Art which no body alive understands, since it relates to the rising and fal-

[2] *Into four Parts the Learn'd this Art divide:*
*The* First *to* Letters *is precisely ty'd;*
*The* Second *does to* Syllables *extend;*
*The* Third *the various Rules of* Words *commend;*
*The* Fourth *it self on* Sentences *does spend.*

For in English, as well as other Languages, this Art consists of LETTERS, SYLLABLES, WORDS and SENTENCES. The *Second* is produc'd by the various Conjunctions of the *First*; the different Union of the *Second* begets the *Third*; and the various joinings of the *Third* compose the *Fourth*.

In the perfect Knowledge of these four Heads consists the Whole Art of GRAMMAR.

Letters being evidently the Foundation of the Whole, ought, in the first place, to be thoroughly consider'd, and all those Rules, which Industry and Observation have been able to furnish, laid down in such a manner, that the Understanding of the Learner being in some measure inform'd of the Reasons of Things, may not pass through this Book to so little purpose, as to learn only a few Words by rote.

[3] A

ling of the Voice, not the Quantity.) We think it the most extensive Definition we have met with; but, indeed, every thing is extraordinary in this Author's Book. And we are pleas'd to find, that ours (which was made before we had the Happiness of seeing his Book) contains the Sense of it. But to Speak, is to Explain our Thoughts by those *Signs*, which Men have invented to that End. We find the most convenient Signs, are *Sounds*, and the *Voice*; but because these Sounds are transient, and pass away, Men have invented *Other Signs*, to render them more durable and permanent, as well as visible, or Objects of the Eye; which are the Characters in Writing, call'd by the Greeks γράμματα, whence our Term of Grammar is deriv'd. Two Things we may consider in these *Signs*: The *first*, what they are by their Nature, that is as *Sounds*, and *Characters*. The *second*, their *Signification*; that is, the Manner in which Men make use of them to express their Thoughts.

[2] Others divide Grammar in the following manner; as *Orthography*, or the Art of true *Spelling*; *Orthoepy*, or exact *Pronunciation*, as to quantity and Accent; *Etymology*, or the Derivation of Words, to discover the Nature and Propriety of single Words; and *Syntax*, to join Words agreeably in Sentences. *Orthography*, or Spelling, has relation to Letters, both to the Knowledge of their Figures, and the Sounds express'd by them, and the putting them together to form Syllables and Words. *Orthoepy* directs the Pronunciation of Syllables, as to their Length or Shortness: *Etymology*, or *Derivation*, regards *Words*; And *Syntax*, *Sentences*.

Mr. *Johnson*, in his Grammatical Commentaries, much better: "From "hence there arise four Parts of "*Grammar*. *Analogy*, which treats "of the several Parts of Speech, their "De-

[3] A Letter, therefore, is a Character, or Mark, either in Print or Writing, which denotes the various Motions, or Poſitions of the [4] Inſtruments of Speech, either in producing, or ending of Sounds. Or you may term them Marks and Signs, expreſſing the ſeveral Sounds us'd in conveying our Thoughts to each other in Speech.

*A Letter is an uncompounded Sound,*
*Of which there no Diviſion can be found:*
*Theſe Sounds to certain Characters we fix,*
*Which, in the* Engliſh Tongue, *are Twenty-ſix.*

Of theſe Signs, Marks, or Characters, the Engliſh Language makes uſe of Twenty-ſix, as will appear from the following Alphabet.

of

" Definitions, Accidents and Formations. *Syntax*, which contains " the Uſe of thoſe Things in Conſtruction, according to their Relations. *Orthography* of Spelling, " and *Proſody* of Accenting in Pronunciation. Our Diviſion is eaſily reduc'd to this for *Orthography*, whoſe natural Place is firſt, as the Foundation of the whole contains *Letters* and *Syllables*. *Analogy* Words, *Syntax* Sentences. As for *Proſody*, we preſume it falls more juſtly (eſpecially in *Engliſh*) under the Art of *Poetry*, as we have plac'd it, but as much as relates to the Pronunciation of Proſe is taken in by *Letters*, where their true Sound is taught; and our Terms being more plain and eaſy, and needing no Explanation, we have choſe to keep ſtill to them.

[3] There are other Definitions of Letters, as the following: *A Letter may be ſaid to be, a ſimple uncompounded Sound of, or in the Voice, which cannot be ſubdivided into any more ſimple, and is generally mark'd with a particular Character.* This Definition we take to err in two Particulars; *firſt*, tho' every Sound ought to be mark'd with a proper and peculiar Character, yet by the Corruption, or Primitive Ignorance of the firſt Writers of our Modern Tongue, the ſame Sounds are often expreſs'd by different Characters; and different *Sounds* are mark'd by one and the ſame Character: In the next place, *Letters* are the Signs of Sounds, not the Sounds themſelves: For the *Greeks* γράμμαϛα is from Writing, and the *Latins Litera*, from *lineando*, (as *linea* it ſelf) or *linendo*; ſo that both Words ſignifie that which is mark'd on the Paper. But if there be any Character, Sign and Mark, that does not expreſs a Sound entirely ſimple, but a Sound compos'd and compounded of two or more, and is reſoluble into as many, it is not ſo properly a *Letter*, as an *Abbreviature* of ſeveral *Letters*, or a Contraction of them into one *Note* or *Mark*, containing in it ſelf ſo many Letters, as its Power contains ſimple Sounds. This is plain in the *Latin* &, *x*, the *Greek* ξ, ⊥, ϛ, and many others ſufficiently known; for they are compos'd of (*et*,) (*cs*,) (κϛ,) (πϛ,) (ϛτ,) &c. On the contrary, a ſimple Sound, tho' it be expreſs'd perhaps by different Characters, yet it is to be eſteem'd but one Letter: For (*th*,) (*ph*,) no leſs than φ, θ, and *f*, are but ſimple Letters.

[4] The chief Inſtruments of Speech, Diſcourſe or Letters, are the

Lungs, the Wind-pipe, Throat, Tongue, Noſtrils, Lips, and ſeveral Parts of the Mouth. The Breath, or that Air that is inſpir'd or breath'd into us, is blown from the Lungs through the Wind-pipe, which furniſhes the Matter of the Voice or Diſcourſe. For from the various Colliſion of this Air or Breath, ariſes the Variety both of Tones and Articulation: And this Variety comes not from the Lungs, but from other Cauſes, as will anon be evident. For all the Variation which Sounds receive from the Lungs, is only from the different Force, with which they ſend out the Breath, by which the Voice becomes more or leſs ſonorous or loud; for the Lungs perform in Speech the Office of the Bellows in the Organ.

I know Anatomiſts have obſerv'd, that we cannot ſo much as talk without the Concurrence of twelve or thirteen ſeveral Parts, as the *Noſe*, *Lips*, *Teeth*, *Palate*, *Jaw*, *Tongue*, *Weaſon*, *Lungs*, *Muſcles* of the *Cheſt*, *Diaphragma*, and *Muſcles of the Belly*; but I have nothing to do with any Part, but what is immediately concern'd in the formation of Sounds, the Obſervation of the Manner of which, leads the Obſerver to certain uſeful Concluſions in the Subject we treat of. Farther Enquiries into other Parts concern'd more remotely in Speech, have little but Amuſements here, tho' of Conſequence in the Contemplation of the admirable Order of Nature.

The Variety of Tones (that is, as far as they relate to Gravity or Acuteneſs, flat or ſharp) ariſes from the Wind-pipe. For as a Flute, the longer and ſmaller it is, the more acute or ſharp, or ſmall the Tone; and the larger and ſhorter, the more grave and big the Tone is, that it gives. The ſame holds good in the Wind-pipe (whence, at leaſt, in ſome Meaſure, ariſes the Variety of Tones in the Voices of ſeveral Men; or even of the ſame Men in the different Parts of their Ages) but chiefly from the *Larynx*, or Knot of the Throat: For the Tone of the Voice is more or leſs grave or acute, as the ſmall Cleft of the Throat opens more or leſs; and this is the Seat of all Muſical Modulations.

From the ſame Seat muſt we ſeek the Reaſon of the Difference betwixt a gentle Whiſper, and loud Talk. For if, when we ſpeak, we make a tremulous Concuſſion of the Throat and Wind-pipe (that is, by reaſon of their Extenſion) it produces loud ſpeaking; but when the Throat and the Wind-pipe are leſs ſtretch'd, and more lax, it is Whiſpering. But all Letters are not capable of this Diverſity, or Variation; but only thoſe, which we call Vowels, half Vowels, half Mutes (and ſuch as derive themſelves from half Mutes:) For *b*, *t*, *c*, or *k*, are ſimply Mutes, and their Aſpirates never admit of that Concuſſion: nor is their Sound in loud Speech different from what it is in a Whiſper.

To this Head we may refer the Hoarſeneſs, often the Companion of Catarrhs, which hinders that Concuſſion of the Throat, and the Wind-pipe.

The Articulation of Words, or the Formation of the ſeveral Letters, begins when the Breath has paſt the Throat; and is almoſt wholly perform'd by the Noſtrils, Mouth, Tongue and Lips. Tho' theſe Remarks ſeem out of the Way to the Common Reader, yet a Judicious Maſter will find it worth his while to ſtudy this Point thoroughly. For by knowing what Letters are formed by the Mouth, Tongue, Throat, Lips, *&c.* the Maſter may give a great Light to the Learner in the Art of Spelling, and perhaps the moſt certain Rule of doing it juſtly, becauſe in theſe Notes we ſhall ſhew how every Vowel and Conſonant is form'd.

[5] Tho' it wou'd be too much from the preſent Deſign for me to enter into the Enquiry, who was the Inventer of Letters, and what Nation

## *Of the* LETTERS. [5]

| | *Old Engliſh.* | | *Roman.* | | *Italian.* | | *Sounded.* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 𝔄 | 𝔞 | A | a | *A* | *a* | *a* | *a* | |
| 2 | 𝔅 | 𝔟 | B | b | *B* | *b* | *be* | *eb* | |
| 3 | ℭ | 𝔠 | C | c | *C* | *c* | *ſee* | *ec* | *ke* |
| 4 | 𝔇 | 𝔡 | D | d | *D* | *d* | *dee* | *ed* | |
| 5 | 𝔈 | 𝔢 | E | e | *E* | *e* | *e* | | |
| 6 | 𝔉 | 𝔣 | F | f | *F* | *f* | *eff* | *fe* | |
| 7 | 𝔊 | 𝔤 | G | g | *G* | *g* | *ghee* | *eg* | *ga* |
| 8 | ℌ | 𝔥 | H | h | *H* | *h* | *atch* | *ha* | *each* |
| 9 | ℑ | 𝔦 | I | i | *I* | *i* | *i* | | |
| 10 | | 𝔧 | J | j | *J* | *j* | *jay* | *ge* | |
| 11 | 𝔎 | 𝔨 | K | k | *K* | *k* | *ka* | | |
| 12 | 𝔏 | 𝔩 | L | l | *L* | *l* | *el* | *le* | |
| 13 | 𝔐 | 𝔪 | M | m | *M* | *m* | *em* | *me* | |
| 14 | 𝔑 | 𝔫 | N | n | *N* | *n* | *en* | *ne* | |
| 15 | 𝔒 | 𝔬 | O | o | *O* | *o* | *o* | | |
| 16 | 𝔓 | 𝔭 | P | p | *P* | *p* | *pee* | *ep* | |
| 17 | 𝔔 | 𝔮 | Q | q | *Q* | *q* | *cue* | *kwe* | *que* |
| 18 | ℜ | 𝔯 | R | r | *R* | *r* | *ar* | | |
| 19 | 𝔖 | 𝔰 | S | ſs | *S* | *ſs* | *eſs* | *ſe* | |
| 20 | 𝔗 | 𝔱 | T | t | *T* | *t* | *tee* | *et* | |
| 21 | 𝔘 | 𝔲 | U | u | *U* | *u* | *u* | | |
| 22 | | 𝔳 | V | v | *V* | *v* | *va* | *ev* | |
| 23 | 𝔚 | 𝔴 | W | w | *W* | *w* | *double u* | *we* | |
| 24 | 𝔛 | 𝔵 | X | x | *X* | *x* | *ex* | | |
| 25 | 𝔜 | 𝔶 | Y | y | *Y* | *y* | *wy* | *ye* | |
| 26 | ℨ | 𝔷 | Z | z | *Z* | *z* | *zed* | *ze*, or *ez* | |

tion had the Honour of first enjoying this Benefit, yet that I may not wholly disappoint some, who may expect this, I shall in a very few Words let him know, That the *Chinese* are allow'd the Palm in this Particular; for their first King *Fohi*, who liv'd 1400 Years before *Moses*, 500 before *Menes* the first King of *Egypt*, and 2950 before *Christ*, was the Author of this Invention, and writ in their Language a Book call'd *Texim*, which is the oldest in the World.

But this was in Parts too remote, and which had so little Communication with the World, that is, all that World which was then known, that we may reasonably make another Enquiry after the Original of Letters in the hither Parts of *Asia*, *Egypt* and *Europe*.

'Tis more probable from the *Mummies* and *Obelisks*, that *Hieroglyphics* were in these Parts the first Manner of Writing, and even prior to *Moses*; the *Pyramids* and *Obelisques* being made, at least in great measure, while yet the *Israelites* were in Slavery to the *Egyptians*, and by Consequence not very well qualify'd for Inventions so curious and judicious.

Whether *Cadmus* and the *Phœnicians* learn'd LETTERS from the *Egyptians*, or their Neighbours of *Judah* and *Samaria*, may be a Question; since the Bible wrote in Letters is more likely to have inform'd them, than the *Hieroglyphics* of *Egypt*. But when or wheresoever the *Phœnicians* learnt this Art, I think it is generally agreed, that *Cadmus*, the Son of *Agenor*, first brought Letters into *Greece*, whence in subsequent Ages they spread over all *Europe*.

Thus much I have thought fit to say on this Head: What remains is That as the difference of the Articulate Sounds was to express the different Ideas and Thoughts of the Mind; so it is certain, that one Letter was intended to *signifie* only one Sound; and not, as at present, now to *express* one Sound, and then another; which has brought in that Confusion, that has render'd the Learning of our modern Tongues extreamly difficult; whereas if the various Sounds were constantly express'd by the same numerical *Letter*, more than half that Difficulty wou'd be remov'd.

But since we are not here to reform, or indeed make a new Alphabet, as some have vainly, against the Stream or full Tide of Custom attempted; but to explain and deliver Rules about that which we have, and according to those Errors and Mistakes which Use, the inviolable Rule and Right of Speaking and Writing, has consecrated, such an Endeavour wou'd be as useless, as singular.


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




Saxon Set Chancery



Old MS.rs Cap.lls



Chancery Gothick



Running Court



Court hand



Exchequer



Pipe office



# CHAP. II.

## *Of* VOWELS. [6]

*Under two Heads these* Letters *still are plac't,*
*The first holds* Vowels, Consonants *the last.*

THese Twenty-six Letters are naturally divided into two sorts, which are call'd *Vowels* and *Consonants*. *Vowels*, or perfect Sounds, being by Nature of greater Excellence than *Consonants*, as Sounding by themselves, and giving the later their Sounds, justly demand our first Consideration.

A *Vowel*, therefore, is a Letter denoting a full Sound made in the Throat, and can be pronounc'd without the help and joining of any other Letter to it.

*A* Vowel *by it self compleat is found,*
*Made in the Throat, one full and perfect Sound.*
*Five Letters we can only* Vowels *call,*
*For* A, E, I, O, U *contain them all.*

[7] In *English* we have but these five Marks, or Characters of these perfect Sounds call'd *Vowels*, *a*, *e*, *i*, *o*, *u*, and *y* at the end of a Syllable for *i*, which is only a different Figure, but entirely of the same Sound. When these Vowels end a Syllable, they are usually long, but generally short in all other Positions.

*To*

[6] It is of use to observe, that the several sorts of Sounds us'd in Speaking, which we call *Letters*, are form'd in a very natural manner. For first, the Mouth is the Organ that forms them, and we see, that some are so simple, and unmixt, that there is nothing requir'd, but the opening of the Mouth to make them understood, and to form different Sounds. Whence they have the Names of *Vowels*, or *Voices*, or *Vocal Sounds*. On the other side we find, that there are others, whose Pronunciation depends on the particular Application, and Use of every Part of the Mouth, as the Teeth, the Lips, the Tongue, the Palate; which yet cannot make any one perfect Sound but by the same Opening of the Mouth; that is to say, they can only sound by their Union with those first and only perfect Sounds; and these are call'd *Consonants*, or Letters sounding with other Letters.

[7] If we judge by the Characters or Marks, we find that there is not the same Number of *Vowels* in all Languages, and yet all Nations almost agree, that there are more different Sounds of *Vowels*, than they have common Characters to express them.

For

*To each of theſe, two different Sounds belong;*
*One that is* ſhort, *another that is* long;
*Five* double Vowels *add, to fill the* Vocal *Throng.*

Each of theſe five has two diſtinct Sounds, that is, a long and a ſhort Sound; the ſhort Sound is always made long by adding *(e)* at the end, as *Lad*, *Lade*; *Met*, *Mete*; *Pip* *Pipe*; *Rob*, *Robe*; *Tun*, *Tune*: To theſe we muſt add five double *Vowels*, compounded each of two of theſe. To attain to the perfect Knowledge of this, the Learner muſt firſt be taught the true Sounds of theſe five *Vowels*, as they lie ſingle, and each by it ſelf; for that is the Guide to arrive ſafely at all their Variations.

*Beſides the* long *and* ſhort, *to* (A) *does fall*
*A Sound that's* broad, *as in* all, ſhall *and* call;
*And in all Words, that end in double* (L),
*As* Wall, *and* Stall; *in* (ld), *as* bald *will tell:*
*Betwixt a double* (U) *plac'd and* (R),
*As* Warden, Ward, Warren, Warm, *and* Warmer

(*A*) in theſe Words ſeems to have gain'd this broad Sound from the Ancient Spelling; which, ev'n in the Days of Queen *Elizabeth*, added a *(u)* after it, as in *talk*, it being then Written *taulk*, as in *Aſcham* and ſeveral other Writers before 1560, &c.

(*A*) beſides its ſhort and long Sound, has before *(l)* or rather double *(l)* generally a broad open or full Sound, as it has in Words ending in *(ld)*, &c. but when the double *(l)* is parted in the middle of a Word it is pronounc'd ſhort, as *Shallow*, *Tallow*; 'tis likewiſe broad when plac'd betwixt *(w)* and *(r)*, and likewiſe in *Waſh*, *Watch*, *Water*, *Wrath*, &c.

(A) *is ſhort when ſingle Conſonants conclude,*
*Or two of the ſame into the middle intrude,*
*Or ſeem in Sound t'obtain the middle Part;*
*But yet the final* (e) *do's length to theſe impart.*

[8] When

For this Reaſon I am of Opinion (ſays our learned Dr. *Wallis*) that they ought to be diſtinguiſh'd into theſe three *Claſſes*; *Gutteral*, or *Throat*-Sounds; *Palatine*, or Sounds of the *Palate*; and *Labial*, or Sounds of the *Lips*, as they are form'd either by the Throat, the Palate, or the Lips.

If therefore we make this Diviſion of the Vowels according to that Number of vocal Sounds, as we find them in our Time, (as we ought) then will their number be Nine, *viz.* Three in the *Throat*, three in the *Palate*, and three in the *Lips*, according to the three ſeveral Degrees

8] When a ſingle Conſonant ends a Syllable, as *Bat*, *can*, *far*, is ſhort; and when two of the ſame Conſonants meet in middle of a Word, as in *batter*, *cannot*, *Farrier*, &c. and n a ſingle Conſonant in the middle Sounds double, as in *iſh*, *Dragon*, *Habit*, &c. and when it precedes two Conſo- ts that end a Word, as *blaſt*, *paſt*, &c. But ſilent (*e*) ev'r r theſe two Conſonants, lengthens the (*a*), as *paſte*, &c.

(A) *ſtill we long moſt juſtly do ſuppoſe*
*In Words which but one Syllable compoſe,*
*Whenever ſilent* (e) *is in the cloſe.*
*And when in th' end of Syllables, 'tis known*
*In words that have more Syllables than one.*

*A)* ſounds long, ſmall, and ſlender, 1ſt, in Words of one able with (*e*) at the end, as *make*, *fate*, *late*, &c. but this e natural Effect of ſilent (*e*), which always gives length to 'foregoing Vowel, and ought never to be written when is ſhort, 'tis likewiſe long in the ends of Syllables in rds of many Syllables, as *Cradle*, *Ladle*, &c.

*No common Word in* (a) *can e'er expire,*
*And yet its Genuine Sound retain entire.*

*A)* is obſcure, or not plainly pronounc'd, in the Word *uſand*.

None but proper Names end in this Vowel, except theſe n in (*ea*), which yet ſound (*e*), as *Lea*, *Plea*, *Flea*, *Pea*, *Sea*, *yea*; the laſt Word is out of uſe.

## *Of the Vowel* (E.)

9] (E) *is of different* Sound, *and various* Uſe,
*Silent it ſelf, all* Vowels *does produce*;
*But leaſt it ſelf, yet ſometimes it is found*
*To lengthen ev'n its* own *preceding Sound,*
*As we in* Scene *and* Glebe, *and others find,*
*But* (e) *is moſtly of the ſhorter kind.*
*But then its Sound is always clear expreſt,*
*As in* Whet, let, Well, met, *and* Reſt.

The

anners of opening the Mouth; is, by a *larger*, *middle*, and *leſs* ee of opening it in thoſe three es or Seats.

] We generally pronounce (*a*) a more ſmall and ſlender d, than moſt other Nations; as the *French* generally do their (*e*) when follow'd by (*n*) in the Word *Entendment*, tho' ſomething ſharper and clearer; or perhaps its moſt uſual Sound in our Tongue comes neareſt to the French Neuter, or open (*e*); as in the Words *Etre*, *Tete*, &c.

or

The Sound of this *Vowel* is differently expreſs'd, and various and great Uſe in the Pronunciation of other *Vowe* for, when ſilent it ſelf, it lengthens them all, but is ſeldo long it ſelf, or lengthen'd by it ſelf in Words of one, or mo than one Syllable.

*Its Sound is always ſhort, howe'er expreſt,*
*As* fret, help, left, Beard, dreamt, *and* bleſt;
*Unleſs made long by ſilent final* (e),
*Or double* (e) *in Form or Sound it be.*

A ſingle Conſonant at the end after (*e*) makes it ſhort, as *Bed*, *fret*, *Den*, &c. two or three Conſonants at the end aft it does the ſame; (*ft*) as *left*, (*ld*) as *held*, (*lm*) as *Helm*, (*l* as *help*, (*lt*) as *melt*, (*mp*) as *Hemp*, (*nt*) as *dent*, *bent*, (*pt*) as *ke* (*rb*) as *Herb*, (*rd*) as *Herd*, (*rk*) as *jerk*, (*rm*) as *Term*, (*rn*) *Hern*, (*rt*) as *pert*, (*ſh*) as *Fleſh*, (*sk*) as *Desk*, (*ſt*) as *Reſt*, *be bleſt*. The Sound of (*e*) expreſs'd by (*ea*) in the middle ſeveral Words is ſhort; as *already*, *Beard*, *Bearn*, (a Chil *Weather*, *Treaſure*, *cleanſe*, *Dearth*, *dreamt*, *Earneſt*, *Earth*, (a all deriv'd from it) *Feather*, *Head*, (and all deriv'd from *Jealous*, *Leachery*, *Lead*, *Meadow*, *Meaſure*, *Pearl*, *Peaſant*, *Pl ſure*, *ready*, *Seamſtreſs*, *ſpread*, and many more.

It being thus naturally ſhort, it lengthens it ſelf in Wor of one Syllable but in theſe ſixteen Examples,

1. *Bede*, } Proper Names.
2. *Pede*, }
3. *Vere*, }
4. *Crete*, an Iſland.
5. *Ere*, before that.
6. *Glebe*, Land.
7. *Glede*, a Kite.
8. *Here*, in this Place.
9. *Mede*, a Country.
10. *Mere*, a Lake or Fenn.
11. *Mete*, Meaſure.
12. *Rere*, hindermoſt.
13. *Scene*, in a Play.
14. *Scheme*, a Draught.
15. *Sphere*, a Globe.
16. *Theſe*.

To theſe, in my Opinion, we may add *there*, *were*, a *where*, tho' by a different, yet wrong, Pronunciation, ſo ſound the firſt (*e*) in theſe Words like (*a*) long.

or as the *Italians* do their (*a*). But yet not like the fat or groſs (*a*) of the *Germans*, which if long, we expreſs by (*au*) or (*aw*), or if ſhort, by ſhort (*o*).

[9] This Vowel is pronounc'd with a clear and acute Sound, li the *French* (*e*) *Maſculine*: bur ſcarce ever has the obſcure Sound the *French* (*e*) *Feminine*; unl when ſhort (*e*) goes before (*r*), in *Vertue*, and *Stranger*.

[10] T

Words of more than one Syllable, the (*e*) at the end thens these Words, as,

1. *Adhere.*
2. *Apozeme.*
3. *Austere.*
4. *Blaspheme.*
5. *Cohere.*
6. *Complete.*
7. *Concede.*
8. *Concrete.*
9. *Convene.*
10. *Extreme.*
11. *Greve*, Lord.
12. *Impede*, to hinder.
13. *Intercede*, mediate.
14. *Interfere.*
15. *Intervene.*
16. *Nicene*, Creed.
17. *Obscene.*
18. *Portreve.*
19. *Precede.*
20. *Recede.*
21. *Replete.*
22. *Revere.*
23. *Severe.*
24. *Sincere.*
25. *Supersede.*
26. *Supreme.*

ote, That *complete*, *replete*, *extreme*, *supreme*, are often *compleat*, *repleat*, *extream*, *supream*; but since they are both ways, I wou'd not omit them, tho' they, when in belong properly to the following Rule.

*When long, acute and clear* (e) *sounds we see,*
*As in* ev'n, evil, be, me, we *and* he.
Ea, ie *and double* (e) *are found,*
*Still to express of* (e) *the longer Sound.*

ustom lengthens the Sound of (*e*) by the improper *double* (*ea*) in all Words where it does not sound (*a*) short, or (*e*) , as will be seen when we come to that improper *double* .

he Sound of (*e*) is lengthen'd by (*ei*) in these Words only.

*Conceit.*
*Conceive.*
*Deceit.*
*Deceive.*
5. *Either.*
6. *Neither.*
7. *Inveigle.*
8. *Receipt.*
9. *Receive.*
10. *Seize.*
11. *Weild.*

) lengthens the Sound of (*e*), or gives it that of double n these,

*Atchievement.*
*Believe.*
*Belief.*
*Besiege.*
*Bier.*
*Brief.*
*Cashier.*
*Chief.*
9. *Cieling.*
10. *Field.*
11. *Fiend.*
12. *Friend.*
13. *Frontier.*
14. *Grief.*
15. *Grievance.*
16. *Grieve.*
17. *Grievous.*
18. *Lief.*
19. *Liege.*
20. *Mulitier.*
21. *Piece.*
22. *Piedmont.*
23. *Pierce.*
24. *Priest.*

25. *Re-*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 25. *Relief.* | 30. *Shriek.* | 35. *Thieve.* |
| 26. *Relieve.* | 31. *Sieve.* | 36. *Thievery.* |
| 27. *Reprieve.* | 32. *Shield.* | 37. *Thievish.* |
| 28. *Siege.* | 33. *Thieves.* | 38. *Yield.* |
| 29. *Shrieve.* | 34. *Thief.* | |

In all other Words the Sound of (*e*) long is expreſs the *double Vowel* (*ee*), as in *Bleed*, *Creed*,&c. [10] The S of (*e*) in *Stranger* is obſcure.

*When* (e) *ends Words it has no Sound at all,*
*Except in Words which we do proper call;*
*Except it doubled be in* Form *or* Sound,
The *is to this the Sole Exception found.*

(*e*) it ſelf, at the end of a Word, has now no proper So of its own, as in *make*, *have*, *love*, &c. except in *the*, w is writ with a ſingle (*e*), to diſtinguiſh it from *thee*; and Proper Names, as *Phœbe*, *Penelope*, *Paſiphae*, *Gethſemane*, in *Epitome*, &c. for (*e*) ſimple is ſeldom elſe pronounc'd a end of a Word, for *he*, *me*, *ſhe*, *we*, *be*, and *ye*, ſound wou'd better be written by (*ee*).

*Whene'er the Sound of* (e) *is in the End,*
*Some of theſe Letters will expreſs't you'll find.*
Y, *or*, ie, happy; ey, *as in* Key,
*Double* (e) *agree*; ea, *as in* Tea.

But the Sound of (*e*) is at the end of many Words, tho' d rently expreſs'd; *firſt*, and moſt commonly, by (*y*); as *holy*, *mercy*; theſe words may be writ with (*ie*) or (*y*), a Writer pleaſes.

2*dly*, By (*ey*), in *Angleſey*, *Balconey*, *Honey*, *Cockney*, *phrey*, *Key*, *Ramſey*, and many more; tho' Cuſtom now be to prevail in the omiſſion of the (*e*).

3*dly*, The Sound of (*e*) at the end is expreſs'd by (*ee*) in *Phariſee*, *Sadducee*, *agree*, *Chaldee*, *Bee*, *Knee*, and many m

The Sound of (*e*) at the end is likewiſe expreſs'd by (*ea* in *Sea*, *Flea*, *Flea*, *Pea*, *Tea*, *yea*.

[10] The Uſe of this (*e*) is the lengthning the Sound of the foregoing Conſonant; and a very learned Man is of Opinion, that it had this Original, That it was pronounc'd but in obſcure manner, like the (*e*) *Feminine* of the *French*; ſo that the Words *take*, *one*, *Wine*, &c. are now Words of one Syllable, formerly Diſ-ſyllables, or Wo two Syllables, *ta-ke*, *o-ne*, *Wi* ſo that the firſt Vowel termin the firſt Syllable, was therefore and that obſcure Sound of the

*Where e'er the silent* (e) *a Place obtains,*
*The* Voice *foregoing Length and Softness gains.*
*And after* (c) *and* (g) *this softning-Power remains.*

The silent *(e)*, which is put at the end of Words and Syllables, does not only produce, or lengthen the foregoing *Vowel*, but often renders its Sound more soft; as in *Face* and *Lace*; so in *Rag*, *Rage*, *Stag*, *Stage*, *hug*, *huge*.

*In Compound Words its Silence* (e) *retains,*
*Which in the Simple, in the end it gains.*

It does the same Office in the middle Syllables, when it follows (*g*) or (*c*), as in *Advancement*, *Encouragement*; since (*c*) and (*g*) are always sounded hard, unless *(e)* or (*i*) soften them; as *sing*, *singe*, *swing*, *swinge*, &c.

I, O *and* U, *at th' end of Words require*
*The silent* (e), *the same do's* (va) *desire.*

The silent (*e*) is added to (*i*), (*o*) and (*u*), at the end of Words, because the Genius of the Language requires it; and likewise to (*v*) Consonant or (*va*), except when an (*i*) follows in the same Word; as in *living*, *thriving*, &c. to avoid the concourse of too many Vowels, it's preserv'd in *blameable*, *changeable*, &c. to mark the distinct Syllables. For (*ie*) we often now put (*y*), as *Mercy* for *Mercie*, and *dy* for *die*, &c.

*In Compound Words, tho' of obscurer sound,*
*Or ev'n silent,* (e) *must still be found.*

Tho'

*e)* by little and little vanish'd so far, that in the end it was totally neglected, as the *(e) Feminine* of the *French* often is, the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel being preserv'd, and all the other Letters keeping their Sounds, as if the *(e)* were likewise to be pronounc'd. And a stronger Argument of this is, that we see this mute *(e)* in the old Orthography or Spelling perpetually annex'd to many Words, in which it is now constantly omitted, as *Darke*, *Marke*, *Selfe*, *Leafe*, *Waite*, and innumerable more, to which Words there is no Reason to imagin, that it shou'd have been join'd, if it had not been pronounc'd *Dar-ke*, *Mar-ke*, *Sel-fe*, *Lea-fe*, *Wai-te*, &c. For, 'tis plain, it could not be join'd to those Words to make the foregoing Syllable long, which is now its principal Use, because the precedent Syllables are either not long, or made so by their *Diphthongs*, or *double Vowels*. Another Proof of this is, that we find in the old Poets this *(e)* makes either another Syllable or not, as the Occasion of the Verse requires; which happens to the *French (e) Feminine*, both in Verse and Prose.

But tho' this mute *(e)* is not sounded in our Time, yet is it far from being of no use and superfluous, for besides its demonstrating, that those Words were formerly of more Syllables, than they are at present, it yet serves to these three Uses:

Tho' *(e)* be not ſounded, or at leaſt very obſcurely, yet muſt it not be left out in Writing in the middle of Compound Words, as *namely, finely, cloſely, handſomely, whereof, wherein, whereon*, &c. nor after *(l)* at the end of a Word, another Conſonant preceeding it, tho' obſcurely ſounded, as *Bridle, Riſle, Bugle*, &c. for its Virtue ſtill reaches the foregoing Vowel as to its Length and Softneſs, unleſs where three Conſonants intervene, as in *Fiddle, Ruffle*, &c. which are call'd a Syllable and half, tho' in reality they are two diſtinct Syllables, as is plain from our Verſes.

*When* (n) *concludes a Word, the* (e)*'s obſcure,*
*Or does perhaps no Sound at all endure.*

The Sound of *(e)* before *(n)* at the end of a Word is very obſcure, or rather ſilent, as *eleven, ſeven, even, Heaven, bounden, beaten*, &c. and this is ſo plain, that in Verſe they are now always us'd for Words of but one Syllable. But proper Names of Perſons and Places are an Exception to this Rule, as *Eden, Eben*, &c.

*When* (re) *concludes a Word the Sound removes*
*Before the* (r) *and* (u), *it moſtly proves.*

The Sound of *(e)* after *(r)* is ſilent, or paſſes into a precedent *(u)* obſcure; as *Fire*, ſounds *Fi-ur*; *Deſire, Deſi-ur*; *more, mo-ur*; *Mare, Ma-ur*; *Rere, Re-ur*, &c. The ſame holds in *Acre, Maſſacre, Meagre, Maugre*, &c.

*When* (s) *at th' end of Plural Words is found,*
*It to the ſilent* (e) *affords no Sound.*

(*E*) i

*Firſt*, To preſerve the Quantity of the foregoing Vowel, which if long before, remains ſo, tho' that final or mute *(e)* be pronounc'd. *2ly*, To ſoften the ſound of *(c) (g)* and *(th)*, as *huge, ſince, breathe, wreathe, ſeethe*, which that being away, wou'd be pronounc'd *hug, ſink, breath, wreath, ſeeth*, &c. *3ly*, To diſtinguiſh *(v)* Conſonant from *(u)* Vowel, as in *have, crave, ſave*, &c. which wou'd elſe be *hau, crau, ſau*, &c. but *(v)* Conſonant having now a peculiar and proper Character, it may perhaps hereafter happen that this mute *(e)* may be left out after it.

Whenever there is neither of theſe Conſiderations, it is redundant, except when it follows *(l)*, preceded by ſome other Conſonant, as in *Handle, Candle*, &c. here indeed the Uſe is not ſo apparent as in the following Inſtances, yet it has even here an obſcure Sound, and the ending Conſonants cou'd not be pronounc'd without it; nay, in Verſe they always make two Syllables: So that Dr. *Wallis*, who makes it here redundant, is certainly miſtaken; tho' he is perfectly in the right in *Idle, Trifle, Title, Table, Noble*, &c. ſince, as he obſerves here, the mute, or rather the obſcure *(e)* produces it.

Thi

(*E*) is silent when (*s*) is added to ends of Words in *Names* which signifie more than one; as in *Blades*, *Trades*, *Glades*, *Babes*, &c. but the Reason of this is, because the Word had (*e*) silent to soften and lengthen the Sound before, and the (*s*) is only added to shew, that it signifies more than one. Thus in *Notes*, *bites*, *takes*, *likes*, *strikes*, &c. which you will find anon to be call'd, by way of Excellence, Words that affirm something of some Name, or Person. And tho' the Affirmation and Name are often written with the same Letters, as *Trades* signifying many Trades, and *trades*, *he trades*; yet, besides the Sense, the writing the Name with a Capital or great Letter, and the Word of Affirmation with a small, (for so they ought to be written) may sufficiently distinguish them.

Nor must (*e*) final be omitted, tho' the Syllable, that goes before consist of a *double Vowel*, as *House*, *Cleanse*, *Disease*, *Increase*, &c. and in *Horse*, *Nurse*, *Purse*.

*But* (e) *between two* (s's) *at the end,*
*Do's to the Ear a certain Sound commend;*
*Or else between* c, g, ch, z *and* s,
*It still another Syllable must express.*

But here it is to be noted, that Words that have the Sound of (*s*), or (*s*) mingled in their Sound, (*es*) then makes another and a distinct Syllable; as after (*e*) in *Traces*, *Places*, *Slices*, &c. after (*ch*) in *Breaches*, *Reaches*, *Leeches*, *Riches*, &c. after (*g*) in *Stages*, *Sieges*, *obliges*, &c. after (*s*) in *Horses*, *Muses*, *Closes*, *Noses*, *Roses*, &c. after (*z*) in *razes*, *amazes*, *surprizes*, &c.

[11] *Of the Vowel* (I).

*When* (I) *precedes* ght, *and* nd,
Gh, mb, gn, ld *still long will be*;
*Else it is always short, as you will see.*

As for its being long when (*e*) silent concludes the Syllable, as in *tide*, *abide*, &c. that is according to the general Rule of (*e*) silent after any other Vowel; the same will hold of (*e*) after (*r*) in *Fire*, *Desire*, &c. Examples of the foregoing Rule, are

This mute (*e*) in the middle of Words is seldom us'd, unless it was in the primitive Words a final (*e*), as in *Advancement*, *Changeable*, &c. it was final in *Advance*, *Change*, &c. But this (*e*) which is mute in words of the singular Number, is sounded in the plural, *House*, *Houses*, &c.

[11] When (*i*) is short, it sounds most commonly like that of the (*i*) of the *French*, and other Nations, with the small Sound; but when 'tis long, it is pronounc'd like the *Greek* (ει).

are *Delight, Fight, Mind, rind, kind, high, nigh, ſigh; climb, deſign, mild, Child,* except *build, guild.* Short, as *bid, did, will, ſtill, win, quilt, Mint, fit,* &c.

(I) *before* (r) *the Sound of* (u) *does ſute,*
*Except in* ir *for* in, *as in* irreſolute.

*Irreverent, irrevocable, irretrievable, irreligious,* &c.

(I) *before* (er) *and* (on) *ſtill ſounds as* (ye),
*And after* (ft) *the Sound the ſame will be.*

Examples are *Bullion, Onion, Communion, Hollier, Collier, Fannier,* &c. *Celeſtial, Chriſtian, Combuſtion, Queſtion,* &c. and ſo it ſounds in *Poiniard.* 'Tis obſcure in *Goſſip.*

*To Sound like double* (e), (i) *does incline,*
*As in* Machine, *and* Shire, *and* Magazine;
*Like* (a) *in* Sirrah; *but writ* (oi) *in* join.

And alſo in *appoint, boil, broil, joint,* &c.

*No Engliſh Word can end in naked* (i),
*It muſt add* (e) *or in their Room place* (y).

The (*e*) is added to (*i*) in the Concluſion of Words, and (*y*) often put in their Room, yet (*ie*) is better after (*f*) and (*s*), as in *crucifie, dignifie, craſie, buſie, Gipſie,* &c. Tho' Incurioufneſs, often in theſe Words, puts (*y.*)

## [12] *Of the Vowel* (O).

(O) *does expreſs* three *ſeveral ſorts of Sound,*
*As* (o) *in* go, *the Mouth ſtill opening round:*
*Of* (au) *in Folly,* (u) *in* come *and* ſome,
*And before* (l) *and ſingle* (m), *except in* Home.

This Vowel expreſſes (*o*) round in *Roſe,* (*a*) long in *folly, fond,* (*u*) obſcure in *come* and *ſome,* &c.

(*O*) in theſe places Sounds (*u*) becauſe theſe Words were Originally ſpelt with a (*u*) and not an (*o*).

(O) *ſtill is ſhort, unleſs when it is found*
*In one of all theſe ways to lengthen Sound;*
*When* (o) *a Word or Syllable does cloſe,*
*Unleſs when double Sounds of Conſonants oppoſe.*

It

[12] Short (*o*) is pronounc'd like the *German* (*a*) or open or fat (*o*), only it is ſhort; as in *fond, mollifie,* &c. long (*o*) is pronounc'd like the *Greek* (*ω*) and the *French* (*au*).

[13] The

It cloſes in *go, ho, lo, ſo, wo, no, who, do, undo, whoſo,* &c. or when it ends Syllables, as in *glo-rious, Sto-ry,* &c. exceptions, as *Body, codicile, notable,* &c. when the Sound of the following Syllable is doubled.

*When* (o) *before double* (l) *its place does hold,*
*Or elſe before* (ld), *as Scroll, bold, Gold*
*Before* (lt) *as* molten, Bolt; *before*
(Lſt), *as* Bolſter, *and ſeveral more*

Examples. When double (*l*) ends a Word, as *Toll, Poll, Roll, controll,* &c. but thoſe were Originally written with (*ou*), and yet retain the long Sound of the *double Vowel.* (*ld*) as *old, Scold, hold,* &c. before (*lt*) and (*lſt*) as *Bolt, holt, Colt, Upholſterer,* &c.

*Before* (rd), (rge), *as* Cord *and* Forge,
Ford, Sword *and* gord, *and likewiſe* George & gorge.
*Before* (rm), (rn), (rt), *as* Storm,
Forlorn, exhort, *and others may inform.*

But ſofter and more obſcure in *Fort, Comfort, Effort,* which has two ways of Pronunciation, the laſt Syllable being long, and the firſt ſhort ſome Times, and at other Times the contrary, tho' the firſt way is the moſt juſt and true Quantity, *Purport, Tranſport,* &c.

*Before* (ft) *and* (ught); *as* Poſt,
(*But with a ſharper Tone in* Froſt, loſt, Coſt)
Nought, bought, Thought, *and after it when we view*
*The Syllable cloſe up with double* (u),
*As we in* blow, ſhow *and* know *find true.*

If it be long by the Syllables ending with (*w*), it will be no leſs by adding (*e*) ſilent, whoſe Quality is to lengthen the foregoing Vowel, and which ought to be added in *Bowe, blowe, Crowe, glowe,* &c. to diſtinguiſh them from Words which have the Sound of the proper *double Vowel* (ow); as *How, now, Cow,* &c.

*In Words of many Syllables* (O)'*l be*
*Obſcure in Sound, when plac'd before a* (P).

As for Example, in *Biſhop, Biſhoprick*; but in Words of one Syllable it ſounds open, as in *ſtop, hop, ſlop,* &c. It is likewiſe very obſcure before (*n*) at the end of a Word, as in *Hatton, Hutton, Button, Parſon, Capon, Falcon,* &c. But theſe are rather ſilent (*o*)'s than obſcure (*u*)'s, the ſecond Syllable being

ſo much ſuppreſs'd, that it ſeems no more than the ſecond in *Heaven, even*, &c. which Uſe has now made but one.

*When ſingle* (l) *or* (m), *or* (r) *purſue*
(O), *when its plac'd 'twixt* (r) *and double* (u)
*When follow'd by* (va) *and ſilent* (e) *we prove*,
(O) *then ſounds* (u), *except in* Rove, Grove, ſtrove.

This is plain from theſe Examples: *Colour, Columbine, Colony*, &c. *Comfort, come, Kingdom, Beſom, Fathom, random*, &c. but *commonly*, &c. is excepted. *World, Work, Worſhip*, &c. before (*th*), as *Brother, Mother, ſmother*, &c. except *Broth, Cloth, Froth, Troth, Wroth*; but moſt of theſe have been, and are ſtill frequently written with (*oa*). (*O*) after (*r*), in *Apron, Citron, inviron, Iron, Saffron*, is obſcure like (*u*), and in *Rom* (the City) 'tis pronounc'd like (*oo*) in *Room*.

*The Sound of* (o) *in th' end you ſtill muſt know*
*Is ne'r expreſs'd thus nakedly by* (o).
*Except in* do, unto, go, lo, ſo, *and* no.

(*O*) never ends an *Engliſh* Word, except before excepted, and *undo, whoſo*, (an antiquated Word) *to, too, two, who, wo, mo*, (for *more* is a Word quite out of uſe) the Sound of (*o*) being there expreſs'd by (*ow*), except in *Foe, Toe, Doe, Roe*.

## [13] *Of the Vowel* (U).

*Two Sounds in* (u) *we certainly ſhall find*
Rub's *of the ſhorter*, Muſe *the longer kind*.

The long Sound is what it bears in the ſingle *Vowel*, the ſhort is more obſcure and Lingual. The ſhort Sounds are *Dub, rub, rut, Gun, Drum, burſt, muſt, Ruſt*.

*Long, when in Words of many Syllables*
*It ends a Syllable, as in* Durables.

This Vowel, when it ends a Syllable in Words of many Syllables, is long; as in *Curious, Union, Importunity, Furious, Purity, Security*, &c. But this long Quality of (*u*) in this place ſeems to come from (*e*) final, underſtood, tho' left out to avoid the claſhing of two Vowels, for it might be *Dureable, Impunety*, &c. tho' a following Vowel of any kind will, after a ſingle Conſonant, naturally lengthen the foregoing; except when the Sound of the following Conſonant is doubled, as in *Bury, buryed*.

[13] The (*u*) long is pronounc'd like the *French* (*u*), ſmall or ſlender.

[14] W

*ryed*, *Study*, &c. where the (*u*) is shorten'd and falls into the ound of (*o*) short or obscure.

*No English Word in* (u) *can fairly end,*
*If Sound expres's'd by* (ew) *or* (ue) *we find.*
*Except* you, thou *and* lieu, *and this one Word* adieu.
*Few Words begin with, or i'th' middle have* (eu).

Instead of (*u*) in the end, we put (*ew*), or (*ue*), as *Nephew*, *ew*, *Sinew*, *Yew*, &c. and *accrue*, *Ague*, *Avenue*, &c. Nor is he Sound of (*u*) in the beginning and middle of Words, in any Words, except such as are deriv'd from the *Greek*; as *ucharist*, *Eunuch*, *Euphrates*, *Eulogy*, *Eutychus*, *Euphony*, *Deuce*, *Deuteronomy*, *Europe*, *Euroclydon*, *Eusebius*, *Eustace*, *Euterpe*, *Eutyes*, *Feud*, *Grandeur*, *Pleurisie*, *Pleuritick*, *Rheumatick*, *Rheumatism*, *heum*.

*Where e'er the* (u) *is long besides, 'tis found*
*That its own Character denotes its Sound.*
Ar, ir, or, *with* ure, *and* er,
*T'express the Sound of* (u) *we oft prefer.*
*When at the end of Words, that do consist*
*Of many Syllables, they are plac't.*

The Sound of (*u*) in all other places, but what are mention'd where it is long, is express'd by the Vowel it self; but when it is obscure and short in the end of Words of many Syllables, and some of one) it is sometimes express'd by (*ar*), by the Corruptness of our Pronunciation; as in *Altar*, *angular*, *calendar*, *jocular*, *medlar*, *pedlar*, *pillar*, *solar*, &c. or by (*ir*), as *Birch*, *Girt*, *Shirt*, *Sir*, *Sirname*; to *Spirt*, or *squirt* Water, *Stir*, *third*, *thirty*, the Words deriv'd from it, &c. or by (*or*), as in *Ancestors*, *actors*, *administrator*, *ambassador*, *anchor*, *assessor*, *corrector*, *Councellor*, *oppressor*, &c. or by (*ure*), as in *Adventure*, *architecture*, *conjecture*, *conjure*, *creature*, *feature*, *figure*, *fracture*, *furniture*, *gesture*, *imposture*, *inclosure*, *indenture*, *injure*, *jointure*, *Juncture*, *lecture*, *leisure*, *manufacture*, *mixture*, *nature*, *nurture*, *Overture*, *pasture*, *peradventure*, *picture*, *pleasure*, *posture*, *pressure*, *rapture*, *rupture*, *Scripture*, *Sculpture*, *stature*, *structure*, *superstructure*, *tenure*, *tincture*, *torture*, *treasure*, *venture*, *vesture*, *verdure*.

These we have inserted because the (*u*) is short and obscure, tho' it have (*e*) final at the end, and serves therefore for an Exception to that Rule, as well as an Example of this.

Or by (*er*), as *Adder*, *Adulterer*, *Auger* a Tool, *Ballisters*, *Banner*, *Fodder*, *Crosier*, *Crupper*, *Daughter*, *Slaughter*, &c. [14]

CHAP.

[14] We ſhall here, at the end of the *Vowels*, ſay a few Words of their Formation, which well ſtudy'd, will (as we have obſerv'd) be a great Help to the Art of Spelling. To proceed therefore according to the Diviſion made in our Notes on Number [6]. The *Gutturals*, or *Throat-Letters*, or *Vowels*, are form'd in the top or upper part of the Throat, or the lower part of the *Palate* or *Tongue*, by a moderate Compreſſion of the Breath. When the Breath goes out with a full guſt, or larger opening of the Mouth, the German *(a)*, or the open *(o)* is form'd. But the *French*, and other Nations, as well as the *Germans*, moſt commonly pronounce their *(a)* in that manner: The *Engliſh* expreſs that Sound, when it is ſhort, by ſhort *(o)*; but when it is long, by *(au)* or *(aw)*, but ſeldom by *(a)*. For in the Words *fall*, *Folly*, *Call*, *Collar*, *Laws*, *Loſs*, *Cauſe*, *Coſt*, and *odd*, *ſawd*, *ſod*; and in many other Words like theſe, there is the ſame ſound of the *Vowels* in both Syllables, only in the firſt it is long, and in the laſt ſhort. And this perhaps might bring our former Diviſion of Sounds into doubt, ſince that ſuppoſes the Difference to ariſe from their Length or Brevity; whereas here we make the Sounds the ſame. But this muſt be here underſtood of the Formation of the Sounds; that is, the ſhort and the long Sounds are produc'd in the ſame Seats or Places of Formation; but in the former Rule the Hearing only is the Judge of the Sounds, as they are emitted, not as to the Place of their Formation.

In this ſame Place, but with a more moderate Opening of the Mouth, is form'd the French *(e)* Feminine, with an obſcure Sound: Nor is there any Difference in the Formation of this Letter, from the Formation of the foregoing open *(a)*, but that the Mouth or Lips are more contracted in this, than in the former. This is a Sound, that the *Engliſh* ſcarce any where allow, or know, except when the ſhort *(e)* immediately precedes the Letter *(r)*, as *liberal*, *Virtue*, *Liberty*, &c.

The ſame Place is the Seat of the Formation of *(o)* and *(u)* obſcure, but ſtill with a leſs opening of the Mouth; and it differs from the French *(e)* Feminine only in this, that the Mouth being leſs open'd, the Lips come nearer together. This ſame Sound the *French* have in the laſt Syllable of the Words *ſerviteur*, *ſacrificateur*, &c. The *Engliſh* expreſs this Sound by ſhort *(u)*, as in *turn*, *burn*, *dull*, *cut*, &c. and ſometimes by a Negligence of Pronunciation, they expreſs the ſame Sound by *(o)* and *(ou)*, as in *come*, *ſome*, *done*, *company*, *country*, *couple*, *covet*, *love*, &c. and ſome others, which they ought more juſtly to give another Sound to. The Welſh generally expreſs this Sound by *(y)*, only that Letter at the end of Words with them ſounds *(i)*.

The Palatine Vowels are form'd in the *Palate*, that is, by a moderate Compreſſion of the Breath betwixt the middle of the Palate and the Tongue; that is, when the hollow of the Palate is made leſs by the raiſing of the middle of the Tongue, than in the Pronunciation of the Throat, or *Guttural Sounds*. Theſe Sounds are of three ſorts, according to the leſſening or enlarging of the ſaid Hollow; which difference may be produc'd two ſeveral ways, either by contracting the Mouth or Lips, the Tongue remaining in the ſame poſition; or by elevating the middle of the Tongue higher to the fore-parts of the Palate, the Lips or Mouth remaining in the ſame ſtate. This is done either way, and it is the ſame thing if it were done both ways.

The *Engliſh* ſlender *(a)* is form'd by a greater Opening of the Mouth; as in *Bat*, *bate*, *Sam*, *ſame*, *dam*, *Dame*, *Bar*, *bare*, *ban*, *bane*, &c. This Sound differs from the fat or open *(a)* of the *Germans*, by raiſing the middle of the Tongue, as the

*Engliſh*

*gliſh* do, and ſo compreſſing the eath in the Palate; but the *Ger-ns*, on the contrary, depreſs their ngue, and ſo depreſs the Breath o the Throat. The *French* ex-eſs this Sound when (*e*) goes be-e (*m*) or (*n*) in the ſame Syllable, *entendement*, &c. The *Welſh* the *Italians* pronounce their (*a*) th this Sound.

In this ſame Seat the *French* form ir (*e*) Maſculine, by a leſs, or the ddle opening of the Mouth, with acute Sound, as the *Italians*, *gliſh*, *Spaniards*, and others, pro-ince this Letter; for it is a mid-Sound betwixt the 'foregoing wel, and that which follows: the *Engliſh* expreſs this Sound only by (*e*), but when it is long, (*ea*), and ſometimes by (*ei*); as *, theſe, ſell, Seal, tell, Teal, ſteal, Seat, beſt, Beaſt, red, read, re-ve, deceive*, &c. But thoſe Words hich are written with (*ea*) would lly be more rightly pronounc'd, o the Sound of (*e*) long, the Sound he Engliſh (*a*) juſtly pronounc'd, re added; as in all probability y were of old pronounc'd, and as y are ſtill in the Northern Parts. d thus thoſe written with (*ei*) u'd be more juſtly ſpoken, if the und of each Letter were mix'd in Pronunciation.

In the ſame place, but yet with a er opening of the Mouth, (*i*) ſlen-is form'd, which is a Sound very iliar with the *French*, *Italians*, *niards*, and moſt other Nations. is Sound, when it is ſhort, is ex-eſs'd by the *Engliſh* by (*i*) ſhort; when it is long, it is generally itten with (*ee*), not ſeldom with ), and ſometimes by (*ea*), as *ſit*, *'t*, *fit*, *feet*, *fill*, *feel*, *field*, *ſtill*, *el*, *ill*, *eel*, *fin*, *ſeen*, *near*, *dear*, *ar*, &c. Some of thoſe Words hich with this Sound are written th (*ea*), are often and more juſtly preſs'd by (*ee*), and others ſpelt th (*e*) Maſculine, adding to it the und of (*a*) ſlender, very ſwiftly onounc'd. The *Welſh* expreſs this Sound not only by (*i*), and in the laſt Syllable by (*y*), but alſo by (*u*), which Letter they always pronounce in that manner, and ſound the Diphthongs or double Vowels *au*, *eu*, like *ai* and *ei*.

The Labial, or Lip-Vowels, are form'd in the Lips, being put into a round form, the Breath being there moderately compreſs'd. There are three Sorts or Claſſes of theſe, as well as of the former.

The round (*o*) is form'd by the larger Aperture or Opening of the Lips, which Sound moſt People give the Greek ω; the *French* with the ſame pronounce their (*au*), and the *Engliſh* almoſt always pronounce their long (*o*) and alſo (*oa*), the (*a*) as it were quite vaniſhing in the utterance; of which the ſame may be ſaid as was before on (*ea*), as *one*, *none*, *whole*, *Hole*, *Coal*, *Boat*, *thoſe*, *choſe*, &c. The ſhort (*o*) is expreſs'd by the open one, as I have ſaid before, but more rarely by the round one.

The German fat (*a*) is form'd in the Lips, by a more moderate or middle degree of opening 'em. The ſame Sound is us'd by the *Italians*, *Spaniards*, and not a few others. The *French* expreſs this Sound by *ou*, the *Welſh* by *w*; the *Engliſh* generally by *oo*, more rarely by *u* or *ou*, as *Foot*, *ſhoot*, *full*, *Fool*, *Pool*, *good*, *ſtood*, *Wood*, *Mood*, *Source*, *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, &c. But *do*, *move*, and the like, are better expreſs'd by round (*o*) than fat (*u*).

Slender (*u*), ſo much in uſe with both *French* and *Engliſh*, is form'd in the ſame place, but with a leſſer opening of the Lips. This Sound is every-where expreſs'd by the *Engliſh* with their long (*u*), ſometimes by (*e*) and (*ew*), which yet are better pronounc'd by retaining the Sound of the (*e*) Maſculine, as *Muſe*, *Tune*, *Lute*, *dure*, *mute*, *mew*, *brew*, *knew*, &c. Foreigners wou'd obtain the Pronunciation of this Letter, if they won'd endeavour to pronounce the Diphthong (*iu*), by putting the

ſlender

ſlender (*i*) before the Letter (*u*) or (*w*), as the Spaniard in *Ciudade*, a City; but this is not abſolutely the ſame Sound, tho' it comes very near it; for (*iu*) is a compound Sound, but the French and Engliſh (*u*) is a ſimple. The Welſh generally expreſs this Sound by *iw*, *yw*, *uw*, as in *lliw*, Colour; *llyw*, a Rudder; *Duw*, God.

We allow theſe nine Sounds to be Vowels, that is, diſtinct, unmixt Sounds, nor do we know any more; for the Engliſh broad (*i*) does not ſeem to be a ſimple Sound, yet we do not deny, but that there may now be in ſome Part of the World, or Poſterity may diſcover more vocal Sounds in theſe Seats of Voice, than thoſe Nine which we have mention'd, and ſo 'tis poſſible there may be ſome intermediate Sounds, ſuch as perhaps is the French (*e*) Neuter, betwixt the Palatine Vowel (*a*) ſlender and (*e*) Maſculine; for the Aperture or Opening of the Mouth is like the continu'd Quantity, diviſible *in infinitum*: For as in the numbring the Winds, firſt there were four Names, then twelve, and at laſt thirty-two thus whereas the *Arabians*, and perhaps the ancient *Hebrews*, had only three Vowels, or one in each Seat; now in our Times we plainly diſcover at leaſt three in every Seat; perhaps our Poſterity may interpoſe ſome betwixt each of theſe.

But all theſe Vowels are capable of being made long or ſhort, whence ariſes the difference of Quantity in long and ſhort Syllables, tho' ſome of 'em are very rarely long, as obſcure (*u*) and (*e*) Feminine: Others are more rarely ſhort, as round (*o*) and ſlender (*u*), at leaſt in our Tongue. But ſome of the Conſonants are capable of contraction, and being lengthned, (eſpecially ſuch as make the neareſt approaches to the nature of Vowels) except *p*, *t*, *k*, or hard *c*, which are abſolute Mutes, nor have any manner of proper Sound, but only modifie the Sound either of the preceding or ſucceeding Vowel.

Here we think it proper to bring all theſe Vowels into one View rang'd in their proper Claſſes.

| Vowels. | Opening. Greater. | Middle. | Leſs. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Guttural or Throat | *a* *o* open | *e* Feminine | *o* obſcure |
| Palatine or Palate | *a* ſlender | *e* Maſculine | *ee* *i* ſlender |
| Labial or Lip | *o* round | *oo* *w* fat | *u* ſlender |

# CHAP. III.

## of DOUBLE VOWELS, *proper and improper.* (15.)

*When of two* Vowels *the compounded Sound*
*Fully in one Syllable is found*
*Of both partaking, yet diſtinct from all,*
*This we a* Double Vowel *ſtill do call.*

WHat we call *Double Vowels*, is, when the Sound of two *Vowels* is mixt perfectly in one Syllable, and indeed, makes a diſtinct Sound from either and all the other *Vowels*, and would merit peculiar Characters, if we were to form an Alphabet, and not follow that, which is already in Uſe; by which we expreſs theſe diſtinct Sounds by the two *Vowels*, whoſe Sound compoſes them; (*ai*) in *fair*, (*au*) in *laud* or *applaud*, (*ee*) in *bleed*, *ſeed*, &c. (*oi*) in *void*, (*oo*) in *food*, and (*ou*) in *houſe*.

*But if the Sound of one is heard alone,*
*'Tis then improperly ſo call'd, we own,*
*Tho' of the* Proper *it before be one.*

When two Vowels come together in one Syllable, and produce no other Sound, but what one of the two gives alone, then is that not properly, but improperly call'd a *Double Vowel*; as (*ea*) is every where pronounc'd (*e*) long, the Sound of the (*a*) not mingling at all with it, is entirely ſuppreſt; as in *beat*, *pleaſure*, *treaſure*, &c. (*ie*) ſounded like (*ee*) in *ſeen*, as in *fiend*; and (*ei*) ſounds only (*e*) long, as in *receive*, and (*ey*) in *key*, or like (*ai*), and ſo make no proper *Double Vowel*. (*Eau*), (*eu*), (*ew*), ſound only (*u*) long, as in *beauty*, *eunuch*, *few*.

Hence it follows, that a true and proper *Double Vowel* muſt conſiſt of two diſtinct Vowels in one Syllable, yet making but one Sound compounded of thoſe two Letters, and different from the other ſingle *Vowels*; they muſt be in one Syllable, becauſe two *Vowels* often come together, but make two diſtinct Syllables, as in *aereal*, *annual*, *aguiſh*, *aloes*, &c.

*of*

[15] Theſe Double Vowels are commonly call'd *Diphthongs*, or *Compounded Sounds*, as ſharing in (or blending) the Sound of Two Vowels in One.

### *Of the proper* Double Vowel (ai), *or* (ay).

*Six proper* Double Vowels *we allow,*
Ai, au, *and* ee, *and* oi, *and* oo, *and* ou,
*At th' end of Words write* ay, aw, oy, *and* ow.

The proper *Double Vowels* are therefore only these me tion'd in the Rule. Firſt (*ai*), or (*ay*); for (*ai*) ends no *Engl* Word, according to the former general Rule, that (*i*) ends Word in our Tongue, and (*ay*) begins none, except a Wo of one Syllable; as *ay* in *Ay me!* an Exclamation. T *Double Vowel* is therefore written (*ai*) in the beginning a middle of Words, but (*ay*) at the end.

In the beginning, as *Air, aim, ail, aid,* but *eight* in numb and thoſe Words that are deriv'd from it, have the Sound (*ai*), but are ſpelt (*ei*): In the middle of Words, as *bra frail, affair, repair,* but ſome few are ſpelt here likewiſe by ( for (*ai*), as *conceipt, receipt, deceipt, heir, reign, vein, weight,* & (*ay*) is put at the end, as *dray, clay, fray, play, day*; and of other Words that ſound (*ai*), except *convey, grey,* (colour a badger) *greyhound*; *obey, prey, purvey, ſurvey, they, trey* or *tr point, Whey.*

Tho' ſometimes the Letters of this *Double Vowel* (*ai*) devia from their proper Sound, into that of (*i*), or (*e*) ſhort, yet the Spelling preſerv'd in (*ai*), as *again, Villain, Founta Wainſcot,* &c.

The finical Pronunciation in ſome Part of this Town *London* has almoſt confounded the Sound of (*ai*) and (*a*), t Maſter and Scholar muſt therefore take a peculiar Care avoid this Error, by remembring that (*a*) ends no *Engl* Word, unleſs before excepted; and however you pronoun write always *day*, not *da*; and ſo of the reſt.

When (*a*) and (*i*) come together in proper Names, eſp cially thoſe of Scripture, as *Ja-ir, Mo-ſa-ic, Re-pha-im,* & they are parted, and make two Syllables.

### *Of the Double Vowel* (au) *or* (aw).

The *Double Vowel* (*au*) is expreſs'd at the beginning a middle of Words by (*au*), at the end by (*aw*), except in *awful, awl, awkerd* or *awkward,* &c. where (*aw*) begins Words; and *Bawble, bawl, brawl, crawl, dawn, dawning, Flawn,* a ſort of Cuſtard; *Hawk,* and Words or Names deri from it; *Hawſer, Lawn, Prawn, Spawl, Spawn, ſprawl, Stra berry, tawney,* tho' in the middle are writ with (*aw*), all oth Words are in the middle as well as beginning (*au*), exce

ſuc

uch as by the Appoſition of (*ll*) to (*a*) ſound (*au*); as *Ball*, *all*, *Hall*, &c. Tho' the Sound of this double Vowel be the ame with (*a*) in *all*, *ſmall*, &c. yet 'tis different from the ommon and more general Sound of that Letter.

*Au* begins a Word, as *Audience*, *Authority*, *auſtere*, *aug.* *ment*, &c. *Au* is us'd in the middle of Words, as *aſſault*, *be-auſe*, *Cauldron*, *Cauſe*, *Cauſey*, *daunt*, *debauch*, *fraud*, *gaudy*, *aunt*, *vaunt*, *Jaundice*, *Laurel*, *Maud*, *Maudlin*, *pauſe*, *Sauce*, *ault*, &c.

But *aw* muſt always conclude a Word, becauſe our Lan-guage abhors a bare naked *u* at the end of a Word; as *Claw*, *aw*, *raw*, *ſaw*, *Law*, &c.

Theſe two Letters are often parted in Proper Names, and nake two Syllables; as in *Archela-us*, *Hermola-us*, &c. yet in *aul*, *Saul*, &c. it remains a double Vowel.

### *Of the Double Vowel* (ee). [16]

*The* (ee) *that was excluded heretofore*
*From Proper Double Vowels, we reſtore:*

Tho' (*ee*) has been excluded by an ingenious Gentleman, rom the number of Proper Double Vowels, becauſe (*ee*) ounds like (*i*) in *Magazine*, *Shire*, and *Machine*, yet the ame Reaſon holding againſt (*au*) much ſtronger, becauſe it ounds the ſame as (*a*) in *all*, *call*, *fall*, &c. we have thought it ut juſt to reſtore (*ee*) to its Right, ſince it is a very diſtinct ound from both the long and ſhort Sound of (*e*), which are ative: That in *Shire*, &c. is borrow'd from this Double owel, as that of *all*, *call*, *ſhall*, &c. is from (*au*); theſe in (*a*) eing much more numerous, than thoſe in (*i*).

The ſingle (*e*) in Words of one Syllable moſtly ſounds (*ee*), s *me*, *he*, *ſhe*, *we*, *ye*, *be*, *here*, &c.

### *Of the Double Vowel* (oi) *or* (oy).

The proper Double Vowel (*oi*) at the beginning, is writ-en by (*oi*); as *Oiſter*, *Oil*, &c. It is in the ſame manner ex-reſs'd in the middle; as *Poiſe*, *noiſe*, *Voice*, *rejoice*, &c. This ouble Vowel, in many Words, has the Sound of (*i*) long; s in *point*, *anoint*, *Joint*, &c. (*Oy*) is written at the end of ll Words; as *Boy*, *coy*, *Joy*, *deſtroy*, *employ*, &c.

*Of*

[16] (*ee*) or *ie*, is ſounded like he French long *i*, (that is, ſlender *i*) or the French give the ſame Sound to *fin*, *vin*, as we ſhould do to *feen*, *veen*; or perhaps *fien*, *vien*, as we do in *Fiend*.

*Of the proper Double Vowel* (oo).

*Two Vowels of a ſort no Word begin;*
*So* (oo), *in th' middle only, is let in.*

[17] As no *Engliſh* Word begins with two of the ſame Letters, except *Aaron, Aaronite*, ſo cannot (*oo*) be put at the beginning of a Word, nor at the end, but of *too* in *too much*, and when it ſignifies *alſo*; and in *Cuckoo*, as ſpelt by ſome. The Uſe therefore of (*oo*) is chiefly, if not only, in the middle of Words; as in *Loom, aloof, boon, Reproof, Broom, Room, Food, Fool, Tool, cool, Gooſe*, and where the true and proper Sound of this Vowel is expreſs'd, as it is in many other Words. This Double Vowel ſounds (*u*) in theſe Words; they were anciently written with a (*u*) or (*ou*), in which the (*u*) only was ſounded.

But it ſounds like ſhort (*u*) in *Flood* and *Blood*, and like (*o*) long in *Door, Floor, Moor*, &c.

*As other Letters the Office do of* oo,
*So that of others by* oo's *performed too.*

And as the Figures of this double Vowel often expreſs the Sounds of other Letters, ſo by the ſame original Error of Pronunciation other Letters expreſs the Sound proper to this double Vowel; as (*ou*) in *could, ſhould, would*, &c. and ſingle (*o*) in *Wolf, Wolves, Rome, Tomb, Womb, approve, behove, move, reprove*, &c.

*Of the proper Double Vowel* (ou) *or* (ow).

*When* (ou) *retains its juſt compounded Sound,*
*A* proper *Double Vowel it is found:*
*But when the Sound of either is ſuppreſt,*
*It ſinks t'* improper, *as do all the reſt.*

This proper Double Vowel (*ou*) or (*ow*) has two Sounds, one proper to it as a Double Vowel, or as compos'd of both (*o*) and (*u*); as in *Houſe, Mouſe, Louſe, Owl, Fowl, Town*; *to bow, Fowl, Bough, our, out*, &c. and another, which is improper to its nature, the Sound of the (*u*) being entirely ſunk, as in *Soul, Snow, know*, &c. Thus, in Words ending in (*ow*) obſcure, (*o*) only is ſounded; as in *ſhallow, ſorrow, Arrow, Bil-*

[17] *oo* is ſounded like the fat *u* of the Germans, and the *ou* of the French; as in the Words *good, ſtood, Root, Foot, looſe*, &c.

[18] All

*Billow*; where the (*w*) ſeems only put for Ornament-ſake, meerly to cover the nakedneſs of ſingle (*o*). This holds in moſt Words of more than one Syllable. (*Ou*) is alſo ſounded like (*u*) ſhort in *couple*, *Trouble*, *ſcourge*, &c. in which the Sound of the (*o*) is entirely ſunk, and leaves it no longer a proper Double Vowel. Thus in *you*, *your*, and *Youth*, the (*u*) is ſounded long.

In *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, and a few others, it ſounds (*oo*). But in the modern way of ſpelling and ſounding, the (*l*) is left out, and *cou'd*, *wou'd*, *ſhou'd*, ſound *cood*, *wood*, *ſhood*, &c.

(Ou) *the Beginning, and the Middle takes;*
*And ſtill the End of Words for* (ow) *forſakes.*

(*Ou*) begins a Word, as *Ounce*, *our*, *out*, and its Compounds; *Ouſel*, except *Owl*: And in the middle of moſt Words; as, *Hour*, *Flour*, *Mountain*, *Fountain*, *bounce*, *flounce*, &c. except *Crown*, *Clown*, *Down*, *drown*, *frown*, *Gown*, *Town*, *Bower*, *Dowager*, *Dower*, *Dowry*, *bowſe*, *dowſe*, *ſowſe*, *Fowl*, *Howlet*, *Towel*, *Towel*, *Trowel*, *Vowel*, *blowſe*, *drowſy*, *Carrowſe*, *Cowardice*, *Endowment*, *lowre*, *Power*, *Tower*, *Howard*, *Allowance*, *Advowſon*, *Bowl*, *rowel*, *rowing*, *Shower*, &c.

This Sound is always at the end of a Word expreſs'd by (*ow*), as *now*, *bow*, *enow*, &c. In ſhort, this is a general Rule, That whenever a proper Double Vowel loſes its native Sound, and varies to any other ſimple Sound, it ceaſes to be a proper, and becomes an improper Double Vowel, as having only the ſimple and uncompounded Sound of ſome one ſingle Vowel. There is but one Exception to this Rule, and that is, when it wanders to the Sound of another Double Vowel, which is only done by (*ou*), when it ſounds (*oo*) in *could*, *would*, *ſhould*, &c. [18]

*Of*

[18] All other Sounds, beſides thoſe enumerated in the foregoing Diſcourſe of ſimple Sounds, are plainly compounded, tho' ſome of them are commonly thought to be ſimple.

The Diphthongs, or double Vowels *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, *au*, *eu*, *ou*, or *ay*, *ey*, *oy*, *aw*, *ew*, *ow*, when they are truly pronounc'd, are compounded of the foregoing or prepoſitive Vowels, and the Conſonants *y* and *w*, which yet are commonly taken for ſubſequent Vowels: For in *ai*, *au* or *ay*, *aw*, the (*a*) ſlender is ſet firſt; in *ei*, or *ey*, the (*e*) Feminine; in *eu*, or *ew*, the (*e*) Maſculine; in *oi*, *ou*, or *oy*, *ow*, the open (*o*) is ſometimes ſet firſt, as in the *Engliſh* Words *Boy*, *Toy*, *Soul*, *Bowl*, a Cup; ſometimes obſcure (*o*), as in the *Engliſh* Words *boil*, *toil*, *Oil*, *Bowl*, *Fowl*, &c. We grant by the Pronunciation of ſome Men, open (*o*) is us'd in theſe Words.

## *Of the Improper* Double Vowels. [19]

*Th'* improper *Double Vowels we declare*
*Nine, as* (aa), (ea), (eo), *and* (eu) *are*
(Ie), (oa), (oe), (ue), *and* (ui):
*But all their ſeveral Sounds here let us try.*

The Juncture of theſe ſeveral *Vowels* can never be properly call'd *Double Vowels*, ſince they every one produce but the Sound of one Letter; (*tial*) is always ſounded (*ſhal*), as in *impartial, credential*, &c. where the (*ti*) is turn'd into (*ſh*), or the two *Vowels* are divided after (*ſt*) or any other Conſonant but (*r*) and (*c*), and ſo make two Syllables, as *beſtial*. Thus (*io*) following (*t*) and before (*n*), ſounds (*ſhun*), as *Conſtitution, Diſcretion*, &c. (*io*) retains the ſame Sound, when it follows ſingle or double (*s*), as in *Alluſion, Aſperſion, Compulſion, Suffuſion,*

* But, whereas ſome will needs have it, that the Conſonants (*y*) and (*w*) do not at all differ from (*i*) and (*u*), or (as we write them) (*ee*) and (*oo*), very ſwiftly pronounc'd; it may eaſily be found to be a manifeſt Error, if we nicely attend the Formation of the Words *yee* and *woo*, eſpecially if we often repeat them; for he will obſerve, that he cannot paſs from the Sound of the Conſonant, to the Sound of the following Vowel, without a manifeſt Motion of the Organs, and by that means of new Poſition, which does not happen in the repeating of the Sounds (*ee*) and (*oo*).

We are ſenſible, that theſe which we call Diphthongs, or double Vowels, in different Tongues, have different Sounds, of which we have no Buſineſs now to treat; yet theſe may all be found and diſcover'd among thoſe Sounds, which we have diſcours'd of; and may be ſo referr'd to their proper Places. The long (*i*) of the *Engliſh* is plainly compounded of the Feminine (*e*) and (*y*), or (*i*), and has the ſame Sound entirely with the *Greek* (ει).

The *Latin* *a*, *æ*, the *Engliſh* *ea, oa, ee, oo*, and ſometimes *ei, ie, ou, au*, (the like being to be found among other Nations) altho' they are written with two Characters, are yet (at leaſt as we pronounce them now) but ſimple Sounds.

[19] They are juſtly call'd improper, becauſe they are moſt uncompounded in Sound, tho' written with two Vowels. 'Tis probable when this Spelling prevail'd, each Letter had a ſhare in the Sound, but Negligence and Corruption of Pronunciation has wholly ſilenc'd one. This is remarkable, that in moſt of them the firſt Vowel prevails, and gives the Sound.

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* *This is Dr.* Wallis's *Obſervation, which we do not think concluſive for what he brings it, becauſe in the Inſtance he gives, the* (y) *and the* (w) *are plac'd before the Vowels, and then they are Conſonants confeſs'd; but when they come after Vowels, they have the very ſame Effect on the Organs, as* (i) *and* (u) *have*: For *no Body contends that they are never* Conſonants, *or that when* Conſonants, *they are form'd in the ſame manner, as when* Vowels.

*ſion*, *Verſion*, &c. *Admiſſion*, *Compaſſion*, *Expreſſion*, &c. But when (*io*) follows (*ſt*), they are parted into two Syllables, as in *Queſtion*, *Combuſtion*; and the ſame is to be obſerv'd after any other *Conſonant*. (*Ua*) are always ſeparated, except after (*g*) in (*gua*), and (*q*) in *qua*; as *Language*, *Lingual*, &c. *Qualify*, *Quality*, &c. except likewiſe when it follows (*ſ*), and then it ſounds (*ſua*), as in *perſuade*, *diſſuade*, and their Derivatives *perſuaſive*, *diſſuaſive*, &c. and *ſuavity*, an obſolete Word.

Next (*uo*) muſt always be parted, except after (*q*), which can't be ſounded without (*u*), as in *quick*, *Quality*, *Qualm*, *quote*, &c.

The improper Double Vowels are counted Nine in number, as (*aa*), (*ea*), (*eo*), (*eu*), (*ie*), (*ea*), (*oe*), (*ue*), and (*ui*).

(Aa) *ſounds* (a), *but it is ſeldom found*;
(Ea) *four ſeveral ways declares its Sound*;
(E) *long*, (a) *ſhort*, (e) *ſhort*, *and double* (ee),
*As in* ſwear, Heart, Head, *and in* Fear *you ſee*.

(*Aa*) is ſeldom in any Word but Proper Names, and there only ſounds (*a*), and is generally divided.

(*Ea*) is ſounded four ſeveral ways, 1*ſt*, like (*a*) long, as *bear*, *ſwear*, *tear*, *wear*; 2*ly*, like (*a*) ſhort, as *hearken*, *Heart*, and Words deriv'd from it, as *hearty*, *heartleſs*, &c. alſo its Compounds, as *Heart-burning*, *Hearts-eaſe*, *faint-hearted*, &c. 3*ly*, (*e*) ſhort, as *already*, *ready*, *Beard*, *Breaſt*, *Head*, &c. 4*ly*, It ſometimes ſounds (*ee*), or (*e*) long; as in *appear*, *Arrear*, *Fear*, *near*, &c. *Bead*, *conceal*, *Deal*, *Veal*, *glean*, *clean*, &c. And generally the long Sound of (*e*) is writ (*ea*), as *Feaſt*, *Beaſt*, &c. and the ſhort Sound of (*e*), as *beſt*, *Gueſt*, &c.

(Eo) (e) *ſhort*, *and double* (e) *we find*,
*As well as* (eu), *to ſound long* (u)*'s inclin'd*.

(*Eo*) ſounds (*e*) ſhort in *Feoffee*, *Jeopardy*, *Leopard*, *Yeoman*, (*e*) long in *People*, *Feodary*, and (*o*) ſhort in *George*.

(*Eu*), or (*ew*), ſound (*u*) long; as *Deuce*, *Deuteronomy*, *Pleuriſie*, &c.

(Ie) *ſounds* (y) *in ending Words*; *and* (e)
*Short*, *and long*, *or double* (e) *'twill be*.

(*Ie*) is ſounded (*e*) long in *Cieling*, *Caſhier*, *Field*, *Fiend*, *Frontier*, &c. but (*e*) ſhort in *pierce*, *fierce*, &c. It is us'd likewiſe for (*y*) at the end of Words.

(Ei) *ſounds* (ai) a *long in* feign *and* eight.
*It ſounds* (e) *long in* perceive, Deceit.

(*Ei*) ſounds like (*ai*), or (*a*) long, in *Reign, feign, eight, weighty*, &c. It ſounds (*e*) long in *deceive, perceive, Deceit.*

This Rule is general, That the Letter which gives or predominates in the Sound, is always plac'd firſt in theſe improper Double Vowels.

*The* (a) *to* (o) *in* (oa) *we apply,*
*To make* (o) *long, and ſilent* (e) *ſupply.*

In (*oa*) the (*a*) ſeems added only to make the (*o*) ſound long, ſupplying the (*e*) ſilent, it giving the ſame Sound; as in *Cloak* and *Cloke, approach, broach, Coaſt, doat, float, Goat, hoary, Load, Moat, Oak, poach, roam, Soal*, a Fiſh, *Toad, Woad*: (*oa*) has a peculiar broad Sound in *broad, abroad, Groat*; and that of (*ai*) in *Goal.*

*The* (o) *and* (e) *alternately prevails*;
*In* (oe) *when this ſounds, then that ſtill fails.*

In (*oe*) ſometimes the (*e*) prevails, and the (*o*) is ſilent; as in *OEconomy, OEdipus, OEcumenical, OEconomical*; but in *Croe* (of Iron) *Doe, Foe, Sloe, Toe, Woe*, the (*e*) is ſilent, and the (*o*) produc'd; theſe latter being Words of Engliſh Origin, as well as Uſe, the former of the Greek. *Shoe*, and *Woe*, to make Love, ſome write with (*oo*), leaving (*o*) bare, contrary to the Genius of the Engliſh Language; whereas the Diſtinction wou'd be preſerv'd, and the Sound juſtly expreſs'd, by adding (*e*) to the (*oo*).

(Ue) *one Syllable we ſeldom ſound*;
(U) *after* (g) *to harden* (g) *is bound.*

Few Words have (*ue*) ſounded as one Syllable, as *Guelderland, Guerkins*; *gueſt* for *gueſs*, is wrong ſpelt, tho' too much us'd of late by the Ignorance or Negligence of Authors, or Printers; for its true Spelling is *gheſs*: in all which the (*u*) is only added to harden the Sound of the (*g*), the (*e*) only being ſounded; tho' (*gue*) in *Guerdon* ſounds (*gue*), as do the Terminations, or Endings of ſeveral Words, as *Apologue, Catalogue, collegue, collogue, Decalogue, Dialogue, Epilogue, Fatigue, Intrigue, League, Plague, Prologue, prorogue, Rogue, Synagogue, Theologue, Tongue, Vogue.* At the end of the following Words (*e*) is added to (*u*), not only to cover its nakedneſs, according to the Genius of the Tongue, but ſometimes to produce the (*u*); as in *accrue, Avenue, cue, due, enſue, Feſcue.*

*Glue,*

*Glue, hue, perdue, purſue, reſidue, Retinue, Rue, ſpue* or *ſpew, ue.* But (*ue*) in all other Words are parted, nor make any manner of Double Vowel, as in *Affluence, Cruelty, Gruel,* &c.

(Ui) *three ſeveral ſorts of Sound expreſs,*
*As* Guile, rebuild, Bruiſe *and* Recruit *confeſs.*

The improper Double Vowel (*ui*) has three ſeveral ſorts of ound, 1. as (*i*) long, in *beguile, Guide, diſguiſe, quite,* &c. . (*i*) ſhort, in *Guildford, build, rebuild,* &c. 3. (*u*) long, as *Bruiſe, Recruit, Fruit,* &c.

## CHAP. IV.
## *Of the* CONSONANTS. [20]

*A* Conſonant *no proper Sound obtains,*
*But from its* ſounding with, *its Name it gains;*
*And yet it varys every* Vowel's *Sound,*
*Whether before, or after it, 'tis found.*

THo' a Conſonant be a Letter that cannot be ſounded without adding ſome Single or Double Vowel before after it, and therefore derives its Name from *conſounding, ſounding with,* yet may juſtly be defin'd, A Letter ſhewing

[20] As the Vowels were divi- into three Claſſes, ſo we divide Conſonants into the ſame Num- ; the *Labial*, or *Lip*; the *Pala- e*, or *Palate*; the *Guttural*, or *roat* Conſonants, as they are form'd the *Throat, Palate*, or *Lips*; that while the Breath ſent from the ngs into theſe Seats, is either *in- cepted*, or at leaſt more forcibly *mpreſs'd.*

But it is beſides to be remark'd, t we may obſerve a *triple Dire- on of the Breath.* For firſt, it is directed wholly to the Mouth; t is, ſeeking its Way or Outlet o' the Lips; or ſecond, it is al- ſt wholly directed to the Noſtrils, re to find Paſſage out; or third, it s it were equally divided betwixt the *Noſtrils* and the *Mouth*: But we believe this Diverſity of the Direction of the Breath wholly proceeds from the various Poſition of the *Uvula.*

Since therefore the Breath ſent out in this threefold manner may be perfectly *intercepted* thrice in each of theſe Seats, there are nine different Conſonants which derive their Origin from them, and which, for that Reaſon, we call *primitive*, or clos'd Conſonants: But if the Breath be not wholly intercepted in theſe Seats, but only more hardly compreſs'd, find, tho' with Difficulty, ſome Way of exit; various other Conſonants are form'd, according to the various manner of the Compreſſion; which Conſonants we ſhall call *deriv'd*, or

*open*

ing the ſeveral Motions and Configurations of the Parts o the Mouth, by which the Sound of the Vowels is variouſl determin'd, are firſt divided into *ſingle* and *double*; th double are x and z, the reſt are all ſingle; and theſe ar again divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids*; eleven Mutes, an four proper Liquids: *h*, *ſ*, and *w*, are *Neuters*, as not ſtrictl adhering to either.

*The* Conſonants *we juſtly may divide*
*Into* Mutes, Liquids, Neuters; *and beſide*
*We muſt for* Double Conſonants *provide.*
*Eleven* Mutes GRAMMARIANS *do declare,*
*And but four* Liquids, l, m, n, *and* r.
*Behind the* Mutes *the* Liquids *gently flow*
*Inverted, from the Tongue they will not go.*

*Conſonants* are divided into *Mutes* and *Liquids*, call'd al *Half-Vowels*; the *Mutes* are, *b*, *c*, *d*, *f*, *v*, *g*, *j*, *k*, *p*, *q*, *t*, an are ſo call'd becauſe a *Liquid* cannot be ſounded in the ſam Syllable, when a *Vowel* follows it, as (*rpo*).

The *Liquids*, or *Half-Vowels*, as they have ſome ſort o obſcure Sound of a *Vowel* attending their Pronunciatio which is likewiſe imitated in their Names, as *el*, *em*, *en*, *e* ſo the Name of *Liquid* imports the eaſie motion, by whic they nimbly glide away after a *Mute* in the ſame Syllabl without any *ſtand*, and a *Mute* before it can be pronounc'd i the ſame Syllable, as *pro* in *probable*.

(C) *the hard Sound of* (k) *will ever keep*
*Before* (a), (o), (u), (l), *and* (r); *as* creep,
Clear, Cup, Coſt, Cat: *Before* (e), (i), *and* (y),
*Or ev'n the Comma that do's* (e) *imply,*
*It moſtly takes the ſofter Sound of* (s);
*As* City, Cell, *and* Cypreſs *muſt confeſs.*
*When final* (c) *without an* (e) *is found,*
*'Tis hard*; *but ſilent* (e) *gives ſofter Sound.*

[21] The genuine and natural Sound of (*c*) is har like (*k*), as when it precedes (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), (*l*), or (*r*); as *Ca*

*open* Conſonants. As to the particular Formation of them, ſee the Notes, at the end of the Chapter.

[21] The *French* expreſs the ſoft (*c*) by this Figure (ç) for Diſtinction, which Character wou'd be of uſe if it were introduc'd among us; tho' it muſt be confeſs'd, that there is ſo much the leſs need of a new Character, as the Rule is ſo general as admit of no Exception. Some affe to imitate the *French* Way of Spelling here, and write *Publique* Publick, not conſidering that they u (*qu*) becauſe they have no (*k*).

[22] Th

*at, Coſt, Cup, clear, creep.* But before (*e*), (*i*), and (*y*), and when there is an Apoſtrophe or Comma above the Word, denoting the abſence of (*e*), it has generally the Sound of (*s*), *Cell, City, Cypreſs.* If in any Word the harder Sound precedes (*e*), (*i*) or (*y*), (*k*) is either added or put in its place, *Skill, Skin, publick:* And tho' the additional (*k*) in the foregoing Word be an old way of Spelling, yet it is now very juſtly left off, as being a ſuperfluous Letter; for (*c*) at the end is always hard, without (*y*) or the ſilent (*e*) to ſoften it, as in *Chace, Clemency,* &c.

Moſt Words ending in the Sound of *ace, ece, ice, oice, uce,* muſt be written with (*ce*), not (*ſe*), except *abaſe, abſtruſe, uſe, caſe, ceaſe, amuſe, conciſe, debaſe, decreaſe, Geeſe, imbaſe, increaſe, mortiſe, Paradiſe, profuſe, promiſe, recluſe, Treatiſe, abuſe, diſuſe, excuſe, Houſe, Louſe, Mouſe, refuſe, uſe, cloſe, oſe.*

Moſt Words ending in *ance, ence, ince, once,* and *unce,* muſt be written with (*c*) between the (*n*) and (*e*), except *inſe, condenſe, diſpenſe, immenſe, incenſe, tenſe, intenſe, pronſe, ſuſpenſe, ſenſe.*

(*C*) before (*h*), has a peculiar Sound, as in *chance, Cherry, Church, Chalk, Chip*; but in *Chart* 'tis like (*k*), and in *Chord* in Muſick.

*The genuine Sound of* (s) *is ſtill acute*
*And hiſſing; but the Cloſe that does not ſute,*
*There 'tis obſcure, and ſoft pronounc'd like* zed,
*And ſometimes 'twixt two* Vowels *when 'tis ſped.*

(*S*) being ſo near a-kin to the ſoft Sound of (*c*), we thought naturally follow'd that Letter in our Conſideration, tho' not in the Alphabet. When (*s*) therefore keeps its genuine Sound, it is pronounc'd with an acute or hiſſing Sound, but when it cloſes a Word, it almoſt always has a more obſcure and ſoft Sound like (*z*), and not ſeldom when it comes between two *Vowels*, or *double Vowels*, when it has this ſoft Sound, Propriety and Diſtinction require, that it be writ with the ſhorter Character of that Letter, as, *his, adviſe,* &c. and with the larger in all other places, as *hiſs, deviſe,* if written with an (*s*) and not with a (*c*), as it too often is. There are but four Words of one Syllable, which end with hard (*s*), *as, this, thus, us.*

*That* (s) *with* (c) *you may not ſtill confound*
*To learn, and mind the following Rules you're bound.*

*By Vowels follow'd,* (ſi), (ti), *and* (ci) *alike*
*With the ſame Sound do ſtill the Hearing ſtrike.*
*In Words deriv'd they keep a certain Law,*
*Impos'd by thoſe from whence their Sound they draw.*
*If thoſe in* (de), (ſ) *or* (ſe) *do end,*
*To their Derivatives they* (ſi) *commend;*
*If with* (ck) *or* (ce) *their cloſe they make,*
*Then the deriv'd* (ci) *will ſurely take;*
*But if with* (t) *or* (te) *that do conclude,*
*Then with* (ti) *Derivative's endu'd.*

[22] *Si, ti,* and *ci* ſound alike, as in *Perſuaſion, Muſici Sedition, Imitation,* &c. Theſe words are all deriv'd from othe and therefore when the Original Words end in *(de), (ſ), (ſe),* then *(ſi)* is us'd; as *perſuade, Perſuaſion, confeſs, Con ſion, confuſe, Confuſion,* &c. If with *(ce),* or *(ck),* or hard then *(ci)* is us'd; as *Grace, Gracious, Muſick, Muſician,* But if with *(t),* or *(te),* then *(ti)* is us'd, as *Sect, Section, I tate, Imitation,* &c. except *Submit, Submiſſion, Perm Termiſſion.*

Tho' this Letter ſeems very regular in its Sound of *(ſe)* the beginning, and *(es)* at the end of Words, yet it is too to be miſtaken for *(c),* eſpecially in the beginning: Yet the following Rules and Exceptions, the Miſtake may obſerv'd to be remov'd.

Moſt Words beginning with the Sound of *(ſ)* before and *(i)* muſt be written with *(ſ),* except theſe with *(c)* fore *(e).*

*Ceaſe, Cedar, Celandine, Celery, Celebrate, Celebration, C rity, Celeſtial, Celibacy, Celibate, Cell, Cellar, Cellarage, cem Cenſe, Cenſor, cenſorious, Cenſure, cent, Centaurs, Centre, Ce nody,* Knot-graſs, an Herb; *Centory,* or *Centuary,* an He *Centry, Centurion, Century, cephalic, Cere-cloath, ceremon Ceremonious, Ceremony, certain, certainly, Certificate, cert cerulean, Ceruſs, Ceſs, Ceſſation, Ceſſion, Cetrach,* Finger-fe and theſe Proper Names, *Cecrops, Celſus, Cenchrea, Ce Cerberus, Cerinthus, Ceres, Cæſar.*

[22] The Reaſon to thoſe who know *Latin,* is much eaſier; for if they are deriv'd from a *Latin* Supine ending in *(tum),* then *(ti)* is us'd, as *Natum, Nation;* but if the Supine end in *(ſum),* then *(ſi)* is us'd; as *Viſum, Viſion; Confeſſum, Confeſſion.* If the Word be deriv'd from a *Latin* Subſtantive of the firſt clenſion ending in *(ca)* or *(tia)* of the ſecond Declenſion endin *(tium)* or *(cium),* then *(ci)* is as *Logica Logician, Gratia Grac Vitium Vicious, Beneficium Be cient,* &c.

[23]

And theſe of (*c*) before (*i*).

*Cicatrice*, *Cicely*, ſweet and wild Herbs; *Cieling*, *Cichory*, *leire*, Drapery or Foliage wrought on the Heads of Pil-rs; *Cinders*, *Cinnabar*, *Cinquefoil*, *Cinnamon*, *Cinque-ports*, *iperus*, a ſweet Root; *Cion*, or *Scion*, *Cipher*, *Circle*, *Circlet*, *rcular*, *Circuit*, *circulate*, *circulation*, *circumciſe*, and all ompounds of *circum*—; *Ciſtern*, *Citarion*, *Citizen*, *citrine*, *citrean*, *Citron*, *Citrul*, a ſort of Cucumber; *Citadel*, *City*, *ives*, a ſort of ſmall Leeks; *Civet*, *Civilian*, *civility*, *civilize*; d theſe Proper Names, *Cicero*, *Cicilia*, *Cilicia*, *Cimbrians*, *immerians*, *Circe*, *Cirenceſter*, *Cisbury*, *Ciſſa*, *Ciſtertian*, onks, *Citherides*.

And theſe likewiſe are excepted of (*c*) before (*y*).

*Cybels*, *Cyclades*, *Cycle*, *Cyclometry*, *Cyclops*, *Cygnets*, *Cylin-ical*, *Cymbal*, *cynical*, *Cinics*, *Cynthia*, *Cyprian*, *Cypreſs*, *rene*, *Cyril*.

The Sound of (*ſ*) in the middle of Words is uſually writ-n with (*ſ*), except *Acerbity*, *Acetoſity*, *adjacent*, *Anceſtors*, *tecedent*, *Artificer*, *cancel*, *Cancer*, *beneficence*, *Chancel*, *Chan-llor*, *Chancellorſhip*, *Chancery*, *conceal*, *concede*, *conceit*, *con-itedneſs*, *conceive*, *Concent*, Agreement or Harmony in Mu-k; *concenter*, *concentric*, *concern*, *Chalcedony*, *concernment*, *ncert*, *concertation*, an affected Word, *Conceſſion*; *Deceaſe*, *cede*, an affected Word; *Deceit*, *deceive*, *December*, *Decency*, *cennial*, *decent*, *Deception*, *deceptive*, *Decertation*, an af-ted Word for ſtriving; *Deceſſion*, as bad a Word for de-rting; *exceed*, *excel*, *Excellency*, *except*, *Exception*, *Exceſs*, *rocer*, *Grocery*, *immarceſſible*, a pedantique Word for incor-ptible; *imperceptible*, *Incendiary*, *Incenſe*, *incarterate*, *incen-ve*, *inceſſant*, *inceſſantly*, *inceſtuous*, *Innocence*, *innocent*, *inter-de*, *Interceſſor*, *Interceſſion*, *intercept*, *mercenary*, *macerate*, *lercer*, *Mercery*, *Magnificence*, *magnificent*, *Munificence*, *mu-ficent*, *neceſſary*, *Neceſſaries*, *neceſſitate*, *Neceſſity*, *neceſſitous*, *ecromancer*, *Larceny*, *Ocean*, *Parcel*, *Parcels*, *precede*, *preceden-al*, *Precedence*, *Precedent*, *preceptive*, *Precepts*, *Predeceſſors*, *cere*, *Sincerity*, *Saucer*, *Sorcerer*, *Sorcereſs*, *Sorcery*, *Macedon*, *Macedonia*. Before (*i*) in the middle, as *Acid*, *Acidity*, *Ac-dent*, *Ancient*, *Angliciſm*, *Galliciſm*, &c. in *ciſm*; *anticipate*, *tificial*, *aſſociate*, *audacious*, *Audacity*, *beneficial*, *calcine*, *cal-nate*, *Council*, *capacious*, *capacitate*, *Capacity*, *conciſe*, *cruciate*, *rucible*, *crucify*, *Crucifix*, *decide*, *decimal*, *decimate*, *Decima-on*, *decipher*, *Deciſion*, *deciſive*, *Deficiency*, *delicious*, *docible*, *ocibility*, *efficacious*, *efficient*, *eſpecially*, *Exception*, *Exerciſe*,

Ex-

*Exciſe, Exciſe-man, Exciſion, excite, excruciate, explicit fecible* for *feaſible, gracious, implicitly, implicit, incapaci tate, incapacity, inauſpicious, incident, incidentally, incircle Inciſion, Inciſure, incite, invincible, judicial, judicious, L quacity, medicinal, Multiplicity, municipal, Nuncio, officiat officious, pacify, pacific, Parcimony, Parricide, participat Pencil, perſpicacious, Perſpicacity, pervicacious, pertinacio Precinct, precious, Precipice, precipitate, Precipitation, pr ciſe, preciſely, prejudicial, proficient, Pronunciation, provin cial, rapacious, Ratiocination, reciprocal, recital, recite, r concile, reconcileable, Rouncivals, ſagacious, Sagacity, Sicil Simplicity, ſociable, Sociableneſs, Soceity, Socinians, Soleciſ ſolicite, Solicitation, Solicitor, ſolicitous, Solicitude, ſolſtici ſpacious, ſpecial, Specialty, ſpecifical, Species, ſpecific, Sp cimen, ſpecious, Sufficiency, ſufficient, ſupercilious, ſuperficia Superficies, ſuſpicious, tacit, Taciturnity, Turciſm, Veracit Vivacity.*

Moſt Words ending with the Sound of (*ſi*) or (*ſe*), mu be written with (*cy*), except *Apoſtaſy, buſy, Controverſ Courteſy, Daiſy, Ecſtaſy, eaſy, Epilepſy, Fanſy,* ſpell likewiſe tho' wrong, *Fancy, Frenſy,* or *Frenzy, Gipſy, greaſy, Hereſ Hypocriſy, Jealouſy, Leproſy, Palſy, Panſy,* a Flower, *Ple riſy, Poſy,* Noſegay, and Motto of a Ring, *Poeſie,* Poetr *purſy, queaſy, Canſy,* to *Propheſy, Cauſey, clumſey, Kerſe Linſey-woolſey, Malmſey, Tolſey, Whimſey.*

In moſt Words (*ſ*) between two Vowels has the ſound (*z*), except thoſe enumerated in the Rule about *ace, ece,* & under (*c*).

Moſt Words ending in the ſound of *arce, erce, orce, ur* muſt be written with (*ſ*) between the (*r*) and (*e*), excep *amerce, Divorce, Farce, fierce, Force, pierce, ſcarce, Scarci Source.*

After (*ou*), (*ſ*) ſoft, and not (*c*), muſt be written; *houſe,* to *houſe*; *mouſe,* to *mouſe*; *rouſe,* to *rouſe*; unleſs interpoſes, and then it muſt be with (*c*), as *Bounce, flounc Ounce,* &c.

All Words of one Syllable, that end with, and bear ha upon the Sound of (*ſ*), muſt be written with (*ſs*), excep *this, thus, us,* and *yes*; but if they are Words of many Syll bles, or more than one, and end with the like Sound in (*us*) the (*s*) is not double, but (*o*) inſerted before; as *ambigu barbarous,* &c.

(T) *before* (i), *t' another* Vowel *join'd,*
*To sound like th' Acute, and hissing* (s) *we find:*
*But when an* (x) *or* (s) *do's* (i) *precede,*
*For its own sound it strenuously do's plead.*

(*T*); when (*t*) comes before (*i*), follow'd by another Vowel, it sounds like the acute or hissing (*s*), as in *Nation, potion, expatiate,* &c. but when it follows (*s*) or (*x*), it keeps its own Sound, as in *Bestial, Question, Fustion,* &c.

(*T*) with an (*h*) after it, has two Sounds, as in *thin*, the Tongue touching lightly the Extreams of the upper Teeth; and *then*, where the Tongue reaches the Palate, and the Root of the Teeth, making some mixture of (*d*).

(H), *tho' deny'd a Letter heretofore,*
*We justly to the Alphabet restore.*

(*H*), tho' excluded the Number of Letters by *Priscian* and some of our Moderns on his Authority, yet in the *Hebrew* Alphabet has three Characters; and beside some obscure Sound of its own, it mightily enforces that of the Vowels, and is manifestly a Consonant; after (*w*) it is pronounc'd before it, as *when, white,* Sounds *hwen, hwite*; (*k*) before (*n*) borrows its Sound, as *knave, knight, hnave, hnight.* 'Tis indeed sometimes near silent, as in *honour, hour,* &c. but so are many other Consonants in particular Positions.

(X), *and* (Z) *are double Consonants;*
*The first the Pow'r of* (c), *or* (ks), *vaunts,*
*The second that of* (ds) *does boast,*
*The Force of* (d) *is now entirely lost,*
*Or rather to a strenuous hissing tost.*

(*X*) and (*Z*) are double Consonants, containing two Pows under one Character; the former (*cs*), or (*ks*), the latter (*s*), tho' the Sound of the (*d*) be not now heard, and only a strong sibilation or hissing be discover'd. The former expressing (*ks*) or (*cs*), cannot begin a Word, except some proper Names, *Xanthe, Xanthus, Xantippe, Xantippus, Xenarchus, Xeneades, Xenius, Xenocrates, Xenophanes, Xenophilus, Xenophon, Xerolibia, Xerxenina, Xerxes, Xystus, Xiphiline,* and some few Terms not vary'd from the *Greek* (this Rule meaning only Words purely Native and not relating to Art) and adds only some not all of that Sound; which is express'd six several Ways: (1*st*,) At the end of short Syllables by (*cks*), *Backs, Necks, Sticks, Rocks, Ducks, Bricks, mocks,* &c.

(2*dly*,) At the end of Syllables made long by a *double Vowel*, it is expreſs'd by (*ks*), as *Books*, *looks*, *breaks*, *ſpeaks*, &c. (3*dly*,) By double (*cc*) in the middle of Words where (*e*) or (*i*) follows; as *Accelerate*, *Accent*, *accept*, *Acceptation*, *Acceſs*, *acceſſible*, *Acceſſion*, *acceſſory*, or *acceſſary*, *Accidence*, *Accident*, *accidential*, *inacceſſible*, *Occident*, *occidental*, *ſucceed*, *Succeſs*, *Succeſſion*, *ſuccedaneous*, *ſucceſsful*, *ſuccinct*, *Succinctneſs*. (4*thly*,) By (*ct*), in Words ending in *action*, *ection*, *iction*, *otion*, *uction*, and *unction*; as *Extraction*, *Perfection*, *Prediction*, *Concoction*, *Deſtruction*, *compunction*; only except *Complexion*, *Reflexion*, a bending back, but more properly *Reflection*, when it relates to thought; *Connexion*, *Crucifixion*, *Defluxion*. (5*thly*,) By (*cts*) at the end of ſome Words, as *Abſtracts*, *Acts*, *collects*, *contracts*, *Defects*, *Effects*, *Inſects*, *Objects*, *Projects*, *Subjects*; he *affects*, *corrects*, *inſtructs*, for *affecteth*, &c. the (*th*) being now entirely chang'd into (*s*). (6*thly*,) laſtly, The Sound of (*k*) muſt be written with (*x*), in the beginning, middle and end of all other Words, except *ecſtacy*. After (*ex*) never write (*s*), and ſeldom (*c*), but in *except*, *exceed*, *exceſs*, *exciſe*, *excite*, &c. and (*c*) after (*ex*), comes before (*co*), (*cu*), (*cl*) and (*ch*), having a full Sound, as *excommunicate*, *excuſe*, *exclaim*, *exchange*.

(K) *before* (i), (e) *when hard, is ſeen*;
*And before* (n), *as* know, kill, keen.

(*K*) begins all Words of a hard Sound before (*e*), (*i*) and (*n*), as *keep*, *kill*, *know*, *knack*, &c. nor is it ever put before any Conſonant but (*n*), and then with ſo much conſtraint, that it almoſt loſes its Sound for that of (*h*).

*Before all other Conſonants* (c)'s *plac't*,
*Altho' the harder Sound is there expreſt.*

And if the Sound of (*k*) comes before any other Conſonant, it is expreſs'd by (*c*), as in *Character*, *clear*, *cringe*.

The Sound of (*k*) at the beginning of any Word or Syllable before (*a*), (*o*) or (*u*), is always expreſs'd by (*c*), as *Cat*, *con*, *cup*; or when a ſilent (*e*) follows (*k*), as *ſpake*, *ſpoke*; or (*ea*) in the middle, as *ſpeak*, *bleak*, &c. and then (*k*) is written ſingly without (*e*) final.

*To* (y) *a double Nature does belong*,
*As* Conſonant, *and* Vowel *in our Tongue*.
*The* firſt *begins all Words, yet none can end*,
*The* laſt, *it for the Cloſe does ſtill contend*.

[23] (*Y*) is both a Vowel and Conſonant; as a Vowel, it has appear'd to an ingenious Author to be ſuperfluous; yet it is of great uſe in our Language, which abhors the ending of Words in (*i*); and when the Sound of (*i*) comes double, tho' in two diſtinct Syllables, as in *dying*, *frying*, &c. When it follows a Conſonant it is a Vowel, and when it precedes a Vowel it is a Conſonant, and ought to be call'd (*ye*), and not (*wy*); and tho' it ends ſo many Words as a Vowel, it can end none as a Conſonant.

At the end of all Words of one Syllable (*y*) has a ſharp and clear Sound, as *by*, *dy*, *dry*, *ſly*, *why*, *ſhy*, *thy*, &c. But at the end of Words of more Syllables it generally ſounds obſcure, like (*e*), as *eternally*, *glorioufly*, *godly*, &c. except at the end of *Words of Affirmation*, as *apply*, *deny*, *edify*, &c. (*y*) only precedes Vowels, and chiefly (*a*), (*e*), (*o*); and theſe it alſo follows and incorporates with them into *double Vowels*, for (*ay*), (*ey*), (*oy*), have the ſame Sound with (*ai*), (*ei*), (*oi*); but the former are more us'd at the end of Words. In the middle of Words it is not ſo frequently us'd for a Vowel, except in Words of the *Greek* Origin.

*And the ſame Right the double* (u) *demands*;
*Begins as* Conſonant, *as* Vowel *ends.*

[24] (*W*). This Letter in its moſt general uſe is a Conſonant, going before all the Vowels, except (*u*); it likewiſe precedes (*r*), and follows (*s*) and (*th*), as *Want*, *went*, *Winter*, *wrath*, *write*, *thwart*. It follows as a Vowel (*a*), (*e*), (*o*), and unites with them into the *double Vowels* (*aw*), (*ew*), (*ow*), as well as (*u*); as *Sow*, *ſowe*, *ſaw*, *few*: But in (*oo*) it generally is obſcure, eſpecially in Words of many Syllables, as in *Shadow*, *Widow*, &c.

It likewiſe, as has been obſerv'd under (*h*), goes before (*h*), tho' it be ſounded after it, as in *when*, *what*, &c.

(Va) *to the* (f) *in Nature is ally'd*,
*And to it* final, *has* (e) *always ty'd.*

[25] (*Va*),

[23] This Conſonant is ſounded like the *German* (*j*) Conſonant, that is with a Sound moſt nearly approaching an extream rapid Pronunciation of the Vowel (*i*). The *Arabians* expreſs (*y*) by their *ye*, or our (*w*) by their *waw*.

[24] The (*w*) is ſounded in *Engliſh* as (*u*) in the *Latin* Words *quando*, *lingua*, *ſuadeo*, and others after *q*, *g*, *ſ*. We generally make this Letter a Conſonant, yet its Sound is not very different (tho' it does ſomething differ) from the *German* Vowel, the *fat* or *groſs* (*u*) very rapidly pronounc'd.

[25] (*Va*) or (*V*) Conſonant, as 'tis call'd, is near a-kin to (*f*): It never ends a Word without ſilent (*e*) after it, nor is it ever doubled, however ſtrong the Accent may be upon it; in *Engliſh* it only goes before *Vowels*, it likewiſe follows (*l*) and (*r*), as *Calves*, *Carve*, &c.

(G) *varies with the* Vowel *ſtill its Sound,*
*Soft before* (i), (e); *before the reſt hard's found:*
*By* (h) *and* (u) *'tis harden'd, as in* Gheſs
*And* Guilt, *and as ſome other Words expreſs.*

(*G*) changes its Sound according to the Vowel it precedes, for before (*a*), (*o*), (*u*), it has a hard Guttural Sound, as *Game*, *Gold*, *Gum*: But this hard Sound is melted into a ſofter, by (*e*), (*i*), or (*y*), as *Gentle*, *Danger*, *Ginger*; but it is harden'd here by the Addition of (*h*) or (*u*), as *Gheſs*, *Guilt*, &c. It retains its native Guttural Sound before (*e*) in theſe: *Altogether*, *anger*, *Auger*, *beget*, *Conger-eel*, *exegetical*, *Finger*, *forget*, *gear*, or *geer*, *Geeſe*, *geld*, *Gelderland*, *Gelder*, Roſe, *Gelding*, *get*, *Gewgaws*, *heterogeneous*, *homogeneal*, *heterogeneal*, *homogeneous*, *hunger*, *Hanger*, *Hungerford*, *linger*, *longer*, *Monger*, *ſpringeth*; obſolete, *ſtringed*, *Vinegar*, *winged*, *wringeth*, *wrongeth*, now written *wrings*, *wrongs*, *younger*; but a *Singer* with a Voice, and a *Singer* by Fire; a *Swinger* on a Rope; and a *Swinger*, a great Lye, muſt be diſtinguiſh'd by the Senſe, or the old Way of Spelling the ſoft Sounds, by adding a (*d*) after the (*n*), as indeed they Sound. (*D*) before (*g*) always ſoftens the Sound of (*g*), as *Hog*, *hodge*, *log*, *lodge*, *dog*, *dodge*, &c. (*G*) is hard before (*i*) in the following Words; as, *Argyle*, *begin*, *gibberiſh*, *gibblegabble*: *Gibbons*, *Giddens*, Sirnames; *giddy*, *gift*, *gig*, *giggle*, *giglet*, *Gilbert*, *gild*, *gilder*, *Gildon*, a Sirname; *Gillet*, a Sirname; *Gills*, *guilt-head*, *Gimlet*, *gimp*, *gird*, *girder*, *Girdle*, or *Girdler*; *Girl*, *girt*, *Girth* of a Horſe; *Gith*, *gittern*, *give*, *Gizzard*; with all the Compounds and Words derived from any of theſe.

*Two* (gg)'s *together make both hard remain,*
*Tho'* (i), *or* (e) *or* (y) *be in their Train.*

When

[25] The (*V*) Conſonant we pronounce as the *French*, *Italians*, *Spaniards* and other Nations do, that is with a Sound very near approaching the Letter (*f*); yet (*f*) and (*v*) have the ſame difference which (*p*) and (*b*) have.

[26] If

Whenever two (*gg*)'s come together, they are both hard, tho' (*e*) (*i*) or (*y*) follow.

If the primitive or original Word end in hard (*g*), all Words deriv'd from them do the ſame; as *Dog*, *dogged*, &c. but moſt of theſe latter are under the former Rule, becauſe moſt of them double the (*g*). (*N*) between the Conſonant and (*g*) hardens it; as *ſtronger*, *longer*, *ſinger*, &c.

(Je)'s *always ſoft, a Vowel ſtill precedes,*
*And in a Syllable the foremoſt leads.*
*All Words, where-e'er this ſofter Sound we ſee*
*Before* (a), (o) *and* (u), *are writ with* (Je).

(*Je*)or (j) Conſonant always begins a Syllable, is ever plac'd before, never after a Vowel, and has an unvary'd Sound, as being pronounc'd every where as ſoft (*g*) in *Ginger*; but when the Sound of ſoft (*g*) is at the end of a Word, it is expreſs'd by (*g*), with ſilent (*e*) after it, *Rage*, *Sage*, *Wage*, &c. or with (*dg*), as *Knowledge*, &c.

All Words beginning with this ſoft Sound before (*a*), (*o*) and (*u*), muſt be written with (*je*) as well as all proper Names deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*.

Many Words which now begin with a (*g*) before (*e*), were originally ſpelt with (*J*), as *Jentleman*, not *Gentleman*; and ought indeed, to be thus written always, which wou'd avoid Confuſion in the Spelling.

(Q) *in its Sound, is always ſounded* kue,
*And ne'er is writ without a following* (u).

(*Q*) Sounds (*kue*) or (*que*), and has always (*u*) after it, and begins all Words with that Sound. It ends no Word without (*e*) after it, and that in but a few Words of *French* Termination, as *Antique*, *oblique*, *pique*, *barque*, *cinque*. [26]

To

[26] If the Breath *directed thro' the Mouth to the Lips*, be intercepted by the *cloſing of the Lips*, the (*P*) is form'd; the *Greek* (π); the *Hebrew* (*Pe*). The *Arabians* have not this Letter, but ſubſtitute in its place (*Be*) or (*Phe*); the *Perſians*, beſides this (*Phe*) of the *Arabians*, have their (*H*), which they diſtinguiſh from (*Be*), by putting three Points under it.

If the Breath reaches not the *Lips*, but be wholly intercepted in the *Palate*, by moving the tip of the Tongue to the fore-part of the Palate, or, which is all one, to the roots of the upper Teeth, the Conſonant (*T*) is form'd; the *Greek* (τ), the *Arabian* (*Te*) or (*Ta*), &c.

But if the Breath do not ev'n reach ſo far, but be intercepted at the top of the Throat, by moving the hinder

To these we shall add some Rules relating to Consonants join'd together.

(Gh) *in the beginning does express*
(G) *hard, as in* Ghost *we find, and in* Ghess.
*Elsewhere this* (h) *we mostly now omit,*
*Yet by it the Syllable a* Length *does get.*
*In* Northern Parts *this very* (h) *is found*
*With a much softer Aspirate to Sound.*

In the beginning of Words (*gh*) is pronounc'd like hard (*g*): Elsewhere 'tis now almost wholly left out, but yet it implies, that the Syllable is to be lengthen'd. But some (especially the Northern People) Sound the (*h*) with a softer Aspiration; as in *Might, Light, Night, Right, Sight, Sigh, weigh, Weight, Though*; (but the three last Letters in this Word are now by the Politer thrown away as useless) *Thought, wrought, taught*, &c.

(Gh) *sometimes will sound like double* (f),
*As* Cough, tough, rough, enough, trough *and* laugh.

When *enough* signifies Number, 'tis spelt *enow.*

(Ch) *produces a Compounded Sound,*
*Which from* (ty) *most surely may rebound.*
*Or from* (tsh), *as in* Church *'tis found.*

We must except Words that are deriv'd from the *Greek* and *Hebrew*, especially proper Names, and where a Consonant follows; for there they sound harder, like (*c*) or (*k*).

(Sh) *like* (sy), (ph) *like* (f) *we find,*
*And the* (th) *is of a double kind;*
*Sometimes a softer Sound, a-kin to* (d),
*Sometimes a stronger, that's a-kin to* (t).

(*Th*) Sounds (*dh*) sometimes, where it has a softer Sound, as it has in the following Words: As *thou, thee, thy, thine, the, this, that, those, these, they, them, their, there, thence, thither, whither, either, whether, neither, though, although*; but in these two last it is generally left out. And in some Words ending in (*ther*), as *Father, Mother, Brother, Leather, Feather*; and in *smooth, Breath, Wreathe, seethe, bequeathe, Clothe.*

Elsewhere it generally has a stronger Sound; as in *with, without, within, through, think, thrive, throw, thrust, Thought, Thigh, thing, Throng, Death, Breath, Cloth, Wrath, Length, Strength, thick, thin*, &c.

PART

part of the Tongue, to the hinder part of the Palate, *(k)* or hard *(c)* is form'd, and the *Greek* (κ), &c. The *Welſh* always give their *(c)* this hard Sound. Theſe three Conſonants we call abſolute Mutes; for they give no manner of Sound in themſelves, or indeed can give any, becauſe the Breath no way gets into the free Air, for it neither gets out by the Noſtrils, nor by the Mouth.

If the Breath, *equally divided between the Noſtrils and the Mouth*, be intercepted by the cloſing of the Lips, the Conſonant *(B)* is form'd, the *Greek* (β), the *Arabian Dal*, &c. But if the Breath be intercepted in the Throat by the hinder parts of the Palate and Tongue (G) is form'd, the *Greek* (γ), &c. The *Welſh* always give this hard Sound to their (G). And theſe we call *half Mutes*, for they make a little ſort of Sound in the Noſe, which can be heard by it ſelf without the aſſiſtance of the Sound of any other Letter.

If the whole, or, if you pleaſe, the greater part of the Breath be divided to the Noſtrils, only in its Paſſage ſtriking the Air that remains in the concave or hollow of the Mouth, the Lips being juſt clos'd, *(M)* is form'd, the *Greek* (μ), the *Arabian Mim*, &c. But if the Cloſure or Interception be made in the fore-part of the Palate, *(N)* is form'd, the *Greek* (ν), and the *Hebrew* and *Arabian Nun*. But if in the Throat, that is in the back-part of the Palate, that Sound is form'd, which the *Greeks* expreſs by (γ) before (κ), (γ), (χ), (ξ): And the *Latins* of old by (g), as *Agchiſis*, *aggeps*, *agulus*, &c. for *Anchiſes*, *anceps*, *angulus*, as *Priſcian* and *Varro* aſſure us. Which all now write with (n) before the ſame Conſonants, eſpecially in the ſame Syllable; ſuppoſe (k), (q), (x), and (c), (g), (ch), pronounc'd with a hard, that is their genuine Sound. For the Sound of (n) is different in the Words *thin*, *ſin*, *in*; from that in *ſing*, *ſingle*, *ſink*, *ink*, *lynx*, &c. ſo in *hand*, *band*, *ran*; from what it is in *hang*, *bank*, *rank*, &c. Nay, the Sound of this Letter is vary'd in the very ſame Words: For (n) ſounds otherwiſe in *lon-ger*, *ſtron-ger*, *an-ger*, *drin-ker*; *in-gruo*, *con-gruo*; but otherwiſe in *long-er*, *ſtrong-er*, *ang-er*, *drink-er*; *ing-ruo*, *cong-ruo*. So we hear ſome ſaying *in-quam*, *tan-quam*, *nun-quam*, &c. while others pronounce them as if they was written *inq-wam*, *tanq-wam*, *nunq-wam*; or *ink-wam*, *tank-wam*, *nunk-wam*. When (n) is pronounc'd in the former, the Extremity of the Tongue always ſtrikes the fore-part of the Palate near the roots of the upper Teeth; but in the latter, the ſame Extremity of the Tongue rather depends to the roots of the lower Teeth; but the hinder-part of the Tongue is rais'd to the hinder-part of the Palate, and there intercepts the Sound; to wit, it is form'd in the Mouth in the ſame manner, as (g); but it has the ſame Direction of the Breath with (n). And this, if we are not deceiv'd, is that very Sound which many wou'd give to the *Hebrew* ע, when they teach us to pronounce it by *ng*, *ngh*, *gn*, *nghn*, &c. for they inſinuate ſome Sound, which does not perfectly agree with either (n) or (g), but has ſomething common to both. And we know not but the *Spaniards* mean the ſame Sound by their (ñ) mark'd thus over head.

We call theſe three Conſonants *half Vowels*; for they have a greater proper Sound than thoſe which we lately call'd *half-Mutes*.

Theſe nine Conſonants, which we have diſcours'd of, are form'd by a total Interception of the Breath, ſo that it has no manner of Paſſage through the Mouth, which therefore we nam'd *clos'd*: But the ſame Formation remaining, *if the Breath hardly preſs'd, yet (tho' with difficulty) find an Outlet*, thoſe Conſonants are form'd, which we call *open'd*, which are the *Aſpirates* of all thoſe (except the *half Vowels*) from whence they are deriv'd:

Tongue

More *subtle* and *thin*, if the Breath goes out by an oblong Chink, Slit or Crevice; or more *gross*, if it go out by a round Hole. They are referr'd to the same Classes their *Primitives* were, as being near a-kin to them. We subjoin no *Aspirates* to the *half-Vowels*; not that there is no Sound, when the Breath breaks from him that is about to pronounce them, but because that Sound has not yet, as far as we can discover, obtain'd any Place in the List, or Catalogue of Letters; for it expresses the Lowing of an Ox, or the Humane Sigh; that is, if that be made in the Lips, this chiefly is in the Palate or Throat.

If the Breath escape the Mouth, when we are going to pronounce the Letter (*p*), its Aspirate (*f*), or (*ph*), that is, the *Greek* (φ), the *Arabian* (*Phe*), the *Welsh* (*ff*), is form'd and pronounc'd; nor is it of Consequence whether the Breath gets out by a longish Chink, or by a round Hole; for tho' that Way the Sound is more *subtle* and *fine*, and this more *gross*, yet the Distinction of both is so very nice and small, that we doubt whether they in any Language are express'd by different Letters.

If the Breath break out by a Chink, when we are going to pronounce (*b*), it forms the *English* (*v*) Consonant, &c. The *Spaniard* not seldom gives the same Sound to (*b*), using the Letters (*b*) and (*v*) promiscuously. The *Welsh* express this Sound by (*f*), and the foregoing Sound by (*ff*). The *English Saxons* either had not this Sound, or express'd it by (*f*) in Writing, for they knew nothing of the (*v*) Consonant; and they wrote many Words with (*f*) (as the *English* did after them for some Ages) which are now written with (*v*), as much as those which still are spelt with (*f*); as *gif*, *Heofen*, &c. which now are writ *give*, *Heaven*, &c. The *Arabians* and *Persians* have not this Sound: And the *Turks* pronounce their *Vaw* in this manner, and as a great many, the *Vau* of the *Hebrews* (which some think more properly pronounc'd as the *Arabic Waw*, or *w*). And we doubt not but the *Æolic* (*f*) had this Sound; for since the *Greeks* had before the Character (φ), there was no manner of need to invent a new one to express the same Sound. Beside *Priscian* owns, that the *Latin* (*f*) had formerly the same Pronunciation, that is, the same Sound, that was afterwards given to the (*v*) Consonant, and so the Letter (*f*) past to the Sound of (φ) or (*ph*).

But if the Breath make its Way out *through a round Hole*, the *English* (*w*) is form'd and the *Arabian* (*waw*), which Sound many give to the *Hebrew* (*vau*). But the *German* (*w*), if we mistake not, has a Sound compounded of this and the former Letter; that is, by placing that before this; so that the *English* would spell that with *vwa*, which the *Germans* express by *wa*. This Sound is not very different from the *English* (*oo*), the *French* (*ou*), and the *German* gross or fat (*u*) most rapidly pronounc'd. For this Reason some have thought it a Vowel, tho' it be in reality a Consonant, yet it must be own'd very near a-kin to a Vowel. The *Welsh* make that a Vowel, as well as this a Consonant, expressing them by the same Character (*w*), but when 'tis a Vowel, it is accented over-head, and sounds long; in other Places 'tis a Consonant, its Sound being short; as, *Gŵydd*, (which is two Syllables) a Goose; *gŵyr*, crooked; *gŵyr*, Men. Whenever this Sound in *Latin* follows *s*, *q*, *g*, as in *suadeo*, *quando*, *lingua*, &c. most take it for a Vowel; and perhaps some, who wou'd have it a Consonant in the *English* Words *wade*, *perswade*, *sway*, &c. and yet the Sound is the very same in both Places. But the subjoin'd Vowel in the Diphthongs or double Vowels (*au*), (*eu*), (*ou*), truly pronounc'd, is no other than this very Consonant; as any Man may see by consulting the discerning *Gataker*, in his Treatise of *double Vowels*.

If the Breath more groſly goes ut by the *Hole*, when we are go-ng to pronounce the Letter (*T*), the *reek* (θ) is form'd, the *Arabic The*), &c. and the *Engliſh* (*Th*), *Thigh*, *thin*, *thing*, *thought*, *rong* : The *Anglo-Saxons* for-erly expreſs'd this Sound by this ote (*þ*), which they call'd *Spina*, the *Thorn* : The *Welſh* always rite it with (*th*).

But if the Breath on this Occa-on go more *ſubtilly* out of the outh by a *Chink*, that part of the ongue which is next to the Ex-emity being lifted up, that the reath may, as it were, be flatted thin'd, and preſs'd with a wider, t groſs Form, the *Greek* (σ) is rm'd, the *Hebrew Samech* and *Shin*, e *Arabic Sin* and *Sad*; the *Latin* d *Engliſh* (*ſ*), pronounc'd with right Sound, that is, a *ſharp*, *a-te*, or *ſtridulous*, or *hiſſing* Sound ; in the Words, *Yes*, *this*, *us*, *thus*, *ſs*, *leſs*, *ſend*, *ſtrong*, &c. With is Sound we alſo pronounce ſoft ) before (*e*), (*i*) and (*y*) ; as in *ace*, *Mercy*, *Peace*, *ſince*, *Princi-l*, &c. The *French* ſometimes ve the (*c*) the ſame Sound when has a Tail, as in *Gar*Ç*on*.

If the Breath get out of the outh by a Hole in a groſſer man-, when you are about to pro-unce (*D*), it forms the *Arabic al*, the *Hebrew Daleth*, the ſofter ) of the *Spaniards* ; that is, as t Letter is pronounc'd in the ddle and end of Words, as *Maje-d*, *Trinidad*, &c. The *Engliſh* ite this Sound in the ſame man-as they do another, which we ve lately nam'd ; that is, with ) in *thy*, *thine*, *this*, *tho'*, &c. e *Anglo-Saxons* writ that Sound th (ƿ), but this with (Ð), (ð), is plain from their Writings, o' they ſometimes confounded ſe Characters), but in following es the *Engliſh* expreſs'd both unds by (ƿ), which by degrees, enerated into the Character (ƿ), ich in very many Manuſcripts petually begins thoſe Words which now are written with (*th*). And hence ſprung the Abbreviations of *the*, *that*, *thou*, by ẏ, ẏ, ÿ. The *Welſh* expreſs the former Sound by (*th*), the latter by (*dd*), only ſome pretend that it is better writ-ten by (*dh*), who have not been able to alter the old *Orthography*. But we (as we have obſerv'd) expreſs both Sounds by (*th*), but erroneouſ-ly, ſince neither of them is a com-pounded Sound, but evidently ſim-ple, varying or deſcending almoſt in the ſame manner from the Sounds of (*d*) and (*t*) ; as (*f*) and (*v*) do from the Sounds of (*p*) and (*b*). We grant, that by the ſame Reaſon, that (*ph*) is written for (*f*), (*bh*), (*th*) and (*dh*), might be alſo written, that is in ſome meaſure, to ſhew the Affini-ty and Derivation of the Aſpirate Letters, to thoſe from whence they draw their Original. But it is evi-dent from the following Words, that the genuine Sound compos'd of the Letters, is plainly different from that of the Aſpirate Letter ; as *Cob-ham*, *Chat-ham*, *Wit-ham*, *Mait-ham*, *Wad-ham*, *Wood-houſe*, *Shep-herd*, *Clap-ham*, *Meſs-ham*, &c. And thus we find entirely other Sounds in *Ocham*, *Block-head*, *Hog-herd*, *Cog-hill*, *Houſ-hold*, *Diſ-honour*, *Miſ-hap*, *diſ-honeſt*, *diſ-hearten*, *Maſ-ham*, *Cauſ-ham*, *Wiſ-heart*, &c. than thoſe which we commonly write with (*ch*), (*gh*), (*ſh*) : But the *French*, the *Flemings*, and many others, do not at all, or extreamly little, pronounce either of thoſe Sounds which we expreſs by (*th*); and while the *French* endeavour to pronounce it, they utter (*t*), the *Flemings* (*d*), and ſome others (*ſ*). Yet it is not hard to pronounce theſe genuine Sounds, if we wou'd but take a more peculiar Care of, and have a nearer Regard to their For-mation. That is, all the Parts of the Formation remain the ſame as if we were going to pronounce (*t*) and (*d*), only we ſuffer the Breath to go out of our Mouths here, and not there. We muſt alſo take heed, that for want of Attention, the part of the

Tongue

Tongue next to the Extremity rise a little, and so form the Letters (ſ) and (z); for as (ſ) is to (t), so is (z) to (d), as we shall now explain.

If when you are about to pronounce (d), you extrude the Breath in a more *subtle* manner, as it were thin'd by a Chink or Crevice, (the Part next to the Extremity of the Tongue being to that end lifted up) the *Latin* (z) is form'd, the *Greek* (ζ), the *Hebrew Zain*, and the *Arabian* (ze), which Sound the *English* expreſs by their (z); but they, as well as the *French*, do ſometimes expreſs this Sound by (ſ), eſpecially when it is plac'd between two *Vowels*, and in the end of a Word, as in *Pleaſure*, *Eaſe*, *Laws*, &c. And when a *Name* or *Noun*, with hard (s) in the laſt Syllable is made a *Verb* or *Word*, then this *Verb* or *Word* is pronounc'd with ſoft (ſ), (that is z); ſo a *Houſe*, a *Louſe*, a *Mouſe*, a *Price*, *Advice*, (or *Adviſe*, according to ſome; tho', in our Opinion, the (c) ought to be kept in the Name, as a farther Diſtinction of the *Name* from the *Word* or *Verb*) *cloſe*, *Braſs*, *Glaſs*, *Graſs*, *Greaſe*, end with hard (ſ); but to *houſe*, to *louſe*, to *mouſe*, to *priſe*, or *prize*, (tho' *Prize* with a (z) ſignifies a Purchaſe, a Caption of ſome Ship, &c. or the Reward of ſome Action, or to be obtain'd by ſome Action, &c.) to *adviſe*, to *cloſe*, to *braze*, &c. are pronounc'd with ſoft (ſ) or (z). But other Letters in the like manner have an analogous Alteration. For from the Names *Wife*, *Life*, *Strife*, *Half*, *Calf*, *Safe*, *Breath*, *Cloth*, are pronounc'd with the harder Sounds; they are thus made *Verbs* or *Words*, to *Wive*, to *Live*, to *Strive*, to *Halve*, to *Calve*, to *Save*, to *Breathe*, to *Clothe*. The *Italians* (eſpecially when it is doubled) expreſs (z) ſtronger, as the *Hebrew* (צ), (tz): Thus not a few pronounce in *Latin* Words when (t) goes before (i) and another Vowel follows; as *Piazza*, *Venetia*, they pronounce *Piatza*, *Venetzia*, &c.

We may add to (d), or, if you pleaſe, to (n), two other Letters form'd in the ſame Seat, that is, in the Palate, *viz.* (l) and (r). We chuſe rather to join theſe Letters to (d) and (n), than to the Letter (t) by reaſon of the Concuſſion of the *Larynx*, or Wind-pipe, and the Emmition of the Breath to the Noſtrils in their Pronunciation, of which the Letter (t), and all that are deriv'd from it, are utterly incapable.

The Letter (l) is form'd if while you are about to pronounce the (d) or (n), you gently ſend out the Breath from one or both Sides in the Mouth, and by the Turnings of the Mouth to the open Lips, with Trembling of the Tongue. And the Sound of this Letter, if we are not deceiv'd, is the ſame in all Languages, as the *Hebrew* ל, and the *Greek* λ.

But the *Welſh* have another ſtronger, tho' a kindred Sound to this, which they write with a (ll) to diſtinguiſh it from that of the ſingle (l), by the Breath's being much more forcibly preſs'd into the Mouth, whence proceeds a more frothy Sound, as it were, compounded of (θλ). But this Sound, we think, no other Nation knows, unleſs perhaps the *Spaniards*.

The Letter (r), which is generally call'd the Dog-Letter, is likewiſe form'd in the Palate; that is, when you are about to pronounce (d) or (n), the Extremity of the Tongue being turn'd inward by a ſtrong and frequent Concuſſion, beats the Breath that is going out; from which Conflict that horrid or rough Sound of the (r) proceeds. And the Sound of this Letter is the ſame in all Nations, as the *Hebrew Reſh*, and the *Greek* (ρ). The *Welſh* frequently ſubjoin (h) to this Letter; and their (rh) anſwers the *Greek* aſpirated (῾ρ). They tell us, that the *Americans* bordering on *New England*, or at leaſt a great part of them, cannot pronounce either (l) or (r), but ſubſtitute (n) in the

ace; thus, for *Lobſter*, they ſay, *obſtan*.

If the Breath, being more ſtrictly mpreſs'd, breaks out *more ſubtil-*, when you are about to pronounce ) or hard (*c*), it forms the *Greek* ), the *Arabian* (*cha*), truly pro-unc'd, *&c.* that is by a middle und betwixt (*c*) and (*h*); and this und is very familiar to the *Ger-ans* and *Welſh*, and they both ex-eſs it by *ch*. But it is quite d aſide in *Engliſh*; for our *ch* a quite different Sound, as we all ſhew hereafter.

But if the Breath go out in a groſ- manner, and leſs impreſs'd (by aſon of the more lax Poſition of e Tongue, and larger Exit for e Breath) the *Latin* (*h*) is form'd; d the *Hebrew* and *Arabian* (*He*) d the *Greek aſpirate Spirit*. And is Sound is common to moſt Na-ons. But the *French*, tho' they rite (*h*), ſeldom pronounce it. The fference between the Sound of this d that of the foregoing Letter is ly this, that the Breath in the rmer is expell'd with a greater orce, and by a narrower Paſſage, it were through a Chink, and is erefore nam'd the double *Aſpirate*; is more freely, and as it were rough a Hole or larger Paſſage.

The *Greeks*, as if it were no Let-r, (becauſe its Sound is but ſmall) ll it an *Aſpiration*, and (at leaſt w a-days) ſet it not down in the rect Line of the Letters, but put it ver the Head of a Letter: Tho' rmerly they did ſet 'em before the owels in the direct Line, but they t the (῾) after them, if we are not iſtaken, and this makes them uſe ) for a Note of an Hundred; for hat is now written ῾εκατον, was rmerly written Ηεκατον. But e can ſee no manner of Reaſon hy (*h*) ſhould not be a Conſonant n all other Languages; for it is by o means to be rejected from the Number of Letters, becauſe the ound of it is ſometimes not pro-ounc'd by the *French* and ſome others; for that is no more than is common to many other Letters, eſpecially of the *Hebrew*, and other Oriental Tongues, which are quieſcent or ſilent: Nor becauſe it does not hinder the Eliſion of the foregoing Vowel, when another Vowel follows in the ſubſequent Word; for (*m*) wou'd then lie under the ſame Fate, and (*ſ*) anciently did not hinder this Contraction. But we muſt confeſs, that there is ſome doubt whether the *Latins*, who were ſuch mighty Emulators of the *Greeks*, allow'd (*h*) to be a Letter or not, eſpecially when we find the *Grammarians* ſo earneſtly denying, it with *Priſcian* at the Head of them.

If when you are about to pronounce (ɣ), or the hard (*g*), the Breath being more hardly compreſs'd, goes out by a more ſubtle Chink, as I may ſay, or Slit, that Sound is form'd which is expreſs'd by *gh*. The *Engliſh* ſeem formerly to have had this Sound in the Words *Light*, *Night*, *Right*, *Daughter*, &c. but now they only retain the Spelling, entirely omitting the Sound; but the *North-Country* People, eſpecially the *Scots*, almoſt retain it ſtill, or rather ſubſtitute the Sound of (*h*) in its room. The *Iriſh* in their (*gh*) have exactly this Sound, as in *Logh*, a Lake, *&c.* It differs from the *German* (*ch*) as (*g*) does from (*c*), that is by the Direction of the Breath to the Noſtrils, which neither (*c*) nor (*ch*) can do. But the *Germans* generally write by (*ch*) thoſe very Words which the *Engliſh* write with (*gh*), for their Nacht, recht, liecht, fechten, tochter, anſwer our *Night*, *right*, *light*, *fight*, *Daughter*; and there are many more Words of the ſame kind. The *Latins*, *Greeks*, *Hebrews* and *Arabians* knew nothing of this Sound. The *Perſians* pronounce their *Ghaf* with this Sound, which is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Arabic Kef* by three Points over it.

But if the Breath go out more freely, and as it were through a more large Hole, the *Engliſh* (*y*)

Con-

Consonant is form'd; the *German* (*j*) Consonant, the *Arabian* (*ye*), which Sound many contend belongs to the *Hebrew* (*jod*). For this Sound is very near a-kin to that of the Vowel (*i*) slender, most rapidly pronounc'd. The Diphthongs, as they are call'd *ai*, *ei*, *oi*, or *ay*, *ey*, *oy*, are promiscuously written by (*i*) or (*y*), especially by the *English* and the *French*. *Y* is not only put for (*i*) at the end of Words, but in the middle, when (*i*) follows the Sound of (*i*); as *dying*, *lying*, &c. the *Anglo-Saxons*, and after them the *English*, for many Ages always put a Point over (*y*), when it was us'd for the Vowel (*i*), thus (*ẏ*)

But it is manifest, that there is a great Affinity between this Letter and *g* and *gh*, from those Words, which are now written by *gh*, as *light*, *might*, *thought*, &c. being in the old Manuscripts written with (*y*), in the same Character, as *yet*, *yonder*, &c. For they had a three-fold Figure, one (ꝑ), which we now express by *th*, as we have already observ'd; another which was us'd for (*i*) Vowel, and differing from the former only by the Point over it; and a third (ȝ), which was always put for (*y*) Consonant, and which was found in those Words which we now spell with *gh*: But the Library-keepers, of latter Times, ignorant of the Matter, have by a very gross Error substituted in the room of it the Character of the Letter (*z*), when they made those monstrous Words **thouzt**, **souzt**, &c. for *thought*, *sought*, &c. or rather for *thouyt*, *souyt*, &c. as they were then us'd to be written by (*y*) Consonant, as we may find them in the Impressions of *Chaucer*, and others of the old Poets. We must also add that not a few Words, which we now spell with (*y*), the old *Saxons* and now most commonly the *Germans*, wrote with *g*; for our Words *Slay*, *Sayl*, *say*, *pay*, *day*, *rain*, and many more, are partly by the *Anglo-Saxons*, and partly by the *Germans* written **Schlagen**, **segel**, **segen**, **sag**, **tag**, **tegen**. And on the contrary many Words which are now written with (*g*), were formerly written with (*y*); as, *again*, *against*, *given*, &c. were anciently written *ayen*, *ayenst*, *yeuven*, &c.

Thus we have run through all the simple Sounds that we know, and have given Rules for their several Formations, and distributed them into their several Families and Classes; and as we have of the Vowels, so shall we here of the Consonants, give you a Plan, which your Eye may view all at once.

| Consonants, | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Labial or Lip | Mute — *P* | F I F | | | |
| | Half-Mute — *B* | *V* I *W* | | | |
| | Half-Vowels *M* | *a Lowing* | | | |
| Palatine or Palate | Mute — *T* | *S* I *T H* | | | |
| | Half-Mute - *D* | *Z* I *D H* | | *L. R.* | |
| | Half-Vowel - *N* | *a Sigh* | | | |
| Guttural or Throat | Mute — *C* | *CH* I *H* | | | |
| | Half-Mute -- *G* | *GH* I *Y* | | | |
| | Half-Vowel — *n* | *a Sigh* | | | |
| | | *more subtil,* | *more gross,* | | |
| | | Aspirates, | | | |

As we have ſaid ſomething of the Compound Sounds of the Vowels, we ſhall add a Word or two here of the Compound Conſonants. The *Engliſh* (j) Conſonant, or ſoft (g), or (dg), is compounded of (d) and (y), as is plain from *Jar*, *joy*, *gentle*, *lodging*, which ſound *Dyar*, *dyoy*, *dyentle*, *lodying*, &c. the *Arabian* *Jjien* (which Letter, tho' it deſcend from the *Hebrew Gimel*, retains not its Sound) and the *Italian Gi*.

The *French* (j) Conſonant and ſoft (g) is compounded of the Conſonants (zy); for their *Je*, *J*; *age*, *aye*, &c. are *Zye*, *azye*, &c. the *Perſians* expreſs this Sound by their *Zye*; which is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Arabian Ze* by having three Points over it.

The *German* (j) Conſonant is plainly a ſimple Sound, that is, as we have ſaid, the ſame with the *Engliſh* (y).

The *Engliſh* (ſh), the *French* (ch), the *German* (ſch), the *Hebrew* and *Arabic* (*ſhin*) ſound (ſy), for the *French Chambre*, the *Engliſh ſhame*, and the *German ſcham*, ſound *Syame*, *ſyame*, *ſyam*. The *Welſh* expreſs this Sound by (ſi), wherefore with them (with a Note of Production over the following Vowel) *ſion*, (*John*), is a *Monoſyllable*, but *Sion* (Mount *Sion*) a Word of two Syllables.

The *Engliſh* (ch) or (tch), ſounds (ty), for *Orchard*, *Riches*, &c. ſound *Rit-yard*, *Rit-yes*, &c. The *Italians* pronounce their (c) thus before (e) and (i). The *Perſians*, to expreſs this Sound, beſides the *Arabic* Alphabet, make uſe of their (*che*), which, by having three Points beneath it, is diſtinguiſh'd from the *Arabic Gjim*. If before the *Engliſh* Word *yew*, you ſeverally put *d*, *t*, *ſ*, it will be made *dyew*, *tyew*, *ſyew*, *jew*, which is the *Engliſh Jew*, *chew*, *ſhew*, and the *French Jeu*, Play. The (X) of the *Latins*, and almoſt all other Languages, and the *Greek* (ξ), is compos'd of (cſ), (κσ).

This Letter is not known to the *Hebrews*, nor the Oriental Tongues; but in the room of it they write thoſe ſimple Letters of which it is compos'd; which the *Germans* likewiſe often do, for their *Ochs*, *wachs*, *ſechs*, *ſechſt*, &c. are the *Engliſh Ox*, *wax*, *ſix*, *ſixt*; the *Welſh* always write this with (cſ).

The *Latin* (k) was anciently put (ca), and they promiſcuouſly wrote *Calenda*, and *Kalendæ*; but it now generally has the ſame ſimple Sound which the *Greek* (κ), whence it is deriv'd, or the *Latin* (c), and it wou'd be plainly a ſuperfluous Letter if (c) always retain'd its genuine Sound; and therefore the *Welſh*, whoſe (c) has always one conſtant Sound, have no ſuch Letter, as well as ſome other Nations.

The *Latin* (q) of old, put for (cu) or rather (cw), which has always (u) after it, has the very ſame Sound with (c) or (k) and is a ſuperfluous Letter. The *Welſh* have it not, but always put for (q), (cw), or (chw). And the *Anglo-Saxons* wrote *Cpen*, that is, *Cwen* for *Queen*.

The *Engliſh* (wh) is pronounc'd perfectly (hw), and the *Anglo-Saxons* us'd to place them ſo; and we cannot tell how the ſucceeding *Engliſh* came to invert the Poſition, and ſet the (w) before the (h).

But this is worthy our Obſervation, That the Conſonants (y) and (w), tho' it be not minded, moſt commonly are ſubjoin'd to kindred Conſonants before kindred Vowels; that is, (y) is often ſubjoin'd to the Guttural Conſonants (c) (g), when a Palatine Vowel follows; for *can*, *get*, *begin*, &c. ſound as if they were written *cyan*, *gyet*, *begyin*, &c. for the Tongue can ſcarce paſs from theſe Guttural Conſonants, to form the Palatine Vowels, but it muſt pronounce (y). But it is not ſo before the other Vowels, as in *call*, *Gall*, *go*, *Gun*, *Gooſe*, *come*, &c. (W) is ſometimes ſubjoin'd to the Labial or Lip Conſonants (p) and (b) eſpecially before open (o); as *Pot*, *Boy*, *boil*,

*boil*, &c. which are sounded as if spelt thus, *Pwot*, *Bwoy*, *bwoil*, &c. but this is not always done, nor by all Men.

We have (*page* 2) consider'd Letters, as the Signs of Sounds, but have not yet examin'd the *Analogy* they bear to the Sounds they represent. We have already said, that *Sounds* are taken for the Signs of our Thoughts, and that Men invented certain Figures, to be the Signs of those *Sounds*. But whereas these Figures or Characters, in their first Institution, signifie immediately only the *Sounds*, yet Men often carry'd their Thoughts of the Characters, to the very *Things* which the *Sounds* signify'd; whence it comes to pass, that the Characters may be consider'd two ways, *viz.* either as they simply signify the *Sound*, or as they assist us in conceiving that which is signify'd by the *Sound*.

Four Things are necessary to give them their Perfection in the first State.

(1.) That every Figure or Character mark or denote some *Sound*: that is to say, That no Character be set down in any Word, but what is pronounc'd.

(2.) That every *Sound*, which is express'd in the Pronunciation, be mark'd with some Figure: that is to say, That we pronounce nothing but what is written.

(3.) That every Figure mark only one simple, or compounded Sound.

(4.) That one and the same *Sound*, be not mark'd by more Figures than one.

But considering the Character in the second manner, that is to say, As they help us in the Conception of those Things, which the *Sounds* signify; we find sometimes, that it is for the Better, that the foregoing Rules are not always observ'd, especially the first and the last.

Because first, it often happens in those Languages, which are deriv'd from Others, that there are certain Letters, which are not pronounc'd and which, for that reason, are of no manner of use to the Sound, but are yet useful in helping us to understand that which the Words signifie. As for Example, in the French Words, *Champs*, *Temps*, and *Chant* the (*p*) and (*t*) are not pronounc'd which are of use to the significatio because by them we find, that the first comes from *Campus*, and *Tempus*, the later from *Cantus*.

In Hebrew itself there are Wor which differ only by one ending *Aleph*, and the other in *Hame* that are not pronounc'd; as אָ which signifies *to fear* or *dread*, יָרָה, *to throw, fling, cast*, &c.

Hence 'tis plain, that this Ab of Words (as 'tis call'd) is not wit out its Benefit to the Language.

The difference between the Ca tals and Small Letters, may seem some a Contradiction to the four Rule, That *one and the same Sou be not mark'd with more than Figure*: And for this Reason, th urge, that the ancient, as well as t present Hebrew, had none of th difference; and that the *Greeks* a *Romans*, for a long time, made u of only Capital Letters in their Wri ting. But this Distinction is of gre Advantage, and Beauty, in mingli with a pleasing Variety the Ca tals and Small Letters, in the beg ning of Periods, proper Names, and to distinguish Names fro Words of Affirmation, and all oth Parts of Speech.

Besides, this Objection will b against the Difference of Hands, Figures of Writing or Printing, the Roman, *Italic*, German, &c. the Impression of this very Book, any other Language, ancient or m dern, which is very usefully e ploy'd in the Distinction, either certain Words, or certain Discour and Sentences, which conveys t Force and Energy intended by Author, to the Reader, and does at all change the Pronunciation.

Tho' what we have said be fr

ient to ſhow, that the uſe of Letters which are not pronounc'd, is not ſo great an Imperfection as generally imagin'd, at leaſt in thoſe inſtances, and Particulars of Words deduc'd from other Languages; yet it muſt be allow'd, that there are too many crept in by a Corruption which has ſpread it ſelf through ſeveral Languages. Thus it muſt be confeſs'd, that it is a certain Abuſe to give the Sound of (*s*) to (*c*), before an (*e*) and (*i*), and of pronouncing (*g*) before the ſame Vowels, otherwiſe than before the others; of having ſoften'd the (*s*) between two Vowels; and of giving (*t*) the Sound of (*s*) before (*i*), follow'd by another Vowel, as *Gratia*, *Action*, *Diction*, &c.

Some People have imagin'd, that they cou'd Correct this Fault in the Vulgar Tongues, by inventing new Characters, as Mr. *Lodwick* has done in his univerſal *Alphabet*, and *Ramus*, in his *Grammar* of the *French Tongue*, by retrenching every Letter that was not pronounc'd, and writing every Sound by that Letter, to which the Sound to be expreſs'd was proper, as by placing an (*s*) before (*i*) and (*e*), and not a (*c*) and the like: But he, and all others of his Mind, ought to conſider, that beſides the Diſadvantage this wou'd be to the Vulgar Tongues, for the Reaſons urg'd before, they wou'd attempt an Impoſſibility; and they little think how difficult a thing it is to change, and bring the People of a whole Nation to the change of a Character they have been us'd to, Time out of Mind; and the Emperor *Claudius* found himſelf diſappointed in an Attempt of this Nature, and was fain to lay aſide his Deſign of introducing a Character he had prepar'd.

All that can be done in this particular, is to retrench by degrees all thoſe Letters which are of no Uſe, either to the Pronunciation, or the Senſe, or Analogy of Languages, as the *French*, and we have begun to do; and to preſerve thoſe, that are uſeful, and to ſet ſome certain ſmall Marks to diſtinguiſh them from thoſe, which are pronounc'd, or which may intimate to us the ſeveral Pronunciations of the ſame Letter. But even this labours under a Difficulty not to be remov'd but by degrees, and in many Years; for the altering any of the preſent, or adding any new Characters at once, wou'd be of no manner of Uſe, while all the chief Books of the Language are without theſe Marks or Alterations, and ſo many People muſt be oblig'd to learn their *Alphabet* over again, or be puzl'd to read what wou'd then be Written or Printed. And indeed, the Rules we have given in theſe Caſes, will (we perſuade our ſelves) be of more Uſe than all theſe Projects for directing the Learner. Yet, to omit nothing that has been offer'd with any Probability, we ſhall add the Method of a *French* Author, to this End; a Point above or below will ſerve for the firſt Caſe, and when (*c*) is pronounc'd like (*s*), it may have a Tail added; and when the (*g*) is pronounc'd like an (*j*) Conſonant, its Tail need not be quite clos'd.

*The End of the* First Part.

# Part II.

## Chap. V.

### Of Syllables.

*A* Syllable's *a compleat and perfect Sound,*
*In which one ſingle, or one double* Vowel's *found;*
*Or either join'd with* Conſonants, *and ſpoke*
*In one ſole breathing, as in* Cloke.

[1] A Syllable is a compleat Sound utter'd in o Breath, which ſometimes conſiſts of one *Vow* or double *Vowel*, ſometimes of one *Vowel*, double *Vowel* join'd to one or more *Conſonants*, not exceedi ſeven in Number.

By this Definition it is plain, that one ſingle Vowel m compoſe a Syllable; as the firſt Syllables in the followi Words, *A-braham*, *E-ternal*, *I-vory*, *O-rient*, *U-nity*. But nu

[1] The Word SYLLABLE is deriv'd from the Latin *Syllaba*, and that from the *Greek* Word συλλαβὴ from συλλαμβάνειν, which is to comprehend; ſo that *Syllaba*, in the Latitude of the Term, may be taken for any Comprehenſion or Connection in general, but in a *Grammatical* Senſe, only for a Connection of Letters in one Sound. *Scaliger* has defin'd a *Syllable* to be an Element under one Accent, that is, what can be pronounc'd at once: *Priſcian* more plainly has it, *Comprehenſio Literarum*, &c. *a Comprehenſion of Letters falling under one Accent, and produc'd by one Motion of breathing.* Yet this has been rejected by ſome GRAMMARIANS, as imperfect, and excluding all Syllables of one Letter: Another has defin'd it thus, *A* SYLLABLE *is a literal or articulate Voice of an i dividual Sound*; for every Syll muſt fall under the ſame Accent, as many Vowels as may occur i Word, to be produc'd under div Accents, or with ſeveral Motions the breathing ſo many Syllables; a on the contrary, tho' there be ſev ral Vowels, if they are pronoun under one Accent, and with o Breathing, they make but one *Syllable.*

In every Word, therefore, the are as many Syllables as there a vocal Sounds, and vocal Sounds a Vowels ſimple or compound, a each of theſe in its Formation, r quires a diſtinct Motion of the P ctoral Muſcles. Thus *a*, *a*, *a*, mak three Syllables, form'd by ſo ma Motions, diſtinguiſh'd by ſmall Sto betwixt each Expiration or Breath i

number of Conſonants can be ſounded without a Vowel, for tho', after the *Mutes* and *Liquids*, (*bl*), (*cr*), in *Table* and *Acre*, the (*e*) be quieſcent, or at leaſt obſcure, yet that Sound, which is expreſs'd by thoſe Conſonants, is deriv'd from that (*e*), by which, making a ſort of Sound, we think (*bl*) and (*cr*) are not juſt Exceptions made to this Rule, for from Verſification it is plain, that *Table* is compos'd of a long and a ſhort Syllable.

*As many* Vowels *as emit a Sound,*
*So many* Syllables *in Words are found.*

As many Vowels, or double Vowels, as are found in any Word, of ſo many Syllables is that Word compos'd, except any of the Vowels be ſilent or quieſcent, as the final (*e*), and ſome Vowels which make the improper double Vowels, the Rules of which have been already given in the *Firſt Part* treating of LETTERS, and the (*e*) which is added to ſome Syllables in the middle of Words; as the (*e*) in *Advancement* and *Rudesby*, which ſerve only to lengthen the foregoing Vowel. Except likewiſe Words ending in (*es*), and no (*s*) coming before (*e*); as *Names*, *Trades*, &c. but if (*s*), or the Sound of (*s*), comes before (*es*), it is another Syllable; as *Horſes*, *Aſſes*, &c. *Faces*, *Races*, *Pages*, *Prizes*: And when (*u*) follows (*g*) or (*q*); as in *Quart*, *Guide*, *Guilt*, &c. and when (*e*) is follow'd by (*n*); as in *even*, *Heaven*, &c. but when this (*e*) is generally left out, they become one Syllable every where.

*Eight Letters in ſome* Syllables *we find,*
*And no more* Syllables *in Words are join'd.*

[2] As there are but eight Letters in any Syllable, ſo has no Word above ſeven or eight Syllables (and few in *Engliſh* ſo many) as *Re-con-ci-li-a-ti-on*, *In-com-pre-hen-ſi-bi-li-ty.*

To divide Syllables juſtly in Writing, eſpecially when part of a Word is written in one Line, and part in another, this is a general Rule.

*When any ſingle* Conſonant *is ſeen,*
*Single or double* Vowels *plac'd between,*
*The* Conſonant *divides ſtill with the laſt,*
*But to the firſt the* (P) *and* (X) *joins faſt.*

When

ing, whereas one (*a*) of the ſame length, is form'd but by one.

[2] In *Hebrew*, all the Syllables begin with a Conſonant, allowing *Aleph* to be one, and a Syllable has never more than one Vowel.

When a single Consonant comes between two Vowels, or between a single and double-Vowel, it must in the dividing Syllables be joyn'd to the later.

Except when (x) or (p) comes between two Vowels; for they are joyn'd to the first, as in *Ex-ample, Ox-en, up-on*; except *Su-pine.*

*In compound Words its own will each retain,*
*The same additional Endings must obtain.*

Except Compounds, where each Word compounding retains its proper Letters; as *un-arm'd, un-usual, in-ure, adorn, with-out, with-in, Safe-ty, love-ly, Name-less,* &c.

When a Word receives an additional Termination, or ending; as *(ed) Wing-ed*; *(edst) Deliver-edst*; *(eth) Deliver-eth*; (for which *Delivers* is now written, and the former ending entirely rejected) *(est) Deliver-est*; *(ing) Deliver-ing*; *(er) Deliver-er*; *(ance) Deliver-ance.*

*The* Consonants *preceeding* (l) *and* (r),
*Follow'd by* (e) *never divided are.*

As *in-se-pa-ra-ble, Tri-fle, Mi-tre,* &c. But this Rule seems included in that of initial Consonants.

*Two* Consonants *betwixt two* Vowels *plac't,*
*If they begin a Word, pursue the last.*
*But those that can no Word at all begin,*
*Can ne'er a* Syllable, *without a Sin.*

When two Consonants come between two Vowels, if they be such as can begin a Word, they both go to the latter Vowel; but if they cannot begin a Word, they must be parted, one joyning the first Vowel, and the other the latter.

To make this the plainer, we shall here enumerate the double-Consonants that can begin Words; which you may easily know by putting (e), or any other Vowel, after them, and if they naturally and easily fall into one articulate Sound, they can begin a Word; if not, they must be parted into distinct Syllables.

These Consonants that begin Words, are Thirty in number.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Bl.* | *Bleed* | *Gl.* | *Glory* |
| *Cl.* | *Clear* | *Pl.* | *Plane* |
| *Fl.* | *Fleet* | *Sl.* | *Slight* |
| *Br.* | *Brave* | *Gr.* | *Grove* |
| *Cr.* | *Croud* | *Pr.* | *Prince* |
| *Dr.* | *Dry* | *Tr.* | *Treat* |
| *Fr.* | *Frost* | *Wr.* | *Wrath.* |

*Ch.*

| | |
|---|---|
| *Ch.* Change | *Sn.* Snare |
| *Dw.* Dwarf | *Sp.* Spill |
| *gn.* gnaw | *Sq.* Squib |
| *Kn.* Knave | *ſt.* ſtill |
| *Qu.* Queen | *Sw.* Swear |
| *ſc.* ſcant | *th.* this |
| *ſh.* ſhow | *tw.* two |
| *ſm.* ſmart | *Wh.* Wheel. |

Nine ways Words begin with three Conſonants, as,

| | |
|---|---|
| *Scb.* Scheme | *Spl.* Spleen. |
| *Scr.* Screen | *ſtr.* ſtrain |
| *Shr.* Shrine | *Thr.* Three |
| *Skr.* Skrew | *Thw.* Thwart |
| *Spr.* Spread | |

In ſhort, all this Rule is compriz'd in this, that a *Mute* and a *Liquid* following one-another, go together with the laſt Vowel, but all double-Conſonants in the middle beſides, are divided.

To this, as well as the former Rules, this Exception holds, That Compounds keep each its Part, as has been obſerv'd; and additional Endings are diſtinct Syllables.

But ſuch Conſonants as cannot begin a Word, can never begin a Syllable, and muſt therefore be parted in the Diviſion of Syllables; as in *ſel-dom*, for *(ld)* can't begin a Word; *(lt)* in *Mul-tiply*, *Trumpet*, *ar-dent*, *Can-did*, *ac-cord*, *ſwag-ger*, &c.

When three or more Conſonants meet in the middle of a Word, that Word is generally a Compound, and therefore each keeping its own, generally the firſt Conſonant goes to the firſt Vowel, and the other to the latter; as in *Con-tract*, *In-ſtruction*, &c.

*Two* Vowels *meeting each with its full ſound,*
*Always to make two* Syllables *are bound.*

If two Vowels come together, and both fully ſounded, they muſt be divided, and make two Syllables, as *Re-enter*, *Mu-tual*, &c.

*The following Obſervations relating to Syllables, or to the Pronunciation of Letters, as they are plac'd in Syllables, and not ſingly by themſelves, we thought more proper for this place, than where they have been plac'd by Others; for to talk of the Pronunciation of Syllables, before the Learner knows what a Syllable is, ſeems ſomething prepoſterous.*

The

The Sound of (*shal*) in Words of more Syllables than one is written in some by (*ti*) before (*al*), as *Credential*, *Equinoctial*, *Essential*, *Nuptial*, *Impartial*, &c. Some others write (*ci*) before (*al*), as *Artificial*, *Beneficial*, *Judicial*, *Prejudicial*, &c. and the Reason is, that the Primitive Words from whence these are deriv'd, end in (*ce*), as *Artifice*, *Benefice*, *Prejudice*, &c. or from the *Latin* Words, in which as (*t*), or (*c*) is us'd, it continues in *English*, as *Judicial*, from *Judicialis*, &c.

The Sound of (*shan*), must be written (*cian*), as *Arithmetician*, *Grecian*, *Logician*, *Magician*, &c. from *Arithmetic*, *Greece*, *Logic*, and *Magic*; and so all others from the (*t*) in *Latin*, except *Ocean*, *Precisian*, *Tertian*, *Egyptian*, *Asian*, &c.

The Sound of (*shate*) is expres's'd by (*ti*), before (*ate*), in *Gratiate*, *expatiate*, *negotiate*, *vitiate*, &c. except *emaciate*, *Associate*, *Nauseate*.

The Sound of (*shent*) is written by (*cient*), in *Ancient*, *Proficient*, &c. (*cient*), in *Patient*, *Impatient*, &c. and (*scient*) in *Omniscient*, &c.

The Sound of *zhun*, or *shun* in the End of Words, must be written (*tion*), with (*t*), except *Allusion*, *Animadversion*, *Ascension*, *Aspersion*, *Aversion*, *Circumcision*, *Collision*, *Collusion*, *Comprehension*, *Compulsion*, *Conclusion*, *Condescension*, *Confusion*, *Contusion*, *Convulsion*; *Decision*, *Decursion*, *Delusion*, *Division*, *Diffusion*, *Dimension*, *Discursion*, *Dispansion*, *Dispersion*, *Dissension*, *Distension*, *Dissuasion*, *Diversion*, *Division*, *Divulsion*; *Effusion*, *Emulsion*, *Erosion*, *Evasion*, *Eversion*, *Excision*, *Exclusion*, *Excursion*, *Expansion*, *Explosion*, *Expulsion*, *Extension*, *Extrusion*; *Illusion*, *Immersion*, *Incision*, *Inclusion*, *Incursion*, *Inhesion*, *Insertion*, *Introversion*, *Intrusion*, *Invasion*, *Irrision*; *Mansion*; *Occasion*, *Occision*, *Occlusion*; *Pension*, *Persuasion*, *Provision*; *Reprehension*, *Reversion*, *Revulsion*; *Sponsion*, *Suffusion*; *Version*: To these add the following Words in (*ssion*), as *Admission*, *Commission*, *Compassion*, *Compression*, *Concession*, *Concussion*, *Confession*; *Decession*, *Depression*, *Dismission*; *Expression*; *Impression*, *Intercession*; *Mission*; *Omission*, *Oppression*; *Passion*, *Percussion*, *Permission*, *Procession*, *Profession*, *Progression*; *Secession*, *Session*, *Succession*.

The following Words written (*sition*), tho' most of the like Sound are spelt (*tition*), as *Petition*; *Acquisition*, *Composition*, *Deposition*, *Disposition*, *Disquisition*; *Exposition*; *Inquisition*, *Interposition*; *Position*; *Transition*, *Transposition*. [3]

[3] At the End of this short *Part* our Division, we shall lay down a w Method of learning to Read in l Languages, as we find it in a *rench* Author, and which perhaps ingenious School-master may nprove to the Advantage of his holars: To which we shall add, hat Mr. *Lodwick*, our own Coun-yman, has advanc'd on the same ead.

This Method (says our Author) re-rds chiefly those, who cannot ead: It is certain, that the Learn-s find no great difficulty in learn-g the Letters themselves, but the rdest Labour and Pains they go rough, is in joining the Letters gether in Syllables. For every etter has its peculiar Name, which pronounc'd differently by it self, om what it is in Conjunction with her Letters; for Example, If you ach a Child to pronounce *Fry* in a llable, you first make him pro-ounce *ef*, *er*, *y*; which must per-ctly confound him, when he comes joyn these three Sounds together, t of them to form the Sound of e Syllable *Fry*.

The same Observation is made by r. *Lodwick*; As the present *Al-habet*, says he, are imperfect, so are lso the *Primmers*, or first *Books*, herein Children are taught to Spell nd Read. First, In not having a erfect *Alphabet*. And Secondly, not being digested in such a Me-hod, as is fit and proper to teach hem as they ought to be taught. or the usual Way of teaching to pell, is to dismember every Syllable f more than one Letter) into many yllables, by expressing every Letter part, and *Syllabically*; and the onsonants with such a Vowel as ey are ordinarily nam'd with, and hen requiring them to join all these yllables into one Word.

But how prepostrous this Me-hod is, one Instance for all will ma-ifest: Suppose the Monosyllable *rand*, to be spell'd, they will teach hem thus to dismember it; *Bee*, *er*, *en*, *dee*, and then require them to join these into one Syllable, which 'tis impossible for them to do, and they must express this one Syllable by five Syllables, which was not de-sign'd; whereas they shou'd teach them to express every Syllable en-tire at first sight, without dismem-bering it; and to do this, they must proceed gradually: First beginning with the most *simple Syllables*, and so by degrees proceeding to the more difficult and *compounded*, till they can readily pronounce a whole Syl-lable at first sight; even the most difficult that are. To that end let all the *Primmers* be thus contriv'd; at the top of the Leaf, let all the Vo-wels be plac'd singly in Order, as they follow in one Rank, and in the same place Syllables, 1*st*, Of *one Vowel*, and *one Consonant* following it, throughout all the Variations; then of *one Consonant*, and *one Vowel* following that. 2*dly*, Of *two Conso-nants* before, and *one Vowel* follow-ing throughout the Variations. 3*dly*, Of *one Vowel*, and *three* or *four Consonants* following; and of *three Consonants* going before, and *one Vowel* following. 4*thly*, Of *one*, *two*, and *three Consonants* going before a *Vowel*; and *one*, *two*, *three*, or *four Consonants* following. 5*thly*, Of some Syllables with Diphthongs and Triphthongs. For Example:

*a. e. i. o. u*, &c.
*ab. eb. ib. ob. ub*, &c.
*ad. ed. id. od. ud*, &c.
*ba. be. bi. bo. bu*, &c.
*ald. eld. ild. old. uld*, &c.
*dra. dre. dri. dro. dru*, &c.
*balm. belm. bilm. bolm. bulm*, &c.

After this, place a number of Words of *two*, *three*, or *four Syla-bles*, from the more easy, to the more difficult Expressions, without heed to their Significations; tho' in our Opinions, if there cou'd be some Order and Connections in their Signification, it would help the Me-mory: Further, let there follow some Words of several Syllables, with the Accent variously plac'd, as on the *first*, *second*, and *third*, &c.

Thus

Thus far Mr. *Lodwick*, who proceeds farther, but that relating too much to his Universal *Alphabet*, can not have a place here.

To this we shall add some Rules of Spelling, which tho' we did not think full enough of Demonstration to be inserted in the Body of the Rules, yet since they really afford Matter of Speculation sufficient to employ the curious Teacher or Learner of his *Mother Tongue*, and may perhaps be render'd capable of Improvement, we shall here add. They were given us by one Dr. *Jones*, who (as we ghess by his Name) being a *Welsh-man*, may, in some Particulars of his Book, be misled by the Pronunciation of his own Tongue; yet is his Book worth our Consideration. But this will be plainer from his Observations.

His Maxims are, first, *That all Words were Originally Written as Spelt.* Tho' this may be disputed, yet the Consequence is not so great as to make us enter into the Controversie.

His next is, *That all Terms which have since alter'd their Sound*, (the Origin of the difficulty of Spelling) *did it for Ease and Pleasure.*

From the *harder*, *harsher*, *longer*, to the *easier*, *pleasanter*, and *shorter* Sounds, which for that Reason became the more usual. From hence it follows, *That all Words that can be sounded several ways, must be Written according to the hardest, harshest, longest and most unusual Sound.* And this Rule, he assures us, is without Exception in our Tongue.

The longest Sound is that which expresses most simple Sounds, or sounds the same number after the longest manner, thus, if you say *agen* and *again*, it must be written *again*; because it sounds more Letters. The same may be said of *Favor* and *Favour*.

The more unusual Sound is known to all, by common Practice.

Thus none can fail to know which is the *longest* and most *unusual Sound*, and that its sufficient almost in all Cases, because the length and unusualness of the Sound, causes it to be the harder Sound, which is the third thing to be observ'd in this universal Rule.

But to make the use of this Rule compleat, because it may happen that some Words (tho' not many) may sound divers ways, and yet express the same number of Letters, and that in the same manner, either long or short, and both Sounds alike usual, as in *Anger*, and *Angur*; *Finger*, and *Fingur*, &c. it will be useful to know which in such a Case is the easier and pleasanter simple Sound, and to which harder and harsher Sounds they are so like, as that they are apt to exchange Sounds with 'em.

*A* is much easier than *E* or *O*; *B*, than *P*; *D*, than *T* or *th* in *tho'*; *E*, than *I*, *O*, *U*; *EE*, than *E*, *I*, *O*; *G*, than *C* for *K*, or hard *C*, or *ch* in *chew*; *M*, *ng*, than *N*; *Ou*, than *O* or *U*; *Sh*, than *Ch* or *S*; *T* in *The*, than *Th*; short *U*, than *A*, *E*, *I*, *O*; *V*, than *F* or *Ph*; *Z*, than *S* in *so*.

Simple Sounds are easier than Compounds; Compounds of two Sounds, than Compounds of three, and so on; and Compounds of easie Sounds, than Compounds of hard Sounds.

Double Characters are to be reckon'd as single, if they have but one Sound.

We have omitted the particular Proofs of these Rules, which the Reader may consult his Book for, if his Curiosity prompt him; this being sufficient to give Ground to his Enquiry; And, we believe, in trying, he will find 'em sometimes pretty true, if not always.

*The End of the* Second Part.

Part

# Part III.

# Of WORDS. [1]

## INTRODUCTION.

WE come now from meer Sounds, to [2] *Words*, which convey ſomething to the Underſtanding: For by theſe we are able to expreſs our Thoughts, or Sentiments of all that we ſee, feel, hear, taſte, touch, or underſtand. All *Knowledge* indeed draws its Original from the Senſes; and our *Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reaſoning*, under which the ſeveral Claſſes, or Orders of Words, are rang'd, proceed from theſe Notices of Things, and Beings, and their Relations to each other, and have no other Source: By theſe we know, that there are Things; that theſe Things have certain Qualities, Beings, Actions, or Paſſions, *&c.* whence it ſeems pretty plain, that the *Words*, which are to expreſs our Sentiments of theſe Things, muſt bear ſome Proportion and Likeneſs to the Things they are to expreſs. Being therefore in *Converſation*, or *Writing* to expreſs or ſignifie all the Objects of our Senſes, and the mental, or intellectual Deductions from them, *Words* are naturally, to that End, to be divided into four original Claſſes or Orders, i. e. *Things*, or rather the *Names* of *Things*; the *Qualities* of thoſe Things, the *Circumſtances*, *Actions*, *Paſſions*, and *Beings* of Things, with their *Relations*, *Regards*, and *Connections* to, and with each other in Sentences.

According to this, there are four Parts of Speech, or four Heads, to which every *Word* in all Languages may be reduc'd.

*The four Parts of Speech.*

[3] NAMES. } { AFFIRMATIONS.
QUALITIES. } { PARTICLES, or the *Manners* of *Words*.

[1] It may here be proper to Explain what we mean by a *Word*, which we think may be thus defin'd: *A distinct articulate Sound, which Men have made the audible Sign of some one of their Thoughts.* Or if we rather take it from Words, as Written and Spoken, we may define it thus. *Words are distinct articulate Sounds, implying by common Consent, some Thoughts or Operations of the Mind, expres'd by some certain Marks, Figures, or Characters agreed on by Men, as the visible Signs of those Sounds and Thoughts.*

This last Definition includes Words in both Senses, that is, both as Spoken and Written.

[2] Man being a Conversible Animal, and form'd for Society, there was a Necessity of some Way or Means of conveying the Mind, or Thoughts of one Man to another; which tho' it might be in some measure done by the Eyes, Hands, Fingers, Motions and Gesticulations of the Body, *&c.* as in the Pantomimes of the Ancients, and Mutes of the Seraglio, *&c.* yet those being more imperfect, as well as more troublesome and tedious, Nature, (which always chooses the easiest and most efficacious Way) directs Mankind to impart the Sentiments of his Mind, rather by the Voice, and the Motions of the Tongue, which are more easy in the several Variations of Sounds, than any other Way. For this Reason, Men have distinguish'd every Modification of the Voice, by a particular Letter, (of which we have already discours'd at large, both in the Text, and the Notes); and tho' these Letters are not many in number, yet are they by their various Conjunctions, sufficient for all the Languages that ever were, or ever can be in the Universe. They are indeed but Twenty-six in our Tongue, and yet they may be so variously dispos'd, as to make more than five Hundred and Seventy-six several Words of two Letters; and Twenty-six times as many Words may be form'd of three Letters; that is to say, Fifteen thousand and six; and Twenty-six times as many more may be made of four several Letters, that is, Nine hundred thousand thirty-six; and so on in proportion. From this manifold Generation of Words, from the various Combinations of Letters, we may judge of their vast Variety, as being indeed not much less than Infinite.

[3] In all Languages there are *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*: *Names* signifie *Things*; *Qualities* signifie the Manners or Qualities of those Things; *Affirmations* affirm something of them. And there are other Words which signify neither of these, but the relation of one to the other, and those are the *Manners of Words*: But these Relations of Words to Words are of several Kinds, which are expres'd by some of these Particles, or short Words, *of, to, for, O, by, with, through, in,* &c. of which in *Construction.*

It is true, that some have endeavour'd to reduce all Words to three Classes, which we shall consider in our Notes; but others vainly boast, or pretend to contract 'em yet closer into two, either ignorant of the Operations of the Mind, which they were invented to express, and which can never be brought into that compass; as will be plain from what follows; or for want of considering what they say; or to be thought Men of wonderful Penetration by ignorant Hearers. Those Gentlemen, who have with great Clearness of Reason propos'd them under three Heads, have however told us, that some Philosophers have thought themselves oblig'd to add a fourth, distinct from the other three; as will appear from the Sequel.

*Words* having something corporeal and something spiritual in 'em, we may say, they consist of Soul and Body: The Ideas of the Mind, when they command the Organs of the Voice, to form such Sounds, which

are

are the audible Signs of thoſe Ideas, are the *Souls* of Words; but Sounds form'd by the Organs of the Voice, are the material Part, and may be call'd the *Body* of *Words*.

We ſhall therefore, here conſider them, as they are abſtracted from Sound, in their Relation to the Mind of Man, and in which we have the Advantage of all other Creatures, and a very ſtrong Proof of our Reaſon Superiour to them; that is, by the Uſe we make of *Words*, to convey our Thoughts to each Other, and that ſurprizing Invention of combining ſix and twenty Sounds in ſo multiplicious a manner, as we have ſaid, by which we diſcover the Variety of our Thoughts, and all our Sentiments on all manner of Subjects, tho' there be no real or natural Likeneſs betwixt the Words, and Operations of the Soul of Man; but only Signs by Compact, and Agreement, to ſignify our Thoughts.

Words therefore, being (as is ſaid) invented to expreſs our Thoughts, it follows, that we cannot perfectly diſcover the different Sorts, and Significations of Words without, firſt conſidering what paſſes in our Minds.

It is agreed by all Philoſophers, that there are three Operations of the Mind, *viz. Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reaſoning*.

PERCEPTION is the ſimple Apprehenſion of any Thing, or Quality of a Thing, whether purely *Intellectual*, as when we ſimply think of the *Being*, *Eternity*, and *Decree of God*; or *Corporeal*, and *Material*, as a *Square*, a *Circle*, a *Horſe*, a *Dog*.

JUDGMENT affirms that the Thing we *perceive*, is ſo, or not ſo, as having the Ideas of the *Earth* and *Roundneſs*; affirm, *that the Earth is round*.

By REASONING, we draw Conſequences to evince the Truth, or Fallacy of a conteſted Propoſition, by comparing it with one or more incontеſtable Propoſitions; or in ſhort, from two Judgments, to infer a third, as when we have judg'd that Virtue is Praiſe-worthy, and that *Patience* is a Virtue, we infer and conclude that *Patience* is Praiſe-worthy.

Hence we may eaſily obſerve, that this *third* Operation of the Mind, is but an Extenſion of the *ſecond*. It will therefore be ſufficient for our preſent Subject, to conſider the firſt two, or what of the firſt is contain'd in the ſecond; for if we ſeriouſly attend what paſſes in our Mind, we ſhall find, that we very rarely conſider the ſimple Perception of Things, without affirming ſomething or other of it, which is the Judgment.

This Judgment we make of Things, as when we ſay *the Earth is round*, is call'd a *Propoſition*; and therefore every Propoſition naturally includes two *Terms*, one call'd the *Subject*, which is the Thing, of which the *Affirmation* is, as *the Earth*; and the other is call'd the *Attribute*, which is the Thing that is affirm'd of the *Subject*, as *round*; and then, *is*, which is the Connection betwixt theſe two Terms.

But it is eaſy to perceive, that theſe two Terms do properly belong to the firſt Operation of the Mind, becauſe that is what we *conceive*, and is the Objects of our Thoughts; and that the Connection belongs to the *ſecond*, which may be properly call'd the Action of the *Mind*, and the manner in which we think.

And thus the greateſt Diſtinction of that which paſſes in our Mind, is to ſignify, that we may conſider the Objects of our Thoughts, and the Form and Manner of them, of which the chief is the *Judgment*. But we muſt beſides refer thither the *Conjunctions*, *Disjunctions*, and other the like Operations of the Mind, as well as all the other Motions of the Soul, as Deſires, Commands, Interrogations, *&c.*

From hence it follows, that Men wanting Signs to expreſs what paſſes in the Mind, the moſt general

Distinction of Words, must be of those which signify the Objects, and Manner of our Thoughts, tho' it frequently happens, that they do not signify the Manner alone, but in Conjunction with the Objects, as we shall soon demonstrate; having already shown that the Knowledge of what passes in the Mind, is necessary for the understanding the Principles of GRAMMAR.

The Words of the first Class, are those which we call *Names, Personal Names*; QUALITIES deriv'd from *Words of Affirmation*, or *Verbs* (call'd in the *Latin* Participles), *Fore-plac'd Words*, (or Prepositions), and *added Words*, (or *Adverbs*). Those of the second, are *Words of Affirmation*, (or *Verbs*) *joining Words*, (or Conjunctions) and Interjections, as the old GRAMMARIANS call'd them absurdly, distinguishing them into a peculiar Part of Speech, which are plainly only *added Words* of Passion, which all derive themselves by a necessary Consequence, from the natural Manner of expressing our Thoughts.

# CHAP. VI.

## *Of* NAMES. [1]

*Whate'er we* see, feel, hear, *or* touch, *or* taste,
*Or in our* Understanding's *Eye is plac'd,*
NAMES *properly we call; for always they*
*Some certain Image to the Mind convey;*
*As* Man, Horse, House, Virtue, *and* Happiness,
*And all such Words as* Things *themselves express.*

[2] NAMES express the *Things themselves*, that is, every Thing that is the Object of our several Senses, Reflection, and Understanding; which conveying some certain *Idea*, or *Image*, to the Mind, they want not the Help of any other Word to make us understand 'em. Thus when we hear any one say, *A Man, a House, a Horse, Virtue, Vice, Happiness*, &c. we perfectly understand what he means.

*Before the* NAMES, a, an, *or* the *may be,*
*But* Thing *you never after them can see.*

[3] Since

[1] The Words that signify the simple Objects of our Thoughts, are in all Languages, but *English*, call'd NAMES; but our first Formers of *Grammar*, either out of Affectation or Folly, corrupted the *Latin* Word *Nomen*, into the Barbarous sound *Noun*, as it is call'd in the Vulgar *Grammars*. And thus the *Grammarians* have made a Division of NAMES, calling the Name of a Thing or Substance, a *Noun Substantive*, and that, which signifies the *Manner* or *Quality*, a *Noun Adjective*.

*jective.* But these additional Terms of *Substantive* and *Adjective*, seem to us superfluous, and burthensom to the Minds of the young Learners; without any manner of Benefit to the Understanding; for the different Natures of the two Words is fully expres'd by the Terms NAMES and QUALITIES, and it is vain to do that by many, which may be done by few. Nature is simple in all her Operations, and he is the best Engineer, who produces the Effect, with the fewest Wheels, Screws, *&c.*

Those who use these Terms give this Reason for them, that they are call'd *Adjectives*, or (as some) *Adnouns*, because having no Natural Substance of their own, they subsist by nothing but the *Noun Substantive*, to which they are joyn'd; as in these two Words, *round Earth*; the last is the *Substantive*, and the first only signifies the Manner or Quality of its Being: That is, the *Adjective*, *Adname* or *Quality* cannot be put by it self in any Sentence; it wou'd not make Sense, it wou'd convey no Idea to the Mind; for to say *a Round, a White, a Black, a Crooked*, &c. is to say nothing: It requires therefore some *Name*, or *Noun Substantive*, as they call it, to be join'd to it, to make Sense, or form any Idea; as a *round Ball*, a *white Horse*, a *black Hat*, a *crooked Stick*, are true Objects of the Thoughts, and every Body understands them: But if you say *a Man, a Horse, a House*, &c. we perfectly know what you mean; and therefore subsisting by it self, in good Sense is call'd a Substantive Name, or in the vulgar Phrase a *Noun Substantive*.

[2] The Objects of our Thoughts are either *Things*, as the *Sun*, the *Earth, Water, Fire, Air Wood*, &c. which we generally call SUBSTANCE; or the *Manner* of Things, as to be *round, red, hard, knowing*, &c. which are call'd ACCIDENTS. And there is this difference betwixt the *Things*, or *Substances*, and the *Manner of Things*, or *Accidents* that the *Substances* subsist by themselves; but the *Accidents* subsist only *by*, and *in* the *Substances*.

This is what makes the principal Difference betwixt Words, that signifie the simple Objects of our Thoughts; the Words which signifie *Substances*, or the Things themselves, are call'd *Names*, or *Substantive Names*; and those which signify *Accidents*, by expressing the *Subjects*, with which these Accidents agree, are call'd *Qualities*, or (according to the common Way) *Adjective Names*, or *Adnames*.

This is the first Original of *Names*, both *Substantive* and *Adjective*, or *Names* and *Qualities*. But we have not stopt here; for less Regard has been had to the Signification, than to the Manner of signifying. For, because the Substance is that which subsists by it self, the Appellation of *Substantive Names* has been given to all those Words which Subsist by themselves in Discourse, without wanting another *Name* to be join'd to them, tho' they did only signifie Accidents. Thus on the contrary, even those Words, which signifie Substances, are call'd *Adjectives*, when by their Manner of signifying they may be join'd to other *Names* in Discourse: As the *Warriour God, the Bowyer King*, and the like, which tho' they are call'd Names put together by Apposition, degenerate here plainly into the Signification of Qualities, belonging to the *Names*; and are therefore *Names* degenerated into *Qualities*, or *Substantives* into *Adjectives*.

But the Reasons that renders a Name uncapable of subsisting by it self, is when, besides its distinct Signification, it has another more confus'd, which we call the CONNOTATION of a Thing, to which that agrees which is meant by the distinct Signification.

Thus the distinct Signification of *Red*, is *Redness*, but it signifies the

Subject of that Redneſs, confus'dly, which makes it not capable of ſubſiſting by it ſelf in Diſcourſe, becauſe we muſt expreſs, or underſtand the Word which ſignifies the Subject. As, therefore, that *Connotation* makes the *Adjective*, or *Quality*, ſo when that is taken away from Words, which ſignify *Accidents*, they become *Subſtantives* or *Names*: As from *Colour'd*, *Colour*; from *Red*, *Redneſs*; from *Hard*, *Hardneſs*; from *Prudent*, *Prudence*, &c. On the contrary, when you add to Words ſignifying *Subſtances*, that *Connotation*, or confus'd Signification of a Thing, to which the *Subſtances* have Relation, makes them *Adjectives*, or *Qualities*, as *Man*, *Manly*, *Mankind*, &c.

The *Greeks* and the *Latins* have an infinite Number of theſe Words; as *ferreus*, *aureas*, *bovinus*, *vitulinus*, &c. but they are not ſo frequent in the *Hebrew*, nor in *French*, and many of the vulgar Tongues; but in the *Engliſh*, we think, they are not more rare, than in the dead Languages.

Again, if we take theſe *Connotations* from theſe *Adjectives* or *Qualities* form'd of *Names*, or of *Subſtantives*, we make them new *Subſtantives*, which we may properly call *Derivatives*, and ſo *Humanity* comes from *Humane*, and *Humanus* from *Homo*.

But there is another ſort of *Names*, which paſs for Subſtantives, tho' in Reality they are Adjectives, ſince they ſignify an *accidental* Form; and beſides, denote a Subject to which that Form agrees: Such are the Names of the ſeveral Offices, and Profeſſions of Men; as *King*, *Philoſopher*, *Painter*, *Soldier*, &c. but the Reaſon why theſe paſs for Subſtantives, is, that they can have nothing but Man for their Subject, at leaſt, according to the ordinary way of Speaking, and the firſt Impoſition of Names, ſo not neceſſary to join their Subſtantives with them, ſince they may be underſtood without any Confuſion, and they can have no Relation to any other Subject. By this means, theſe Words have obtain'd what is peculiar to Subſtantive, *viz.* to Subſiſt by themſelves in Diſcourſe.

'Tis for this very ſame Reaſon that certain *Names*, and *Perſonal Names*, or *Pronouns* are taken *Subſtantively*, becauſe they relate to a Subſtance ſo general, that it is eaſily underſtood, as our *Country*, *Earth* is underſtood; *Judea*, *Province* is underſtood.

And we have obſerv'd, that *Adjectives* or *Qualities* have two Significations; one diſtinct of the *Form*, and one confus'd of the *Subject*: But we infer not from thence, that they ſignifying the moſt diſtinct Signification, are alſo the moſt direct; for they ſignify the Subject directly, tho' more confus'dly, but the Form only indirectly, tho' more diſtinctly. Thus *White* ſignifies directly ſomething *that has Whiteneſs*, but in a very confus'd manner, without denoting in particular any one Thing that may have *Whiteneſs*, and it ſignifies *Whiteneſs* only indirectly, but in as diſtinct a manner as the Word *Whiteneſs* it ſelf.

There are two ſorts of *Ideas*, one repreſents to us a ſingle Thing, as the *Idea* of ones *Father*, *Mother*, a Friend, his own Horſe, his own Dog, *&c.* The other *Idea* preſents to us ſeveral things together, but of the ſame Kind, as the *Idea* of Man in general, Horſes in general, *&c.* But not having different *Names* for theſe different *Ideas*, we call the Names of ſingle *Ideas*, *proper Names*; as the Name of *Plato*, which agrees to one particular Philoſopher, ſo *London* to one City; and thoſe Names which ſignify common *Ideas*, general, or appellative Names, as the Word *Man*, which agrees with all Mankind; of the ſame Kind are the Words *Lion*, *Dog*, *Horſe*, &c. yet the proper Name often belongs to ſeveral at the ſame time, as *Peter*, *John*, *Robert*, &c. but this is only by Accident, by reaſon that many have taken the ſame Name; but then

Since *Names* expreſs the *Things themſelves*, you cannot put the Word *Thing* after 'em, without Nonſenſe. Thus you cannot ſay *Man Thing*, *Virtue Thing*, and the like.

They alſo admit of *a* or *the* before 'em, or *un*, if they begin with a Vowel.

*Of* Names *three ſeveral ſorts there are,*
*As* Common, Proper, Perſonal *declare.*

There are three ſorts of NAMES; *Common Names* are ſuch as agree to, or expreſs a whole Kind, as the Name *Horſe* ſignifies *my Horſe*, *your Horſe*, and all *the Horſes* that are.

*Proper Names* diſtinguiſh *Particulars* of the Kind from each other; as *Cæſar*, *Pompey*, *Cicero*, diſtinguiſh thoſe from all the reſt of Mankind. The ſame holds of the Proper Names of *Cities*, *Towns*, *Mountains*, *Rivers*, *Countries*, &c.

*Perſonal Names* are us'd when we ſpeak of *Perſons* or *Things*, to avoid the Repetition of the ſame Word, and ſupply the place of Names of Men, Women, and Things.

*Two different Endings different Numbers ſhow,*
*And which no other Part of Speech do's know.*

[3] *Names* in general ſignifying either one, or more of the ſame Kind, muſt have two different Numbers to expreſs this difference; as, the *Singular*, which ſignifies but *One*, and the *Plural*, which ſignifies *more* than *One*; and all *Names* diſcover this Diſtinction of Number, by the changing their Endings; as, *Man*, One Man; *Men*, more than One.

This likewiſe gives another Mark to diſtinguiſh *Names* from the other Parts of Speech: For tho' the *Affirmations* have two Numbers, yet are they not thus diſtinguiſh'd; as we ſhall ſee when we come to 'em. There are two more Diſtinctions of *Names*, which come properly after all the Parts of Speech, becauſe they depend on the Knowledge of 'em.

*To* Singular Names *we always add an* (s)
*When we the* Plural Number *wou'd expreſs;*
*Or* (es), *for more delightful eaſie ſound,*
*Whene'er the* Singular *to end is found*
*In* (ex), *or* (ze), (ch), (ſh), *or* (s)
(Ce), (ge) *when they their ſofter ſound confeſs.*

The *Singular* Number is made *Plural* by adding *(s)* to the *Singular*; as *Tree*, *Trees*; *Hand*, *Hands*; *Miles* and *Mile*: But when the Neceſſity of Pronunciation requires it in the

place of (*s*), we muſt add (*es*); that is, when the Singular ends in (*s*) or (*ſe*), (*ze*), (*x*), (*ſh*), (*ce*), (*ch*) or (*ge*) pronounc'd ſoft, as *Horſe*, *Horſes*; *Fox*, *Foxes*; *Fiſh*, *Fiſhes* and *Fiſh*; *Maze*, *Mazes*; *Prince*, *Princes*; *Tench*, *Tenches*; *Page*, *Pages*; by which means the *Plural Number* conſiſts of two Syllables, tho' the *Singular* is but one; as all the foregoing Examples ſhew.

*The following Exceptions yet are ſeen,*
*When for the* (s) *the* Plural *ends in* (en);
*As* Oxen, Women, Chicken, Brethren, Men.
Cow *has the Plural* Cows, *or* Keen, *or* Kine;
*And ſo has* Sow *the Plural* Sows *or* Swine.

*Ox*, *Chick*, *Man*, and all deriv'd from it, as *Horſeman*, *Footman*, &c. *Woman*, *Child*, *Brother*, have the Plural in (*en*); tho' *Brethren* ſignifying both *Brothers* and *Siſters*, has likewiſe *Brothers*; and *Swine* ſignifies both male and female, and with (*a*) before it, is us'd for *One Hog* or *Sow*. *Chicken* is ſometimes likewiſe us'd for *one Chick*: *Deer*, *Sheep*, *Fern*, are the ſame in both Numbers; of the Singular with (*a*) before them.

*To theſe* Irregulars *ſome more add yet*;
*As* Louſe, Lice; Mouſe, Mice; Gooſe, Geeſe; & Foot, Feet;
*And* Tooth, Teeth; Die, Dice; *and alſo* Penny, Pence
*Deriv'd from* Penny's, *Critics ſay*, *long ſince*.
*The* Names *whoſe Sing'lars end in* (f), *or* (fe),
*Their Plurals have in* (ves), *we always ſee*;
*As* Calf, Calves; Sheaf, Sheaves; half, halves; *and* Wife, Wives;
Leaf, Leaves; Loaf, Loaves; Shelf, Shelves; ſelf, ſelves; Knife, Knives:
*Add unto theſe* Wolf, Wolves; Thief, Thieves; Life, Lives.

*Staff* has *Staves*, tho' the double (*ff*) Singular generally makes double (*ff*) with (*s*) in the Plural; as *Cliff*, *Skiff*, *Muff*, &c. *Miſchief* is us'd both *Miſchieves* and *Miſchiefs* in the Plural; (*f*) and (*ve*) are ſo nearly related, that they eaſily paſs from one into the other, in all Languages.

*Except* Hoof, Roof, *and* Wharf, *and* Proof, Relief,
Ruff, Cuff, Skiff, Muff, Dwarf, Handkerchief, *and* Grief.

There may be ſome others of the ſame Kind, theſe are enow to make good the Exception in the ſound of thoſe Singulars that end in (*s*) and (*th*): There is a like Softning or Alleviation, without changing the Letters, as *Houſe*, *Houſes*, as

as it were *houzes*; *Path*, *Paths*; *Cloth*, *Cloths*, or *Cloaths*. *Earth* keeps its harder Sound when 'tis us'd in the *Plural*, which is but seldom.

*Custom, to which all Languages must bow,*
*Does to some Names no* Singular *allow.*

Use has in *English*, as well as other Languages, deny'd the Singular Number to some Words; as *Annals*, *Alps*, *Ashes*, *Bowels*, *Bellows*, *Breeches*, *Calends*, *Cresses*, *Goods*, (meaning Things possess'd by any one, as the Goods of Fortune) *Entrails*, *Ides*, *Smallows* of every kind, *Nones*, *Scissars*, *Snuffers*, *Shears*, *Tongs*, *Lungs*, &c.

*To others she, with arbitrary Will,*
*Denys the Claim of* Plural *Number still*;
*All* Proper Names *we in this Rule contain,*
*The Names of* Liquids, Herbs, *most sorts of* Grain,
Fat, Unctuous Matter, Wax, Pitch, *and* Glue,
*The Names of* Virtues, Vice, *and* Metals *too.*

As we have some Words which have no Singular Number, so on the other hand we have many more without a Plural; some by the Nature of the Things signified, others by meer Use. Thus all Proper Names of Men, Women, Mountains, Rivers, or any other Creature, to whom (for Distinction) a Proper Name is given; as *Bucephalus* to the Horse of *Alexander the Great*: These have no Plural Number, because they naturally agree but to one: For when we say, the *Cæsars*, the *Alexanders*, the *Mordants*, and the like, it is figuratively, including under those *Proper Names* all those who resemble them in their Valour, Conduct, Virtue, &c. except *Alps*, and perhaps *Appenines*.

To these we may add the Names of *Virtues*, *Vices*, *Habits*, abstract Qualities; of *Metals*, *Herbs*, *Spices*, *Liquids*, *Unctuous Matter*, *Fat*, *Wax*, *Pitch*, *Glue*; most sorts of Grain, as *Wheat*, *Rye*, *Barley*, *Darnel*, except *Oats* and *Tares*, (*Peas*, *Beans* and *Vetches* are Pulse, not Grain, tho' set down by some for 'em) likewise *Chaff*, *Bran*, *Meal*. The Names of Spices, as *Pepper*, *Ginger*, *Mace*, *Cinnamon*, except *Cloves* and *Nutmegs*: Of Herbs and Drugs, *Cochineal*, *Sotherwood*, *Grass*, *Madder*, *Rue*, *Moss*, *Fennel*, *Rosemary*, *Wolfwort*, *Cliver*, *Endiff*, *Sage*, *Parsley*, *Spicknard*, *Spinach*, *Savory*, *Hellebore*, *Hemlock*, &c. except *Colworts*, *Leeks*, *Artichoaks*, *Cabbages*, *Nettles*, and those whose Names are compounded with *Foot* or *Tongue*, as *Crowfoot*, *Adders-tongue*: Of Liquids, as *Air*, *Choler*, *Blood*, *Must*, or new *Wine*,

*Wine*, *Ale*, *Beer*, *Spittle*, *Snot*, *Sweat*, *Urine*, *Vinegar*, *Milk*: Of Unctuous Matter, as *Honey*, *Butter*, *Fat*, *Greaſe*, *Amber*, *Wax*, *Marrow*, *Pitch*, *Roſin*, *Tar*, *Glue*, *Lard*, *Dirt*, *Sulphur*, *Bitumen*, *Brimſtone*: Of Metals, as *Lead*, *Braſs*, *Pewter*, *Tinn*, *Copper*, *Silver*, *Gold*; add *Ivory*, *Jet*: Of Virtues, *Prudence*, *Juſtice*, *Chaſtity*; and of Vices, *Pride*, *Sloath*, *Envy*: Of Abſtract Qualities, *Wiſdom*, *Probity*, *Modeſty*, *Baſhfulneſs*, *Swiftneſs*, *Boldneſs*, *Conſtancy*, *Courage*, *Ardour*, *Candour*, *Contempt*, *Paleneſs*, *Fame*; add to theſe *Hunger*, *People*, *Vulgar*, *Offspring*, *Ruſt*, *Duſt*, *Soot*, *Wool*, &c.

The beſt Rule for this is, That Things that are ſmall and undiſtinguiſhable, want the *Plural* Number; but thoſe which are larger, and more diſtinguiſh'd, have it.

Thus much for *Names Common* and *Proper*; we ſhall conclude this Head with a thorough Examination of the *Third ſort*, call'd *Perſonal Names*. [4]

*Three*

then other Names are added, which determine and reſtore the Quality of a *proper Name*. Thus the Name of *Charles* is common to many, yet if you add the (2*d*), it becomes proper to the King of that Country where 'tis ſpoken. Nor is it neceſſary ſometimes to make any Addition, becauſe the Circumſtances of the Diſcourſe ſufficiently denote the Perſon that is ſpoken of.

[3] The *common Names* which agree to ſeveral, may be conſider'd ſeveral Ways: For *Firſt*, They may either be apply'd to one of the Things to which they agree, or may all be conſider'd in a certain Unity, which the Philoſophers call UNIVERSAL UNITY. 2*dly*, They may be apply'd to ſeveral together, conſidering them as ſeveral.

To diſtinguiſh theſe two ſorts of Ways of *Signifying*, two Numbers have been invented, the *Singular*, as a Man; the *Plural*, as *Men*. Nay, the *Greeks* have yet another *Number*, call'd the *Dual Number*, or ſignifying two; the *Hebrews* have the ſame, but that is only when the Words ſignifie a thing double either by Nature, as the *Eyes*, the *Hands*, the *Feet*; or by Art, as *Sciſſars*, *Tongs*, &c.

As for *Common* and *Appellative Names*, they ſeem all naturally to require a Plural Number, yet are there ſeveral which have none, whether by the Influence of Cuſtom only, or ſome Reaſon; ſo the *Names* of *Gold*, *Silver*, *Iron*, or other Metals, have ſcarce any Plural in any Language. The Reaſon of which we fancy to be this, That becauſe of the great Reſemblance there is between the Parts of Metals, every Species thereof is not conſider'd, as having ſeveral Individuals under it. This is very palpable in the *French*, where to denote a ſingular Metal, we add the Particle of Partition, *de L'or*, *de L'Argent*, *du Fer*, Gold, Silver, Iron, as we ſay *Irons*, but then it ſignifies not the Metal it ſelf, but Inſtruments made of Iron; the Latin *Æra*, ſignifies Money, or a certain ſounding Inſtrument, like the Cymbal, &c.

But this difference of Number in the Names, is expreſs'd by a difference of Termination or Ending, as is expreſs'd in the Text. But tho' *Qualities* ſhou'd have a Plural, becauſe they naturally imply an uncertain Signification of a Subject, which renders them capable of agreeing with ſeveral Subjects, at

leaſt

least as to the Manner of signifying, tho' in Effect they did only agree to one; yet in *English* there is no difference of the Termination or Ending, to distinguish this Agreement.

There are three Things more, which are *Case*, *Declension* and *Gender*, which the *English Names* have not. But the Cases of the *Latin* and *Greek* expressing the Relations of Word to Word, and their dependance on each other, we supply that with greater ease by Prepositions; as by *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, &c. But these having a peculiar regard to the Construction of Words join'd in Sentences, we shall refer our Learner to that place.

Tho' we have (in our Language) no Note of difference of Gender, either by the Ending or Termination of the Words, or any Article proper to them, yet we thought it proper in this general view of GRAMMAR, which we give you in these *Notes*, to add something on this Head in Relation to other Tongue.

The *Adnames*, or *Adjective Names*, or, as we call them, *Qualities*, naturally agree to several, and therefore it has been thought fit, both for the avoiding of Confusion and the Ornament of Discourse, with Variety of Terminations to invent a Diversity in the *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, or *Qualities*, suitable to the *Names*, or *Substantives* with which they agree.

Now Men having consider'd themselves, and observ'd the considerable Difference of the two Sexes, thought fit to vary the same Adjective Names, by giving them different Terminations, as they are differently apply'd to Men or Women; as when we say in Latin, *bonus Vir*, a good Man; in the Masculine, speaking of a Woman, they change the Ending of the *Adjectives* or *Quality*, and say *bona Mulier*.

But in *English* we are more strict in this, for we express the difference of Sex by different Words, and not by the Variation of *Epithets* or *Substantives*; as *Boar*, *Sow*; *Boy*, *Girl*; *Brother*, *Sister*; *Buck*, *Doe*; *Bull*, *Cow*, *Bullock*, *Heifer*; *Cock*, *Hen*; *Dog*, *Bitch*; *Duck*, *Drake*; *Father*, *Mother*; *Gander*, *Goose*; *Horse*, *Mare*; *Husband*, *Wife*; *Lad*, *Lass*; *King*, *Queen*; *Man*, *Woman*; *Master*, *Dame*; *Nephew*, *Neice*; *Peacock*, *Peahen*; *Ram*, *Ewe*; *Son*, *Daughter*; *Uncle*, *Aunt*; *Widower*, *Widow*; *Wizard*, *Witch*; *Batchelor*, *Maid*, *Virgin*; *Knight* or *Lord*, *Lady*. But the following twenty four Feminines or Females, are distinguish'd from the Males, by the Variation of the Termination of the *Male* into (*ess.*)

| | |
|---|---|
| *Abbot* | *Abbess* |
| *Actor* | *Actress* |
| *Adulterer* | *Adultress* |
| *Ambassador* | *Ambassadress* |
| *Count* | *Countess* |
| *Deacon* | *Deaconess* |
| *Duke* | *Dutchess* |
| *Elector* | *Electress* |
| *Emperor* | *Empress* |
| *Governor* | *Governess* |
| *Heir* | *Heiress* |
| *Jew* | *Jewess* |
| *Lion* | *Lioness* |
| *Marquis* | *Marques*, or *Marchioness* |
| *Master* | *Mistress* |
| *Prince* | *Princess* |
| *Prior* | *Prioress* |
| *Patron* | *Patroness* |
| *Poet* | *Poetess* |
| *Prophet* | *Prophetess* |
| *Shepherd* | *Shepherdess* |
| *Tutor* | *Tutoress* |
| *Viscount* | *Viscountess* |

And two in (*ix*), as *Administratrix* *Executrix*.

This is all that our Language knows of any thing like the Genders, which is only a different way of expressing the Male and the Female; but the old Languages have gone farther; for as same *Adjectives* or *Qualities* might have Relation to other Things, besides Men and Women, it was thought necessary to Appropriate to them, one or other of the Terminations invented for

*Men*

*Men* and *Women*: Hence all other Names, or Substantives, have been rang'd under the Heads of Masculine or Feminine; and sometimes indeed not without a plausible Reason, as in the Names of Offices properly belonging to Men, as *Rex*, *Judex*, &c. (which as we have before hinted, are but improperly *Substantives*) which are of the *Masculine Gender*, because *Homo* is understood. In the same Manner, all the Female Offices are of the *Feminine Gender*, as *Mater*, *Uxor*, *Regina*, &c. because *Mulier* is understood.

But this happens in other Cases meerly by Fancy, without any other Reason, than the Tyranny of Custom; and therefore it varies according to the Languages, or even according to the Words introduc'd from one Language into another. Thus *Arbor*, a Tree, is *Feminine* in *Latin*; but *Arbre*, is Masculine in *French*; and *Dens* (a Tooth) is Masculine in *Latin*, and Feminine in *French*, (*Dent*). Nay, that has sometimes chang'd in one, and the same Language according to Time and Occasions. And thus according to *Priscian*, *Alvus* in *Latin*, was anciently Masculine, and afterwards became Feminine; *Navire* (a Ship) was anciently *Feminine* in *French*, but is now *Masculine*.

The same Variation of Custom or Use has made some Words, which were formerly certain, of a doubtful Gender, being us'd as Masculine by some, as Feminine by others; as *hic*, or *hæc Finis*, in *Latin*; and *le*, or *la Comte* in *French*.

But the Gender which is call'd doubtful, is however not so common as some *Grammarians* imagine, for it properly belongs only to the Names of some Animals, which in *Greek* and *Latin* are promiscuously join'd both to Masculine and Feminine *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, to express either the Male or Female, as *Bos*, *Canis*, *Sus*, &c.

There are still other Words, which they place under the Neuter Gender, but they are properly only *Adjectives* or *Qualities*, taken *Substantively*, because they commonly subsist in Discourse by themselves, and have not different Terminations accommodated to the different Genders, as *Victor*, *Victrix*, *Rex*, *Regina*, *Pistor*, *Pistrix*, and the like.

We ought also here to observe from hence, that what the *Grammarians* call *Epicene*, is not a different Gender, for *Vulpes* (a Fox), tho' it indifferently signifies either the Male or Female, is really of the Feminine Gender in the *Latin*; and thus in *French*, the Word *Aigle* (an *Eagle*) is truly *Feminine*; because the Masculine or Feminine Gender in a Word, does not so properly regard its Signification, as that it shou'd be of such a nature as to join with *Adjective* or *Quality*, in the Masculine or Feminine Termination, as either does occur: And so in the *Latin*, *Custodiæ*, *Vigiliæ*; *Prisoner*, or *Watchmen* or *Centinels*, are really Feminine, tho' they signifie Men: This is what is common in the Genders to all Languages that have them.

The *Latin* and *Greek* in the Neuter Gender do not regard them, having no Relation to the Male or Female Sex, but what Fancy gives them, and the Termination of certain Words.

[4] Tho' we think it pretty obvious, that *Personal Names* are not a different Part of Speech from *Names*, notwithstanding some, who are wedded to the old way only because it is old; yet we shall here add the learned Mr. *Johnson*'s Proof of this Truth. *Pronoun* (says he in his fifth Animadversion, p. 10) *quasi pro Nomine*; *It is put for a* Noun, *then it seems by the Name, and our Author* (LILLY) *it is much like a* Noun *in his Definition of it, so like indeed, that it is the same: The only difference betwixt it and other* Nouns, *is, that it signifies a Person Primarily, and Secondarily a Thing, which is* Vossius's *Definition of it.* Primario Nomen, *especit, I suppose* Nomen Personæ, *secundario rem.* *Analog.* lib. 1. cap. 3. and

*Three* Persons *only every Language claims,*
*Which we express still by the following* Names;
I, thou, *and* he, she, it, we, ye, *and* they,
*If you to these will add* who, what, *you may.*

[5] Since in Discourse whatever is said, is spoke either of our selves, to another, or of a third, it is necessary that there be three Persons; *I*, the first, *thou*, the second, and *he*, *she*,

*and if it signifie a Person, it must come under the Notion of a* Noun; for *a* Person *is a* Thing, *such a* Thing *as may be consider'd alone by the* Understanding, *and be the* Subject *of a* Predicate, *I mean the* Substantive Pronoun, *for there are also* Pronouns Adjective. *Indeed, this Part of* Speech *is in order of Nature the* first Noun; *for when* Adam *and* Eve *were only in the World, they needed no other Name but* I *and* Thou *to speak to one-another, and those Names were not given them but of any Necessity. The* Pronoun *therefore is a* Noun, *only a* Personal *one, to be us'd when we speak of* Things *Personally, to which (upon the Multiplication of Mankind) was added the* proper Name *to distinguish* Persons *by, and also particular* Things, *which are as it were spoken of Personally, when they are spoken of particularly. And thus we find* Nouns *us'd in the* first Person, *as* Romulus Rex Regia Arma afero. Liv. l. 1. *also* Anobal peto pacem. Id. l. 30. *and* Callopius recensui at the End of *Terence*'s Plays. And thus far Mr. *Johnson*, which is sufficient to show, that we have justly plac'd them here under the Head of NAMES.

[5] The frequent Repetition of the same Words being as disagreeable as it is necessary for us to speak often of the same Thing, to avoid this there are, in all known Languages, certain Words establish'd to supply this defect and remove this indecorum, which are call'd *Pronames*, for *Names*, *Personal Names*, or as vulgarly in English, *Pronouns*.

In the first place it has been observ'd, that it wou'd be tedious as well as indecent to be often naming our selves by our *Proper Names*, and for that Reason the *Proname* of the *first Person* was introduc'd to stand in the place of his Name who speaks, as *I*, *Eye*.

And on the other-hand, to avoid the too frequent Repetition of the Name of the Person to whom you speak, *thou* or *you*, (*Pronames* of the *second Person*) were invented.

And lastly, to avoid the too often repeating the Names of other *Persons* or *Things* of which we discourse, the *Personal Names* of the *third Person* were invented; as *He*, *She*, *it*, *who*, *what*.

These *Personal Names* performing the Office, and supplying the Place of other *Names*, they have like them two *Numbers*; that which signifies *one*, and that which signifies more than *one*, (*i. e.* the *Singular*); as *I*, *thou*, *you*, *he*; and the *Plural*, as *we*, *ye*, or *you*, and *they*. *You* (as has been said) is us'd in the *Singular* for *thou* and *thee*, as well as in the *Plural* for *ye*. Thus in *French*, *vous* for *tu* and *toy*.

In other Languages which have *Genders*, the *Pronoun* has the same, the *first* and *second* are common, except in the *Hebrew*, and those Languages which imitate that in which the *Masculine* is distinguish'd from the *Feminine*; but in the *English* we have no *Genders*, as has been seen in the foregoing Notes. The same may be said of Cases. There is this to be observ'd in these *Personal Names*, That the Termination changes in *both Numbers* when it comes after a *Verb* or *Word of Affirmation*; as *I*, *me*; *we*, *us*; *thou*, *thee*; *you*, or *ye*, *you*; *he*, *him*; *she*, *her*, *they*, *them*; except *it*, which does not vary.

[1] In

*ſhe*, or *it*, the third, of which all other Words but *I* or *thou*, with the *Plurals*, are. If we ſpeak of a Male, we ſay, *he*; if of a Female, *ſhe*; if of Things, that have no Sex, we uſe *it*. The *Plural Number* of *I* is *we*; of *thou*, *you* and *ye*; tho' by Cuſtom we ſay *you*, when we ſpeak but to one Perſon, *thou* being ſeldom us'd but to GOD, as, *wilt thou, O Lord!* and on ſolemn Occaſions to Princes, *Remember, O Prince! that thou art born a Man*; otherwiſe *thou* is never us'd but in Contempt, Anger, Diſdain, or Familiarity. *He*, *ſhe*, and *it*, have (in the *Plural Number*) only *they*.

*Theſe* Names *in both the Numbers we allow*
*A* leading *and a* following State *to know.*
*The* leading State *is* I, *the* following ME,
*The* following State *is* US, *the* leading WE,
*Thus* THOU *and* THEE, YE, YOU, HE, HIM, & SHE HER; THEY *and* THEM; *who and whom*; *but* WHAT *and* IT,
*To vary like the Reſt do not think fit.*

Thoſe *Perſonal Names* have in both Numbers a double *Form* or *State*, the firſt is what we may call the *leading State*, as *I*; the ſecond the *following State*, as *ME*. In the *Plural Number* the *leading State* is *WE*, the *following US*. The Second is in the *leading State THOU*, in the *following THEE*, in the Plural *YE* and *YOU*. The third is in the *leading State HE*, if we ſpeak of a Male in the *following*, *HIM*, or *SHE*, *HER*, and in the Plural *THEY*, *THEM*, which is the *Plural* of *HE*, *SHE* and *IT*, which never varys its Ending, and is in both States *IT*, when we ſpeak of Things of neither Sex. *WHO* in the *leading State* of both Numbers has *WHOM* in the *following State* in both. It is call'd the *Interrogative*, becauſe it asks Queſtions of *Perſons* or *Individuals* (as, *Who is there, Peter?*), as *What* does of the *Kind*, or *Quality*; and alſo in the order of a *Thing*; as, *What is that? it is a Book*; *What art thou?* in the order of Number, the firſt, ſecond, third, fourth, &c. (which is the ſame in both the *leading* and *following* State, or indeed, like *It*) *It* has no State.

But to make this the plainer, we ſhall lay down a view of all theſe *Perſonal Names* together, in both their ſtates.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perſ. 1. | Sing. | *I* | *Me* |
| | Plur. | *We* | *Us* |
| Perſ. 2. | Sing. | *Thou* | *Thee* |
| | Plur. | *Ye* | *Us* |
| Perſ. 3. | Sing. | *He* | *Him* |
| | | *She* | *Her* |
| | Plur. | *They* | *Them* |
| Interrog. | Perſons | *who* | *whom* |
| | Things | *what* | |

CHAP.

# CHAP. VII.

## *Of* QUALITIES.

*We've seen, that* Names *the Things themselves express,*
Qualities *the* Manners *of those Things confess;*
*And on the* Names *entirely depend,*
*For without them they can no Sense pretend:*
*As* round, black, white, swift, crooked, square,
*Must (to be understood) to* Names *adhere.*

[1] NAMES, as we have seen, express the *Things* themselves, *Qualities* are the Manners of those *Things*, as *good*, *bad*, *round*, *square*, &c. For Example, The Being of *Wax*, is the Substance of *Wax*, or *Wax* it self, without regard to any *Form* or *Colour*, and is what we properly call the *Name*; the *Roundness*, *Squareness* of the Figure, (which may be absent without any Detriment to the Being of the Wax) are the Manners of the *Being*; as, to be ignorant, or knowing, are the *Manners* or *Qualities* of our *Being*; thus we say a *round*, *black*, *white*, &c. *Table*; *Table* is the *Name*, and *round*, *black*, *white*, &c. are the *Qualities* of that *Name*.

And since these Words are added to *Names* to explain their *Manner* of Being, in respect of some Quality, Number, Figure, Motion, Relation, Posture, Habit, &c. as a *cunning Fox*, the *third Heaven*, a *crooked Crab-tree*, a *swift Horse*, a *Golden Candlestick*, &c. they are properly call'd *Qualities*, and are incapable, preserving their Nature, of being added to any other Part of Speech.

Thing, *that to follow* Names *did still deny,*
*Does after* Qualities *good Sense supply.*
*As* black Thing, white Thing, good Thing *may convince,*
This *makes* that *understood, and be good Sense.*

You

[1] In our *Notes* on NAMES, we have likewise deliver'd such Sentiments of *Qualities*, under the Title of *Adjectives*, *Adnames*, &c. as are sufficient to be said on this Head, at least as far as relates to the *General* GRAMMAR. But we cannot omit Mr. *Johnson*'s Proof, *That the* Adjective *or* Quality *is a different Part of Speech from the Name or Substantive.* Grammatical Commentaries, *p.* 8. *The* Ad-

jective (*no doubt of it*) requires a *Substantive* to be join'd with it in Speech, to which it may adhere. *But the Question is, whether it be* a Noun, *or* Name of a Thing; *that is, whether it be equally so with the* Substantive; *for if it be not, there is not an* unequal Participation *of the* Genus *between these two, and so the Division is imperfect and* Equivocal: *That is, these two have not the same* Genus, *and therefore cannot be the same Part of Speech. Now I suppose, that no body will say, the* Adjective *is equally, or as much the* Name of a Thing *as a* Substantive. *The* Substantive *represents all that is essential to the Nature of the* Thing; *as* Homo *a* Man, *represents* Animal rationale, *or a* rational Living Creature; *but* Bonus Good, *represents only an accidental Quality, which tho' morally necessary, is not naturally so, but meerly accidental. So that tho' a* Man *may be call'd* Good, *and therefore* Good *in some Sense may be said to be his* Name, *yet it is not equally as much his* Name *as* Man, *this last representing all that is essential to his Nature, the other only what is accidental. For* Adjectivum *comes from* adjicio, *and there can be no need of adding any thing to the* Substantive *but what is* accidental, *for what is necessary and essential, is in the* Substantive *already. 'Tis therefore a sufficient Definition of a* Substantive, *That it is the* Name of a Thing; *but that it may be known what is meant by* Thing, *I have added*, which may so subsist in the Imagination, as to be the Subject of Predication: *And the true Definition of an* Adjective, *is, that* it is a Word added to the Substantive to declare some additional Accident of the *Substantive* consider'd by it self; as of Quality, Property, Relation, Action, Passion, or manner of Being. *I have added* consider'd by it self, *because the Relations of* Substantives, *as consider'd in Sentences, is declar'd by* Prepositions *and not by* Adjectives. *Here is then a very different End and Intention in the use of these Words; and that is one good Ground of constituting different Parts of* Speech. *But then, not only the End in Signification, but the End also in Construction is very different, and that is the other Ground of making different* Parts of Speech. *For I know no Reason why any body shou'd be troubled with the Distinction of the several* Parts of Speech, *but to know their different Significations and Constructions in general, or how generally to make use of them in* Speech.

Tho' this be a Demonstration of the difference between the *Name* and *Quality*, or *Substantive* and *Adjective*, and that they are two different Parts of Speech; yet since what follows proves the *Participle* and *Adjective* to be one part of Speech, we shall pursue our learned Author's Discourse, only adding, that *Scioppius* long since contended for the same thing, in his *Institutiones Grammatica Latina*, in the beginning of his *Auctuarium*, p. 162 of the Book.

*Now the Construction of a* Substantive *is its Government by which it is govern'd, in such Case as its Dependance requires in its several Relations that it may have in a Sentence: Whereas the only Construction of the* Adjective *is its Agreement with its* Substantive, *it being govern'd by it so as to agree with it in Case, Gender and Number, whatever Relation it be in, or whatever Case it be in by that Relation. And tho'* Substantives *be put in Apposition with other* Substantives, *and agree with them, yet this is no real Objection, such* Substantives *becoming* Adjectives *by that very Use; as an* Adjective *of any other* Part of Speech *becomes a* Substantive, *when it is us'd like a* Substantive; *that is, consider'd as a* Thing. NOW *in this the* Participle *and the* Adjective *both agree as well in Significations as Construc-*

You may know this Part of Speech, by putting *Thing* after it, which it will bear with good Sense, as a *good Thing*, a *black Thing*, a *white Thing*, &c. nor has it any differing Ending to express *one*, and *many*. And as it cannot be understood, or convey any Idea, or Notion by it self, (as we cannot in Sense say, a *black*, a *white*, &c.) without being join'd to some *Name*, (as a *black Horse*, a *good Man*, a *white House*, &c.) so it bears all *Particles* expressing different *relations of Names* with the *Name* to which it belongs; for it can do nothing, nor signifie any thing, without a *Name* express'd or understood, as, to *hit the white* (Mark) is understood; to *bowl on a Green* (Turf) is understood; refuse the evil (*Thing*), and choose the good (*Thing*), is in both places suppos'd.

*In* Qualities *no different Number are,*
*As their unvary'd endings may declare.*

This is spoke as to their Forms in our Language, for in other Languages, where they have various Terminations, they have Numbers.

*Three kinds of* Qualities *there are we know,*
*Which from their Names immediately do flow:*
*First, from possession, we* possessive *call,*
*And from all* Names *by adding* (s), *do fall.*

These

*tion. The* Adjective *declares an accidental difference of the* Substantive, *so does the* Participle. *The* Adjective *denominates the* Substantive *by that accidental difference, so in some Sense becomes its* Name, *so does the* Participle; *unless any one will say that a* trotting Horse *does not as much denominate the* Substantive *as a* white Horse. *The* Adjective *agrees with its* Substantive *in Construction, and so does the* Participle. *The only difference between them is, that the* Participle *is said to signify some distinct time. I shall consider that hereafter, but if that difference be sufficient to make them two* Parts of Speech, *the* Adjective *and* Substantive *must be two different* Parts, *because of a greater difference. But that* that *difference is not sufficient to make them different* Parts of Speech, *I shall show in my Animadversion upon the* Infinitive Mood; *which notwithstanding its Consignification of Time, I shall prove to be a* Substantive. *And therefore, if Consignification of Time will not* unsubstantive *that, as agreeing in the general Signification and Use of a* Substantive, *so neither will the like Consignification of Time* unadjective *the* Participle, *which agrees in general Signification and Construction with the* Adjective.

Thus far Mr. *Johnson*; and he makes his Word good in Animadversion, from *p.* 341, to 350. which he may consult, that is not satisfy'd with what we have produc'd from him on this Head.

These *Poſſeſſive Qualities*, or *Qualities* of *Poſſeſſion*, are made by any *Name*, whether *Singular* or *Plural*, by adding (*s*) or (*es*), if the neceſſity of Pronunciation require it; as *Mans* Nature, for the Nature of *Man*; *Mens* Nature, for the Nature of *Men*. *Waller's Poems.*

*But if the plural Name in* (s) *does end,*
*The* (s) poſſeſſive *and that* (s) *is join'd.*

If the Plural Name (as it generally does) end in (*s*), the two (*ss*) (that is that which forms the Number, and that which forms the Poſſeſſion) join in one, or rather one is left out for the eaſineſs of Sound; as the *Lords Houſe*, for the *Houſe of Lords*; the *Commons Houſe*, for the *Houſe of Commons*, inſtead of the *Commons's Houſe*, *the Lords's Houſe*.

*The ſame in* Proper Names *is often found,*
*For the more eaſy Flowing of the Sound.*

The ſame is often done in the Singular Number, when a proper Name ends in (*s*), as *Priamus Daughter*, *Venus Temple*; for *Priamus's Daughter*, or *Venus's Temple*. Tho' the full writing is ſometimes preſerv'd, as King *Charles's Court*, and St. *James's Park*, and the like. [2]

*Where'er two* Names *compounded we do ſee,*
*The firſt is always deem'd a* Quality.

This is the other ſort of *Qualities* that derive themſelves immediately from NAMES; as *Sea-fiſh*, *Self-love*, *River-fiſh*, *Turkey Voyage*, *Sea Voyage*, *Home-made*, *Self-murder*, *Man-ſlaughter*, *Gold-Ring*; and this ſort of *Qualities* Dr. *Wallis* calls *reſpective*; in which, almoſt all other reſpects (but thoſe of *poſſeſſive Qualities*) are imply'd; which are yet more diſtinct, when they are requir'd to be expreſs'd by *Particles*. This is nothing elſe but the Name put after the manner of a *Quality*, and join'd to the following Word

[2] Thoſe who have imagin'd that this (*s*) was put in the place of *his*, (the firſt part being cut off by *Apharefis*) and that therefore the Note of *Apoſtrophe* ought always to be expreſs'd or underſtood, are extreamly out of the way in their Judgment. For tho' we do not deny, but the Note of the Apoſtrophe may juſtly (ſometimes) be plac'd there, to give a more diſtinct perception of the uſe of the (*s*) where there is occaſion, yet we muſt deny that, therefore it ought always to be done, and to ſignify the Abſence of his; for it is join'd often to the Names of Women, and to *Plural Names*, where *his* cannot be ſuppos'd to be without a palpable Soleciſm; and in the Words *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, *hers*, where ſure no body cou'd ever dream that *his* cou'd be.

[3] The

Word by this line or mark call'd a *Hyphen* -, to incorporate it, as it were, into one Word, and which is ſometimes done without that ſhort line.

*As* Qualities *from* Names, *we ſee, do flow,*
*Thus ſome to* Perſ'nal Names *we likewiſe owe*;
*As* our, ours; their, theirs; her, hers; my *and* mine;
His, your, yours, *and* its, *and* whoſe, thy, *and* thine.

Theſe are Perſonal Poſſeſſives, and *my, thy, her, our, your, their*, are us'd when they are join'd to *Names*; as *this is my Horſe, this is my Hat.* But *mine, thine, hers, yours, theirs* are us'd when the *Name* is underſtood; as *this Horſe is mine*; *this Hat is thine*; that is, *this Horſe is my Horſe*; *this Hat is thy Hat*, &c. Thus *own* cannot follow the later, but the former, as we ſay, not *yours own*, or *ours own*, but *your own*, and *our own*. But *mine* and *thine* are moſt commonly us'd when a *Name* follows that begins with a Vowel; as *my Arm*, or *mine Arm*; *thy Aunt*, or *thine Aunt*. We ſhall put them all in one View, as we have done the *Perſonal Names*.

| | | with the Name. | without the Name. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perſ. 1. | Sing. | *My* | *Mine* |
| | Plur. | *Our* | *Ours* |
| Perſ. 2. | Sing. | *Thy* | *Thine* |
| | Plur. | *Your* | *Yours* |
| | | *His* | |
| Perſ. 3. | Sing. | *Her* | *Hers* |
| | Plur. | *Their* | *Theirs* |

Theſe by no means ſubſiſting by themſelves, nor ſignifying any thing without reference to ſome other *Name* or *Names*, are properly *Qualities*. [3]

*Ano-*

[3] The Demonſtratives *this* and *that*, and their Plurals *theſe* and *thoſe the ſame*, and the Relative or Interrogative *which*, are by no means *Pronames*, but *Adjectives*. For they are not put for a *Name* or *Subſtantive*; that is, they do not ſupply the place of a Name (as is eſſential to a *Proname*, and which the very Denomination of the

*Another sort of* Qualities *there are,*
*Which* being, doing, suffering *declare,*
*And Time imply, as* present, past, *to* come,
*In some more plainly, more obscure in some.*
*In* (ing) *it ends, when* doing *is expres's'd,*
*In* d, t, n, *when* suffering's *confess'd.*

These *Qualities* are what the old GRAMMARIANS call'd *Participles*, and a modern Author has continu'd under that Name, notwithstanding what Mr. *Johnson*, *Sciopius*, and others have urg'd; but without any Reason produc'd for so doing. But we being convinc'd that those Reasons are not to be answer'd, besides several more which might be produc'd; as Words which signify *Time*, *Action*, &c. and yet are allow'd, on all Hands, not to be either *Participle*, *or of Affirmation*, venture to call them *Qualities*.

We have not in the Verse said any thing of the Ending when it betokens *Being*, because that is confin'd to that one Word, and therefore needs no Rule; and is only *being* and *been*. *I* being *sick, sent for a Doctor. I have* been *a Soldier*. It signifies *doing*; as, *I am* hearing *a Song*; *I was* tuning *my Harpsicord*. It signifies *suffering*; as, *I was* beaten, *I was* abus'd; and the like. [4]

(A)

Word demonstrates to be necessary to it) but they are added to *Names* or *Substantives*, as the *Qualities* or *Adjectives* are; as *this Man*, *that Man*, the *same Man*. If they ever occur without their *Names* or *Substantives*, which they often do, the *Substantives* are always understood; thus we say, *one, all, many, others, the Learned, the Unlearned*, omitting or leaving out the *Substantives* or *Names*, and yet these *Adjectives* are not put into the Number of *Pronames*.

*Which*, is the same in both Numbers, and is us'd when we speak of *Things*, as *who* and *whom* are when we talk of *Persons*.

We must observe, that *what* is us'd Adjectively when it signifies *Qualis*, and is in a Question, as in *what Man?* that is, what kind of Man, or in Number the first, second, and that is often us'd for *which*, and so is an *Adjective*.

The Word *own*, very often emphatically subjoin'd to *Names* and *Pronames*, is likewise an *Adjective*; as *your* own *Horse*, *my* own *Goods*, Alexanders *own Sword*.

The Word *self*, tho' plac'd by some among the *Pronames*, (because 'tis generally render'd into *Latin* by the Word *ipse*, is yet plainly a *Substantive* or *Name*, to which there is scarce any Word directly answers in the *Latin*; that which comes nearest to it is *Persona*, or *Propria Persona*; as *thyself, myself, ourselves, yourselves, himself, itself, themselves*, are we confess us'd for *his self, its self, their selves*; but interposing *own*, we say *his own self, its own self, their own selves*. In the same Sense we meet in the Greek Poets, ὡς βίη as βίη Ἡρακλῆος or Ἡρακλέος, *Hercules ipse, Hercules himself, Hercules his own self*.

[4] The time that is imply'd by this

(A), (an), *and* (the), *we* Qualities *may name,*
*Because their Use and Nature are the same.*

These Signs of *Names*, (*a*) and (*the*), have the Nature of *Qualities*, for they are added to *Names*, nor subsist or convey any Idea without them, and pay the same Attendance on the *Names*.

The use of these Signs are worthy Remark; for (*a*) before a Consonant, and (*an*) before a Vowel, extend the Signification of a *Name* to any one, and so to all, one by one, of its kind; but (*the*) restrains it to some *Particular*, and by that means makes a *Common* equivalent to a *Proper Name*.

*But since these Signs don't Individuals show,*
*They ne'er before a* Proper Name *can go;*
*Nor before* Pers'nal Names *and* Qualities,
*Nor when the thing in general we express,*
*Nor before* Names *of* Vertues, Herbs *and* Vice.

But these Signs not denoting *Individuation*, are not set before *Proper Names*; as *Peter*, *John*, *William*, &c. Nor before *Personal Names* or *Qualities*. Nor are they us'd when the Name expresses the Thing in General; as we say, Man *being Mortal, soon fades away and dies*; not *the*, or *a* Man, and we say *Vertue consists in the Mean*, not *a*, or *the Vertue*, &c. These *Signs* signifying *Particularity*, we say *the Justice of God*, since that is *particular*. Nor are they set before the particular *Names* of *Vertues* or *Vices*, or *Herbs*, *Metals*, &c. as we say, not a *Temperance*, a *Sloath*, a *Thyme*, an *Hissop*.

(*A*) and (*an*) sometimes signifie *one*, as *all to a Man*. [5]

*The* is a Demonstrative, and signifies the same as *that*, but less emphatically. It denotes the determination of one or more

this sort of *Quality* or *Adjective*, is generally obscure in *English*, and rather plac'd in the *Word of Affirmation*, which is generally plac'd with it; but in *Latin* we agree with Mr. *Johnson* against *Sanctius*, That the time is signify'd pretty plainly by the Participle.

[5] Names generally signify Things in a general and unlimitted Sense, but *Signs*, or *Articles* (as some call them) restrain and determine the Signification of Names, and apply them to a particular Thing. If we say, *'tis a Happiness to be King*, 'tis an uncertain, wandring and undetermin'd Word; but if you add (*the*) to it, and says *'tis a Happiness to be the King*, it determines it to be the King of the People mention'd before. So that these little Signs contribute much to the clearness of Discourse.

The *Latins* have none of these *Signs* or *Articles*, whence *Scaliger* falsely concluded, that they were useless; but he is indeed a Critic that very often is in the wrong: And here 'tis plain from the Instances given, that they are necessary

more, to which the general Word is actually apply'd. Thus we uſe the Word *Earth* when we deſign the Species or Element; but *the Earth*, when we mean the Globe of Earth (which is a certain determin'd Individual) 'tis plac'd with both in the Singular or Plural Number, becauſe we may ſpeak determinately of one, as well as more Individuals.

As neither of theſe are fix'd to a Word of *a general Signification*, or *proper Name*, ſo are they not us'd when any other Quality is preſent that virtually contains 'em; as, *a Man, one Man, ſome Man, any Man*; *the World, this World*; for here *one, ſome, any, this*, certainly imply *a* and *the*.

There are beſides ſome particular Phraſes, as *many a Man, never a Man*, which differ from *many Men, no Men*, as *every Man* from *all Men*; the former ſignifie *many Men, all Men, no Men*, ſeparately, or taken diſtinctly; the later conjunctly, or collectively. Nor are the following abſolutely unlike theſe, when (after *ſuch*, and the Particles of Compariſon, *as, ſo, too*, and ſcarce any others) the *Quality* (*a*) is interpos'd between the *Name* and its *Quality*, (which is uſually put after it) as, *Such a Gift is too ſmall a Reward for ſo great a Labour, and as great a Benefit.*

*When* QUALITIES *for* NAMES *we e'er find ſet,*
*They then the Properties of* NAMES *will get.*

*Qualities* are ſometimes put for *Names*, and then they aſſume their Rights and Properties; tho' ſome contend, that the *Names* are always underſtood, tho' not expreſs'd, to make 'em ſubſiſt in good Senſe.

*Moſt*

ry to the avoiding Ambiguities. The *Greeks* have one ὁ, ἡ, τὸ. Tho' theſe Signs ſhou'd not be put before proper Names for the Reaſon given, yet the *Greeks* do ſometimes put the Article to the *Proper Names* of Men, ὁ φιλίππ&, and the *Italians* do it Cuſtomarily, as *l'Arioſto, Il Taſſo, l'Ariſtotele*; which the *French* imitate in thoſe *Words* or *Names* which are purely of *Italian* Original, but in none elſe; and we put them to the Names of *Rivers*, as the *Thames*, the *Ouſe*, the *Rhine*, &c.

In fine, the *Articles* or *Signs*, are not put to the *Qualities* or *Adjectives*, becauſe they muſt receive their determination from other *Names* or *Subſtantives*. Or when we find them ſet before *Qualities* or *Adjectives*; as the *Black*, the *White*, &c. then are they ſet for *Names*, or *Subſtantively*: The *White* means as much as *Whiteneſs*, or elſe the *Subſtantive* is underſtood; as the *Black* is the *black Mark*, or *Spot*.

[1] We

*Moſt Qualities by two Degrees do riſe,*
*Or fall as much in* Number, Bulk, *or* Price;
*By adding to its end* or, er, *or* eſt,
*Which by ſome* little Words *is elſe expreſt*;
*As* wiſe, wiſer, wiſeſt, *and* moſt wiſe;
*But* (very) *oft the Place of* (more) *ſupplys.*

*Qualities* have yet another Difference from *Names*, for they admit by the Variation of their Endings, or by the Addition of *ſome little Words*, Degrees of Compariſon. For, ſignifying *Manners* or *Qualities*, they naturally muſt be of ſeveral Degrees, which encreaſe twice, by adding (*er*) to the QUALITY it ſelf, and (*eſt*). *Fair* is the *Quality* it ſelf, for Example, its *firſt* riſing or Degree is *fairer*; and the next, beyond which there's none, is *faireſt*. Theſe again are form'd by *little Words*, without altering the Ending or Termination of the *Quality*; as, *fair*, *more fair*, *moſt* or *very fair*.

All Words therefore, whoſe Signification will admit *Encreaſe*, and conſequently in good Senſe will ſuffer theſe Words (*more*, *moſt*, or *very*) before 'em, are *Qualities*, that have their Degrees of Compariſon, or of Encreaſe and Decreaſe.

*Theſe three alone irregular are found,*
Good, bad, *and* little, *alter* Name *and Sound.*

Theſe three have an irregular manner of being compar'd, as *good*, *better*, *beſt*; *bad*, or *ill*; *worſe* (and *worſer*) *worſt*; *little*, *leſs*, (or *leſſer*) *leaſt*: To which add *much*, (or *many*) *more*, *moſt*.

But there are ſome *Qualities*, before which you cannot in good Senſe put *more* or *moſt*, as *all*, *ſome*, *any*, &c. for we cannot ſay *more all*, *moſt all*, &c. *Much*, *more*, and *moſt*, when they are joyn'd to Names of the Singular Number, ſignifie Quantity; as, *much*, *more*, *moſt Wine*: But when the Name joyn'd to them is of the Plural Number, they ſignifie Number, as, *much*, *more*, and *moſt Company*; but *much* is chang'd into *many* when Numbers are ſignified. Thus the *Quality* ALL joyn'd with a *Name* of the Singular Number, relates to *Quantity*, as *all the Wine*; but with a *Name* of the Plural Number, it ſignifies *Number*, as *all the Children*. *Every* is never put with a *Name* of the Plural Number, as *every Man*, not *every Men*. Thus *enough* ſignifies *Quantity*, whoſe Plural is *enow*, which ſignifies *Number*; *I have Wine enough*, *I have Books enow*.

When the *Quality* NO has no Name after it, we ſay *none*; as, *Is there no Wine? There's none.*

CHAP.

# CHAP. VIII.

## *Of* AFFIRMATIONS.

[1] WE come now to that Part of Speech which is the Soul of a Sentence, for without this a Sentence cannot ſubſiſt, ſince nothing can be ſpoken that is affirm'd or deny'd without it. The *Latins* call this Part of Speech *Verbum*, from whence our *Engliſh* Grammarians very awkardly have borrow'd *Verb*, which all other Nations, that borrow from the *Latin*, call in their own Tongue *Word*, for that is the plain Engliſh of *Verbum*: The *Word* was us'd by way of Eminence; but if our Grammarians had us'd *Word* inſtead of *Verb*, tho' it wou'd have been more eaſie and obvious to the Learner's Memory and Underſtanding, yet it would require a long Explanation of its Nature as a *Part of Speech*, nothing of that being contain'd in its Name; but the very Eſſence of it is expreſt in the Term *Affirmation*, ſince all Words of this kind do *affirm Something of Something*; as will be plain from the Notes on this Head.

[2] *An*

[1] We have thus far explain'd thoſe Words, which ſignifie the Objects of our Thoughts, to which indeed the Prepoſitions and Adverbs belong, tho' the Order of the Text has poſtpon'd 'em: We now come to conſider thoſe Words, which ſignify the Manner, as *Verbs*, or *Affirmations*, *Conjunctions*, or joyning Words, and *Interjections*.

The knowledge of the Nature of the *Verb*, or *Affirmation*, depends on what has been ſaid at the beginning of theſe Notes on Words, and that is, that the Judgment we make of Things (as when I ſay, *the Earth is round*) neceſſarily implys two Terms, one call'd the SUBJECT, which is the Thing of which the Affirmation is made, as the *Earth*; and the other the ATTRIBUTE, which is what is affirm'd of the Subject, as *round*. And beſides theſe two Terms, there is in that Propoſition another Word, which is the Connection of thoſe two Terms, and which is properly the Action of the Mind, which affirms the Attribute of the Subject. Men are therefore under an equal Neceſſity of inventing Words, that mark and denote the Affirmation, which is the principal Manner of our Thoughts, as to invent thoſe, which mark the Objects of 'em. And this third Connective Term, is what is generally call'd a *Verb*, but more intelligibly an AFFIRMATION, ſince its chief Uſe is to ſignifie the Affirmation; that is, to ſhow that the Diſcourſe in which this Word is us'd, is the Diſcourſe of a Man, who not only conceives Things, but judges, and affirms ſomething of 'em; in which

the

the Verb, or Affirmation, is distinguish'd from some Names and Qualities, which signifie Affirmation likewise; as, *affirmans*, *affirmatio*, because they do not signifie, that the Thing is become the Object of our Thoughts, by the Reflection of the Mind, and therefore do not mark, that he who uses those Words affirms, but only, that he barely conceives an Affirmation.

We have said, that the chief use of the *Verb*, is to signifie the *Affirmation*, because we shall see, that the Verb is likewise made use of, to signifie other Motions of the Soul, as *to desire*, *to pray*, *to command*, &c. but it is only by changing the Inflection, and the Mode. We shall at present only consider the Verb in its chief Use and Signification, which is that which it has to the *Indicative*, or first *State*, *Mode*, or *Manner*.

According to this Sense, it may be said, that the *Verb* or *Affirmation* ought to have no other Use, but the marking the Connection we make in our Minds, between the Terms of a Proposition. Thus there is only the Verb *esse*, *to be*, (which is call'd a Verb Substantive) that remains in this simplicity: And further, we may say, that even this Verb is properly thus simple, only in the third Person of the Present Tense or Time, *est*, *is*, and on certain Occasions: For as Men naturally incline to shorten their Expressions, they have always joyn'd to the Affirmation, other Significations in the same Word. 1*st*, They have joyn'd that of some Attribute, by which means two Words then make a Proposition; as when I say, *Petrus vivit*, Peter *lives*, because the Word *vivit* (or lives) includes both the Affirmation, and Attribute of being alive, since it is the same thing to say, *Peter lives*, and *Peter is living*; thence arises the great diversity of Verbs, in every Language; whereas if the general Signification of the Affirmation were only given to the Verb, without joyning any particular Attribute, there wou'd be no need of more than one Verb in each Language, which is that we call Substantive.

2*dly*, They have joyn'd the Subject of the Proposition on certain Occasions, so that Two Words (nay, even One) may make an entire Proposition, two Words, as *Sum Homo*, because *Sum* not only signifies the *Affirmation*, but includes the Signification of the *Pronoun*, or *Personal Name*, *Ego*, *I*; which is the Subject of the Proposition. And in our own Tongue we always express it, *I am a Man*. One Word may likewise express an entire Proposition; as, *vivo*, *sedeo*, &c. For these *Verbs* include both the *Affirmation* and the *Attribute*, as we have already said; and being in the first Person, they include the Subject likewise, as, *I am living*, *I am sitting*: And hence comes the difference of Persons, which is generally in Verbs.

3*dly*, They have also join'd a Relation to the Time, with respect to the Thing affirm'd; so that one Word (as *cunasti*) signifies that I affirm of him, to whom I speak, the Action of *supping*, not for the present time, but the past, *Thou hast supp'd*. And from hence the Verbs derive their diversity of Times, (or as the Vulgar has it, Tenses) which is also generally common to all Verbs, or Words of Affirmation.

The diversity of these Significations, join'd in the same Word, is what has hinder'd a great many otherwise, of a very good Capacity, from rightly understanding the Nature of the Verb, because they have not consider'd it according to what is essential to it, which is the Affirmation, but according to the various Relations accidental to it, as a Verb, or Word of Affirmation.

Thus *Aristotle* confining himself to the third Signification, added to that which is essential to it, defines a Verb, *Vox significans cum Tempore*,

*pore*,

*pore*, a *Word*, *that ſignifies with Time*. Others, as *Buxtorfius*, adding to it the ſecond, defines it, *Vox flexilis cum Tempore, & Perſona, a Word that has divers Inflections with Time and Perſon.*

Others have confin'd themſelves to the firſt Signification, added to the Eſſential, which is that of the Attribute; and conſidering, that the *Attributes* Men have join'd to the *Affirmation* in the ſame Word, are commonly Actives and Paſſives, have thought the Eſſence of a *Verb* conſiſts in *ſignifying the Actions and Paſſions*. And in fine, *Julius Scaliger* thought that he had diſcover'd a great Myſtery in his Book *of the Principles of the Latin Tongue*, by ſaying, that the diſtinction of Things into *permanentes, & fluentes, Things permanent or laſting, or fixt, and paſſing, or that paſs away*, was the true Original of the diſtinction of *Names*, or *Nouns* and *Verbs* or *Affirmations*; ſince *Names* are to ſignify the former, and *Verbs* the latter. But we may eaſily perceive that theſe Definitions are falſe, and do by no means explain the true Nature of the *Verb*.

The manner of the Connection of the two firſt ſhow it ſufficiently, becauſe 'tis not there expreſs'd, what the *Verb* ſignifies, but only that with which it ſignifies, *viz. Cum Tempore, cum Perſona*; the two latter are ſtill worſe, having the two great Vices of Definitions, which is to agree, *neque omni, neque ſoli:* For there are *Verbs* which ſignify neither *Actions* nor *Paſſions*, nor what paſſes away, as *exiſtit, quieſcit, friget, alget, tepet, calet, albet, viret, claret*, &c. of which we may have occaſion to ſpeak elſewhere.

There are Words which are not *Verbs*, that ſignify Actions and Paſſions, and even Things tranſient, according to *Scaliger's* Definition. For 'tis certain, that *Participles* (or Qualities deriv'd from Verbs) are true *Nouns*, and yet thoſe of *Verbs active*, ſignify *Actions*, and theſe of *Verbs paſſive*, Paſſions, as much as the *Verbs* themſelves from which they are form'd, and there is no Reaſon to pretend that *fluens* does not ſignify a Thing that paſſes, as well as *fluit*. To which may be added againſt the two firſt Definitions of the *Verb*, that the Participles ſignify alſo with Time, there being a preſent, a paſt, and a future, eſpecially in the *Latin* and *Greek*, &c. And thoſe who (not without Reaſon) believe that a *Vocative Caſe* is truly the ſecond Perſon, eſpecially when it has a different Termination from the Nominative, will find, that on that ſide there wou'd be but a difference of the more, or the leſs, between the *Participle* and the *Verb*. And thus the eſſential Reaſon, why a Participle is not a Verb, is, that it does not ſignify the *Affirmation*; whence it comes that to make a *Propoſition*, which is the Property of the *Verb*, the Participle muſt add a *Verb*, that is, reſtore that which was taken away, by turning the *Verb* into the *Participle*. For how comes it that *Petrus vivit, Peter lives*, is a *Propoſition*; and *Petrus vivens, Peter living*, is not ſo, unleſs *eſt*, *is*, be added, as *Petrus eſt vivens, Peter is living*, but becauſe that Affirmation (which is in *vivit*) was taken away by making the *Participle vivens*? whence it appears, that the Affirmation that is, or is not found in a Word, makes it to be, or not to be a *Verb*.

Upon which we may obſerve *en paſſant*, that the Infinitive *Mode* or *Form*, or *Mood*, which is very often a *Noun* or *Name*, (as when we ſay in *French, le Boire, le Manger*) is different from Participles, the Participles being Noun Adjectives, or what we call *Qualities*: But the *Infinitive Moods* are *Noun Subſtantives*, or *Names* made by Abſtraction of thoſe *Adjectives*; in the ſame manner as of *Candidus*, *Candor* is made, and of *White*, *White-*

*Whiteneſs*. Thus *rubet*, a *Verb*, ſignifies *is red*, including the Affirmation and the Attribute; *rubens*, the Participle ſignifies only *Red*, without *Affirmation*, and *Rubere* taken for a *Noun*, ſignifies *Redneſs*.

It ſhou'd, therefore, be allow'd a conſtant Rule, that conſidering ſimply what is eſſential to a *Verb*, the only true Definition is *Vox ſignificans Affirmationem*, *a Word that ſignifies an Affirmation*, ſince we can find no Word that marks an *Affirmation*, but what is a *Verb*; nor any *Verb* but what marks it (at leaſt) in the *Indicative*, or *firſt Mood*: And there can no manner of doubt be made, that if a Word were invented, as *eſt*, wou'd be, which ſhould always mark the Affirmation, without having any difference of Time or Perſon; ſo that the diverſity of Perſon ſhou'd be mark'd only by *Nouns* or *Names*, and *Pronames* or *Perſonal Names*, and the diverſity of Times by *Adverbs* or added *Words*, (as in *Engliſh*) it wou'd however be a true *Verb*. As in the Propoſitions, which the Philoſophers call eternally true, as *God is infinite*, *Body is diviſible*, *the whole is greater than its Parts*; the Word (*is*) implies only the ſimple Signification, without any Relation to Time, becauſe 'tis true to all Times, and without our Minds ſtopping at any diverſity of *Perſons*.

Thus the *Verb* (according to what is eſſential to it) is *a Word that ſignifies Affirmation*. But if we wou'd join its principal Accidents, it may be thus defin'd, *Vox ſignificans Affirmationem*, *cum Deſignatione* Perſonæ, Numeri & Temporis, *a Word which ſignifies* Affirmation *with the Deſignation of the* Perſon, Number *and* Time, which agrees properly with the *Verb Subſtantive*. But for the others, in as much as they differ by that Union, Men have made of the *Affirmation* with certain *Attributes*, they may be thus defin'd, *Vox ſignificans Affirmationem alicujus Attributi*, *cum Deſignatione* Perſonæ, *&c. a Word ſignifying the* Affirmation *of ſome* Attribute, *with the Deſignation of* Perſon, Number *and* Time: We may likewiſe tranſiently obſerve, that the Affirmation (as 'tis conceiv'd) may be the Attribute of the *Verb* alſo, as in the *Verb affirmo*, which Verb ſignifies two *Affirmations*, one regards the Perſon ſpeaking, and the other the Perſon ſpoken of, whether it be of himſelf, or of another. For when we ſay, *Petrus affirmat*, it is the ſame as to ſay, *Petrus eſt affirmans*, and then *eſt* marks our *Affirmation*, and the Judgment we make concerning *Peter* and *affirmans*, that we conceive, and attribute to *Peter*.

The *Verb* NEGO (on the contrary) contains by the ſame Reaſon an Affirmation and Negation. For it muſt be farther obſerv'd, that tho' all Judgments are not *affirmative*, and that there are ſome Negatives; nevertheleſs *Verbs* never ſignify any thing of themſelves but Affirmations; Negations are only mark'd by Particles, or little Words, as *non*, *ne*, *haud*, &c. or by Nouns that imply it, as *Nullus*, *nemo*, &c. which being join'd to *Verbs*, change the Affirmation into a Negation, as, *no Man is immortal*, *Nullum Corpus eſt indiviſibile*. Tho' much of theſe Notes, which relate to the Knowledge of the true Nature of a *Verb*, may ſeem to (and indeed in many Things do) relate more to the dead Languages than the living, yet there is nothing advanc'd which will not be uſeful to the Student of GRAMMAR, ſince by theſe Obſervations he will enter into the very Eſſence of the Art, and ſee in what it is founded on the Nature of Things; and we are very certain, that great part of theſe *Notes* are equally advantageous to our underſtanding the Nature of our own Words, and in what they are founded on the general Reaſon of all Languages.

[2] *An* Affirmation (*as the Word do's ſhow*)
*Something affirms, and do's* Number *know,*
[3] *And* Time *and* Perſon; *whether it expreſs*
Action, Being, Paſſion; *or their want confeſs.*

An *Affirmation* is a Part of Speech (as the Word imports) which affirms ſome Attribute, which the Deſignation of Time, Number and Perſon, expreſſing *being*, *doing* or *ſuffering*, or the want of them, or the like.

*Two Times the* Engliſh *Language only knows,*
*The firſt the* preſent, *next the* paſſing *ſhows;*
*And they by diff'rent Ending are made known*
*By adding* (d), *or* (ed) *are moſtly ſhown;*
*The* preſent Love, *the* paſſing lov'd *do's make,*
*Or elſe ſome other* Affirmations *take*
*Before it, which its different Times declare,*
*And in the Rules of* Affirmations *ſhare.*

All *Affirmations* affirming in *Time*, this *Time* is expreſs'd either by different Endings, as *Love*, *lov'd*, or *loved*; *burn*, *burn'd*, or *burned*; or by putting other *Affirmations* before them, which alſo expreſs the Manner of the *Affirmation*, as *have*, *ſhall*, *will*, *might*, *wou'd*, *ſhou'd*, &c. as will be ſeen in the Sequel.

In *Engliſh* we have but two Times diſtinguiſh'd by the different ending; the *Preſent* is the *Affirmation* it ſelf, as *I Love*; the ſecond is the *paſſing*, as *I lov'd*: All other Times are expreſs'd by the 'foreſaid Words.

*The* Perſonal Names *the Perſons do expreſs,*
*As* I, thou, he, we, ye, *and* they *confeſs.*
*With theſe their various Endings too agree,*
*As we by* love, loveſt *and* loves *may ſee.*

The Perſons of the *Affirmations* are always expreſs'd by the Perſonal Names *I*, *thou*, *he*, in the *Singular*, and *We*, *ye*, or *you*, and *they*, in the *Plural* Number; the *two firſt* reaching only themſelves, the *third* all other *Names*, becauſe *all* other NAMES are of the *third Perſon*. They alſo vary their their Endings in the *ſecond* and *third Perſon Singular*; as *I love*, *thou loveſt*, *he loves*; *we*, *ye* and *they love*, in the *preſent Time*; and *I loved*, *thou lovedſt*, *he loved*, in the *paſſing Time*; the *Soldier fights*, *Gold prevails*. *I love*, beſides the *firſt Perſon*, denotes the *Time* when *I love*, that is, the *preſent Time* when I am ſpeaking; but by adding (*d*), it ſignifies the Time *paſſing*, as *I loved*, *lov'd*, or *did love*.

[4] *The*

[2] We have in the 'foregoing Notes obſerv'd, that the diverſity of *Perſons* and *Numbers* in *Affirmations* or *Verbs*, proceeds from the joining in the ſame Word the Subject of the Propoſition, at leaſt on certain Occaſions, to the *Affirmation* proper to the *Verb*, to ſhorten the Expreſſion, (tho' this will not hold in moſt Modern Tongues, at leaſt in none which want variety of Terminations, to diſtinguiſh the Perſons, which we do by Perſonal Names) for when a Man ſpeaks of himſelf, the Subject of the Propoſition is the *Pronoun* or *Perſonal Name*, of the firſt Perſon *Ego*, *I*, and when he ſpeaks of him, to whom he addreſſes himſelf, the Subject of the Propoſition is the Pronoun of the ſecond Perſon *Tu*, *thou*, *you*.

Now that he may not always be oblig'd to uſe theſe Pronouns, it has been thought ſufficient to give to the Word which ſignifies the Affirmation, a certain Termination which ſhows, that it is of himſelf a Man ſpeaks, and that is what is call'd the firſt Perſon of the Verb, as *Video*, *I ſee*.

The ſame is done with Reſpect to him, to whom a Man addreſſes himſelf; and this is call'd the ſecond Perſon, *vides*, *thou ſeeſt*, or *you ſee*. And as theſe *Pronouns* have their *Plurals*, that ſignify more than one, as when a Man talking of himſelf joins others, as *us*, *we*; or of him, to whom he ſpeaks, by joining others, as *you*, to two different Terminations in the *Latin*, are join'd to the Plural, as *videmus*, *we ſee*, *videtis*, *you ſee*.

But becauſe often the Subject of the Propoſition is neither a Man's ſelf, nor the Perſon to whom he ſpeaks, 'tis neceſſary not only to reſerve theſe two Terminations to thoſe two Perſons, but that a third be made, to be join'd to all other Subjects of a Propoſition. And this is what is call'd the third Perſon, as well in the Singular Number, as Plural; tho' the Word *Perſon*, which properly agrees only to rational and intellectual Beings, and ſo is proper but to the two former, ſince the third is for all other ſorts of Things, and not for Perſons only. By that we ſee, that naturally what we call the third Perſon ought to be the *Theme* of the *Verb*, as it is alſo in all the Oriental Tongues, for it is more natural, that the Verb ſhou'd ſignify properly the Affirmation, without making any Subject in particular, and that afterwards, it be determin'd by a new Inflection, to include the firſt or ſecond Perſon, for a Subject.

This diverſity of Terminations for the firſt Perſon, ſhows that the Ancient Languages had a great deal of Reaſon not to join the *Pronouns* of the firſt and ſecond Perſon to the Verb, but very rarely (and on particular Conſiderations) contenting themſelves to ſay, *Video*, *vides*, *videmus*, *videtis*, becauſe theſe Terminations were originally invented for this very Reaſon, *viz.* to avoid joining the Pronouns to the Verbs: Yet all the vulgar or living Languages, and ours eſpecially, always joyn them to their Verbs; for we ſay, *I ſee*, *thou ſeeſt*, or *you ſee*, *we ſee*, &c. the Reaſon of which may be, or rather plainly is, that our Verbs have no diſtinct Terminations to expreſs the Perſons without them.

But beſides theſe two Numbers, *Singular* and *Plural*, which are in Verbs as well as Nouns, the *Greeks* have a *Dual Number*, which is proper only to two, but this is not ſo commonly made Uſe of, as the other two.

The Oriental Languages thought it proper to diſtinguiſh when the Affirmation related to the one, or the other, and to the Maſculine, or Feminine; for this Reaſon they gave the ſame Perſon of the Verb two Terminations to expreſs the two Genders, which indeed is a great help in avoiding *Equivocals*.

[3] The Signification of the *Time*, is another thing which we

have ſaid to be join'd to the Affirmation of the Verb; for the Affirmation is made according to different Times, ſince we may affirm a Thing *is*, *was*, or *will be*; whence other Inflections are given to *Verbs*, ſignifying theſe ſeveral Times, which our Engliſh Grammarians have by a barbarous Word call'd *Tenſes*: But there are but three *ſimple Tenſes*, or *Times*, the *Preſent*, as *amo I love*; the *Paſt*, as *amavi, I have lov'd*; and the *Future*, as *amabo, I will* (or *ſhall*) *love*.

But becauſe in the Paſt one may mark, that the Thing is but juſt paſt or done, or indefinitely that it was done; it from this proceeds that in the greateſt part of the Vulgar Languages there are two ſorts of *Preterits* or *Paſt Times*, one that marks the Thing to be preciſely done, and is therefore call'd Definite; as, *I have written, I have ſaid*; and the other that marks or denotes it done indeterminately, and therefore call'd Indefinite, or *Aoriſtus*; as, *I wrote, I went, I din'd*; which is properly only ſpoke of a Time, at leaſt of a Days diſtance from that in which we ſpeak. But this holds truer in the French Language, than in any other, for in that they ſay, *J'ecrivis hier, I wrote Yeſterday*, but not *J'ecrivis ce Matin*, nor *J'ecrivis cette Nuit*, but *Jay* ecrit *ce Matin, Jay* ecrit *cette Nuit*, &c.

The Future will alſo admit of the ſame Differences; for we may have a mind to denote or mark a Thing that is ſuddenly to be. Thus the Greeks have their *Paulo-poſt* future, ὀλίγον μέλλων, which marks the Thing about to be done, as ποιήσομαι, *I am about to do it*: And we may alſo mark a Thing that is ſimply to happen, as, ποιήσω, *I will do it*; amabo, *I will love*.

This is what we may ſay of the Times, or Tenſes of Verbs, conſidering 'em ſimply in their Nature, as Preſent, Paſt, and Future. But becauſe it has been thought fit to mark theſe Tenſes, with a relation to another, by one Word, other Inflections have been invented in the Verbs or Affirmations, which may be call'd the *Compound Tenſes*, or *Times*.

The firſt is that, which marks the Paſt, in relation to the Preſent, and 'tis call'd the Preterimperfect Tenſe, or Time, becauſe it marks not the Thing ſimply and properly, as done, but as imperfect, and preſent, with reſpect to a Thing which is already nevertheleſs paſt. Thus when I ſay, *Cum intravit cœnabam, I was at Supper when he enter'd*, the Action of Supping is paſt in reſpect of the Time, of which I ſpeak, but I mark it as preſent in reſpect of the Thing of which I ſpeak, which is the *Entrance of ſuch a one*.

The ſecond Compound Time, or Tenſe, is that which doubly marks the paſt, and on that account is called the Preterpluperfect Tenſe, or the Time more than perfectly paſt; *Cœnaveram, I had ſupp'd*; by which I denote my Action of ſupping, not only as paſt in it ſelf, but alſo as paſt in reſpect to another Thing, which is alſo paſt; as, *I had ſupp'd when he enter'd*; which ſhews my Supping was before his Entrance; which however is alſo paſt.

The third Compound Time is that which denotes the Future with reſpect to the Paſt, *viz.* the Future Perfect; as *Cœnavero, I ſhall have ſupp'd*; by which I mark my Action of Supping as Future it ſelf, and paſs'd in regard to another Thing to come, that is to follow, as *when I ſhall have ſupp'd, he will enter*; which is to ſay, That my Supper (which is not yet come) will be paſt when his Entrance (which is alſo not yet come) will be preſent.

Thus a fourth Compound Time may be added, that is, that which marks the Future with relation to the Preſent, to make as many Compound Futures as Compound Preterits, or Paſt Times, or Tenſes; and perhaps the ſecond Future of the

Greeks

[4] *The following Nine are of moſt general uſe,*
*And various Meanings in the reſt produce;*
Do, will, *and* ſhall, muſt, ought, *and* may,
Have, am, *or* be, *this Doctrine will diſplay.*
*For theſe Neceſſity, or Pow'r, or Will,*
*And Time, or Duty are expreſſing ſtill.*

Of *Affirmations*, the following *Nine* are moſt generally us'd, being plac'd before all other *Affirmations*, to ſignifie their *Time*, *Power*, *Will*, *Liberty*, *Neceſſity*, *Duty*, &c. Of theſe therefore it is neceſſary we firſt treat.

Do *does the* Preſent Time *with force expreſs,*
*And* did *the* Paſſing *ſhews us with no leſs.*

*Do* is, and denotes the *preſent Time*, which in the *paſſing* Time changes its ending into *did*: Both theſe are us'd to expreſs their ſeveral Times with the greater force, diſtinction, and fulneſs; as, *I do love*, *I do not love*. Thus *did* expreſſes the *paſſing* Time emphatically, except when *whilſt* goes before it, for then 'tis but imperfectly paſt, or paſſing. The Perſonal Endings of this *Affirmation* are, *I do*, *thou doſt*, *he does*, ſingular; *we*, *ye*, and *they do*, plural.

When *do* ſignifies Action, as, *I do ſuch a thing*, it admits theſe other *Affirmations* before it, to denote its Time and Manner of *doing*. *Will* does the ſame when it ſignifies *willing*, as, *I will this to be done*; tho' this is ſeldom found in our preſent way of Writing.

Will *is the* preſent Time, *and* wou'd *the* paſt,
*But before other* Affirmations *caſt,*
*The Time to come by both is ſtill expreſt.*

*Will*

Greeks marks this in its Origin, whence it comes that it almoſt always preſerves the Figurative of the Preſent; nevertheleſs in the uſe of it, it has been confounded with the former; and even the Latin makes uſe of the ſimple Future for that; as, *Cum cœnavero intravis*, *You will enter when I have ſupp'd*; by which I mark my Supper as future in it ſelf, but as preſent when you enter.

This is what has given Riſe to the ſeveral Inflections of *Verbs* or *Affirmations*, that they may diſtinguiſh the ſeveral *Times* or *Tenſes* upon which We muſt obſerve, that the Oriental Tongues have only the *Paſt* and the *Future*, without any of the other Differences of *imperfect*, *preterpluperfect*, &c. which renders theſe Languages ſubject to great and many Ambiguities, not to be met with in others. But theſe Differences of the Times (in our Tongue eſpecially) are clearly denoted by the *Auxiliary Verbs*, and very few Alterations of the Terminations, as in *Latin*; as is ſhown in the *Text*.

*Will* is the present Time, and *wou'd* the past, of this *Affirmation*; but they signifie the Time to come, when they are plac'd before other Affirmations, as, *I will love, I wou'd love.* Its Persons are *I will, thou wilt, he will* sing; *we, ye, they will.* *Will* implys the Inclination of the Agent.

*The same Rule holds of* shall, *and* shou'd; *we find,*
*Since all the* Time to come *alone intend.*

*Shall* is the *present* Time, and *shou'd* the *past*; but it signifies the *Time to come*, when added to other Affirmations; as *I shall love, I shou'd love.* *Shall* is sometimes left out, as, *if he write*, for *If he shall write*; *if he have written*, for *if he shall have written.*

*In the first Person simply* shall *foretells:*
*In* will *a Threat, or else a Promise dwells.*
Shall *in the second and the third does threat*;
Will *simply then foretells the future Feat.*

We use not *shall* and *will* promiscuously for one another, for *shall* in the first Person simply foretells, *will* implys a Promise, or a Threat. In the second and third Person *shall* promises, or threatens, and *will* only simply foretells; thus, *I shall burn, you will*, or *thou wilt burn, he will burn, we shall, ye will, they will burn*; that is, I foretell this *will* be. *I will, you shall*, or *thou shalt*; *he shall, we will, ye shall, they shall burn*; that is, I promise, or engage, that such a thing *shall* be done.

*Wou'd* and *shou'd* foretells what was to come, but with this difference, *wou'd* implys the Will and Propension of the Agent; *shou'd*, only the simple Futurity; as, *I wou'd burn, I shou'd burn*; *rather than turn, I wou'd burn*; *if the Fire went about me, I shou'd burn.*

*Shou'd* seems likewise, in many places, to be the same as *ought*; as, *I have been oblig'd to* Roger, *and* shou'd *now return the Obligation.* The Persons of these are, *I shou'd, thou shou'dst, he shou'd*; *I wou'd, thou wou'dst, he wou'd.*

*We, ye,* and *they* { *wou'd* / *shou'd.*

*The Time to come most absolutely note*
*Both* shall *and* will; *but* wou'd *and* shou'd *do not,*
*But with Condition* Time to come *expres*;
*Which Difference they every-where confess.*

*Shall* and *will* denote absolutely the Time to come; *shou'd* and *wou'd* do it conditionally.

May *does the* Right, *or* Poſſibility;
*And* can *the* Agents Pow'r *to do, imply.*

*May* and *can*, with their *paſt* or *paſſing* Times *might* and *cou'd*, imply a Power; but with this diſtinction, *may* and *might* are ſaid of the *Right, Poſſibility*, and *Liberty* of doing a Thing; *can* and *cou'd* of the Power of the *Agent*; *I can burn, I cou'd burn*; *I may burn, I might burn*; that is, *it is poſſible or lawful for me to burn.* The Perſons are, *I may, thou may'ſt, he may*; *we, ye*, and *they may. I might, thou mightſt*, or *you might, he might*; *we, ye*, and *they might. I can, thou canſt, he can*; *we, ye*, and *they can. I cou'd, thou cou'dſt, he cou'd*; *we, ye*, and *they cou'd. May* and *can* are us'd with Relation both to the Time *preſent*, and to *come*; *cou'd* from *can*, and *might* from *may*, have Relation to the Time *paſt*, and to *come.*

Muſt *the* Neceſſity *does ſtill denote,*
*And ſtill the* Duty *we expreſs by* ought.

*Muſt* implies *Neceſſity, I muſt burn*; *ought* implies *Duty*, as, *I ought to burn.* But theſe two *Affirmations* have only the *preſent* Time, and their Perſons are only expreſs'd by the *Perſonal Names*, for it is now quite obſolete to ſay, *thou oughteſt*; for it now changes its Ending no more than *muſt.*

Have (*when with* Qualities *of* ſuff'ring *plac't*)
*Denotes the Time that perfectly is paſt*;
*And thus by* had *is moſt directly ſhown*
*The Time, that more than perfectly is gone.*
Shall, *and* will have, *do ſtill the Time declare*
*That will be paſt before ſome others are.*

*Have* (join'd to a *Quality* that ſignifies *ſuffering*) denotes the Time perfectly *paſt*, that is, that which is now *paſt. Had* marks the Time that is more than perfectly *paſt*, or ſometime *paſt*, that is, at the Time when it was ſpoken of; as, *I have burn'd, I had burn'd.* Thus *ſhall have*, and *will have burn'd*, denote the Time which will be *paſt* before another Thing which is to *come, happens*, or *is.* As, *when I ſhall have read a Page, I will ſhut the Book.* The Perſons of theſe *Affirmations* are, *I have, thou haſt, he has*; *we, ye*, and *they have. I had, thou hadſt, he had*; *we, ye*, or *you* and *they had.*

*Whenever* have, Poſſeſſion *does denote,*
*Theſe* Affirmations *it admits, elſe not.*

When *have* ſignifies *Poſſeſſion*, as *I have a Horſe, I have a Commiſſion*, and the like, it admits ſome of the nine *Affirmations* we have been treating of before it, to expreſs its Times, Manner, &c. elſe not.

Am,

Am, *or* be, *ſtill in their Native Senſe*
Being *import*; *but then they ſtill diſpenſe*
*The* Affirmation *to the* Quality
(*Without it loſt*) *that* ſuff'ring *does imply.*

*Am*, or *be* (for they are the ſame) naturally, or in themſelves ſignify *being*; but join'd to, or ſet before a *Quality* ſignifying *ſuffering*, reſtore the *Affirmation* of *ſuffering*, which as a *Quality* it loſt; as *I am burn'd*, *he muſt be burn'd*. It has therefore a double Formation.

| | Singular, | Plur. |
|---|---|---|
| In the *preſent Time* | *Am, art, is,* / *be, beſt, be,* | *are.* / *be.* |
| In the *paſſing*, or *paſt Time* | *was, waſt, was,* / *were, wert, were,* | *were.* |

*I am burn'd, thou art burn'd, he is burn'd, if I were burn'd, I was burn'd, I have been burn'd, I had been burn'd, I ſhou'd be burn'd, I ſhou'd have been burn'd.*

All other *Engliſh Affirmations* having no other differing Endings to ſignify all the other different Times, which are in Nature, muſt of neceſſity ſupply that Defect, by making uſe of one or more of theſe nine foregoing Words; for beſides the *preſent* and the *paſſing* Times, which the *Engliſh* diſtinguiſhes by varying the Ending of the *Affirmation*, there is the *future*, or Time to *come*, the Time perfectly *paſt*, and the Time more than perfectly *paſt*; all which theſe little Affirmations eaſily ſupply.

*Where'er theſe* Affirmations *do precede,*
*The Endings of the following have no need*
*To change at all, but theſe muſt vary ſtill,*
*The Uſe of* Perſ'nal Endings *to fulfil.*

Whenever theſe foregoing *Affirmations* are plac'd before any others, they not only change their own *Perſonal* Endings, but hinder the following *Affirmations* from changing theirs, as *I do love*, *thou doſt love*, *he does love*, *we*, *ye*, and *they do love*; not *I do love*, *thou doſt loveſt*, *he does loves*, &c. But the *Perſonal Name* is often left out when the *Affirmation* implies Exhortation or Command, as *burn*, for *burn thou*, or *ye*.

We have ſhewn, that *Affirmations* form their *paſſing Time* by adding (*d*) to the *preſent*, or by changing (*e*) into (*d*) or (*ed*); as, *I love*, *I lov'd* or *loved*; *I burn*, *I burn'd* or *burned*; but the (*ed*) is now almoſt wholly left out, except in *winged*, and a very few more; and therefore it is only on account of ſome old Books, that we mention it here.

Theſe

Theſe Perſonal Endings are not only omitted after the nine Affirmations, but after *if*, *that*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *whether*, &c.

*But when the* preſent *ends in* (d) *or* (t),
*The* paſſing Time *the ſame we always ſee.*

When the *preſent Time* ends in (*d*), or (*t*), the *paſſing* has the ſame ending; as, *read*, *ſpread*, *caſt*, *hit*, *knit*, and ſome others, which are diſtinguiſh'd only by the Pronunciation, tho' they were doubtleſs of old *readed*, *ſpreaded*, *caſted*, *hitted*, *knitted*, &c. And if they were ſtill ſpelt with a double Conſonant, it would be much better for the Diſtinction, tho' this Defect is fully ſupply'd by the former nine little *Affirmations* of Time, &c.

*Other Exceptions to this Rule we find,*
*Which to the following Liſt are moſt conſign'd.*

There are ſome *Affirmations*, which are irregular in this Matter, or are Exceptions to this Rule, but this Irregularity reaches only thoſe which are Native, and originally Engliſh Words, and of one Syllable, or deriv'd from Words of one Syllable.

The firſt Irregularity, and that which is the moſt general, aroſe from our Quickneſs of Pronunciation, by changing the Conſonant (*d*) into (*t*), as often as by that means the Pronunciation is made the more expeditious; and indeed ſeems rather a Contraction, than an Irregularity; particularly after *c*, *ch*, *ſh*, *f*, *k*, *p*, *x*; and after *s*, and *th*, when pronounc'd hard; and ſometimes after *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, when a ſhort Vowel goes before; for theſe Letters more eaſily admit a (*t*) than a (*d*) after 'em; as, *plac't*, *ſnatch't*, *fiſh't*, *wak't*, *dwelt*, *ſmelt*, inſtead of *plac'd*, *ſnatch'd*, *fiſh'd*, *wak'd*, *dwell'd*, *ſmell'd*.

But (*d*) remains after the Conſonants *b*, *g*, *v*, *w*, *z*, *s*, *th*, when they have a ſofter Sound, and when a long Vowel precedes *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*, for they more eaſily unite and incorporate with (*d*) than (*t*), becauſe of the like direction of the Breath to the Noſtrils; as you may find in the Notes to this Grammar on the formation of thoſe Letters, thus, *liv'd*, *ſmil'd*, *raz'd*, *believ'd*, &c. from *live*, *ſmile*, *raze*, *believe*.

Except when the long Vowel is ſhortned before *l*, *m*, *n*, *r*; or when (*b*) and (*v*) are chang'd into (*p*) or (*f*), and the ſofter Sound of (*s*) paſſes into their harder, as, *felt*, *delt*, *dremt*, *ment*, *left*, *bereft*, &c. from to *feel*, *deal*, *dream*, *mean*, *leave*, *bereave*, &c.

But

But when (*d*) or (*t*) go before, and are join'd by (*d*) or (*t*), (in this contracted Form), they incorporate with the radical (*d*) or (*t*), into one Letter; that is, if (*t*) be the radical Letter, they unite into (*t*), but if (*d*) be the radical Letter, then they incorporate into (*d*) or (*t*), according as this, or that Letter is the easier to be pronounc'd, as *read, led, spred, dread, shred, tread, bid, hid, chid, fed, bled, bred, sped, strid, slid, rid,* &c. (which, doubtless, were Originally, *read'd, bid'd,* &c. as it were, *read'd, bid'd,* &c.) from to *read, lead, spread, shed, dread, shread, bid, hide, chide, feed, bleed, breed, speed, stride, slide, ride,* &c. thus, *cast, hurt, cost, burst, eat, beat, sweat, sit, quit, smit, writ, bit, hit, met, shot,* &c. (tho' perhaps these Words wou'd for the distinction of the *passing* Time, from the *present*, be better Spelt; *eatt, beatt, bitt, hitt,* &c. as it were *eat't, bit't hit't,* &c.) from these WORDS to *cast, hurt, cost, burst, eat, beat, sweat, sit, quit, smite, write, bite, hit, meet, shoot,* &c. thus, *lent, sent, rent, girt,* &c. for *lend'd, send'd,* &c. from to *lend, send, rend, gird,* &c.

Tho' this Irregularity be sometimes lost, and the regular Spelling observ'd, as *plac'd, fish'd,* &c. yet 'tis but seldom, and in few Words.

There are not a few other irregular WORDS in the *passing* Time, but those which are more particular and special, may be reduc'd to their Classes; as,

1. *Won, spun, begun, swam, struck, sung, stung, flung, rung, wrung, sprung, swung, drunk, sunk, shrunk, slunk, hung, come, run, found, bound, ground, wound*; many of them are likewise spelt with (*a*), as *began, sang, rang, sprang, drank, came, ran,* and some others, tho' not so often; from to *win, spin, begin, swim, strike, stick, sing, sting, sling, ring, wring, spring, swing, drink, sink, shrink, stink, hang, come, run, find, bind, grind, Wind,* &c.

2. *Fought, taught, raught, sought, besought, caught, bought, brought, thought, wrought*; from to *fight, teach, reach, seek, beseech, catch, buy, bring, think, work*; yet some of these sometimes keep their Regularity; as *reach'd, beseech'd, catch'd, work'd,* &c.

3. *Took, shook, forsook, woke, awoke, stood, broke, spoke, bore, shore, swore, tore, wore, wove, clove, strove, throve, drove, shone, rose, arose, smote, wrote, bode, abode, rose, chose, trod, got, begot, forgot, rod*; some likewise write *thrive, rise, smit, writ, abid, rid,* &c. others form them by (*a*), as *brake, spake, bare, share, sware, tare, ware, clave, gat, begat, forgat,* and perhaps some others; but this Way is seldom, and very unpolite;

te; the *preſent* Times of theſe Words are, *take, ſhake, for-ke, wake, awake, ſtand, break, ſpeak, bear, ſhear, ſwear, tear, ear, weave, cleave,* (to cling to), *cleave* (to ſplit), *ſtrive, rive, ſhine, riſe, ariſe, ſmite, write, bide, abide, ride, chuſe* or chooſe) *tread, beget, forget.*

4. *Give, bid, ſit,* having their *paſſing* Times, *gave, bad, te.*

5. *Draw, know, ſnow, grow, throw, blow, crow, fly, ſlay, e, ly,* make their *paſſing* Times, *drew, knew, ſnew* (or rather *ow'd*), *grew, threw, blew* (or rather *blow'd*), *crow,* (or rather *ow'd*;) *flew, ſlew, ſaw, lay, flee* (or *flye*) *fled*; from *go, went.* Theſe are all, or the moſt part at leaſt, of the moſt conſequence of all the irregular WORDS in the *Engliſh Tongue.*

*When* Affirmations *are together join'd,*
To, *ſtill between them does its Station find.*

When two *Words of Affirmation* come together, before the latter the Sign (*to*) is always expreſs'd or underſtood; as *love to read, I dare fight*; in the latter, (*to*) is underſtood, for it means, *I dare to fight,* as *do, will, may, can*; with their *paſſing* Times, *did, wou'd, ſhou'd, might, cou'd,* and *muſt, bid, dare, let, help,* and *make.*

CHAP.

[4] In this Place we ſhall alſo ſay what we have to ſay of the *Moods* or *Forms* of *Verbs*, or *Affirmations.* We have therefore already ſaid, that Verbs are of that Kind of Words that ſignify the Manner and Form of our Thoughts, the Chief of which is *Affirmation*: And we have alſo obſerv'd, that they receive different Inflections, according as the *Affirmation* relates to different *Perſons* and *Times*; but Men have found, that it was proper to invent other Inflections alſo, more diſtinctly to explain what paſs'd in their Minds. For firſt they obſerv'd, that beſides ſimple Affirmations, as *I loves, he lov'd,* &c. there were others conditional and modify'd, as *tho' he might have lov'd, tho' he wou'd have lov'd,* &c. and the better to diſtinguiſh theſe *Affirmations* from the others, they doubl'd the Inflections of the ſame *Tenſes* or *Times*, making ſome ſerve for ſimple *Affirmations*, as *loves, lov'd*; and others for thoſe *Affirmations* which were modify'd; as, *might have lov'd, wou'd have lov'd*; tho' not conſtantly obſerving the Rules, they made uſe of ſimple Inflections to expreſs *modify'd Affirmations*, as, *etſi vereor*, for *etſi verear*; and 'tis of theſe latter ſort of Inflections, that the GRAMMARIANS make their Mood call'd the *Subjunctive*: Moreover (beſides the *Affirmation*) the Action of our Will may be taken for a Manner of our Thought, and Men had Occaſion to mark what they wou'd have underſtood, as well as what they thought. Now we may will a Thing ſeveral Ways, of which three may be conſider'd as chief:

1. We *would* have Things that do not depend on ourſelves, and then

we

we *will* it only by a ſimple Wiſh, which is explain'd in *Latin* by the particle *Utinam*, and in our Tongue by *would to God*. Some Languages (as the *Greek*) have invented particular Inflections for that; which has given Occaſion to the GRAMMARIANS to call them the *Optative* Mood: And there's in *French*, and in the *Spaniſh*, and *Italian*, ſomething like it, ſince there are Triple Tenſes; but in others, the ſame Inflections ſerve for the *Subjunctive* and *Optative*; and for this Reaſon, one may very well retrench this Mood in the *Latin* Conjugations; for 'tis not only the different way of ſignifying, which may be very much multiply'd, but the different Inflections that ought to make Moods.

2. We *will* ſometimes after another manner, when we content our ſelves with *granting* a Thing, tho' *abſolutely* we would not do it; as when *Terence* ſays, *Profundat, perdat, pereat, Let him laviſh, let him ſink, let him periſh*, &c. Men might have invented an Inflection to mark this Movement, as well as they have invented one in *Greek*, to mark a *ſimple Deſire*, but they have not done it, and make uſe of the *Subjunctive* for it; and in *French* and *Engliſh* we add *qu'e, let*. Some GRAMMARIANS have call'd this the *Potential* Mood, *Modus Potentialis*, or *Modus Conceſſionis*.

3. The third ſort of *willing* is, when what we *will* depends on a Perſon of whom we may obtain it, ſignifying to him the *Deſire* we have that he *will* do it. This is the *Motion* we have when we *command* or *pray*. 'Tis to mark this *Motion*, that the Mood call'd *Imperative* was invented: It has no firſt Perſon, eſpecially in the *Singular*, becauſe one cannot properly *command* ones ſelf; nor the third in ſeveral Languages, becauſe we don't properly *command* any but thoſe to whom we Addreſs and Speak. And becauſe the *Command* or *Deſire* in this Mood has always regard to the *Future*, it thence happens that the *Imperative* and *Future* are often taken one for another, eſpecially in the *Hebrew*, as *non occides, you ſhall not kill*, for *kill not*: Whence it comes to paſs that ſome GRAMMARIANS have plac'd the *Imperative* among the *Futures*.

Of all the Moods we have been ſpeaking of, the Oriental Tongues have only this latter, which is the Imperative: And on the contrary, the Vulgar Tongues have no particular Inflection for the Imperative, but our way of marking it in the French, is to take the ſecond Perſon plural, and even the firſt without the Pronouns that go before 'em: Thus *Vous aimez, You love*, is a ſimple Affirmation; *aimez* an Imperative. *Nous aimons, We love*; *aimons* an Imperative: But when we command by the Singular, which is very rare, we do not take the ſecond Perſon, *Tu aimes*, but the firſt, *aime*.

There's another Inflection of a Verb, that admits of neither Number nor Perſon, which is what we call Infinitive; as *eſſe, eſtre, to be*; *amare, aimer, to love*. But it muſt be obſerv'd that ſometimes the Infinitive retains the Affirmation, as when I ſay, *Scio malum eſſe fugiendum*, I know the Evil is to be avoided; then often it loſes it, and becomes a Noun, eſpecially in Greek and the Vulgar Tongues; as when we ſay, *Le boire, le manger*, and alſo *je vieux boire, volo bibere*; for 'tis as much as to ſay, *Volo potum*, or *potionem*.

This being ſuppos'd, 'tis demanded what the Infinitive is properly when 'tis not a Noun, but retains its Affirmation; as in this Example, *Scio malum eſſe fugiendum*. I know of no body that has taken Notice of what I am about to Obſerve, which is, that we think the Infinitive is among the other Moods of Verbs, what the Relative is among the Pronouns; for as the Relative has more in it than the other Pronouns, that it joyns the Propo-

tion in which it is to another Propoſition, ſo I believe the Infinitive, beſides the Affirmation of the Verb, may joyn the Propoſition in which it is to another; for *Scio* is as good as a Propoſition of it ſelf; and if you add *malum eſt fugiendum*, 'twou'd be two ſeveral Propoſitions; but putting *eſſe* inſtead of *eſt*, you make the laſt Propoſition but a part of the firſt. And thence it is that in French they almoſt always render the Infinitive by the Indicative of the Verb, *Je ſcay, que le mal eſt fuir*; and then this *que* ſignifies only this Union of one Propoſition to another; which Union is in Latin contain'd in the Infinitive, and in French alſo, tho' rarely, as when we ſay, *Il croit ſcavoir toutes choſes*.

This way of joyning Propoſitions by an Infinitive, or by *quod* and *que*, is chiefly in uſe when we make one part of a Diſcourſe have a relation to another; as if I would report that the King ſaid to me, *Je vous donneray une charge*, I ſhall not generally do it in theſe terms, The King ſaid to me, *I will give thee a Poſt*, le Roy m'a dit, *Je vous donneray une charge*, by leaving the two Propoſitions ſeparate, one for *me*, the other for *the King*, but ſhall joyn 'em together by a *Que le Roy m'a dit, qu'il me donnera une charge*; and then it being only a Propoſition, which is of *my ſelf*, I change the firſt, *je donneray*, into the third, *il donnera*, and the Pronoun *vous* (ſignifying *the King* ſpeaking) to the Pronoun *me*, (ſignifying *my ſelf*) who ſpeak.

This Union of the Propoſition is alſo made by *ſi* in French, and by *an* in Latin, in relating an Interrogative; as if any one may demand of me, *Pouvez vous faire cela, Can you do that?* I ſhou'd in relating it ſay, *On m'a demande ſi je pouvois faire cela, I was ask'd if I could do that*: And ſometimes without any Particle, by changing only the Perſon; as, *He ask'd me, Who are you? He ask'd me, who I was.*

But we muſt obſerve, that the Hebrews, tho' they ſpoke in another Language (as the Evangeliſts) make very little uſe of this Union of Propoſitions, but always relate Diſcourſes directly as they were made, ſo that the ὅτι (*quod*) which they frequently us'd, did often ſerve for nothing, and did not joyn Propoſitions: An Example of which is in St. *John*, ch. 1. *Miſerunt Judæi ab Hieroſolymis Sacerdotes & ſcribas ad* Joannem *ut interrogarent eum, Tu quis es? Et confeſſus eſt & non negavit; & confeſſus eſt quia* (ὅτι) *non ſum ego Chriſtus. Et interrogaverunt eum, Quis ergo? Elias es tu? Et dixit, Non ſum. Propheta es tu? Et reſpondit, Non.* According to the common uſe of our Tongue, theſe Queſtions and Anſwers would have been related indirectly thus: *They ſent to ask* John *who he was, and he confeſs'd he was not* Chriſt. *And they demanded who he was then, if he was* Elias; *and he ſaid, No. If he was a* Prophet, *and he reply'd, No.* This Cuſtom is even met with in prophane Authors, who ſeem to have borrow'd it alſo from the *Hebrews*: And thence it is that the ὅτι had often among them only the Strength of a Pronoun, depriv'd of its common Uſe of Connection even when Diſcourſe is reported not directly.

We have already ſaid, that Men have, on an infinite number of Occaſions, join'd ſome particular Attribute with the Affirmation, made ſo many *Verbs* different from *Subſtantives*, which are to be found in all Tongues, and that they may be call'd *Adjective*; to ſhew that the Signification, which is proper to each, is added to the Signification common to *all Verbs*, which is that of *Affirmation*. But 'tis a vulgar Error to believe that all theſe Verbs ſignify *Action* or *Paſſion*; for there's nothing a Verb cannot have for its Attribute, if the Affirmation be join'd to the Attribute. Nay, we

we *will* it only by a ſimple Wiſh, which is explain'd in *Latin* by the particle *Utinam*, and in our Tongue by *would to God*. Some Languages (as the *Greek*) have invented particular Inflections for that; which has given Occaſion to the GRAMMARIANS to call them the *Optative* Mood: And there's in *French*, and in the *Spaniſh*, and *Italian*, ſomething like it, ſince there are Triple Tenſes; but in others, the ſame Inflections ſerve for the *Subjunctive* and *Optative*; and for this Reaſon, one may very well retrench this Mood in the *Latin* Conjugations; for 'tis not only the different way of ſignifying, which may be very much multiply'd, but the different Inflections that ought to make Moods.

2. We *will* ſometimes after another manner, when we content our ſelves with *granting* a Thing, tho' *abſolutely* we would not do it; as when *Terence* ſays, *Profundat, perdat, pereat, Let him laviſh, let him ſink, let him periſh*, &c. Men might have invented an Inflection to mark this Movement, as well as they have invented one in *Greek*, to mark a *ſimple Deſire*, but they have not done it, and make uſe of the *Subjunctive* for it; and in *French* and *Engliſh* we add *qu'e, let*. Some GRAMMARIANS have call'd this the *Potential* Mood, *Modus Potentialis*, or *Modus Conceſſionis*.

3. The third ſort of *willing* is, when what we *will* depends on a Perſon of whom we may obtain it, ſignifying to him the *Deſire* we have that he *will* do it. This is the *Motion* we have when we *command* or *pray*. 'Tis to mark this *Motion*, that the Mood call'd *Imperative* was invented: It has no firſt Perſon, eſpecially in the *Singular*, becauſe one cannot properly *command* ones ſelf; nor the third in ſeveral Languages, becauſe we don't properly *command* any but thoſe to whom we Addreſs and Speak. And becauſe the *Command* or *Deſire* in this Mood has always regard to the *Future*, it thence happens that the *Imperative* and *Future* are often taken one for another, eſpecially in the *Hebrew*, as *non occides you ſhall not kill*, for *kill not*. Whence it comes to paſs that ſome GRAMMARIANS have plac'd the *Imperative* among the *Futures*.

Of all the Moods we have been ſpeaking of, the Oriental Tongues have only this latter, which is the Imperative: And on the contrary the Vulgar Tongues have no particular Inflection for the Imperative but our way of marking it in the French, is to take the ſecond Perſon plural, and even the firſt without the Pronouns that go before 'em. Thus *Vous aimez, You love*, is a ſimple Affirmation; *aimez* an Imperative. *Nous aimons, We love*, *aimons* an Imperative: But when we command by the Singular, which is very rare, we do not take the ſecond Perſon, *Tu aimes*, but the firſt *aime*.

There's another Inflection of the Verb, that admits of neither Number nor Perſon, which is what we call Infinitive; as *eſſe, eſtre, to be*, *amare, aimer, to love*. But it muſt be obſerv'd that ſometimes the Infinitive retains the Affirmation, as when I ſay, *Scio malum eſſe fugiendum*, I know the Evil is to be avoided; then often it loſes it, and becomes a Noun, eſpecially in Greek and the Vulgar Tongues; as when we ſay, *Le boire, le manger*, and alſo *je vieux boire, volo bibere*, for 'tis as much as to ſay, *Volo potum*, or *potionem*.

This being ſuppos'd, 'tis demanded what the Infinitive is properly when 'tis not a Noun, but retains its Affirmation; as in this Example, *Scio malum eſſe fugiendum*. I know of no body that has taken Notice of what I am about to Obſerve, which is, that we think the Infinitive is among the other Moods of Verbs, what the Relative is among the Pronouns; for as the Relative has more in it than the other Pronouns, that it joyns the Propo-

tion in which it is to another Proposition, so I believe the Infinitive, besides the Affirmation of the Verb, may joyn the Proposition in which it is to another; for *Scio* is as good as a Proposition of it self; and if you add *malum est fugiendum*, 'twou'd be two several Propositions; but putting *esse* instead of *est*, you make the last Proposition but a part of the first. And thence it is that in French they almost always render the Infinitive by the Indicative of the Verb, *Je scay, que le mal est fuir*; and then this *que* signifies only this Union of one Proposition to another; which Union is in Latin contain'd in the Infinitive, and in French also, tho' rarely, as when we say, *Il croit scavoir toutes choses.*

This way of joyning Propositions by an Infinitive, or by *quod* and *que*, is chiefly in use when we make one part of a Discourse have a relation to another; as if I would report that the King said to me, *Je vous donneray une charge*, I shall not generally do it in these terms, The King said to me, *I will give thee a Post*, le Roy m'a dit, *Je vous donneray une charge*, by leaving the two Propositions separate, one for *me*, the other for *the King*, but shall joyn 'em together by a *Que le Roy m'a dit, qu'il me donnera une charge*; and then it being only a Proposition, which is of *my self*, I change the first, *je donneray*, into the third, *il donnera*, and the Pronoun *vous* (signifying *the King* speaking) to the Pronoun *me*, (signifying *my self*) who speak.

This Union of the Proposition is also made by *si* in French, and by *an* in Latin, in relating an Interrogative; as if any one may demand of me, *Pouvez vous faire cela, Can you do that?* I shou'd in relating it say, *On m'a demande si je pouvois faire cela, I was ask'd if I could do that*: And sometimes without any Particle, by changing only the Person; as, *He ask'd me, Who are you? He ask'd me, who I was.*

But we must observe, that the Hebrews, tho' they spoke in another Language (as the Evangelists) make very little use of this Union of Propositions, but always relate Discourses directly as they were made, so that the ὅτι (*quod*) which they frequently us'd, did often serve for nothing, and did not joyn Propositions: An Example of which is in St. *John*, ch. 1. *Miserunt Judæi ab Hierosolymis Sacerdotes & scribas ad* Joannem *ut interrogarent eum, Tu quis es? Et confessus est & non negavit; & confessus est quia* (ὅτι) *non sum ego Christus. Et interrogaverunt eum, Quis ergo? Elias es tu? Et dixit, Non sum. Propheta es tu? Et respondit, Non.* According to the common use of our Tongue, these Questions and Answers would have been related indirectly thus: *They sent to ask* John *who he was, and he confess'd he was not* Christ. *And they demanded who he was then, if he was* Elias; *and he said, No. If he was a* Prophet, *and he reply'd, No.* This Custom is even met with in prophane Authors, who seem to have borrow'd it also from the *Hebrews*: And thence it is that the ὅτι had often among them only the Strength of a Pronoun, depriv'd of its common Use of Connection even when Discourse is reported not directly.

We have already said, that Men have, on an infinite number of Occasions, join'd some particular Attribute with the Affirmation, made so many *Verbs* different from *Substantives*, which are to be found in all Tongues, and that they may be call'd *Adjective*; to shew that the Signification, which is proper to each, is added to the Signification common to *all Verbs*, which is that of *Affirmation*. But 'tis a vulgar Error to believe that all these Verbs signify *Action* or *Passion*; for there's nothing a Verb cannot have for its Attribute, if the Affirmation be join'd to the Attribute. Nay, we

ſee that the Verb Subſtantive *Sum, I am*, is frequently Adjective, becauſe inſtead of taking it to ſignify the Affirmation ſimply, the moſt general of all Attributes is join'd to it, which is *Being*; as when I ſay, *I think therefore I am*; *I am* ſignifies *Sum ens, I am a Being, a Thing*; *Exiſto*, ſignifies alſo *ſum exiſtens, I am, I exiſt.*

However that does not hinder, but that the common Diviſion of theſe Verbs into *Active, Paſſive* and *Neuter*, may be retained. Thoſe Verbs are properly call'd *Active*, which ſignify *Action*, to which is oppos'd *Paſſion*; as, *To beat, to be beaten*; *to love, to be belov'd*: Whether thoſe *Actions* be determin'd *to a Subject*, which is called real Action, as, *To beat, to break, to kill*, &c. or only to an *Object*, which is called intentional Action; as, *To love, to know, to ſee.*

Whence it is that in ſeveral Languages, Men make uſe of the ſame Word, by giving it ſeveral Inflections, to ſignify both the one and the other, calling that a *Verb Active*, which has an Inflection, by which the *Action* is mark'd, and a *Verb Paſſive*, that which has an Inflection, by which the *Paſſion* is mark'd; *Amo, amor*; *verbero, verberor.* This was the Cuſtom in all the Ancient Languages, *Latin, Greek*, and *Oriental*; and moreover, theſe latter gave three Actives to the ſame Verb, with each their Paſſive, and a Reciprocal between both the one and the other; as, *s'aimer* would be, which ſignifies the Action of the Verb, on the Subject of that Verb. But the vulgar Tongues of *Europe* have no *Paſſive*, and inſtead of that, they make uſe of a Participle made of the *Verb Active*, which is taken in a Paſſive Senſe, with the Verb Subſtantive; *Je ſuis, I am*; as, *I am beloved, Je ſuis aime*; *Je ſuis battu, I am beaten*, &c. Thus much for Verbs, *Active* and *Paſſive.*

*Neuters*, call'd by ſome GRAMMARIANS *Verba Intranſitiva*, are two ſorts; the one does not ſignify the *Action*, but a *Quality*; as, *Albet, it is white*; *viret, it is green*; *friget, it is cold*, &c. Or ſome Situation; as, *Sedet, he ſits*; *ſtat, he ſtands*; *jacet, he lies.* Or has ſome relation to Place; *Adeſt, he is preſent*; *abeſt, he is abſent.* Or ſome other State or Attribute; as, *Quieſcit, he is quiet*; *excellit, he excells*; *praeſt, he is Superiour*; *regnat, he is King.*

The other Verbs *Neuter*, ſignify *Actions*, but ſuch as do not paſs in a Subject different from him who Acts, or which do not relate to another Object; as, *To dine, to ſup, to march, to ſpeak.*

Nevertheleſs, theſe latter ſorts of Verbs *Neuter*, ſometimes become *Tranſitive*, when a Subject is given them; as, *Ambulare viam*, where the Way is taken for the Subject of the *Action*; often alſo in *Greek*, and ſometimes in *Latin*, a Subject is given it, being a Noun form'd of the ſame Verb; as, *Pugnare pugnam, ſervire ſervitutem, vivere vitam.*

But we believe theſe later Ways of Speaking were occaſion'd only to mark ſomething particular, that was not entirely contain'd in the Verb, as when one wou'd ſay, Man *leads a ſhameful Life*, which is not imply'd in the Word *vivere*; it has been ſaid, *vivere vitam beatam*; as alſo *Servire duram Servitutem.* Thus when we ſay, *vivere vitam*, 'tis without doubt a *Pleonaſm* come from thoſe other Ways of Speaking. For this Reaſon (in all the new Languages) we avoid joining the Noun to the Verb, as *a fault*, and don't ſay, for Example: *To fight a great fight.*

By this that Queſtion may be reſolv'd, whether every Verb not Paſſive, govern always an Accuſative, at leaſt underſtood: 'Tis the Opinion of ſome very able GRAMMARIANS, but for our Parts we don't think it. For firſt, The Verbs that ſignify no Action, but ſome Condition; as, *quieſcit, exiſtit*; or ſome Quality; as, *albet, calet*, have no Accuſative they can govern; and for the

the reſt it muſt be regarded, whether the Action they ſignify has a Subject or an Object, that may be different from that which Acts. For then the Verb governs the Subject, where this Object has the Accuſative. But when the Action ſignify'd by the Verb has neither Subject nor Object different from that which acts, as, *to dine*, *to ſup*; *prandere*, *cœnare*, &c. then there is not ſufficient Reaſon to ſay they govern the Accuſative: Tho' thoſe GRAMMARIANS thought the Infinitive of the Verb to be underſtood as a Noun form'd by the Verb, and by this Example, *Curro*, they will have it *curro curſum*, or *curro currere*: However, this does not appear to be Solid enough, for the Verb ſignifies every Thing; the Infinitive ſignifies taken as a Noun; and further, the Affirmation and Deſignation of the Perſon and Tenſe. As the Adjective *candidus*, *white*, ſignifies the Subſtantive drawn from the Adjective (to wit) *candor*, *whiteneſs*, and alſo the Connotation of a Subject, in which is that abſtract; wherefore, there's as much Reaſon to pretend, that when we ſay, *Homo candidus*, *candere* muſt be underſtood, as to imagine that when we ſay *curris*, *currere* is to be underſtood.

The *Infinitive* (which we have been explaining) is what properly ſhould be call'd a Verb Impersonal, ſince it marks the Affirmation, which is the Property of the Verb, and marks it indefinitely, without Number and Perſon, which is properly to be Impersonal.

Nevertheleſs, the GRAMMARIANS generally give the Name of *Impersonal* to certain Defective Verbs, that have hardly any thing but the third Perſon.

There are two ſorts of theſe Verbs, the one have the Form of *Verbs Neuter*, as *Pœnitet*, *pudet*, *piget*, *licet*, *lubet*, &c. the other are made of *Verbs Paſſive*, and retain the Form, as *Statur*, *curritur*, *amatur*, *vivitur*, &c. Now theſe Verbs have ſometimes more Perſons than the GRAMMARIANS think of, as may be ſeen in the *Method. Latin Remarks on Verbs*, Chap. 5. But what we may conſider here, and which few Perſons have taken Notice of, is, that it ſeems they are call'd *Impersonal*, only becauſe implying in their Signification a Subject, which agrees only to the third Perſon. 'Twas not neceſſary to expreſs the Fact, becauſe 'tis mark'd enough by the Verb itſelf; and thus the Affirmation and Attribute have been compriz'd by the Subject in one Word, as *Pudet me*, that is *pudor tenet*, or *eſt tenens me*; *Pœnitet me*, *pœna habet me*; *Libet mihi*, *libido eſt mihi*: Where it muſt be obſerv'd that the Verb *eſt* is not only ſimply the Subſtantive, but ſignifies alſo *Exiſtence*. For 'tis as it 'twas ſaid, *Libido exiſtit mihi*, or *eſt exiſtens mihi*. And thus in other Impersonals reſolv'd by *eſt*; as *licet mihi*, for *licitum eſt mihi*, *Oportet orare*, for *opus eſt orare*, &c. As to Paſſive Impersonals, *Statur*, *curritur*, *vivitur*, &c. they may alſo be reſolv'd by the Verb *eſt*, or *fit*, or *exiſtit*, and the Nouns Verbal taken of themſelves, as *Statur*, that is, *Statio fit*, or *eſt facta*, or *Exiſtit*; *Curritur*, *curſus fit*; *Concurritur*, *Concurſus fit*: *Vivitur*, *vita eſt*, or rather *vita agitur*. *Si ſic vivitur*, *ſi vita eſt talis*, *If Life is ſuch*. *Miſere vivitur cum medice vivitur*. Life is miſerable when 'tis too much ſubjected to the Rules of Phyſick, and then *eſt* becomes a Subſtantive, becauſe of the addition of *miſere*, which makes the Attribute of the Propoſition.

*Dum ſervitur libidini*, that is, *dum ſervitus exhibetur libidini*, when a Man makes himſelf a Slave to his Paſſions. By this methinks may be concluded the Vulgar Languages have not properly Impersonals; as when we ſay in *French*, *il faut*, *it muſt*, *il eſt permis*, *il me plaiſt*; for *il* is there properly a Relative, which always ſerves in-

ſtead of the Nominative of the Verb, which generally comes after in the Conſtruction, as if we ſay, *il me plait defaire cela*; that is to ſay, *il de faire*, for the *Action or the Motion to do that pleaſes me*, or *eſt mon plaiſir*, 'tis my Pleaſure. However, this *il* (which few People in our Opinion have rightly underſtood) is only a ſort of Pronoun, for *id* that, which ſerves inſtead of the Nominative underſtood, or imply'd in the Senſe, and repreſents *il*, ſo that 'tis properly taken from the Article *il*, of the *Italians*; inſtead of which we ſay *le*; or from the Pronoun *ille*, from whence we alſo take our Pronoun of the third Perſon *il*; *il aime*, *il parle*, *il court*, &c.

For the Paſſive Impersonals, *amatur*, *curritur*, expreſs'd in *French* by *on aime*, *on court*; 'tis certain theſe Ways of Speaking in our Modern Languages, are ſtill leſs Impersonal, tho' Indefinite; this *on*, is there for *Man*, *Homme*, and conſequently ſerves inſtead of the Nominative to the Verb: All this relates particularly to the *French*, and we have leſs of the Impersonal than they, but the ſame Reaſons will remove ours, juſtly apply'd. And one may alſo obſerve, that the Verbs of the Effects of Nature, as, *Pluit*, *ningit*, *grandinat*, may be explain'd by theſe ſame, in both Tongues.

As *Pluit* is properly a Word, in which for brevity ſake the Subject, the Affirmation, and Attribute are Included, inſtead of *Pluvia fit*, or *cadit*; and when we ſay *it Rains*, *it Snows*, *it Hails*, &c. it is therefore the Nominative, that is to ſay, *Rains*, *Snows*, *Hails*, &c. included with their Verb Subſtantive *eſt* or *fuit*; as if we ſhould ſay, *il pluie eſt*, *le Neige ſe fait*, for *id quod dicitur pluvia eſt*, *id quod vocatur nix fit*.

This is better ſeen in the Way of Speaking, where the *French* join a Verb with their *il*, as *il fait chaud*, *il eſt tard*, *il eſt ſix heures*, *il eſt jour*, &c. For 'tis the ſame as may be ſaid in *Italian*, *il caldo fa*, tho' in uſe we ſay ſimply *fa caldo*; *Æſtus*, or *Calor eſt*, or *fit*, or *exiſtit*. And *il fait chaud*, that is to ſay, *il chaud* (*il caldo*) or *le chaud ſe fait*, to ſay *exiſtit*, *eſt*. Thus we alſo ſay, *il ſe fait tard*, for *il tardo*, that is to ſay, *il tarde* (*le tard*, or the *Evening*) *ſe fait*. Or as is ſaid in ſome Provinces, *il s'en va tard*, for *il tarde*, *le tard s'en va venir*, that is, the Night approaches: As alſo *il eſt jour*, that is *il jour* (or the *Day*) *eſt*, is. *Il eſt ſix heures*, that is, *il temps ſix heures eſt*; The Time or part of the Day call'd ſix a-Clock, is. And thus in other the like Terms.

Tho' we have no *Participles* in *Engliſh*, but what by the beſt Judges are reduc'd to *Qualitys*, yet to carry on this general *Grammar*, we here add ſomething on them: Participles are true Noun Adjectives, and 'twou'd not be proper to diſcourſe of 'em here, if they had not ſuch a near Relation to Verbs. This Relation conſiſts (as we have ſaid) in that they ſignify the ſame Thing as the Verb, except the Affirmation, which is taken away, and the Deſignation of the three different Perſons, which follows the Affirmation. For which Reaſon (when 'tis reſtor'd to it) we do the ſame thing by the Participle, as by the Verb; as *amatus ſum*, is the ſame thing as *Amor*; and *ſum amans*, as *amo*. And this Way of Speaking by Participle, is more uſual in *Greek* and *Hebrew*, than in *Latin*, tho' *Cicero* makes uſe of it ſometimes.

Thus the Participle retains the Attribute of the Verb, and alſo the Deſignation of the Time or Tenſe, there being Participles of the Preſent, the Preterit, and the Future, eſpecially in *Greek*. But this is not always obſerv'd, tho' ſome Participles joyn often all ſorts of Tenſes; as for Example, the Paſſive Participle *Amatus*, which in moſt GRAMMARIANS paſſes for the Preterit, is often of the Preſent and Future; as *amatus ſum*, *amatus ero*. And on the contrary, that of the Preſent; as *amans* is often of the

Pre-

*Preterit*, *Apri super se dimicant, indurantes Attritu arborum costa, Plin.* That is to say, *postquam induravere*, and the like, *Nouv. Meth. Lat. Remarq.* on Participles.

There are Active and Passive Participles, the Active in *Latin* end in *ans* or *ens*, *currans*, *docens*; the Passive in *us*, *amatus*, *doctus*; tho' there are some of these that are Active, to wit, those of Verbs Deponent; as *Loquutus*. But there are some also, that add this Passive Signification, *que cela doit estre, qu'il faut que cela soit*, that must or ought to be, as are the Participles in *dus*, *amandus*, that *that ought to be belov'd*; tho' sometimes that later Signification is almost quite lost.

The Property of Participles of Verbs Active, is to signify the Action of the Verb, as 'tis in the Verb, that is to say, in the Course of the Action it self; whereas Verbal Nouns that signify Actions also, signify them rather in the Habit, than in the Act. Thence it is that Participles have the same Regimen as the *amans Deum*. Whereas Verbal Nouns have the same Regimen as Nouns, *amator Dei*. And the Participle itself, has the same Regimen as Nouns, when it signifies rather the Habit than the Act of the Verb, because it then has the Nature of a simple Noun Verbal, as *amans Virtutis*.

We have seen, that by taking away the Affirmation from Verbs, Active and Passive Participles are made, which are Noun Adjectives, retaining the Regimen of the Verb, at least in the Active.

But there are in *Latin* two Noun Substantives form'd, one in *dum*, call'd a *Gerund*, which has divers Cases, *dum*, *di*, *do*; *amandum*, *amandi*, *amando*; but it has but one Gender, and one Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *dus*, *amandus*, *amanda*, *amandum*.

Another in *um*, call'd Supine, which has also two Cases, *tum*, *tu*; *amatum*, *amatu*; but it has no more diversity either of Gender or Number, in which it differs from the Participle in *tus*; *amatus*, *amata*, *amatum*.

We know very well the GRAMMARIANS are puzzled a little to explain the Nature of the Gerund; and that some very able ones have thought 'twas an Adjective Passive, whose Substantive was the Infinitive of the Verb; so that they pretend for Example, that *tempus est legendi Libros*, or *Librorum* (for both the one and the other is us'd) is as if it were *tempus est legendi τῶ legere libros vel librorum*. There are two Speeches, to wit, *tempus legendi τῶ legere*, which is the Adjective and Substantive, as if it was *legenda lectionis*, & *legere Libros*, which is the Noun Verbal that then governs the Case of the Verb, as well as a Substantive governs the Genitive, when we say *librorum* for *Libros*. But considering every thing, we don't see that this Term is necessary.

For 1. As they say of *legere*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Substantive, which as such may govern either the Genitive, or even the Accusative, as the Ancients said, *curatio hanc rem*; *Quid tibi hanc tactio est?* Plaut. We say the same Thing of *legendum*, that 'tis a Verbal Noun Substantive, as well as *legere*, and that consequently it may do all that's attributed to *legere*.

2. There is no Ground to say that a Word is understood when 'tis never exprest, and cannot be exprest without appearing absurd: Now never was an *Infinitive* join'd to its *Gerund*; and if one shou'd say *legendum est legere*, it wou'd appear altogether absurd therefore, &c.

3. If the Gerund *legendum* were an Adjective Passive, it wou'd not be different from the Participle *legendus*; for what Reason therefore did the Ancients, who understood their Tongue, distinguish Gerunds from Participles? We believe therefore the Gerund is a Noun Substan-

tive, which is always Active, and which differs from the Infinitive, only consider'd as a Noun; because it adds to the Signification of the Action of the Verb, another of the Necessity or Duty; as if one wou'd say, the Action that is to be done, which seems to be mark'd by the Word Gerund, which is taken from *gerere*, to do; whence it comes that *pugnandum est*, is the same Thing as *pugnare oportet*; and the *English* and *French*, which have not this, render it by the *Infinitive*, and a Word which signifies *ought to be*. *Il faut combattre*; and in *English*, *we ought to fight*.

But as Words do not always preserve the Force for which they were invented, this Gerund in *dum* often loses that *Oportet*, and preserves only the Action of the Verb; *Quis talia fando Temperet a Lacrymis?* That is to say, *in fando*, or *in fari talia*.

As for the *Supine*, we agree with those GRAMMARIANS, that it is a Noun Substantive which is Passive, whereas the Gerund in our Opinion is always active.

# CHAP. IX.

## *Of* PARTICLES, *or* Manners *of* WORDS.

*By* PARTICLES *these several Things are done*;
Circumstance *and* Manner *of* Words *are shown*,
*And then to every Part of Speech are flown*;
*Or else they do denote of* Words *the State*,
*And how each* Word *to other does relate*:
*Or* Sentence, *else to* Sentence *they unite*,
*And their* Dependance *on each other cite*.

[1] PARTICLES (that is little WORDS) or *Manners* of WORDS, have these several Offices: 1*st*, They express or signify the Circumstance or Manner of *Words*; as, *I love you dearly*; explaining (when join'd to an *Affirmation*) *how*, *when*, *where*, or *whether* or *no* one is, does, or suffers; as, *he reads* well; *he dances* scurvily; *he sings* now; *the Play is acted* here; *it is a doubt* whether *he sings or* not. It is join'd to a QUALITY; as *he is* very *happy*; *he is* always *fortunate*; *a Woman* truly *loving*, *is ever disappointed*; *a Wife* seldom *scolding*, *is very rare*, &c. 'Tis sometimes join'd to it self; as, *I live* very *comfortably*. They farther denote, or shew the *State* of *Words*, and their *Reference* or Relation to each

[1] We have already observ'd, that Cases and Prepositions, or *Fore-plac'd Words*, were invented for the same Use; that is, to shew the Relations that Things have to one another. In all Languages these Relations are shewn by Prepositions.

[2] The

each other; as, Stephen *goes* over *Highgate-hill*; James *went* under *Temple-bar*; Mary *went* through *the Hall*; Susan *went* to *Westminster*, from *St. James's Park*; *the Queen dwells* at *St. James's*; Henry *lives* in *the Town*, *but* Matthew without, *or* out of *it*, &c. It connects Sentences; as, Roger *went* to *his Country-house*, and *study'd there the whole Season*; Peter also *accompany'd him*; nor *was there any thing wanting*; neither *did* Ralph *stay long behind*.

[2] They are therefore divided into three sorts, or rather rang'd under these three Heads; the first shewing, the *Manners*, or *Qualities* of *Words*, by being added to them; the second denotes some Circumstances of *Actions*, and joins Words to Words, and little Members of a Sentence to each other; the third joins Sentence to Sentence, as greater Members of a Period.

*These from the other Parts of Speech are known,*
*Because before them they do still disown*
By, with, for, through, from, of; *and all*
*Those* Names *which we the* Personal *do call.*

[2] The Desire Men have to shorten Discourse, gave Rise to *Adverbs*; for the greatest part of these *Particles*, are only to signify in one Word, what cou'd not else be done without a *Preposition* and a *Noun*; as *Sapienter*, for *cum sapientia*, *with Wisdom*; *hodie*, *to Day*, for *in hoc die*, *in this Day*.

And this is the Reason, that in the vulgar Languages the greatest Part of the *Adverbs* are generally more Elegantly explain'd by the *Noun* and the *Preposition*; thus we rather say (we speak generally, for it holds not always) *with Wisdom*, *with Prudence*, *with Pride*, *with Moderation*, than *wisely*, *prudently*, *proudly*, *moderately*; tho' in *Latin* it is generally more Elegant to use the *Adverbs*.

Thence it is that a *Noun* or *Name*, is often taken for an *Adverb*; as *Instar* in *Latin*, *primum*, or *primo*, *partim*, &c. Thus in *French* *Dessus*, *dessous*, *dedans*, which are indeed *Nouns*. These two sorts of Particles, which we have just remark'd on, are concern'd in the Objects of the Mind, not in the Actions or Judgment.

The second sort of Words, which signify the Form of our Thoughts, and not properly their Objects, are the *Conjunctions* or *Joining-Words*, as *et*, *non*, *vel*, *si*, *ergo*, &c. *and*, *not*, *or*, *if*, *therefore*, because if we consider well, and reflect justly, we shall find that these Particles signify nothing but the very Operation of the Mind, which joyns or disjoyns Things which we deny, or which we consider absolutely or conditionally; for Example, There is no Object in the World lies out of our Mind; which answers the Particle *Non*; but it is plain, that it denotes nothing but the Judgment which we make to shew, that one thing is not another.

Thus *Ne*, which in *Latin* is a Particle of Interrogation, as *Aisne? Do you say it?* is not the Object of our Mind, but only marks the Motion of our Soul, by which we desire to know something. And the same may be said of all Words of Interrogation, as *quis*, *que*, *quod*.

Interjections are Words that signify nothing without us, but they are Words, or rather Sounds, which are more Natural than Artificial, which express the Emotions of our Souls; as *alas! woe's me! oh!* &c.

This

This Part of Speech is eaſily diſtinguiſh'd from the Reſt, becauſe in good Senſe they cannot admit theſe Words, *of, to, for, O, with, by, from, through*; nor the *Perſonal Names, I, thou, he, we, ye, they*; for we cannot ſay, *of fooliſhly, to fooliſhly, from fooliſhly*, &c. nor *I fooliſhly, thou fooliſhly, he fooliſhly.*

*This* firſt, *with* Affirmation *and its* Name,
*Makes perfect Senſe, as* Peter ſlowly came;
*And by its anſwering to the Queſtions* How,
(*And in what manner*) do they ſteer the Plough?

You may know the firſt, by its making compleat Senſe with one *Affirmation* and its *Name*; as, *A Philoſopher ſpeaks* **wiſely**; *A Wiſe Man lives* **happily.** And by anſwering the Queſtion *How?* or *after what Manner?* This *Part of Speech* is ſometimes join'd to a *Name* or *Quality* to expreſs their Manner, as, *too much a Philoſopher*; *egregiouſly impudent.* But here indeed, and in moſt Caſes, a *Word* is expreſs'd or underſtood, to which this alſo relates.

*This ſort the* Manner, Time, *and* Place *imply,*
*As by the following Scale you will deſcry.*

This ſort relates either to the *Manner, Place,* or *Time*: The firſt expreſſes the Manner of *being, doing,* or *ſuffering, Abſolutely,* or *Comparatively.*

I. *Abſolutely.*

By
1. Certainty; as, *Verily, truely, undoubtedly.*
2. Contingence; as, *Happily, perhaps, by chance, perchance.*
3. Negation; as, *Not, in no wiſe.*
4. Natural Powers, or Habits; as, *Wiſely, liberally, juſtly.*
5. Senſible Impreſſions; as, *Brightly, naſtily, bitterly, loudly, ſmoothly.*
6. Paſſions of the Soul; as, *Merrily, joyfully*; as, *Ha! ha! he! wondringly*, as, *Lo! O! oh! Scornfully*, as, *Tuſh*; *lovingly*, as, *Ah! hatefully*, as, *Fob*; *ſorrowingly*, as, *Alas! ah! wo's me!*

II. *Comparatively.*

By
1. Exceſs; as *very, exceedingly, too much, more, moſt*; as *more hardly, moſt ſoftly.*
2. Defect; as *almoſt, well nigh, little leſs, leaſt of all.*
3. Likeneſs, or Equality; as *ſo, alike, as it were, as.*
4. Unlikelineſs, or Inequality; as *otherwiſe, differently, far otherwiſe.*

III. *Of*

## III. *of Place.*

Denote
1. Presence in a Place, answering to the Question **where?** as, *here, there, elsewhere, every where, no where, somewhere else, above, below, within, without*; or to the Question, **with whom?** as, *together, at once, apart, severally.*
2. Motion from a Place; as *whence, hence, thence.*
3. Motion towards a Place; as *Whitherwards, hitherwards, thitherwards, otherward, toward, upward, backward.*
4. The Way to a Place; as *Whitheraway, this, that,* or *another way.* Tho' these are scarce to be allow'd Particles, or Manners of Words.
5. The Term or End of Motion; as *whither, hither, thither, whitherto, hitherto.*

## IV. *of Time.*

Denote
1. Being in Time; as, **when?** either the Present, as *now, to day*; the Past, as *already, yesterday, before, long since, heretofore*; the Future, as *to morrow, not yet, after, hereafter, henceforward.*
2. Duration and Continuance; **how long?** *a long while, slowly, quickly, shortly, hitherto.*
3. Vicissitude, or Repetition; **how often?** *often, sometimes, seldom, dayly, yearly*; *by turns, alternately*; *once, twice, thrice, ten times*, &c.

Those that are deriv'd from *Qualities*, which admit degrees of Comparison, do the same; as *hardly, more hardly, most* or *very hardly.*

*The second sort that shew of Words the state,*
*And how each Word to Others does relate,*
*You in the following* Catalogue *you'll find,*
*And how its* Use *and* Meaning *is to each assign'd.*

OF] denotes Relations betwixt the Word that goes before, and the Word that follows it, whether that Word be *Name, Quality*, or *Affirmation*; as, *the Son of Adam*; but this properly belongs to *Construction*, to which we refer you.

It signifies *concerning*, or the Object, or Matter about which you speak or write; as, *a Treatise of Virtue*, or *on*, or *concerning* Virtue.

The

The Matter; as, *a Cup of Gold.*

The Means, (or WITH) to *die of Hunger.*

It signifies AMONG; as, *of five Horses four were blind.*

THROUGH; *'tis* of *God's great Mercy*: But this is a Vulgarism, and scarce worth Notice.

FROM, *South of* Windsor.

**OFF** ] signifies Separation and Distance, and has its Opposite in ON, which implys Continuation; as, *to put off, to put on*; *He put off his Hat, he stood off to Sea.* It signifies Delay; *He put me off from Day to Day, he is off and on with me.*

**FROM** ] implys the Term *from which*, or Motion, and is oppos'd to TO; as, *He went* from *Hackney* to *London*; *from Head to Foot, from first to last, from hence, from thence*, &c.

It signifies OFF; as, *He took me from the Ground*, or *from off the Ground.* Out of Sincerity, *I speak it from my Heart.*

**TO** (*Unto*, not much us'd) signifies Motion *to*, *I go to* Windsor; Relation, *faithful to his Soveraign.*

IN] *to* Day, *i. e.* in *this Day, to morrow.*

FOR] *she had a Thousand Pounds to her Fortune.*

BEFORE] *you promis'd me to my Face.*

ABOUT, or concerning] *Speak to the Head we agreed on.*

TOWARDS] *I thank you for your Kindness to me.*

TILL, or Until] *The Meeting is put off to* November.

In Comparison OF] *He is nothing* to *Hercules*, or *in comparison of* Hercules.

**MAY**, can or will] *I have nothing to comfort me*; *i. e.* that may, can, or will comfort me.

**TILL**, or Until] is only spoke of Time; *He play'd till eight a-Clock.*

Before] *He wou'd not remove his Quarters* till (or until) *his Contributions were paid.*

**FOR**] denotes the *Purpose, End*, or *Use*, Benefit or Damage for, *&c.* George *got a House* for *Stephen*; *the Advocate pleads for his Client.*

Oppos'd to *against.*] William *is* for *me*, John *is* against *me.*

Fitness, Inconvenience] as, *This Hat is too little* for *me.*

Ex-

Exchange, or trucking] as, *He had Barley* for *his Hops.*

In place, or instead of] *Harry did Duty* for *John.*

Distribution] *I appointed one Room* for *every Company.*

In regard or consideration of] as, *He liv'd high enough* for *his Estate.*

In consideration of] *James was rewarded* for *his Valour.*

During] *He was Captain of the Fort,* for *Life.*

Notwithstanding] For *all his conceited Wisdom, he was a Fool.*

BY] The several Meanings of this Word is seen in this Sentence: *He was slain* by *his Enemy, by* (near, or beside) *a Spring of Water, but wounded first* by *his own Fear, and then* by *his Enemy's Sword.*

In] *By Day, by Night.*

WITH] shews the Instrument, or Means, and Concomitance; *He was slain* with *a Sword*; *he abides* with *me*; *he purg'd* with *Jollop.*

THROUGH] implys the Cause, Means, or Medium, but chiefly the local Medium, tho' it signifies the Moral and Natural likewise; as, *The Beams of the Sun with incredible Speed pass from Heaven,* through *the Air to the Earth, endu'd with Light, and Heat, by* (with, through) *which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants, which God has prepar'd for us, and given to us, for our Use, and his Glory.*

AFTER] opposes *before,* relates to Time and Place, the Posteriority of the former, and Inferiority of the later: *After* Christmas *comes* Hilary *Term*; *the Sheriff is* after *the Mayor.*

For] *She pines* after *Melons.*

IN, INTO] denotes Time, Place, the Manner of being, thinking, doing; with the Motive, Cause, or Means of doing. John *lives* in *the Castle*; William *goes* into *the Country*; in *Winter*; in *the City.*

Posture Disposition] *To stand* in *a decent posture*; *he is* in *his Cloak.*

The Motive] *He did it* in *Revenge.*

Among] Harry *has not Sobriety* in *all his Meditations.*

Manner of Change] *He changes Water* into *Wine.*

AT]

AT] implys nearneſs to a Place, Time, Price; the Inſtrument, Cauſe, Manner, &c. At *School*, at *Weſtminſter*, at *the beginning*, at *the bottom*.

Near, cloſe by] *He watches* at *the end of the Street*.

For.] *He diſpos'd of his Tickets* at *a good Rate*: *What do you ſell this* at?

With.] *He plays* at *Bowls*, at *Cards*, at *Dice*.

According to.] *At my Pleaſure*.

On, *or* Upon.] Baniſter *is good* at *the Flute*; Peter *is a Markſman* at *Shooting*.

Employment.] *To be* at *Study*, at *Supper*, at *Prayers*.

WARD] is always put after a Word; as, *toward*, *homeward*, *Heav'nward*, and implys *to*.

There are many more of this ſort, but we ſhall be content with theſe, as well as Dr. *Wallis*, ſince abundantly ſufficient for our End: For the reſt, we ſhall refer you to a Treatiſe of our *Engliſh Particles*, which We ſhall publiſh as a Supplement to the Study of the *Engliſh Tongue*; as *Turſelinus*, and others, have done to that of the *Latin*.

*By the third ſort of Particles is ſhown*
*How Sentences Dependance may be known,*
*And to each other Sentences we join.*

The third ſort of theſe *Particles*, or *Manners of Words*, joyn *Sentences* together, and let us ſee by that the Relation of one Notion to another, and the Dependance of one Sentence on another; as, *and*, *alſo*, *ſo as*; *nor*, *neither*, *but*, *unleſs*, *nevertheleſs*, *however*, *otherwiſe*; *if*, *ſave*, *except*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *as*, *namely*, *to wit*, *why*, *wherefore*, *for*, *becauſe*, *that*, *therefore*, *whereas*, *ſince*, *likewiſe*, *thereupon*, &c.

What elſe is neceſſary to be known in *Grammar*, concerning theſe *Particles*, will be ſhewn in the following Part of our Diviſion of *Grammar*, under the Title of *Sentences*.

Here we think it proper to add ſome Proprieties in Writing, which make Words more beautiful, becauſe more diſtinct, and expreſſive. All *Proper Names* (and indeed all *Names*) ought to be written with the initial Letter a *Capital*. The ſame muſt be done by any other Part of Speech, when there's a Force or Emphaſis laid on it: Otherwiſe *Qualities*, *Affirmations*, *Particles*, are always written with ſmall Letters. The firſt Word of every Epiſtle, Book, Chapter, Verſe, &c. begins with a Capital; but ſome Sentences of Importance are expreſs'd all in Capitals, as *Inſcriptions*, &c.

The End of the Third Part.

Part

# Part IV.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of* SENTENCES.

*At leaſt, three Words a Sentence muſt contain,*
*Which muſt ſome Sentiment or Thought explain.*

A Sentence comprehends at leaſt *three* Words, by which ſome Sentiment or Thought of the Mind is expreſs'd: Nor can it be without one *Affirmation*, and a *Name* ſignifying the Subject of that *Affirmation*, i. e. a *Name* of which ſomething is affirm'd; as, *a Lie is abominable.*

[1] The Conſtruction of this Sentence, is the regular Connection of the Words in the Form of Nature, which is generally more regarded by the *Engliſh*, and other Modern Languages, than by thoſe of the Ancients.

*A*

[1] As we have done in our Notes on the Parts of Speech, or Words, ſo we ſhall here add the general Notions of *Grammar* in the Syntax, or Conſtruction of Words together in a Sentence, according to thoſe Principles of the Art, which we have drawn from Reaſon eſtabliſh'd.

The Conſtruction of Words, is generally diſtinguiſh'd into *Concord* and *Government*; the firſt, by which the Words ought to agree among themſelves, and the ſecond, when one cauſes any Alteration in the other.

The firſt, generally ſpeaking, is the ſame in all Languages, becauſe it is the natural Order, which is in the general Uſage, the better to diſtinguiſh our Diſcourſe.

Thus the diſtinction of the two Numbers, Singular and Plural, is the Reaſon why the Adjective is to agree with the Subſtantive in Number; that is, that one be put either in the Singular or Plural, as the other is. Becauſe the *Subſtantive* is the Subject that is confuſedly, tho' directly mark'd by the *Adjective*. If the *Subſtantive* marks *many*, there are *many* Subjects of the Form, mark'd by the *Adjective*, and by Conſequence it ought to be in the Plural Number, as *Homines docti, learned Men*. But there being no Termination in the *Quality* in *Engliſh*, to diſtinguiſh the Number; it is only imply'd in Reaſon, the ſame Word ſignifying the Singular, as well as Plural Number.

The diſtinction of the Maſculine and Feminine Gender, obliges the Languages, which have diſtinct Terminations, to have a Concordance or Agreement between the

*Name* and *Quality*, or *Substantive*, and *Adjective* in *Gender*, as well as Number.

The *Verbs*, or *Affirmations* for the same Reason are to agree with the *Nouns* and *Pronouns*, or *Names*, and *Personal Names* in *Number* and *Person*.

But if at any time, in Reading, you meet with any Thing that may appear contrary to these Rules, it is by a Figure of Discourse, that is, by having some Word understood, or by considering the Thoughts more than the Words themselves, as we shall see anon.

The Construction of Government on the contrary, is entirely Arbitrary, and for that very Reason, is different in all Languages. For one Language forms their Government or *Regimen* by *Cases*; others make use of little Signs or Particles in their Place, which yet do not mark all the Cases, as in *French* and *Spanish*, they have only *de* and *a*, which mark the *Genitive* and *Dative Cases*; the *Italians* add *da*, for the Ablative, the *English* have *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *by*, &c. yet none for the Accusative, and the same sometimes for two Cases. Here you may look back to what has been said on the Cases, and forward to what may be added in the *Appendix of Prepositions*, to the short Remark on them in their Places.

Yet it will not be amiss to observe some general Maxims, which are of great Use in all Languages.

The *First*, That there is no *Nominative Case*, or *first State of the Name* in any Sentence, which has not a Reference to some *Verb* or *Affirmation*, either express'd or understood; because we never talk meerly to mark the bare Objects of our Conception, but to express our Sentiments of what we conceive, which is the Office of the *Verb* or *Affirmation* to mark.

The *Second*, That there is no *Verb* or *Affirmation*, which has not its *Name* or *Nominative Case*, either express'd or understood; because it is the proper Office of the Verb to affirm, and therefore it must have something to affirm of, which is the *Subject* or the *Nominative* of the *Verb*; tho' before an Infinitive, there is an Accusative, (not a *Nominative Case*) as *Scio Petrum esse doctum*, *I know Peter to be learned*. But this of the Accusative relates only to those Languages which have that Case.

The *Third*, That there can be no *Adjective* or *Quality*, which has not a Reference to some *Substantive* or *Name*, because the Adjective marks confus'dly the *Substantive* or *Name*, which is the Subject of the Form that is distinctly mark'd by the Adjective or Quality; as *Doctus*, learn'd, must have regard to some Man who is *learned*.

The *Fourth*, That there never is a *Genitive Case*, which is not govern'd by some other *Name* or *Noun*, because that Case continually marks that which is as the Possessor, so that it must be govern'd by the Thing possess'd. For this Reason, both in *Latin* and *Greek*, this *Case* is never govern'd properly by a *Verb*. This Rule is with more difficulty apply'd in the Vulgar Tongues, because the Particle or Sign *of*, which properly is the Sign of the *Genitive Case*, is sometimes put for the Preposition *of*, and *de French*, for *ex* and *de*.

The *Fifth*, That the Government of Verbs is oftentimes taken from divers sorts of References, included in the Cases according to the Capriciousness of Custom or Usage, which yet does not change the Specifick Reference of each Case, but only shews, that Custom has made choice of *this* or *that*, according to Fancy.

Thus in *Latin* we say, *Juvare aliquem*, and *Opitulari alicui*, for these are two Verbs of *Aid*, because it pleas'd the *Latins* to regard the Government of the first Verb, as the Form, to which the Action passes; and that of the second, as a Case of Attribution, to which the Action of

*A Sentence is, or* ſimple, *or* compound,
*Still in the firſt,* One AFFIRMATION's *found,*
*And of the Subject too,* One NAME *expreſs'd,*
*Or underſtood, as is by all confeſs'd.*

Sentences are twofold, *ſimple* and *compound*; a *ſimple Sentence* is, where there is but one AFFIRMATION and one NAME of the *Subject* of that *Affirmation*, either *expreſs'd* or *underſtood*.

*A compound Sentence is of two compos'd,*
*Or more, by* Particles *together clos'd*;
*Or by conjunctive* Qualities *combin'd,*
*As in th'Examples you may quickly find.*

A compound Sentence is made up of *two*, or *more* ſimple Sentences join'd to each other by ſome *Particle* or *conjunctive* QUALITY; as, *I ride*, and *thou walkeſt*. *This is the Man*, who *did the Savage kill*.

## *Of the* Conſtruction *of* NAMES.

*The NAME, the Subject of the AFFIRMATION,*
*Before it generally aſſumes its Station.*

The *Name*, or *Perſonal Name*, of which the *Affirmation* affirms ſomething, is generally plac'd in *Conſtruction* before the *Affirmation*; as, *I am happy*. Suſan *loves* Roger. *The* Parſon *preaches*. *The Book is read*.

*Except Command, or Queſtion be imply'd;*
*Then to the* Name *Precedence is deny'd.*
*But if* may, can, ſhall, will, ought, wou'd, *and* do,
*Before the* principal Affirmation *go,*
*Then does the* Name *between them take its place.*
*Elſe will the Style want all its proper Grace.* Ex-

of the Verb has a Reference.

Thus in *French* they ſay *Servir Quelqu'un*, and *Servir a quelque Choſe*, to *ſerve one*, *to ſerve for*, *or to a Uſe*.

Thus in *Spaniſh* the greateſt part of the *Verbs Active* govern indifferently a *Dative*, and an *Accuſative Caſe*.

Thus the ſame Verb may receive ſeveral Governments; as *Præſtare alicui*, or *aliquem*; and thus they for Example ſay, *Eripere Morti aliquem*, or *Aliquem a Morte*, and the like.

Sometimes theſe different Regimens of the Verbs cauſe an alteration in the Senſe, in which the uſe of a Language muſt be conſider'd; as for Example in *Latin*, *Cavere alicui*, to watch, or be careful of the Preſervation of one; but *cavere Aliquem*, is to be aware of him. But in this we muſt always have a particular regard to the Uſage of all Languages.

We have in the Text ſaid what is neceſſary for the Knowledge of the Figures of Speech, to which we refer you. [2] Theſe

Except when a *Queſtion*, *Command*, *Permiſſion*, or *Conceſſion* be imply'd, for then the *Name* is put after the *Affirmation*, or betwixt one of the *nine Affirmations*; *Do*, *may*, *can*, *will*, *ſhall*, *ought*, &c. as, *does* Stephen *write*? *will you depart*? *burn I*? *burnſt thou*? or *doſt thou burn*? &c.

*If of the* Nine, *two do at once precede*
*The principal* Affirmation, *take heed*
*The* Name *between thoſe two obtain its Lot*,
Cou'd I have gone? cou'd *Cælia* have forgot?

But if the *principal Affirmation* have two of the nine before it, then the Name is ſet between them; as,

*Cou'd* Cælia *have forgotten me*, *ſoon*
*Might* Roger *have gone out of Town*?
*When the* Command *the* ſecond Perſon *takes*
*The* Pers'nal Name *then no appearance makes.*

When the *Command*, *Permiſſion*, *Conceſſion*, &c. is in the *ſecond Perſon*, the *Perſonal Name*, which uſually goes before the *Affirmation*, is often omitted or underſtood; as, *burn*, for *burn thou*? or *you*, or *ye*.

In other Perſons there is frequently a Circumlocution by the Affirmation *let*; as, *let me burn*; *let him burn*; *let them burn*. *Let him ask as often as he will, he never ſhall obtain. Let me do what I will, it is to no purpoſe.* As for *ask I*, or *ask he*, &c. *never ſo often*, &c. it is Barbariſm, and never us'd by any good Author.

*When* did, might, ſhou'd, wou'd, cou'd, *and* had & were,
If *do imply*; *and alſo after* there
*The* Affirmation *goes before the* Name;
*By Way of* Emphaſis *it will do the ſame.*

When the paſſing, or paſt Times of *do*, *may*, *can*, *will*, *ſhall*, *have*, *am*, ſupplies the place of, or implies *if*, the *Name* is ſet after the *Affirmation*, and alſo *there* is us'd; as, had *he* (for if he had) *ask'd*, *he had obtain'd*. Had *I* (for if I had) *heard this*, *I wou'd not have been ſo complaiſant*. Were *I a Prince*, *I wou'd govern better*. There *fell a Thouſand Men on the ſpot*. There *is cold in the Ice* (*or cold is in the Ice*). The ſame is likewiſe done by Way of *Emphaſis*; as, *it was* Mordaunt, *who conquer'd*. *It was the Church*, *that fell*.

This happens ſometimes, when there are none of theſe Conſiderations; as, *ſaid I*; *ſaid he*; *then follow'd Belvidera.*

To,

To, *and an* Affirmation *oft we know*
*Will for the* Name *to th'* Affirmation *go*;
*And to a* Sentence *we the ſame allow.*

Inſtead of the *Name* that goes before the *Affirmation*, and of which the later affirms ſomething, ſometimes another *Affirmation*, with *to* before it, ſupplies its place, as having ſomething affirm'd of it; as, *to Dance* is *wholſom*; *to Play* is *delightful*. *To Conſider* is *uſeful*.

A whole Sentence is the ſame; as, *That the Day is broke, is evident, ſince the Sun ſhines*. In ſhort, whatever will anſwer to the Queſtions *who?* or *what?* will ſupply the Office of the *Name* to the *Affirmation*.

*The* Pers'nal Name, *or follows, or precedes,*
*Ev'n as the* Name *it ſelf purſues, or leads.*

The *leading State* of the *Perſonal Name* is ſet before, or after the *Affirmation*, according to the foregoing Rules of Names; as *I read, beareſt thou?* &c.

*That* Affirmation, *which its Act extends*
*To ſomething elſe, ſtill after it commands*
*A* Name, *to which that Action does relate;*
*As, Roger* ſpurns me with his uſual Hate.

As the *Name*, when it ſignifies the *Subject* of which ſomething is affirm'd by the *Affirmation*, goes before the *Affirmation*, (except before excepted) ſo a *Name* is always plac'd after the *Affirmation*, which ſignifies the Thing to which the Action of the *Affirmation* immediately relates; as, *I read a Book*; *the Fire burns* Robert.

Thus the *following State* of the *Perſonal Names* generally are ſet after the *Affirmation*, and the Particles *to, for, of*, &c. tho' *whom* generally goes before the *Affirmation*; as Martin *is the Man* whom *I ſaw laſt*.

*Theſe* Names *diſtinguiſh'd are by* what *and* who?
*And* whom *and* what? *as the Examples ſhew.*

Theſe two *Names* are eaſily known, or diſtinguiſh'd by asking the Queſtion *who?* or *what?* and *whom?* and *what?* the firſt Name anſwers to the Queſtion *who?* or *what?* as who *reads?* anſw. *I*; what *burns? the Fire*: on the contrary, what *do I read?* anſw. *the Book*; whom *does the Fire burn?* anſw. *Robert*.

*But when the Action don't at all relate*
*T'another, but in the Subject terminate*

*No* Name *the* Affirmation *then requires*
*To follow it, but in it self expires.*

All the Buſtle ſome GRAMMARIANS have made about *Verbs Neuter*, is diſpatch'd in theſe four Lines, that is in this one Rule; that when the Action of the *Affirmation* does not extend or relate to any other Perſon or Thing, but terminates in the Subject, there is no *Name* requir'd after it; as, *I grieve, I rejoyce, I ſit, I run, I ſtand*, &c.

## *Of the Conſtruction of* AFFIRMATIONS.

This very nearly relating to the former, ſeems to demand our next Conſideration, both indeed being interwoven with each another.

*The* Affirmation *always muſt agree*
*In Number and Perſon with the* Name *you'll ſee.*

The *Affirmation* muſt agree with the *Name* of which it affirms ſomething in *Number* and *Perſon*: That is, if that be of the Singular, or Plural, this muſt be ſo too; if that be of the firſt, ſecond, or third Perſon, this muſt be of the ſame, whether the Number or Perſon be expreſt by the Ending or Termination, or by the nine *Affirmations* diſcours'd of under the Head of Affirmations; as, *I write or do write, thou writeſt or doſt write, he writes or does write*; *we, ye*, and *they write*, or *do write*: Not *I writeſt, he write*, &c.

*When of two* Names (*tho' each be* Singular)
*We ought* affirm, *the* Affirmations *are*
*Moſt juſtly in the* Plural *ſeen t'appear.*

But when the *Affirmation* relates to, or affirms of two 'foregoing *Names*, tho' they are both of the *Singular* Number, muſt be of the *Plural*; as, *the King and Queen* are *happy*, not *is* happy.

It is a lame Allowance of a late Author of *Grammar*, That *it* may be alſo of the *Singular* in Engliſh, ſince he is forc'd to ſalve the Soleciſm, by underſtanding other Words to make up the Defect; as in this, *His Juſtice and Goodneſs was great*; that is, ſays he, *His Juſtice was great, and his Goodneſs was great.*

*An* Affirmation *may be* (*at your Eaſe*)
*Or* Singular, *or* Plural, *as you pleaſe,*
*When to a* NAME *of* Number *it is join'd,*
*Tho' ſtill the* NAME *you Singular do find.*

A *Name* of *Number*, or whose Meaning implys more than one, or many, tho' it be it self of the *Singular Number*, the *Affirmation* may yet be in the *Plural*; as, *the MOB* is *unruly*, or *the MOB* are *unruly*; *the* Convocation *are debating*, or *is debating*. The Affirmation agreeing sometimes with the Number of the *Name*, and sometimes with the Signification.

*When two* Affirmations *are together seen,*
*Then must the* Particle (to) *be set between,*
*Except* let, bid, dare, help, *and all the* Nine.

When two *Affirmations* follow one-another, the Particle *to* ought to be set between 'em, except *do*, *will*, *shall*, *may*, *can*, with their *passing* or *past* Times, *did*, *shou'd*, *wou'd*, *cou'd*, *might* and *must*. Add to these *let*, *bid*, *dare*, and *help*, and perhaps some few others.

Have, am, *or* be, *with passive* Qual'ty *join'd*,
*Or with a* Quality *that Being does intend*,
*All* Suffering *and* Being *does express*
*That the* Britannic Language *will confess*.

*Have*, *am*, or *be*, join'd to a Quality, express all manner of Being, or Suffering, in our Tongue, which has no other way of doing it. They are set before *Qualities* of all sorts, and even *Names*.

There is no change of the Personal, or Numeral Terminations, when the Affirmation signifies Command, or is preceded by *if*, *that*, *tho'*, *altho'*, *whether*, and sometimes by other Particles.

## *Of the Construction of* QUALITIES.

*The* Qualities *in English mostly claim*
*The Place immediately before their* Name.

Tho' in Nature we think of the *Name* before the *Quality*, yet in *English*, *Qualities* are generally plac'd before the *Names* to which they belong, or of which they express the Manner,

*Except an* Affirmation *come between*;
*As in the following Example's seen.*

Unless when an Affirmation comes between the *Quality* and the *Name*; as, *Just* art *thou*, *O! God! and righteous* are *thy Judgments*; or, GOD *is just*, *and his Judgments are righteous*. Otherwise when it comes alone, without its Attendants, which it governs, it always goes immediately before its *Name*; as, *A* good Man *is rarely to be found*, *a* good Woman

man *much more rarely.* Good Men *are valuable Jewels in a Commonwealth,* good Women *make* good Wives. Good Things *are only so in Opinion.*

*Poetic Diction with peculiar Grace*
*Allows the* Name (*not Proſe*) *the foremoſt place.*

The *Quality* rarely in Proſe is ſet after the *Name,* but in Verſe 'tis beautiful and harmonious; as, *Hail Bard divine!*

*But when there are more* Qualities *than one*
*That come together, or together join;*
*Or elſe one* Quality *with its govern'd Train;*
*Then do they follow the preceding* Name.

But when there are more *Qualities* than one come together, tho' collaterally join'd, or one *Quality* with its depending Words, it generally comes after the *Name*; as, *a Man both wiſe and valiant,* a Man *exceeding wiſe and valiant*; a Man *ſkilful in many things.* But then we likewiſe ſay, *a wiſe and valiant Man, an exceeding wiſe Man, a ſkilful Man in many things.*

*A* Name *and all its* Qualities *unite,*
*And form one Word, as all the Learned write;*
*But when theſe ſeveral Words in one conſpire,*
*They then ſome other* Quality *require.*

A *Name,* with its *Qualities,* (or any governing Word, with its Attendants) is as one compounded Word; on which theſe join'd *Names* and *Qualities* aſſume another *Quality,* as if they were one Word, (and theſe being join'd, another; and ſo onward) as, *a Man, an old Man*; *a wiſe old Man, a very wiſe old Man, three wiſe old Men.* Here to the NAME *Man* is prefix'd *a,* which is of the *Quality* kind; and then to the Quality *old* is added; and to that, *an*; then *wiſe, very wiſe*; and to all theſe aggregated or incorporated Words the Quality *a,* or *three,* is prefix'd.

*Two ſorts of* Qualities *from* Names *do flow,*
*And both before their* Names *directly go.*

There are two ſorts of *Qualities* (as we have obſerv'd under that Head) which are deriv'd immediately from *Names,* and go immediately before 'em, ſupplying the place of almoſt all the Manners of *Words* or *Particles*; the firſt we call *Poſſeſſives*: And this is form'd from almoſt all *Names,* Singular or Plural. By adding (*s*) or (if the Pronunciation requires it) (*'s*) it implys the ſame as the Particle *of*; as,

*Man's*

*Man's Nature*, *the Nature of Man*; *Mens Nature*, or *the Nature of Men*; Virgil's *Poems*, &c.

The ſame is done when an aggregated *Name* occurs, (that is, a primary Name with its Attendants;) for the formative (*s*) of the *Poſſeſſive* is put after the whole aggregate; as, *the King's Court*, or *the Court of the King*; *the King of* Spain's *Court*, or *the Court of the King of* Spain: For the (*s*) is put after the whole aggregate (*the King of* Spain) as after one ſingle *Name*.

A, *or* an, *immediately we place*
*Before the* NAME, a Man, an Hour, a Face.
*But if another* QUALITY *come in*,
*'Tis moſtly plac'd the* a *and* Name *between*.

The Quality *a*, or *an*, is generally plac'd immediately before the Name; as, *a Man*, *an Arm*, *a Mountain*: But if any other Quality comes with it, it muſt be plac'd generally between the *a* and the Name; as, *a good Man*, *a black Horſe*. But *a* is ſometimes ſet between the other Quality and the Name, as, *many a Man*, *never a Man*. (*A*) is always before the Singular Number, but (*the*) before both Singular and Plural.

## *The Conſtruction of* PARTICLES; *or, the* Manners of WORDS.

We have ſhewn under the Head of *Particles*, or *Manners of Words*, that beſides *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations*, there is another Part of Speech, which denotes the Reference and Relation of *Names* to *Names*, *Names* to *Affirmations*, and the Connections of *Sentence* to *Sentence*: For this Reaſon we have divided them into three ſorts; the Firſt ſhew the Circumſtances or Manners of Words, which are join'd to every Part of Speech.

*Theſe after* Affirmations *we admit*,
*But before* Qualities *we moſtly ſet*.

This firſt ſort are generally put after the Affirmation whoſe Manner it does expreſs; as, Cynthia *danc'd* admirably; Peter *ſpoke* learnedly; Dorothy *acted* finely; Harry *fought* lately. But it is ſet before Qualities; as, *Robert was* very lucky; John *is* extreamly rich, very rich.

[*] Secondly, All *Names*, *Qualities*, and *Affirmations* have various States, Relations, and References to each other, which are moſtly expreſs'd by theſe Particles, *of*, *to*, *for*, *from*, *O!* *by*, *with*, *through*, &c. Theſe are at leaſt of the moſt frequent Uſe, the reſt we ſhall treat of in a Diſcourſe by it ſelf, as we have before obſerv'd under *Particles*: An Example will render the Uſe more plain; as, O! *God! the Memorial* of *thy Love* to *the Sons* of *Men*, from *the Beginning* of *the World* to *this Day*, *is recorded* with *Thankfulneſs* in *the Hearts* of *the Righteous*. All theſe Particles in this Sentence ſhew the Relation or Reference of *Name* to *Name*, and their Connection, in that Manner, with each other.

*Between the Words whoſe Reference they expreſs,*
*Theſe* Particles *demand the certain Place.*

Theſe *Particles*, which denote the Dependance of one thing on another, or the Reference or Relation of one Word to another, muſt naturally be plac'd betwixt them whoſe Relation

[*] Theſe ſeveral States or Relations of *Name* to *Name*, are expreſs'd in *Latin* by varying the Terminations, or Ending of the *Name*, five ſeveral Ways, which were call'd *Caſes*, *a cadendo*. So that there were threeſcore various Endings in the *Latin*, and double the number in *Greek*, all expreſs'd by theſe few *Engliſh Particles*; the firſt State of, or the Name it ſelf is call'd the *Nominative Caſe*. If things were always conſider'd ſeparately from one-another, *Names* wou'd have only the two Changes of *Number*, and *Gender* to the QUALITIES.

But ſince they are often conſider'd with Regard to the Relation they have to one-another, the giving of divers Terminations or Endings to *Names*, which are call'd *Caſes*, are made uſe of in ſome Languages, to expreſs theſe Relations.

It muſt be confeſs'd, that the *Greek* and the *Latin* are (we think) almoſt the only Languages, in which the Names have what are properly call'd Caſes, that is, in which theſe Relations are expreſs'd by the different Endings of the ſame Words; but as there are ſome ſort of Virtual Caſes, or State in all Languages, (eſpecially in the Pronouns or Perſonal Names, as we have obſerv'd) and becauſe without that the Connection of Diſcourſe, which is call'd Conſtruction, wou'd not be well underſtood; 'tis in a great meaſure neceſſary for the right underſtanding of any Language whatſoever, to know what is meant by the *Caſes*, or States of the *Names*; which we ſhall here endeavour to Explain with all the Perſpicuity we are able, keeping to the old *Names* of them, and applying them to the new.

### *Of the firſt State, or Nominative Caſe.*

The ſimple Poſition of the *Name*, is call'd the *Nominative*, which indeed is not properly a Caſe, (tho' it be a State) but the Matter from which the Caſes are form'd, by the various Changes of the firſt Termination, or Ending of the *Name*. Its chief Uſe is to be ſet before the *Verb* or *Affirmation*, to be the Subject

ject of the Propoſition in Diſcourſe; *Dominus regit me*, the Lord governs me; *Deus exaudit me*, God hears me, or my Prayer.

### *Of the Vocative.*

When we name the Perſon to whom we ſpeak, or any other Thing to which we apply our ſelves, as if it were a Perſon, the Name does by that acquire a new Relation, which is ſometimes mark'd by a Termination, different from that of the *Nominative*, and which is call'd *Vocative*, from *Vocare*, to call; and thus from *Dominus* in the *Nominative*, they make *Domine* in the *Vocative*; of *Antonius*, *Antoni*. But as that was not very neceſſary, ſince the *Nominative* might be us'd in the place of the *Vocative*, it has happen'd, 1*ſt*, That this different Termination of the *Nominative*, is not us'd in the Plural Number. 2*dly*, That even in the Singular Number, it is only us'd in the ſecond Declenſion of the *Latin* Tongue. 3*dly*, That in the *Greek* (where it is more common) the *Nominative* is often us'd for the *Vocative*, as may be ſeen in the *Greek* Verſion of the *Pſalms*: From whence St. *Paul* in his Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*, cites theſe Words oo prove the Divinity of CHRIST, Θρόνος σῆ, ὁ Θεὸς; where 'tis plain, that ὁ Θεὸς is a Nominative for a Vocative, ſince the Senſe is not, *God is thy Throne*, but *thy Throne, O God*: &c. 4*thly*, In fine, Nominatives are ſometimes join'd to Vocatives; as *Domine, Deus meus! Nate meæ vires, meæ magna Potentia ſolus!*

All theſe Difficulties in this and other Caſes, in the *Latin* and *Greek* are avoided by the Signs expreſs'd with Eaſe, without ſtudying the various Terminations of ſo many Thouſands of Names; which are inſiſted upon, only for the Information of the Student in the general Notion of the *Grammar* of the Ancient Tongues, and the Analogy of Ours to them.

### *Of the Genitive Caſe.*

This Caſe is ſo call'd from *Genus*, Kindred or Family, becauſe 'tis us'd to expreſs Alliances of Blood between Perſons; beſides, it imports great Variety of other Relations between Things, as well as Perſons. For the Relation of one Thing to another, in any manner whatever, has occaſion'd in the Languages that have *Caſes*, a new Termination in the *Names* or *Nouns*, which is call'd the Genitive (as we have ſaid) to expreſs that general Relation, which is after diverſify'd into ſeveral *Species*, ſuch as the Relations are of the *whole* to its *Parts*, as *Caput Hominis*; of *Parts* to the *whole*, as *Homo craſſi capitis*; of the *Subject* to the *Accident* or *Attribute*, as *Color Roſæ*, *Miſericordia Dei*; of the *Accident* to the *Subject*, as *Puer optimæ Indolis*; of the *Efficient Cauſe* to the *Effect*, as *Opus Dei*, *Oratio Ciceronis*; of the *Effect* to the Cauſe, as *Creator Mundi*; of the *final Cauſe* to the *Effect*, as *Potio Saporis*; of the Matter to the Compound, as *Vas Auri*; of the *Object* to the Acts of the Soul, as *Cogitatio Belli*, *Contemptus Mortis*; of the Poſſeſſour to the Things poſſeſs'd, as *Pecus Melibœi*, *Divitiæ Craſſi*; of the *Proper Name* to the *Common*, or the *Individual* to the *Species*, as *Oppidum Londini*.

And as amongſt all theſe Relations there is ſome Oppoſite, which ſometimes occaſions Equivocal Terms, (for in theſe Words, *Vulnus Achilles*, the *Genitive Achilles* may ſignify either the Relation of the Subject, and then 'tis taken paſſively for the Wound that *Achilles* has receiv'd; or the Relation of the *Cauſe*, and then 'tis taken actively for the Wound which *Achilles* gave;) ſo in that Paſſage of St. *Paul*, *Certus ſum qui a neq; Mors neque Vita*, &c. *poterit nos*

*ſe-*

*separare a Charitate* Dei *in* Chriſto Jeſu, *Domino Noſtro*, &c. The Genitive *Dei*, has been underſtood two different Ways by Interpreters; thoſe who have aſcrib'd to it the Relation of the Object, believing, that in this Paſſage was meant the Love which the Elect bear to God, in *Jeſus Chriſt*; whilſt Others (who have aſcrib'd to it the Relation of the Subject) do underſtand by the Paſſage aforeſaid, the Love of God to the *Elect* in *Jeſus Chriſt*.

Tho' the *Hebrew* Names are not declin'd by *Caſes*, the Relation expreſs'd by the *Genitive*, does notſtanding cauſe a change in the *Names*, tho' quite different from that of the *Greek* and *Latin*, for in theſe Languages the change is in the Word *governed*, but in the *Hebrew*, in the Word *governing*.

In the Vulgar Tongues they make uſe of a Sign to expreſs the Relations of this Caſe, as *of* in *Engliſh*, *de* in *French*, &c. as *Deus*, *God*, *of God*; *Dieu*, *de Dieu*.

What we have ſaid (that the *Genitive* was made uſe of) to denote the Relation between the *Proper Name* and the *Common*, or which is the ſame Thing, between the *Individual* and the *Species*, is much more common in the Vulgar Tongues. For in *Latin*, the *Common* and the *Proper Name*, are frequently put in the ſame *Caſe*, by Appoſition, as 'tis call'd, as *Urbs Roma*, *Fluvius Thameſis*, *Mons Parnaſſus*, but we ordinarily ſay, the City of *Rome*, the Hill of *Parnaſſus*; but we ſay the River *Thames*, as well as of *Thames*.

### *Of the Dative Caſe.*

There is yet another Relation, which is that of the Thing to the Benefit or Damage of which other Things have a Relation. This in the Languages which have Caſes is call'd the *Dative Caſe*, which is alſo us'd ſo many other Ways, that 'tis hardly poſſible to mention the Particulars: *Commodare* Socrati, *to lend to* Socrates; *Utilis Reipublicæ*, *uſeful to the Commonwealth*; *Perniciosus Eccleſiæ*, *pernicious to the Church*; *Promittere Amico*, *to promiſe a Friend*, *or to a Friend*; *Viſum eſt* Platoni, *it ſeemed good to* Plato; *Affinis Regi*, *related to the King*, &c.

In Engliſh we expreſs this Caſe, or that which is equivalent to it, by the Sign *to*, or *for*, which uſually do or may come before it, tho' the ſame Signs are likewiſe us'd to what is the Accuſative and the Ablative in the Latin.

### *Of the Accuſative.*

The Verbs or Affirmations that expreſs Actions which paſs from the Agent, as *to beat*, *to break*, *to heat*, *to love*, *to hate*, have Subjects that receive theſe Things or Objects which they regard: For if I beat, I muſt beat Something; and ſo of the reſt. So that it is plain, that theſe Verbs or Affirmations require after 'em a Name, to be the Subject or Object of the Action they expreſs. And hence it is that in the Languages which have Caſes the Names have a Termination they call *Accuſative*; as *amo Deum*, *I love God*; Cæſar *vicit* Pompeium, Cæſar *vanquiſh'd* Pompey.

There is nothing in Engliſh to diſtinguiſh this Caſe from the Nominative, or rather to diſtinguiſh this State of the Name from the firſt; but as we almoſt ever plac'd the Words in their natural order, they are eaſily diſcover'd, becauſe the Nominative (or firſt ſtate) is generally before, and the Accuſative after the Verb or Affirmation: as *The King loves the Queen*; and *the Queen loves the King*: The King is the Nominative in the firſt place, and the Accuſative in the ſecond; and the Queen the Accuſative in the firſt, and the Nominative in the ſecond.

Relation and Dependance it is to expreſs; as we may obſerve in the following Liſt.

OF *has this peculiar Eminence,*
*Always to bound* of *Words the general Senſe.*

As *of* ſignifies the Relation between the Name that follows it, and that which goes before it, and joins the following *Name* to the foregoing, as, *the Sons of* Adam, ſo in all the following Inſtances, and all others that may be thought of, it is obſervable, that *of* has the Property of limiting and determining the general Signification of the Word on which it depends.

1. Of *the Part to the Whole.*
The Tail of the Lion.
2. Of *the Subject to the Accident.*
The Splendor of the Sun.

or of

*The Whole to the Part.*
A Man of a thick Skull.
*The Accident to the Subject.*
A Boy of a good Underſtanding.

3. Of

*Of the Ablative Caſe.*

Beſides the five Caſes already mention'd, the *Latins* have a ſixth, which was not invented to expreſs alone any particular Relation, but to be join'd with ſome of the Particles, call'd *Prepoſitions*: For the firſt five Caſes, not being ſufficient to expreſs all the Relations that Things have to one-another, they have in all Languages had Recourſe to another Invention, which is that of contriving *little Words* to be put before *Names*, which for that Reaſon are call'd *Prepoſitions*. And ſo as the Relation of a Thing, in which another is contain'd, is expreſs'd in *Latin* and *Engliſh* by (*in*), it is in *French* by (*dans*), as *Vinum* in *Dolio*, *le Vin* dans *le Muid*, *the Wine in the Veſſel*. But in the Languages which have Caſes, theſe Prepoſitions are not join'd with the firſt Form of the *Name*, which is the *Nominative*, but with ſome of the other Caſes: And tho' in *Latin*, there are ſome join'd with the *Accuſative*, as *Amor erga Deum*, *love towards God*; they yet have invented another Caſe, call'd the *Ablative*, to be join'd with ſeveral other *Prepoſitions*, from which it is inſeparable in Senſe; whereas an *Accuſative* is often ſeparated from its *Prepoſitions*, as when it is after a *Verb Active* or an *Infinitive*.

That Caſe in Propriety of Speech is wanting in the Plural Number, ſince it never has there a different Termination, from that of the *Dative*: But becauſe it wou'd too much confound the Analogy, to ſay that the Prepoſition govern'd an *Ablative* in the *Singular*, and a *Dative* in the *Plural*, it has been judg'd fitter to ſuppoſe an *Ablative* in the Plural Number, tho' always the ſame with the *Dative*.

And for the ſame Reaſon it is, that they have given an *Ablative* to the *Greek Names*, which are always like the *Dative*, for preſerving the greater Analogy between theſe two Languages, which are commonly learn'd by one-another.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3. Of *the Efficient to the Effect.* | | *The Effect to the Efficient.* |
| The Temple of *Solomon.* | | The Creator of the World. |
| 4. Of *the End to the Means.* | | *The Means to the End.* |
| The Preparations of the Feaſt. | | The Death of the Croſs. |
| 5. Of *Material to Materiate.* | | *Materiate to Material.* |
| A Cup of Silver. | | The Stones of the *Temple.* |
| 6. Of *the Object to the Act.* | | *The Act to the Object.* |
| The Love of God. | | The Delight of the Eye. |
| 7. *Offices Political.* | or of | *Relations Oeconomical.* |
| The King of *England.* | | The Maſter of the Houſe. |
| 8. Of *the Poſſeſſor to Poſſeſſion.* | | *Poſſeſſion to the Poſſeſſor.* |
| The Flock of *Mælibeus.* | | The Shepherd of the Flock. |
| 9. Of *Time to the Event.* | | *Event to Time.* |
| The Time of War, the Hour of Supper. | | The Luxury of the Age. |
| 10. Of *the Contents to the Continent.* | | The Silence of the Night. |
| The Fiſh of the Sea. | | *Continent to the Contents.* |
| | | A handful of Flowers. |

*Two* Names *without a Word between,*
Of *betwixt both moſt frequently is ſeen.*

When two Names come together, *of* generally goes before the later; as may be ſeen in all the foregoing Examples. But when this *of* ſignifies Poſſeſſion, then it may be left out, and *s*, or *es* put at the end of the firſt *Name*, by which it becomes a *Quality*; as we have ſufficiently prov'd already. *The Houſe of* Roger, or *Roger's Houſe.*

*Except they to the ſame Thing do relate,*
*For then the middle* of *is out of date.*

For Names that relate to the ſame Things have no Particle between them; as the *River Thames, Chriſtopher Columbus, London City*; tho' we likewiſe ſay, the *River* of *Thames*, the *City* of *London*, &c.

*Between* Superlatives *and following* Names
OF (*by Grammatic Right*) *a Station claims.*

All Superlatives may have the Particle *of* before the following *Name*; as *the greateſt* of *Villains, the moſt Wiſe* of *Philoſophers, the Beſt* of *Princes.*

Qualities *that do* Partition *ſignify,*
Affection, Vice, *or* Virtue *do imply*
*Any Deſire or Paſſion of the Mind,*
*Follow'd by* of *we generally find.*

Such

*Such as want* Knowledge, Ignorance *declare*,
Forgetfulneſs, *or* Mem'ry *in this Rule are.*

Qualities that ſignify Partition, generally have *of* after them; as *One* of *the French Priſoners*, *none* of *theſe*, *the third* of *Family*, &c. and thoſe which ſignify Affection, Paſſion, or Deſire of the Mind; any Knowledge, Ignorance, Memory, Forgetfulneſs, Vice, Virtue, or any ſuch Diſpoſition of the Soul, have *of* between them and the Word to which they relate; as *Coveteous* of *Gold*, *fearful* of *Thunder*, *anxious* of *Glory*, *void* of *Grace*, *empty* of *Senſe*, *conſcious* of *Guilt*, *ignorant* of *all things*, *forgetful* of *his Friends*, *mindful* of *his Children*, *guilty* of *Bribes*, *weary* of *the Journey*, *free* of *the Corporation*, *needy* of *Money*, &c. we ſay alſo, *forſaken* of *all Men*, *worthy* of *Happineſs*, *born* of *Royal Race*, *naked* of *Friends*, *depriv'd* of *Eſtate*, *robb'd* of *Money*. Thus after ſome AFFIRMATIONS, as, to *repent* of *Sin*, to *treat*, *talk*, *write* of *Happineſs*, &c.

*Where Benefit or Hurt comes from the* Name,
TO, *to direct you whither 'tis aim'd, do's claim.*

TO or FOR import the Thing or Perſon *to* or *for* whom any Convenience or Inconvenience is meant by the NAME, QUALITY, or AFFIRMATION; as, *a Friend* to *the Muſes*, *good* for *the Stomach*, *yielding* to *his Betters*. Hence all Words that ſignify the *uſe*, *Relation*, *likeneſs*, *doing*, or *giving* of one Thing to another, muſt have *to* or *for* after it. Tho' *to* is ſometimes left out, as *give me*, *like me*, *tell me*, *near me*; where *to* is underſtood much better than expreſs'd.

*In Invocations we prefix an O!*
O! God, our Frailty thou doſt ſurely know.

When we call on God, the King, or any one elſe, in a ſolemn manner, we put O! before the Name of him we addreſs to; as *O! King*, *remember that thou art a Man!*

*When you the Inſtrument or Manner* how,
By which, wherewith *expreſs*, *allow*
*Theſe Particles to be always ſeen*
By, with, *and* through, *and* from *and alſo* in.

When we expreſs the Inſtrument, the Medium by which, wherewith, or the Manner how a Thing is done, you make uſe of *by*, *with*, *from*, *through*, *in* and the like; as, *the Beams of the Sun* with *incredible ſpeed*, *paſs* from *Heav'n*, through *the Air*, *to the Earth*, *endu'd* with *Light and Heat by* (with, through)

through) *which it comforts us, and quickens the Plants which God has provided* for *us, and given to us for our Use, and his Glory. He was slain* with *his Sword. He abides* with *me.*

*By* is us'd for the Efficient Cause, (as well Principal as Instrumental and Moral) and also signifies *near to*, &c. as, *he was slain* by *his Enemy*, by (beside or near) *a Spring of Water, but wounded first* by *his own Fear, then* by *his Enemies Sword.*

*In* signifies, as it were, Presence in a Place, and is us'd when we wou'd either express *Rest*; as, Mary *lives* in *the Cellar*, in *the City*, in *the Winter*, in *a strange Posture*, in *an ill state of Health*, in *Battle Array*; in *act to strike*, in *his Cloak*, in *Favour*, in *War*, *rich* in *Land or Money*, in *Fear*, in *Doubt*, in *good Part*; *he is* in *Esteem*, *he did it* in *Revenge*, in *Hope*, in *my Thoughts.*

These are the several Senses in which the Particle IN is us'd.

The third sort of *Particles* which connect *Sentence* to *Sentence*, we have only this Remark:

*That they between those Sentences take site,*
*Which by the joining Vertue they unite.*

They are plac'd between the two Propositions, or Sentences which they unite; as for their Names, see *Particles* the third sort. 'Tis true, we might here give, or might there have given you several Denominations of them, as *Copulative*, *Disjunctive*, *Comparative*, and the like, as some others have done, and so given a several Head or Term to every other *Particle* of this Kind, but we seeing no Advantage accrue from such a multiplying of Terms, but the Burthen very much encreas'd to the Learner, have thought fit to leave out all that unnecessary Jargon.

What more may be said of *Particles*, and their various Meanings and Use, shall be found in our forecited Treatise of *Particles.*

We shall not conclude this short Discourse of *Construction*, without adding a few Words of a *Period*, and of *Figurative Construction*; tho' we are of Opinion, that the first is more proper to fall under the consideration of *Rhetoric*, and that the Use of the later is in English the Effect of Custom, not Art: Yet since we find others have thought fit to deliver Rules relating to both, we shall not omit them entirely.

To compose therefore a Period, or to express a Sentence, that is compos'd of two or more Sentences, with Art, we must first take care that the Expressions be not too

long,

long, and that the whole Period be proportion'd to the Breath of the Speaker. The Expreſſions of particular Sentences, that are Members of the Body of a Sentence, ought to be equal, that the Voice may repoſe at the end of theſe Members by equal Intervals. The more exact this Equality is, the more Pleaſure it will produce, and the more excellent the Period.

A Period ought to conſiſt at leaſt of two Members, and at moſt but of four. A Period is at leaſt to have two Members, becauſe its Beauty proceeds from the Equality of the Members, and Equality ſuppoſes at leaſt two Terms. To have a Period perfect, there ſhould not be four Members crouded into one Period, becauſe being too long, the Pronunciation muſt be forc'd, which muſt by conſequence be diſpleaſing to the Ear, becauſe a Diſcourſe that is incommodious to the Speaker, can never be agreeable to the Hearer.

The Members of a Period ought to be join'd cloſe, that the Ear may perceive the Equality of the Intervals of Reſpiration: For this cauſe the Members of a Period ought to be united by the Union of a ſingle Sentence, of that Body of which they are Members. This Union is very diſcernable, for the Voice repoſes at the end of every Member, only the better to continue its Courſe, it ſtops not fully, but at the end of the whole Sentence.

*Variety* may be two ways in a Period, *i.e.* in the Senſe, and in the Words. The Senſe of each Member of the Period ought to differ with each other. We cannot expreſs the different Thoughts of our Minds, but by different Words of different ſignification: Equal Periods are not to follow one another too near.

An Example of a Period of two Members: As, (1). *Before I ſhall ſay thoſe Things (O Conſcript Fathers) about the Public Affairs, which are to be ſpoken at this time*; (2.) *I ſhall lay before you, in few Words, the Motives of the Journey, and the Return.* The next conſiſts of three Members; as, (1.) *Since, by reaſon of my Age, I durſt not pretend to aſſume the Authority of this Poſt,* (2.) *And had fix'd it as a Maxim that nothing ought here to be produc'd but what was perfected by Induſtry and labour'd by the Underſtanding*; (3.) *I thought that my whole Time and Pains ſhould be transfer'd to thoſe of my Friends.* The laſt conſiſts of four Members, of which this is an Example: (1.) *If Impudence ſhould have as great Prevalence in the Court,* (2.) *as Inſolence has found in the Country and deſart*

*Places,* (3.) Aulus Cæcinna *wou'd not less in this Tryal give way to the Impudence of* Æbutius, (4.) *than he has already in Violence given place to his Insolence.*

This is sufficient to give a full Idea of the Nature and Beauties of a Period, which we have inserted meerly in compliance with Custom, being sensible that the Learner will be so far from being able to make his Advantage from it, till he has arriv'd much beyond the Province of Grammar, that there will be few *Masters* found, who have the Education of Children, that know any thing of this Matter.

Custom, produc'd by the general Inclination of Men to short Speaking, has introduc'd several Figures or Forms of Construction, by which Words are transpos'd, left out, one put for another, and the like. The Figures therefore of Construction are these:

I. *Transposition*, which is the placing of Words in a Sentence out of their Natural Order of Construction, to please the Ear in rendring the Contexture more agreeable, elegant, and harmonious: For when the concurrence of rough Consonants, and gaping Vowels, renders the Sound and Pronunciation inelegant, this Figure may be us'd, but never but upon such an Occasion, except in Verse, where *Transposition* is generally more elegant and harmonious than in Prose.

II. *Suppression*, which is an Omission of Words in a Sentence, which yet are necessary to a full and perfect Construction; as, *I come from my Father's*; that is, *from my Father's House*; but *House* is omitted. Words are suppress'd for Brevity or Elegance, but their number in English is too great to be enumerated; but for our direction, we may mind these Rules: 1*st*, That whatever Word comes to be repeated in a Sentence oftner than once, to avoid the inelegant repetition of the same Word, it must be left out; as, *This is my Master's Horse*; or, *This Horse is my Master's*; for, *This Horse is my Master's Horse*. 2*dly*, Words that are necessarily imply'd need not be express'd; as, *I live at* York: *Life* is necessarily imply'd, and therefore need not be express'd. 3*dly*, All Words that Use and Custom suppress in any Language, are not to be express'd without some particular Reason; as, *A good Man leads a* good Life; where the **Quality** *Good* is necessary to the **Name** *Life*.

III. *Sub-*

III. *Substitution*, is the using one Word for another, or the Mode, State, Manner, Person, or Number of a Word for another: And the Construction indeed often lies in the Sence, and not in the Words; as, *The whole Nation were in an Uproar*; where *the whole Nation* is put for *all the People* of the Nation. *Part of the Men are kill'd*; *Part* and *Nation* signifying Number, (tho' the Name be of the Number signifying one) it puts the Affirmation in the Plural, or the Number signifying many, but it may be in either.

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# Chap. XI.

## *Of Stops or Pauses in Sentences; the Use of Marks in Writing, and Abbreviations of Words.*

From what has been said of Sentences 'tis plain, that in a full Sentence there may be four Members, *viz.* Comma (,) Semicolon (;) Colon (:) and Period, or full-Stop (.) and these bear a kind of Musical proportion of Time one to another: For a *Comma* stops the Readers Voice, while he may privately tell one; the *Semicolon*, two; the *Colon*, three; and the *Period* four.

The Use of these Points, Pauses or Stops, is not only to give a proper Time for Breathing, but to avoid Obscurity and Confusion of the Sense in the joining Words together in a Sentence. After a *Comma* always follows something else which depends upon that which is separated from it by a *Comma*; as,

*If Pulse of Verse a Nation's Temper shows*
*In keen* Iambics *English Metre flows.*

Where the Sense is not compleat in the first Verse, and the second has a plain Dependance on the first. A *Semi*, or *half Colon*, is made use of when half the Sentence remains yet behind; as,

*Tho' God bids Peace with Promises of Life,*
*Men only Reason arm for deadly Strife;*

*By bloody Wars Earth making desolate,*
*And sacrificing Thousands to their Hate*, &c.

A *Colon*, or two Points, is made when the Sense is perfect, but the Sentence not ended; as,

*O Lord! in thee do I put my Trust: save me from all those, that persecute me, and deliver me:* &c.

The *full-Point* is when the Sentence is compleat and ended; as,

*O Shame! O Curse! O more than hellish Spight!*
*Damn'd Devils! with each other never fight.*

Besides these Points, there is a Mark that signifies a Question is ask'd, and is put when the Sense of that Question is compleat; this is the Figure of it (?) as,

*Why so Frolick? Why so Merry?*
*Is your Noddle full of Sherry?*

When we express our Wonder, or Admiration of any thing after the Sentence, we put this Point (!), which is call'd a Point of Admiration; as, *O Times! O Manners!*

In Sentences there is sometimes occasion to interpose another distinct Sentence, which being left out, the Sense of the Sentence is entire, and it is thus mark'd ( ), and is call'd a *Parenthesis*; as, *For to their Power (I bear Record) they were willing.*

When Words cannot be written entirely in the Line, the Syllables are parted, one ending the Line, and another of the same Word beginning the next; and this is mark'd at the end of the first Line thus (-)

The (*e*) is often left out as well as other Vowels, for the sake of the Sound, and that is call'd an *Apostrophe*, and is thus express'd (') as, *I am amaz'd*, for *amazed*; Henry *lov'd me*, for Henry *loved me*, &c.

*Accent* (`) being plac'd over any Vowel in a Word, notes that the tone, or stress of the Vowel in pronouncing, is upon that Syllable.

*Breve* (˘) is a *curve*, or crooked mark over a Vowel, and denotes that the Syllable is sounded quick or short.

*Dialysis* (··) being two Points plac'd over two Vowels of a Word, that wou'd otherwise make a Diphthong, parts 'em into two several Syllables.

*Index* (☞) the Fore-finger pointing, signifies that passage to be very remarkable against which its plac'd.

*Asterism* (*) guides to some Remark in the Margin, or at the foot of the Page. Several of 'em set together signify that

that there is something wanting, defective, or immodest in that passage of the Author, thus, ***.

*Obelisk* (†) a Dagger, is us'd as well as the *Asterism*, to refer the Reader to the Margin.

*Section* (§), or *Division* is us'd in subdividing of a Chapter into lesser parts.

*Caret* (^), when any Letter, Syllable or Word happens, by Inadvertence, to be left out in Writing or Printing, this mark (^) is put under the Interlineation in the exact place where it is to come; as *when* *Alice* ^ *was gone*, &c.

*Circumflex* (◌̂) is the same in shape as the *Caret*, but is always plac'd over some Vowel of a Word, to denote a long Syllable; as, *Eu-phrâ-tes.*

*Hyphen* (-) *Connexion*, is us'd to join or compound two Words into one, as, *Male-contents*, *Male-administration*; or when Names or Words are purposely left out, a stroke or small Line is thus put —— to signify the Name or Word understood, with the *initial* and *final* Letters at the beginning, or end, or both. Being plac'd over a Vowel, it is not then call'd *Hyphen*, but a *dash* for *M* or *N*.

*Parathesis* [ ], or *Brackets* include Words or Sentences of the same value and signification with those they are join'd to, and may be us'd in their stead.

*Quotation* (‘‘), or a double *Comma* turn'd, is put at the beginning of such Lines as are recited out of other Authors; as, "LOOK UPON ME THAT I MAY BE SEEN.

N. Note.
N. B. Nota Bene, *mark well.*
v. vid. vide, *see.*
viz. videlicet, or videre licet, *you may see.*
i. d. idem, *the same.*
i. e. id est, *that is.*
q. quasi, *as it were.*
q. d. quasi dicat, *as if he should say.*
s. c. scilicet or scirelicet, *you may know.*
etc. et cætera, *the rest.*
&c. and so forth, or *so on.*
N. L. Non Liquet, *it appears not.*
dit. ditto, *the same.*
p. per pro, *by.*
Cent. Centum, *an Hundred.*
e. g. exempli gratia, *examples.*
v. g. verbi gratia, *as for example.*
MS. Manuscript, *a written Book* or *Copy.*
p. pagina, *side* or *page.*
li. Linea, *Line.*
l. liber, *Book.*
fol. folio, *Books of the largest size*, or *a half Sheet.*
q. 4to. quarto, *a quarter of a Sheet.*

8vo. Octavo, *having eight leaves to a Sheet.*
12mo. Duodecimo, Twelves, *or a Sheet divided into* 12 *parts, as this* Grammar.
A Column is half a side of a Leaf, *as in the* Notes *of this Book.*
P.S. Postscript, *after written.*
Fra. Francis, Frances.
℞ Recipe, *Take thou.*
ana. *Of each alike.*
P. A Pugil, or *half a handful.*
M. Manipulus, *a handful.*
Ss. Semissis, *half a pound,*
q. s. quantum sufficit, *a sufficient quantity.*
q. l. quantum libet, *as much as you please.*

CC. Two hundred.
D. or IↃ. Five hundred.
DC. Six hundred.
M. or CIↃ. One Thousand.
IↃↃ. Five thousand.
CCIↃↃ. Ten thousand.
IↃↃↃ. Fifty thousand.
MDCCXII One thousand seven hundred and twelve.

Pr. Priest.
Deac. Deacon.
Cur. *Curius*, Curate.
Cl. Clericus, *Clergyman.*
Bp. Bishop.
ABp. Archbishop.

S. S. T. D. or D. D. } Sacro sanctæ Theologiæ Doctris, *Doctor of Divinity.*
L. L. D. } Legum
J. D. } Juris } Doctor, *a Doctor of Laws.*
M. D. Medicinæ Doctor. *a Doctor of Physic.*
A. B. Artium Baccalaureus, *Bachelor of Arts.*
A. M. Artium Magister, *Master of Arts.*
F. R. S. Fellow of the Royal Society.
Astr. P. G. Astronomy Professor of *Gresham College.*
P. M. G. Professor of Music, *at Gresham College.*
C. C. C. Corpus Christi College, *at Oxford.*
C. S. Custos Sigilli, *the Keeper of the Seal.*
C. P. S. Custos Privati Sigilli, *Keeper of the Privy-Seal.*
Philom. Philomathes, *a lover of Learning.*
V. D. M. Verbi Dei Minister, *Minister of the Word of God.*
IHS. Jesus, *the three first Letters of his Name in Greek.*
S. V. Siste Viator, *Stand still Traveller.*

*The End of the* GRAMMAR.

# *The Art of* POETRY.

## CHAP. I.

### *Of Accents and Quantities.*

THE Art of Pronunciation is reckon'd a part of *Grammar*, and is the true Utterance of Words, according to their *Quantity* and *Accent*. *Quantity*, is the Length or Shortneſs of Syllables; and the Proportion, generally ſpeaking, betwixt a long and ſhort Syllable is two to one; as in *Muſic*, two *Quavers* to one *Crotchet*.

In Engliſh, as well as in Latin and Greek, there are not only theſe long and ſhort Syllables, but thoſe which are either long or ſhort, as the Meaſure requires; as, *Rĕcŏrds* and *Rĕcōrds*.

[a] *Accent* is the raiſing and falling of the Voice, above or under its uſual Tone, but an Art of which we have little Uſe, and know leſs, in the Engliſh Tongue; nor are we like to improve our Knowledge in this Particular, unleſs the Art of *Delivery*, or *Utterance*, were a little more ſtudy'd.

Of

[a] There are three ſorts of Accents, an *Acute*, a *Grave*, and an *Inflex*, which is alſo call'd a *Circumflex*. The *Acute*, or *Sharp*, naturally raiſes the Voice; and the *Grave*, or *Baſe*, as naturally falls it. The *Circumflex* is a kind of Undulation, or Waving of the Voice; as in pronouncing *amare*, *to love*, you ſhould pronounce it as if ſpelt *aamare*, riſing at the firſt *a*, and falling at the ſecond. But tho' the *Latins* (in imitation of the *Greeks*) have ſome Signs to expreſs theſe Marks, yet the Uſe of them is not known, except in the diſtinction of Adverbs: Nay, ſhould ſome old *Roman* ariſe from the Dead, if we believe *Quintilian*, the Rules of them could not be deliver'd in Writing. Some of our Moderus (eſpecially Mr. *Biſh*, in his Art of Poetry) and lately Mr. *Matteire*, in what he calls *The Engliſh Grammar*, erroneouſly uſe *Accent* for *Quantity*, one ſignifying the Length or Shortneſs of a Syllable, the other the raiſing or falling of the Voice in *Diſcourſe*; which indeed moſt People have naturally, except ſuch who have the Misfortune of a Monotony, or of Speaking always in the ſame Tone of Voice; which is a great Vice in Utterance, and what few are guilty of, but ſuch as have a ſmall and acute Voice; for thoſe of a groſſer Conſtitution ſeldom are fixt to one Tone.

A

Of this long and short Syllable are all *Poetic Feet* in English (as well as all other Languages) form'd; and tho' *Horace* himself makes use of no less than twenty-eight several sorts of Feet, yet do they all, and many more, arise from the various Compositions of long and short Syllables.

Before we come to the different Feet that are in use in our Mother Tongue, it will be proper to lay down some Rules of Quantity, by which we may in some measure arrive at some Certainty in this particular.

*In Words whose Letters still appear the same,*
*By differing Sense yet gaining different Name,*
*The Sense lies still, distinguishes the sound*
*In* Names *that's short, in* Words *which long is found.*

In Words that differ in the *Sense*, but not in the *Spelling*, the first Syllable of the *Name* is long, but the last Syllable of the *Affirmation* is short; as the following Examples will shew; for no Words of different sense are exactly spelt alike, unless the *Name*, and the *Affirmation*.

| | Names. | Words of Affirmation. |
|---|---|---|
| The first Syllable is pronounc'd long. | *Absent* | *Absent* |
| | *Accent* | *Accent* |
| | *Cement* | *Cement* |
| | *Collect* | *Collect* |
| | *Conduct* | *Conduct* |
| | *Consort* | *Consort* |
| | *Convert* | *Convert* |
| | *Contest* | *Contest* |

The last Syllable is pronounc'd long.

A very Learned and Ingenious Author gives us this familiar and easie Distinction betwixt *Quantity* and *Accent*: 'It may be observ'd, 'that the Variations of the Voice, 'by *high* and *low*, *long* and *short*, '*loud* or *soft*, (however they happen to be confounded by some) are 'all of as different Nature and Effects, as the Beats of a Drum are 'from the Sounds of a Trumpet, or 'the Reading in one unvaried Tone 'is from Singing. All the possible 'Diversities of Poetic Feet, together 'with the Changes of *loud* and *soft*, 'the Drum expresses to a wonder: 'But while yet there is μονοτονία 'in the Sound, there can be no 'place for Accents: This plain Instrument does indeed in one single 'Tone shew what a Power there is 'in Musical Numbers, and of the 'various movement of *Poetic Feet*, 'and how the Ear is affected with 'the sudden intermixture of *loud* 'and *soft* Notes; but let the Trumpet tell how far short all these are 'of well-turn'd and rightly-plac'd 'Accents: In these consist the Life 'of Language, these being the Enchantments, which being justly 'apply'd to well-chosen Words, 'lead all the Passions captive, and 'surprize the Soul itself in its inmost Recesses.

(b) But

| Names. | | Affirmations. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| The first Syllable is pronounc'd long. | *Ferment* | The last Syllable is pronounc'd long. | *Ferment* |
| | *Frequent* | | *Erequent* |
| | *Incense* | | *Incense* |
| | *Object* | | *Object* |
| | *Present* | | *Present* |
| | *Project* | | *Project* |
| | *Record* | | *Record* |
| | *Subject* | | *Subject* |
| | *Torment* | | *Torment* |
| | *Unite.* | | *Unite.* |

and some others. But the following Rules of Quantity will be of some Use; as,

*When Endings to* One-Syllab'-Words *are join'd,*
*Long the first Syllable you always find.*

(1.) When an Ending is join'd to a Word of one Syllable, the first Syllable is long; as, *Peace-able, sin-ful, self-ish, good-ness, toil-some, faith-less, heart-y, godly,* &c.

*When* (er), (or), (ure) *two* Syllab'-Words *do end,*
*Of the first* Syllab' *they the sound extend.*

(2.) In Words of two Syllables which end in *er, or,* or rather *our* and *ure,* the first is long, as *enter, Honor,* or *Honour, venture,* &c. but we must except *defer, refer, prefer,* which indeed belong to the Rule of *Particles.*

*When* (le), *or* (en) *obscure do end a Word,*
*To the first Syllable they Length afford.*

As for Example; *Trouble, double, Fiddle, Garden,* &c.

*When* Particles *with other Words compound,*
*The* last *still lengthen their own proper Sound.*

(3.) When *Particles* are compounded with Words of one Syllable, the *Word* it self is long; as, *allure, collegue, pollute,* except *object, adjunct, Advent, Aspect, Compass, Concourse, Conduit, perfect, Perfume, Prelate, Profit, Progress, Prologue, Reliques, Respit, Succour, Substance, Suburbs, Surplice.* Note, that *perfect* and *Perfume,* when they are Affirmations, relate to the foregoing Rule, not the Exception.

*If to* two Syllab'-*Words an* Ending's *bound,*
*That which before was long maintains its Sound.*

If an Ending be added to a Word of two Syllables, that Syllable which was originally long continues so; as, *Profit, profitable*, except *protest, Protestant.*

*When many Syllables compose a Word,*
*That Vowel's long, that from the last is third;*
*Except* Position *give the last but one*
*(By crouding* Consonants*) a longer Tone.*

(4.) In Words of many Syllables (as we call all that consist of more than two) the third Vowel from the last is long, as, *Salvation, Damnation*, &c. except when the last Syllable but one is long by *Position*, that is, by the coming together of many Consonants, and bearing the Vowel hard upon 'em; as, *abundance, accomplish, illustrate*, to which we may add *Affiance, Affidavit, antecedent, Armado, Balconey, Bravado, Carbonado, Cathedral, Dandalion, Horizon, obdurate, Opponent, pellucid, Precedent*, tho' erroneously too often spelt *President*) *Recusant, Vagary.* In these that follow the last Syllable is long; as, *acquiesce, comprehend, condescend.*

*Some Words of many Syllables are found*
*Ev'n of two* Vowels *to extend the sound;*
*The fourth, or fifth, and of the last but one;*
*But still the last is of a weaker Tone.*

(5.) Some Words of many Syllables have two long Syllables, the fourth or fifth Vowel from the last, and the last but one; tho' the Quantity of the last be not so loudly sounded in the Delivery; as, *Ácademy*, which yet is often pronounc'd *Acadèmy, accessary, Acrimony, admirable.* Tho' it may be doubted whether *admirable*, as usually pronounc'd, be not more properly one long and three short. *Adversary, Antimony, Alimony, ambulatory, amicable, anniversary, antiquated, Apoplexy, arbitrary, Auditory, habitable, Hierarchy, Ignominy, necessary, Necromancy, refractory, sedentary.*

*Four or more Syllables, that end in* ness,
*The first and last long Syllables confess.*

But *Temperament*, and all Words of four or more Syllables ending in *ness*, have the first and last Syllables long; as, *Righteousness, Tediousness*, &c. except *Forgetfulness, Unsprightfulness.*

*Some are of doubtful Quantity by Use,*
*And shorten now, and now the same produce.*

Some are of a doubtful Quantity, according to the Will or Occasion of the Writer or Speaker; as, *acceptable, contribute, corruptible, Confessor, Successor,* &c. and indeed some of the former.

*Back to the Vowels now convey your Eye,*
*And there the Rules of Quantity you'll spy,*
*In Words that many Syllables deny.*
*For Common most they short, and long are found,*
*But those that to such Consonants are bound*
*As close the Lips, can ne'r extend their Sound.*
*Emphatic Words we justly still produce;*
*But every* Sign *is short by sacred* Use.

The Rules of the Vowels will be found at the beginning of the *Grammar*; and we here may add to these Observations, that most Words of one Syllable are common, except they end with silent (*e*), whose nature it is to lengthen the 'foregoing Vowel. All the Signs are short, without an Emphasis, which they seldom have; as, *a, the, an, for, by, with, to, from,* &c. but whatever Word of one Syllable ends with a Letter that closes the Mouth, can never be long; as all such as end in (*m*), or the sound of (*m*), and in most *Mutes.*

*Two Syllables our* English Feet *compose,*
*But* Quantities *distinguish them from Prose.*
*By* long *and* short *in various stations plac'd*
*Our English Verse harmoniously is grac'd.*
*With* short *and* long *Heroic Feet we raise,*
*But these to vary is the Poets Praise.*
*For the* same *Sounds perpetually disgust:*
DRYDEN *to this* Variety *was Just.*

Having given these Rules for *Quantities* in the *English* Tongue, we must observe, that two Syllables make a Poetic Foot, which hitherto will not admit a greater number, tho' in the *Latin* and *Greek* a Foot might contain six, and those might be resolv'd into the simple Feet of two or three Syllables. *Heroic Verses* consist of five *short*, and five *long* Syllables intermixt, but not so very strictly, as never to alter that Order. Mr. *Dryden* has vary'd them with admirable Beauty, beginning his Heroic Verse sometimes with a *long* Syllable, follow'd by two *short*, and other Changes, which a Master only must venture on.

From hence 'tis plain, that the Learner can never imagin that any number of Syllables is sufficient to make any kind

of Verſe, for by that means there could be no Proſe; ſo that to conſtitute a Verſe, variety of Numbers is neceſſary.

In *Engliſh*, the Metre or ſorts of Verſe are extreamly various and arbitrary, every Poet being at liberty to introduce any new Form he pleaſes. The moſt us'd are, firſt the *Heroic*, conſiſting of five long and five ſhort Syllables generally ſpeaking; Verſes of four Feet, and of three Feet, and three Feet and a Ceſure, or one Syllable. *Stanza*'s have been endeavour'd to be introduc'd, but never yet have been able to eſtabliſh themſelves.

[*b*] To help the Learner to ſome Means or Examples of forming new Feet in the *Engliſh Tongue*, we ſhall here ſet down the Variations made by the Ancients, of a long and a ſhort Syllable.

A *Spondee*, Two long Syllables.
*Pirric*, Two ſhort Syllables.
*Trochee*, A long and ſhort Syllable.
*Iambic*, A ſhort and a long Syllable.
*Theſe are of Two Syllables.*

A *Moloſs*, Three long Syllables.
*Tribrach*, Three ſhort Syllables.
*Dactyl*, One long and two ſhort Syllables.
*Anapeſt*, Two ſhort and one long Syllable.

[*b*] But as many Ways as Quantities may be varied by Compoſition and Tranſpoſition, ſo many different Feet have the Greek Poets contriv'd, and that under diſtinct Names, from two to ſix Syllables, to the number of 124. But it is the Opinion of ſome Learned Men in this Way, that Poetic Numbers may be ſufficiently explain'd, by thoſe of two or three Syllables, into which the reſt are to be reſolv'd.

Of thoſe eight here ſet down, the *Spondee* and the *Dactil* are the moſt conſiderable, as being the Meaſures us'd in the Heroic Verſe by *Homer*, *Virgil*, &c. Theſe two Feet are of equal Time, but of different Motion: The *Spondee* has an even, ſtrong, and ſteddy Pace, like a Trot, as I may ſay; but the *Dactil* reſembles the nimbler ſtrokes of a Gallop. An inverted *Dactil* is an *Anapeſt*, a very ſpritely Trot, and a Motion proper to excite and enrage. The *Iambic* is alſo of a light and ſpritely nature, and reigns moſt in our Engliſh Verſe. The *Trochee* is quite contrary to the *Iambic*, fit to expreſs weak and languid Motions; as all theſe Meaſures are which move from long to ſhort Syllables. The *Pirric* and *Tribrach* are very rapid, as the *Moloſs* is ſlow and heavy.

Tho' Rhime has been (by the Ignorance of our Fore-fathers) thought the only Eſſential of Engliſh *Verſe*, yet it is in Reality the moſt inconſiderable Part of it, and may be left out without any Detriment; as is plain from the Great *Milton*. But if you reſolve to write in Rhime, you muſt take a peculiar Care of obſerving them exactly, for a Botch in this is unpardonable. My Lord *Roſcommon*, tho' he was an Enemy to Rhime, yet was moſt exact in it, when he vouchſafed to make uſe of it. This Niceneſs muſt be obſerv'd in double or treble Rhimes, which yet are never properly us'd, but in *Burleſque*.

CHAP.

# CHAP. II.

## *The* Art *of* POETRY *in General; and first, of* Epigram, Paſtoral, Elegy, *and* Lyric.

HAving in the foregoing Chapter laid down the Rules of the Mechanic part of *Poetry*, which is as far as the *Grammar* generally goes, tho' with great Abſurdity, we ſhall now proceed to the Art it ſelf, which (by we know not what Infatuation) has never been yet taught in our Schools. For if *Poetry* is to be baniſh'd our Studies entirely, to what purpoſe does every Petty School teach the Rules of *Quantity*? But if we are allow'd to read the Poets, nay, if we are ſo fond of them, as to teach them to Children before they are Maſters of the Tongue they ſtudy, why muſt not the Beauty and Excellence of their Works be ſhown? By the firſt we teach Boys to be meer *Verſifyers*, *Poetaſters*; by the ſecond we form their Judgment, and let them ſee the Difficulty of being a good *Poet*; which wou'd deter them attempting an Act for which they find no true Genius, and at the ſame time give them a juſt value for the Books they read. The common *Proſodia*'s make Scriblers, which is a Scandal; the preſent Rules inſtitute a Poet, which is an Honour.

For the Learner muſt not fancy, that to write a Verſe, or conclude a Rhime, gives the Title of Poet; no, he muſt underſtand the Nature of his Subject throughly; and let his Copy of Verſes or Poem be never ſo ſhort, he muſt form a Deſign, or Plan, by which every Verſe ſhall be directed to a certain End, and each have a juſt Dependance on the other; for only this can produce the Beauty of Order and Harmony, and ſatisfy a rational Mind. For to jumble a Company of Verſes together without any Deſign, let them be never ſo ſmooth and flowing, is an Undertaking of no Value, and incapable of any thing *Great* and *Noble*. A *Blockhead* with a good Ear, and a tolerable Knowledge of the Language, may do theſe, but nothing but a *Poet* the other.

But if a Deſign be neceſſary in the ſhorteſt and leaſt of our Poems, it is vaſtly more neceſſary in thoſe of greater length; which without this will infallibly prove intolerably

tedious, and a rude indigeſted Heap. Fix this, therefore, in the *Learner's* Mind, that a VERSIFYER and POET are two different Things; the firſt is Contemptible, and has been ſo theſe 2000 years, but the later Honourable in the Opinion of the Men of Senſe and Learning, in all Ages and Nations, ſince the Birth of this Heav'nly Art.

Before we come to the Rules of the ſeveral Parts of *Poetry*, we muſt premiſe a Word or two to the Teachers. The *Maſter*, or *Miſtreſs*, who inſtructs the Young in this Art, ſhou'd thoroughly know its Nature and Parts, not only in this, which is but an Abridgment of a larger Diſcourſe, that will be publiſh'd ſoon after it, but the full diſplay of this Art in a much greater Volume.

They ſhou'd likewiſe read themſelves, with Application, all the beſt Tranſlations of the old *Latin* and *Greek* Poets; and direct their Scholars to Read and Study the ſame. For tho' theſe Tranſlations are far ſhort of the Originals, yet are they capable, as they are, of fixing a juſt and true Taſte and Reliſh of the Nature of *Poetry* in the *Engliſh* Student; which has not been kept ſo much in View in moſt of our Modern Compoſitions, but as they depart from Nature, want her Regularity of Order and Beauty. *Ovid*'s Metamorphoſis ſhou'd be firſt read thoroughly, becauſe it furniſhes all the Hiſtories of the *Heathen Gods*, and their Notions about them. To theſe you may add my Lord *Bacon*, *Danet*, and other Books on that Subject. *Virgil*, *Ovid*, *Horace*, *Homer*, we have in part in pretty good Verſions: And in ſome of theſe the Scholar ſhou'd every day take a Leſſon, beſides that which he takes in the Rules of the Art; by which he may come to join the Theory and Practic, which only can make a Poet, or Judge of Poetry.

We now come to the *Rules* of POETRY, in which I ſhall begin with the moſt inferiour Kind, and ſo aſcend by degrees up to the higheſt Performance in the Art.

*Epigram* is the loweſt Step of the Temple of the MUSES, or rather the Ground neareſt to the firſt Step of its *Aſcent*.

## Of *EPIGRAM*.

*The* Epigram *in Shortneſs takes delight,*
*And tho' all Subjects are its proper Right,*
*Yet* each *of* one *alone can only write.*

An *Epigram* is a ſhort Copy of Verſes treating of one only Thing, with *Beauty* and *Point*: All Things are allow'd to be

be treated of in the *Epigram*, provided that *Brevity*, *Beauty* and *Point* are preserved.

*Two Parts this little* whole *muſt ſtill compoſe,*
Recital of the Subject, *and the* Cloſe:
*To make this Poem perfect, be your Care*
*That* Beauty, Point *and* Brevity *appear.*

The *Epigram* conſiſts of two Parts, the *Recital of the Subject*, and the *Concluſion*. *Beauty* runs through the whole, but the *Point* is for the *Concluſion* only.

*That you this needful* Brevity *may claim,*
*Let one Thing only be your careful Aim;*
*And in few Words that* only *Thing expreſs,*
*But Words that* Force *and* Energy *confeſs.*

To attain this *Brevity*, you muſt not aim at many Things through the whole *Epigram*, and then take care to expreſs that *Little* as conciſely as poſſibly you can; that is, in ſuch Words, as that to extend them into more, wou'd enervate and loſe the Force and Strength of the Thought, and the *Point* or *Acumen*.

Beauty's *harmonious Symetry of Parts,*
*Which to the* whole *an Excellence imparts,*
*Adorn'd with ſweet* Simplicity *and* Truth,
*The* Diction *ſtill polite, and ne'r uncouth.*
*This* BEAUTY Sweetneſs *always muſt comprize,*
*Which from the Subject, well expreſs'd, will riſe.*

The next Quality is *Beauty*, that is, an exact and harmonious Formation of the *whole*, and the apt Agreement of all the Parts of the Poem, from the beginning to the end, with a ſweet *Simplicity* and *Truth*. The Language muſt be *Polite*, not *Ruſtic*: The *Beauty* muſt always be accompany'd with *Sweetneſs*, which varys according to the Subject; if that be delicate, ſoft, tender, amorous, *&c.* thoſe Qualities will ariſe from the well expreſſing of the Subject, that will give *Beauty* and *Sweetneſs*. But this muſt not be too viſibly ſought after; avoid rather what is harſh, and an Enemy to *Sweetneſs* in the Language, than ſtudy too much to encreaſe it.

*The* POINT *in the* Concluſion *takes its Place,*
*And is the* Epigram's *peculiar Grace;*
*Some* unexpected, *and ſome* biting *Thought*
*With poinant Wit, and ſharp Expreſſion fraught.*

The

The third neceſſary Quality of the *Epigram* is the POINT; and it is much inſiſted on by the *Epigrammatical* Critics, and is chiefly in the *Concluſion*; where it muſt end with ſomething biting and unexpected. There are others who ever exclude the *Point* from *Epigram*, becauſe *Catullus* has it not ſo frequently as *Martial*; but here, as in other Things, we muſt be guided by the majority, and if we here exclude the *Point*, we may have it ſpread ſtill through greater Work, where it is abominable.

*From two to twenty Verſes it extends,*
*But beſt when two, or four, it not tranſcends.*

The number of Verſes in an *Epigram* is from two to twenty, or even to fifty; but the ſhorter the better, becauſe it comes neareſt to the Perfection of *Brevity*. We have not many formal *Epigrams* in *Engliſh*, but then we run into a worſe Error, by ſcattering the *Epigrammatic Point* through all our Verſes, to the ſcandal of the *Engliſh Poets*, ſince that wholly belongs to *Epigram*. One Example ſhall ſuffice, and that is from Mr. *Brown*,— on a Gentleman who took the Oaths, and made three Gods of the Trinity.

*The ſame Allegiance to two Kings he pays,*
*Swears the ſame Faith to both, and both betrays:*
*No wonder, if to Swear he's always free,*
*Who has two Gods to Swear by, more than we.*

Here is the *Brevity*, *Point* and *Beauty* of an *Epigram*, expreſs'd by a Domeſtic Example: You may find ſeveral *Epigrams* of *Martial* tranſlated by the ſame Author, and by Mr. *Cowley*, and ſome out of *Catullus*, which are too long to inſert in this Abridgment.

## Of *PASTORAL*.

*The Paſtoral, that ſings of happy Swains*
*And harmleſs Nymphs that haunt the Woods and Plains,*
*Shou'd through the whole diſcover every where*
*Their old ſimplicity and pious Air.*
*And in the Characters of* Maids *and* Youth,
*Unpractic'd* Plainneſs, Innocence, *and* Truth.

As every ſort of *Poetry* is an Imitation of ſomething, ſo is the *Paſtoral* an Imitation of a *Shepherd*'s Life, conſider'd under that Character, or rather an Imitation of rural Actions. For this Reaſon there ought to be an Air of Piety, on all occaſions,

casions, maintain'd through the whole Poem; the Persons introduc'd being Innocent and Simple, without Corruption; such as *Shepherds*, *Goatherds*, *Cowherds*, *Pruners*, and the like. The Characters therefore shou'd represent that ancient Innocence, and unpractic'd Plainness which was then in the World, and which is visible in *Theocritus* and *Virgil*, as may be seen in the Translations of those *Poets*.

*Each* Pastoral *a little* Plot *must own,*
*Which as it must be simple, must be one;*
*With small Digressions it will yet dispense,*
*Nor needs it always* Allegoric *Sense.*

Every *Pastoral Poem* shou'd have a little *Plot* or *Fable*, which may deserve the Title of a *Pastoral Scene*; it must be simple, and one, yet not so as to refuse all manner of Digressions, provided they be little. Nor is the Poet oblig'd always to make it *Allegoris*, that is, to have some real Persons meant by those fictitious Shepherds which are introduc'd. This Rule of the *Plot* is every where observ'd by *Virgil*, particularly in his first, which is the Standard of *Pastorals*. The Plans, or Arguments of this and two or three more, will make this plain: Of the *first*.

Melibœus, *an unfortunate* Shepherd, *is introduc'd with* Tityrus, *one more fortunate; the former addresses his Complaint of his Suff'rings and Banishment to the later, who enjoys his Flocks and Folds in this public Calamity, and therefore expresses his Gratitude to the Benefactor from whence this Favour flow'd: But* Melibœus *accuses Fortune, Civil War,* &c. *bidding Adieu to his Native Home.* This is therefore a Dialogue—the next—Is a *Pastoral* Complaint without any Dialogue; for CORYDON *in a Courtship wholly* Pastoral, *complains of the Coyness of* Alexis, *recommends himself for his Beauty, and Skill in playing on the rural Pipe; invites him into the Country, promising him the Pleasures of the Place, with a Present of* Nuts *and* Apples. *But finding all in vain, he resolves to quit his Amour, and betake himself again to his Business.* Here is a visible *Plan* or *Design*, which makes every thing depend upon the other.

In the third *Menalcas*, *Damœtas*, and *Palæmon* are introduc'd in this manner. — Damœtas *and* Menalcas, *after some Country Railery, agree to try which has the best Skill at Song, and that their Neighbour* Palæmon *shall be judge of their Performance; who, after hearing both, declares himself unfit to decide the Controversie, and so leaves it undetermin'd.*

We

We need give no more Examples here of the little *Plot* or *Fable* of a *Paſtoral*; you may conſult Mr. *Dryden*'s *Virgil*, and the ſeveral Tranſlations of *Theocritus*, by which you will confirm the Rule abundantly.

Connections, *and* Tranſitions, *pray take Care*
*They are not made too* ſtrict *and* regular.

The *Connections* ſhou'd be negligent, and the *Tranſitions* eaſy; as may be obſerv'd in thoſe of *Virgil*; for a too ſtrict Regularity in theſe, will make the Poem ſtiff and formal.

*The* Paſtoral *admits of Vows and Praiſe,*
*Of Promiſes, Complaints, of Mirth and Joys,*
*Congratulations, Singing, Riddles, Jeſt,*
*Of Parables, Sentences, and the reſt.*

*Philoſophic Queſtions, Riddles, Parables*, ought to be eminent in this Poem, which gives a peculiar Reliſh of the ancient Manner of Writing; and the Writer ſhou'd ſhow ſome competent Skill in the *Subject-Matter*, which makes the Character of the Perſons introduc'd; as *Virgil* every where does, but the Moderns ſeldom or never.

*The Style muſt ſtill be natural and clear,*
*And Elegance in every Part appear;*
*Its humble Method nothing has of fierce,*
*But hates the Ratling of a lofty Verſe.*

The Style ought to be natural, clear and elegant, but nothing ſublime or lofty, or ſet off with ſuch Ornaments as are not at all agreeable to the Humility of the Subject. The Sentences ſhou'd be ſhort and ſmart, and the Verſification ſmooth, eaſy and harmonious, without Affectation of Grandeur and Majeſty, but when akin to the Subject; as in one of *Virgil*'s to *Pollio*.

*Oppos'd to this another low in Style,*
*Makes* Shepherds *ſpeak a Language baſe and vile.*

This *Randal* has done in his *Paſtorals*, and ſeveral others; changing *Dæmon* and *Phillis* into *Tom* an *Beſs*. Nor muſt Battles and War be treated of in a *Paſtoral*: We muſt either feign Names according to the Subject, or borrow thoſe which we find already in good Authors. This Poem ought never to exceed one hundred Verſes; the beſt of *Virgil*'s is but fifty, that is (in *Engliſh*) about ſeventy.

Of

## Of *ELEGY.*

*The* Elegy *demands a ſolemn Style,*
*It mourns with flowing Hair at Funeral Pile,*
*It paints the Lover's Torments and Delights,*
*A Miſtreſs flatters, threatens, and invites.*

*Elegy* was firſt made on Melancholy Subjects, as on the Death of Friends, *&c.* as *Ovid* on *Tibullus*, which is tranſlated. In Proceſs of Time, Joy, Wiſhes, and almoſt every Subject, was made free of the *Elegy*, as Complaints, Expoſtulations, Prayers, Love, Vows, Praiſes, Congratulations, Admonitions, Reproaches.

*The Model of this Poem ſhou'd be made,*
*And every ſtep of all its Progreſs laid;*
*And all directed to ſome certain End,*
*And Verſe on Verſe perpetually depend.*

This and all other Poems ought to have a Plan made of the whole Deſign before a Line is written: For elſe the Author will not know where to begin, and where to end, but ramble in the Dark, and give us Verſe which have no Relation to each other, or at leaſt have not any Dependance on each other. This is the Fault of thoſe who are ignorant of Art, and are only *Verſifyers.*

*No glittering Points, nor any nice Conceit*
*Muſt load the* Elegy *with Foreign Weight;*
*Paſſion and Nature here avow their Right,*
*And with Diſdain throw back that mean Delight.*

The *Epigrammatic Point* muſt never be here admitted, 'tis abominable; none of the fine things that ſome are ſo fond of in all places, no Conceits, nor the like: Theſe give place to the Paſſions, which muſt here ſpeak with Nature.

*Remember that the Diction every where*
*Be gentle, clean, perſpicuous, and clear,*
*Correct; the Manners all-along expreſs,*
*In every place the Paſſions ſtill confeſs.*

The Diction to the *Elegy* ſhould be ſtandard, correct, clean, gentle, perſpicuous, clear, expreſſive of the Manners tender, full of Paſſions, or pathetic; but never oppreſs'd or deboch'd with fine Sayings and exquiſite Sentences. It is wonderfully adorn'd with frequent Commiſerations, Complaints, Exclamations, Addreſſes to Things or Perſons,

Words

Words of feign'd Perſons, or Things inanimate made to ſpeak, ſhort Digreſſions, yet pertinent to the Subject; nor does it receive a little Beauty from Alluſions to Sayings: Examples not only from the *like*, but *unlike*, and Contrarys. Sometimes Compariſons are made, ſmart and ſhort Sentences are thrown in, to confirm what is propos'd.

*No cutting off the* Vowels *muſt be found,*
*That wou'd deſtroy that ſmooth, that flowing Sound*
*Which in the Elegy muſt ſtill abound.*

There ſhould be no Apoſtrophe's, by which when one Vowel ends a Word, and the next begins with another, the former is cut off; for that begets a ſort of Roughneſs, which is not agreeable to this kind of Poeſie.

*Some to two Verſes will the Senſe confine,*
*Conſummate in the cloſe of every other Line.*

The Reaſon of this Opinion ſeems to be the ſort of Verſe this Poem makes uſe of in the Latin, which ſeems to require a Full-point or Period at the end of every *Diſtich* compos'd of a Verſe of ſix Feet, and another of five, and ſo begins again like a ſhort *Stanza*. But this Rule will not always hold in Engliſh, nor is it always obſerv'd in Latin.

## The *LYRIC.*

Sweetneſs *is moſt peculiar to the Ode,*
*Ev'n when it riſes to the Praiſe of GOD.*

The Characteriſtic of this ſort of Poeſie from all others, is *Sweetneſs*: For as Gravity rules, and moſt prevails in *Heroic* Verſe, Simplicity in *Paſtoral*, Tenderneſs and Softneſs in *Elegy*, Sharpneſs and Poinancy in *Satire*, Humor and Mirth in *Comedy*, the Pathetic in *Tragedy*, and the Point in the *Epigram*, ſo in this ſort of Poeſie the Poet applys himſelf entirely to ſooth the Minds of Men by *Sweetneſs* and Variety of the Verſes, and the exquiſite Elegance of the Words of the whole *Song* or *Ode*, in the Beauty and Agreeableneſs of Numbers, and the Deſcription of Things moſt delightful in their own nature.

*The Expreſſion ſhou'd be eaſie, Fancy high,*
*That not ſeem to creep, nor* this *to fly:*
*No Words tranſpos'd, but in ſuch Order all,*
*As tho' hard wrought, may ſeem by Chance to fall.*
*But Obſcene Words do always give Offence,*
*And in all Poetry debaſe the Senſe.*

Songs

*Songs* are a Part of *Lyric* Poetry, for *Ode* indeed ſignifies a *Song*; tho' our common *Madrigals* degenerate much from their Original the *Ode*; yet, that we may have better for the future, we here take Notice of them, and they ſhou'd be moſt exact in the Propriety of Words and Thoughts; but here, as well as in all manner of true Poeſie, Obſcurity ſhou'd with the utmoſt Care be avoided.

*Variety of Numbers ſtill belong*
*To the ſoft Melody of* Ode *or* Song.

The Verſe of the *Lyric* Poetry in the beginning, was only of one kind, but for the ſake of Pleaſure, and the Muſic to which they were ſung, they ſo vary'd the Numbers and Feet, that their ſorts are now almoſt innumerable.

Pindaric Odes *are of a higher Flight,*
*And happier Force, and fierce is the Delight:*
*The Poet here muſt be indeed inſpir'd*
*With Fury too, as well as Fancy fir'd;*
*For Art and Nature in this* Ode *muſt join,*
*To make the wondrous Harmony Divine.*
*But tho' all ſeem to be in Fury done,*
*The Language ſtill muſt ſoft and eaſy run;*
*The bright* Tranſitions, *and* Digreſſions *riſe,*
*And with their natural Returns ſurprize.*

As the Language, or Expreſſions ſhou'd be elegantly ſoft, ſo an ill or low Expreſſion cloggs and debaſes the Beauty and Brightneſs of the Thought. This Poem is diſtinguiſh'd from all other *Odes* by the happy Tranſitions and Digreſſions which it beautifully admits, and the ſurprizing and naturally eaſy Returns to the Subject; which is not to be obtain'd without great Judgment and Genius. The ſuppos'd Irregularity of *Pindar*'s Numbers, has made our ignorant Imitators pretend to be *Pindaric* Poets, by their wild irregular Verſes alone, tho' very falſely. Here the Poet that wou'd excel, ſhou'd draw the Plan of his Poem, and mark out the Places where theſe elegant Wandrings may properly be, and how the Returns may juſtly be made to the Subject; for without that it muſt be Chaos and Confuſion in bold Sonorous Verſes. Conſult and ſtudy *Pindar*'s *Odes*, tranſlated by Mr. *Cowley*; and a Poem entitled, *The Female Reign*; in which the Tranſitions and Returns are excellent. [a]

CHAP.

[a] The *Ode* Originally had but one *Strophe* or *Stanza*, but was at laſt divided into three Parts; the *Strophe*, *Antiſtrophe*, and *Epode*.

For the Priests went round the Altar singing the Praises of the *Gods*, or *Goddesses* in Verse: So they call'd their first Entrance to the Left, *Strophe*, or *turning to*; the second, returning to the Right, they call'd *Antistrophe*, or the *Returning*; and the Songs they call'd *Ode*, or *Antode*; as they call'd their *Entrance* and *Return Strophe*, and *Antistrophe*: At last standing still before the Altar, they sung the rest, and that they call'd the *Epode*. The *Strophe* and *Antistrophe* consisted of the same number and kind of Verses, nay, almost of Syllables, but the *Epode* of Verses of a different kind, which were sometimes more in number, sometimes less; and if the *Ode* contain'd several *Strophes*, and *Antistrophes*, and *Epodes*, the same Rule was follow'd in all the rest.

The *Odes* of *Horace* are compos'd of two, three or four sorts of Verse, after which the *Stanza's*, or *Strophes* begin again, *&c.*

# CHAP. III.

## *Of* SATIRE *and* COMEDY.

*Satire* and *Comedy* being both directed to lash and ridicule Folly and Vice, may (we think) properly come into one Chapter.

*Folly and Vice of every Sort and Kind*
*That wound our Reason, or debase the Mind;*
*All that deserves our Laughter or our Hate,*
*To biting* SATIRE's *Province do relate*
*The sloathful Parasite, affected Fool,*
*Th' Ingrateful, and the pert loquacious Tool,*
*The Lustful, Drunkard, th'avaritious Slave,*
*The noisy Bravo, and the tricking Knave.*
Satire, *by wholsom Lessons, would reclaim,*
*And heal their Vices, to secure their Fame.*

*Satire*, like the old *Comedy*, takes Cognizance of, and has for its Subject *Turpitude*, or such things as are worthy our *Laughter*, or our *Hatred*. Whatever therefore is not ridiculous or odious, is not the Subject of *Satire*; as any thing that is full of Grief, Terror, Pity, or other Tragical Passions. *Satire* derides and falls on the Sloathful, the Parasite Affectation, the Loquacious or Talkative, the Ingrateful, Libidinous, Drunkards, the Avaritious Usurers, Bravo's, public Robbers, Adulterers, *&c.* He was in the Right, that subjected the Distempers of the Mind to *Satire*, since it is as much employ'd in this, as the Physician in curing the Body

Body. Both propoſe to themſelves the Health of the Patient, *Satire* by Diſcourſe, the Phyſician by his Potions and Pills. The Medicines of both are in themſelves unſavory and diſagreeable to the Palate of the Diſtemper'd on whom they make Inciſions, whom they cauterize and ſpare not. The Phyſician gilds his Pill, that it may go down glibly, the *Satiric* Invectives muſt be ſweeten'd with the mixture of Pleaſantry and Wit, and agreeable Railery, till both the Medicines are ſwallow'd, and in the Bowels perform their Operation. The Railery and biting of *Satire* correct the Perverſe, and deter others from falling into Folly and Vice.

*The Latin Writer's Decency neglect,*
*But Modern Readers challenge more Reſpect;*
*And at immodeſt Writings take offence,*
*If clean Expreſſion cover not the Senſe.*
Satire *ſhou'd be from all Obſceneneſs free,*
*Not Impudent, and yet preach Modeſty.*

The *Satiric Poet* ſhou'd not expoſe Vice and Lewdneſs as *Horace* and *Juvenal* have done, in Words and Expreſſions that may corrupt the Innocent, whilſt they ſtrive to correct the Guilty. He muſt, therefore, carefully avoid all obſcene Words and Images.

*Tho' Vice and Folly be keen* Satire's *aim,*
*It muſt not on their Nature here declaim.*

Tho' the Buſineſs of *Satire* be to call Men from Vice and Folly, and invite them to Wiſdom and Virtue, yet it is by no means to waſte it ſelf on Diſquiſitions on the Nature of Virtue and Vice; which is the proper Buſineſs of *Moral Philoſophy*. In ſhort, this Poem requires for its Author, a Man of Wit and Adreſs, Sagacity and Eloquence; and a Sharpneſs that is not oppoſite to Mirth and Pleaſantry.

*No Parts diſtinct do's biting* Satire *know,*
*And without certain Rules its Courſe will go.*
*Oft by* Inſinuation *it begins,*
* *And oft* abruptly *falls upon our Sins,*
*But this* Abruptneſs *muſt regard the* Whole,
*Which muſt its Words, and Manner too, controul.*

*Satire* has no certain nor diſtinct Parts; ſometimes it begins by inſinuating it ſelf by degrees; but more commonly abruptly, and with Ardour. But tho' the beginning be a-



* *See the firſt* Satire *of* JUVENAL.

brupt; yet it ought to have a Reference and Regard to the the Compoſition of the whole Body of the Poem. Examples you may ſee in *Juvenal*, tranſlated by Mr. *Dryden*.

*Of well-choſe Words ſome take not Care enough,*
*And think they ſhou'd be (like the Subject) rough.*
*But this great Work is more exactly made,*
*And ſharpeſt Thoughts in ſmootheſt Words convey'd.*

Here, as well as in all Poems, there ought to be care taken of the ſmooth flowing of the Verſe, which Mr. *Dryden* in his *Mac Fleckno* has perfectly obſerv'd, and ought to be the Model of our Verſe in all *Engliſh Satires* [b]

## Of *COMEDY*.

We come now to the *Drammatic* Poetry, which is much the moſt uſeful and difficult, as well as delightful of any: We can ſcarce except a juſt *Epic Poem*, which has not been ſeen theſe 1700 years; for tho' that be more difficult becauſe of its Length and Variety, yet it is, beyond Controverſie, leſs uſeful, and leſs capable of giving that ſtrong and lively Pleaſure which is to be found in a juſt *Tragedy*: But we begin with *Comedy*.

*In* Comic Scenes *the common Life we draw,*
*According to its humorous Actions Law,*
*And* Vice *and* Folly *laughing, keep in awe.*
*But what is yet a nobler, juſter End,*
*To all the Charms of* Virtue *do's commend.*

*Comedy* imitates common Life in its Actions and Humors, laughing at, and rendring Vice and Folly ridiculous; and recommending Virtue. It is indeed an Imitation of Life, the Mirrour of Cuſtom, and the Image of Truth; and whatever *Comedy* follows not this Track, is unworthy of the Name.

*To*

[b] *Satire* is allow'd to be an urbane, joceſe, and biting Poem, form'd to reprehend corrupt Manners, and expoſe Improbity of Life; but yet there is no certainty of the Etymology of its Name. Some draw it from a ſort of *Plate* or *Charger*, in which the various ſorts of *Firſt-fruits* were offer'd to *Ceres*; thus, ſay they, in *Satire* are handled various and different ſorts of Things or Subjects, with which it is as it were fill'd to Satiety; ſo from Fulneſs or Satiety they draw *Satire*. Others derive it from the Dances of the *Satyrs* leaping from *ſide* to *ſide*, skipping and jumping this way, and that. Or perhaps from the *Satyrs* themſelves, thoſe Gods having of old been often introduc'd into this ſort of *Poetry*.

*To four eſſential Things w'aſſign a Part*
*In every* Comedy *that's writ with Art;*
*The* Fable, Manners, Sentiments *are theſe,*
*And proper* Diction, *that muſt all expreſs.*
*The* Fable *is the* Plot *that is deſign'd*
*To imitate the Actions of Mankind.*
*But without* Manners *thoſe cannot be drawn*
*In them the Temper, and the Humours ſhown;*
*As by the* Sentiments *theſe are made known.*
*The* Diction *is the Language that do's ſhow*
*In Words, the* Sentiments *that from them flow.*

COMEDY has Parts of *Quality*, and Parts of *Quantity*. Of the firſt kind there are four eſſential, the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*; to which two are added which only relate to the *Repreſentation*, viz. the *Muſic* and *Decoration*; without the firſt four Parts no *Comedy* can be written. For the *Poet* muſt neceſſarily invent the *Matter*, or *Subject* on which he writes, and that is what we call the *Fable* or *Plot*: But ſince the *Fable* imitates, there is a neceſſity that it ſhou'd have the *Manners*, that is, nicely and juſtly expreſs the *Tempers*, *Humours* or *Manners* of the ſeveral *Dramatic Perſons* that are repreſented in *Comedy*. The *Sentiments* are added, becauſe we muſt diſcover by them the Senſe and Opinion of them in Words; and becauſe the *Sentiments* are, and muſt be expreſs'd more plainly by Words, the *Diction* obtain its place in theſe four Parts of *Comedy*.

The difference of the *Perſon* much alters the *Manners*, and differences them from one-another. For theſe *Manners* which are Praiſe-worthy in one, are far from being ſo in another, being not at all convenient to his Character, and therefore to be diſprais'd. Thus we find in Arts themſelves, for one of the Vulgar gains Reputation by being a good *Fidler* or *Piper*; but this in a King is ridiculous and diſagreeable to his Dignity. A *Woman* has a juſt Praiſe for ſowing well, and working finely with her Needle; but this being no Manly Quality, is diſpicable in a *Man*. The *Manners* muſt therefore be agreeable to every Man's Station, Quality, or Years, and the like. And Life is the beſt Book to ſtudy theſe in, when we are once Maſters of the Rules of Art. In the mean while, learn theſe following Verſes out of *Horace*, of what is proper to the ſeveral Ages and Stations of Man, that you may not err againſt them: They are found thus in blank Verſe, in my Lord *Roſcommon*'s Tranſlation.

*One that has newly learn'd to ſpeak and go,*
*Loves Childiſh Plays; is ſoon provok'd and pleas'd,*
*And changes every Hour his wavering Mind.*
*A* Youth, *that firſt caſts off his* Tutor's *Yoke,*
*Loves Horſes, Hounds, and Sports, and Exerciſe;*
*Prone to all Vice, impatient of Reproof;*
*Proud, careleſs, fond, inconſtant, and profuſe.*
*Gain, and Ambition rule our riper Years,*
*And make us Slaves to Intereſt and Power.*
*Old Men are only walking Hoſpitals,*
*Where all Defects, and all Diſeaſes croud,*
*With reſtleſs Pain, and more tormenting Fear,*
*Lazy, moroſe, full of Delays, and Hopes,*
*Oppreſs'd with Riches, which they dare not uſe;*
*Ill-natur'd Cenſors of the preſent Age,*
*And fond of all the Follies of the paſt.*
*Thus all the Treaſure of our flowing Years*
*Our Ebb of Life for ever takes away.*
*Boys muſt not have th' ambitious Cares of Men,*
*Nor Men the weak Anxieties of Age.*
*Obſerve the Characters of thoſe that ſpeak,*
*Whether an honeſt Servant, or a Cheat,*
*Or one whoſe Blood boils in his Youthful Veins,*
*Or a grave Matron, or a buſie Nurſe,*
*Extorting Tradeſmen, careful Husbandmen.*

Theſe are the general Rules for thoſe Characters that fall under them; but *Humour* being eſſential to Engliſh *Comedy*, we muſt ſee what that is.

*Subordinate Paſſion we* Humour *name,*
*By which our Bards have gain'd peculiar Fame.*
*Each Paſſion does a double Face confeſs,*
*The* ſtrong *is* Tragic, Comic *is the* leſs.
*Here* Affectation *ſome to* Humour *add,*
*By that are ſome ridiculouſly mad.*
*Whatever Humours you at firſt beſtow,*
*Thoſe in the end your Perſons ſtill muſt ſhow,*
*Thoſe muſt be uppermoſt in all they do.*

*Humour* is ſaid by the Critics to be a ſubordinate, or a weaker Paſſion, and that in Perſons of a lower degree than thoſe who are fit for Tragedy; and it is more viſible in the lower ſort of People, whoſe Characters are therefore fitter for *Comedy*. Every Paſſion has two different Faces; one

that

that is ſerious, great, terrible, ſolemn, that is for *Tragedy*; and another that is low, comical, ridiculous.

Affectation is thought alſo to be a Character fit for *Comedy*, as being highly ridiculous, and capable of being corrected by it. Your Characters muſt always retain the ſame Humour through the Play, which you give them at firſt, or elſe 'tis abſurd and prepoſterous.

*Expoſe no ſingle Fop, but lay the Load*
*More equally, and ſpread the Folly broad;*
*The other Way is vulgar: Oft we ſee*
*A* Fool *derided by as great as he:*
*Ill Poets ſo will* one poor Fop *devour.*
*But to collect, like Bees, from every Flour*
*Ingredients to compoſe this precious Juice,*
*Which ſerves the World for Pleaſure, and for Uſe,*
*In ſpight of Faction, will our Favour find,*
*And meet with the Applauſe of all Mankind.*

The Poet ſhould not pick out any one particular Fop he may meet with in his Converſation, but form the general Follies from a Character that may be of Uſe to many, and a Diverſion to all.

*All Fools in this ſpeak Senſe, as if* poſſeſt,
*And each by* Inſpiration *breaks his Jeſt.*
*If once the Juſtneſs of each part be loſt,*
*We well may laugh, but at the Poet's coſt.*
*That ſilly thing Men call* Sheer-Wit *avoid,*
*With which our Age ſo nauſeouſly is cloy'd:*
Humour *is all,* Wit *ſhou'd be only brought*
*To turn agreeably ſome proper Thought.*

'Tis a Breach of Character to make the Coxcombs ſpeak Wit, and fine Raillery, and therefore good for nothing. *Humour* is the true Wit of Comedy, the fine Things, the *Sheer-Wit* is only for *Epigram.*

*The Parts of Quantity are likewiſe four;*
*The* Entrance *does the Characters explore:*
*And to the Action ſomething does proceed,*
*The* Working up. Action *and* Warmth *does breed.*
*The* Counter-turn *does* Expectation *croſs,*
*But the* Diſcovery *ſettles all i'th' cloſe.*

The Parts of Quantity of a *Comedy* are four; the *Entrance*, which gives Light only to the Characters, and proceeds very little into any part of the Action. 2*dly*, The *Working up* of the

the *Plot*, where the Play grows warmer, and the Design or Action of it is drawing on, and you see something promising. 3*dly*, The *full Growth* of the Plot, which we may properly call the *Counter-turn*, destroys the Expectation, and embroils the Action in new Difficulties, leaving you far distant from the Hopes, in which it found you. 4*thly*, The *Discovery* or *Unraveling* of the Plot, where you see all things settling again on their first Foundation. The Obstacles, which hinder'd the Design or Action of the Play, once remov'd, it ends with the Resemblance of Truth, and Nature and the Audience are satisfied with the Conduct of it.

But our Plays being divided into Acts, I shall add a word about them. There must be no more, nor less, than five Acts; this is a Rule of 1700 Years standing at the least.

The first contains the Matter or Argument of the Fable, with the shewing the principal Characters. The second brings the Affairs or Business into Act. The third furnishes Obstacles and Difficulties. The fourth either shews how those Difficulties may be remov'd, or finds new in the Attempt. The fifth puts an end to them all, in a fortunate Discovery, and settles all as it should be.

## CHAP. IV.
## *Of* TRAGEDY.

*ONE only* Action, *that's* entire *and* grave,
*And of* just length, *the* Tragic Muse *must have*
*The Object of its artful Imitation,*
*And that without the Help of the Narration,*
*By the strong Pow'r of Terrour and Compassion.*
*All sorts of Passion perfectly refines,*
*And what in us to Passion else inclines.*

As all the other Parts of *Poetry* are *Imitations*, so is *Tragedy*; for the best Critics define it thus: — "*Tragedy* is "the *Imitation* of one grave, and entire Action, of a just "length, and which, without the Assistance of *Narration*, "by the Means of Terrour and Compassion, perfectly re- "fines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever is like "them.

Thus *Tragedy* is the Imitation of some one Action, and not of all the Actions of a Man's Life; and 'tis equally plain, that there is no room for any thing in this Poem,

(the

(the moſt uſeful and noble of all Poeſie) but what is grave and ſerious. This Action muſt be *entire*, it muſt have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. The *Beginning* is that before, which we have no need to ſuppoſe any neceſſary Cauſe of it; the *Middle* is all that this *Beginning* produces, and the *End* is that after which nothing is neceſſarily ſuppos'd to compleat the Action. It muſt be of a juſt *length*, that is, it muſt not be ſo long as that of an Heroic Poem, nor ſo ſhort as a ſingle Fable. The excluding *Narration*, and the confining it to Terror and Compaſſion, diſtinguiſhes it from an Heroic Poem; which may be perfect without them, and employs *Admiration*. By the refining the Paſſions, we mean not Extirpation, but the reducing them to juſt Bounds and Moderation, which makes them as uſeful as neceſſary. For by ſhowing the Miſeries that attend the Subjection to them, it teaches us to watch them more narrowly, and by ſeeing the great Misfortunes of Others, it leſſens our Own, either preſent or to come.

*There is no Action that do's not proceed*
*From* Manners, *and the* Sentiments *indeed.*
*And therefore theſe, in this ſublimer Art*
*Of* Tragedy, *muſt claim eſſential Part.*

As *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an Action, not of Inclinations or Habits, ſo there is no *Action* that does not proceed from the *Manners* and the *Sentiments*, and therefore the *Manners* and the *Sentiments* are eſſential Parts of *Tragedy*; for nothing but theſe can diſtinguiſh an *Action*. The *Manners* form, and the *Sentiments* explain it, diſcovering its Cauſes and Motives.

*All* Tragedies *four Parts do claim,*
Fable *the firſt, and* Principal *we Name*;
*The* Manners *and the* Sentiments *ſucceed,*
*The* laſt *place to* Diction *is decreed.*

There is no Subject of a *Tragedy* where theſe following Parts are not to be found; the *Fable*, the *Manners*, the *Sentiments*, and the *Diction*. Some add the *Decoration*, becauſe that denotes the Place; and every *Action* requiring ſome Place, the *Decoration* is in ſome meaſure the Object of the Poets Care, that the Place may be proper for the *Repreſentation*. The chief and much moſt conſiderable, is the *Fable*, or the Compoſition of the *Incidents*, which form the Subject of the *Tragedy*. For *Action* being the Object of the

Imi-

Imitation of this ſort of Poetry, muſt be the moſt conſiderable; but the *Action* conſiſts of the *Incidents* and their Conduct, which is the *Fable:* The *Fable* muſt be the moſt conſiderable; and all the Beauties of *Manners*, *Diction*, and *Sentiments*, can't make amends for the Defects of this. The general End that Mankind propoſe, is, to live Happily, but to live Happily is an *Action*; for Man is either Happy or Miſerable by his *Actions*, not *Manners*. *Tragedy* only adds them for the Production of *Actions*. The *Fable* being therefore the End of *Tragedy*, as being the Imitation of the *Action*, it muſt be of the greateſt Importance; for ſo is the End in all Things.

*The* Manners *next, by the* Dramatic *Laws,*
*As they of* Action *are the Source and Cauſe,*
*Demand our Study, and our utmoſt Care;*
*By thoſe the Perſons, their Deſigns declare,*
*And from each other beſt diſtinguiſh'd are.*

The *Manners* are the moſt conſiderable next to the *Fable*. For as *Tragedy* is the Imitation of an *Action*, ſo there are no *Actions* without the *Manners*; as no Effect without a Cauſe. The *Manners* diſtinguiſh Character from Character, and diſcover the Inclinations of the Speaker, and what Part, Side, or Courſe he will take on any *important* and *difficult* Emergence, know how he will behave himſelf before we ſee the Actions. If Pride, Choler, Piety, or the like, be the *Manners* of the Hero, we may know that he will follow the Dictates of the prevailing Paſſion of his Character.

*The* Sentiments *obtain the next Degree,*
*Tho' leaſt in Excellence of all the Three.*
*The* Sentiments *the* Manners *do expreſs,*
*But muſt with* Truth *and* Likelihood *confeſs.*

The *Sentiments* are next in degree of Excellence to the *Fable* and the *Manners:* For theſe are for the *Manners*, what the *Manners* are for the *Fable*. The *Action* cannot be juſtly imitated without the *Manners*, nor the *Manners* without the *Sentiments*. In theſe we muſt regard *Truth* and *Verſimilitude*. As when the Poet makes a *Madman* ſpeak juſt as a *Madman* does; or as it is probable he wou'd do. For this ſee King *Lear* in *Shakeſpear*.

*The* Diction *muſt the* Sentiments *unfold,*
*Which in their proper Language muſt be told.*

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The *Diction*, or Language of *Tragedy*, can demand but the fourth Place in the eſſential Parts, and is of the leaſt importance of any of them; yet muſt peculiar Care be likewiſe taken of this, that every Paſſion ſpeak in ſuch Words and Expreſſions as is natural to it.

Having thus ſeen the ſeveral Parts of *Tragedy*, and their Exellence in regard of each other, we ſhall now proceed to give Directions neceſſary to the making each of them perfect, and to the knowing when they are ſo in what we read.

*Firſt on a* Plot *employ thy careful Thoughts,*
*And guard thy ſelf againſt its uſual Faults.*
*Turn it with Time a thouſand ſeveral ways*
*That (as it ought) gives ſure Succeſs to Plays.*

As the *Plot*, or *Fable*, is the chief Thing in a *Tragedy*, ſo our firſt and principal care ought to be employ'd in contriving this Part with that care, that each may produce and depend upon the former. This Part being perform'd with Skill, has given Succeſs to thoſe Plays which have been defective in all the other Parts.

*Beſides the main Deſign compos'd with Art,*
*Each* moving Scene *muſt have a* Plot *apart.*
*Contrive each little Turn, mark every Place;*
*As* Painters *firſt chalk out the future Face.*
*Yet be not fondly your own* Slave *for this,*
*But change hereafter what appears amiſs.*

As the main *Plot*, or *Fable*, conſiſts of many *Incidents* or *Scenes*, the Poet muſt make a Draught of theſe before he begins to write; which will appear more plainly when we come to diſcourſe of the *Incidents*. In this Scheme we muſt mark all the fine Touches of the Paſſions, and all the admirable Turns that produce them. But when we come to write, we may diſcover Faults in the firſt Draught, which we muſt correct.

*Each* Tragic Action *muſt be both* entire,
*And of that* length *which* Tragedies *require.*
Beginning *it muſt have, and* Middle, *and* End,
*Each to produce the other ſtill muſt tend.*
*The Cauſe of Undertaking and Deſign*
*Of* Action, *to* Beginning *we confine;*
*All the Effects and Obſtacles we find*
*In th' Execution, to* Middle *are aſſign'd*
*Th' unravelling and diſſolving of the ſame,*
*With Juſtice we the* End *do always name.*

E-

Every *Action*, that is fit for a *Tragic Imitation*, ought not only to be *entire*, but of a *juſt length*; that is, muſt have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. This diſtinguiſhes it from *momentaneous Actions*, or thoſe which happen in an inſtant, without Preparation or Sequel, which, wanting Extenſion, may come into the *Incidents*, not build a *Fable* on. The Cauſe or Deſign of undertaking an *Action* is the *Beginning*; and the Effects of thoſe Cauſes, and the Difficulties we find in the Execution, are the *Middle*: The unravelling and diſſolving theſe Difficulties, is the *End*.

An Explanation of this will beſt appear by an Example, which we will take from the *Plot* of the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*. *On the Death of the two Brothers*, Eteocles *and* Polynices, Creon, *who ſucceeds them in the Kingdom of* Thebes, *prohibits the burying the Body of the later, becauſe he invaded his Native Country with Foreign Troops: This Decree makes* Antigone, *who was betrothed to* Hæmon *the Son of* Creon, *bury him, is diſcover'd, and condemn'd to be bury'd alive*: Creon *cou'd not be brought to relent by* Hæmon, *or* Tereſias; *and ſo* Hæmon *kills himſelf with her: This makes* Eurydice, *his Mother, deſtroy herſelf*; *and* Creon, *in theſe Miſeries ſeeing the fatal Conſequence of his Decree, repents too late, and becomes miſerable.*

The *Beginning* of this *Action* has no neceſſary Conſequence of the Death of *Polynices*, ſince that Decree might have been let alone by *Creon*, tho' it cou'd not have been without that Death; ſo that the *Action* naturally begins with that Decree. The *Middle* is the Effects produc'd by that Decree, the Deaths of *Antigone*, *Hæmon*, and *Eurydice*, which produce the *End* by breaking the Obſtinacy of *Creon*, and making him repent, and miſerable. Thus the Poet cannot begin or end his *Action* where he pleaſes (which is the fault of moſt of our old Plays) if he wou'd manage his Subject with true Oeconomy and Beauty. For there muſt be the *Cauſe* or *Beginning*; the *Effect* of that *Cauſe*, which is naturally the *Middle*; and the unravelling or finiſhing of it, which is the *End* produc'd by the *Middle*, as that by the *Beginning*. The *Middle* ſuppoſes ſomething before it, as its *Cauſe* and following, as its *Effect*; the *Beginning* ſuppoſes nothing before, and the *End* nothing to follow, to make the *Action* compleat.

*The* Unities *of* Action, Time, *and* Place,
*If well obſerv'd, give Plays a perfect Grace.*

The

The Subject of a *Tragedy* shou'd be of a just extent, neither too large, nor too narrow, but that it may be seen, view'd, and consider'd at once, without confounding the Mind, which if too little or narrow, it will do; nor make it wander to distract it, as it will do if it be too large and extensive. That is, the Piece ought to take up just so much *Time* as is necessary or probable for the introducing the Incidents with their just *Preparation*. For to make a *good Tragedy* that is a *just Imitation*, the *Action* imitated ought not, in Reality, to be longer than the *Representation*; for this makes the *Likeness* greater, and by consequence more perfect. But since there are *Actions* of ten or twelve Hours, we must bring some of the Incidents into the Intervals of the *Acts*, the better to deceive the Audience.

Next, the *Unity of Action* is such, that it can never be broke without destroying the Poem. This *Unity* is not preserv'd by representing of several Actions of *One Man*; as of *Julius Cæsar*, of *Anthony*, or *Brutus*; for then the Poet has no Reason to begin at any certain place; and *Shakespear* might have brought his Play down to the last Emperor of *Rome*, as well as to the Death of *Brutus*.

But this *Unity of Action* does not exclude the various *under-Actions*, which are perfectly dependent on, and contribute to, the chief; and which without it are nothing. Nor does this Exception make for our silly *under-Plots*, which have nothing to do with the main Design, but is another *Plot*; as *Adrastus* and *Eurydice* in *Dryden*'s *Oedipus*, which are abominable. In the *Orphan* the *Action* is *One*, and every Part or *under-Action* carries on and contributes to the *main Action*, or *Subject*. Thus the different Actions of different Men are not more distinctly different Actions, than those of *One Man* at different Times. Whatever can be transpos'd, or left out, without a sensible Maim to the *Action*, has nothing to do there.

*The* Tragic Person *is no certain Man,*
*The* Bard PARTICULARS *wou'd draw in vain;*
*For to no Purpose is that* useless *Draught,*
*By which no moral Lessons can be taught.*
*Great* Homer, *in th'* Achilles, *whom he drew,*
*Sets not that* one sole *Person in our view;*
*But in that Person to explain did choose*
*What Violence and Anger wou'd produce.*

The Poet is not oblig'd to relate Things just as they happen'd, but as they might, or ought to have happen'd: That is, the *Action* ought to be *general*, not *particular*; for *particular Actions* can have no *general Influence*. Thus *Homer*, in *Achilles*, intends not the Description of that *one individual Man*, but to shew what *Violence* and *Anger* wou'd make all Men of that Character say or do: And therefore, *Achilles* is a *general* and *Allegoric* Person, and so ought all *Tragic Heroes* to be, where they shou'd speak and act necessarily, or probably, as all Men so qualify'd, and in those Circumstances wou'd do; differing from *History* in this, that *Tragedy* consults not the Truth of what any particular Person did say, or do, but only the general Nature of such Qualities, to produce such *Words*, and such *Actions*. 'Tis true, that *Tragedy* sometimes makes use of true Names, but that is to give a Credibility to the *Action*, the Persons still remaining *general*. The Poet may take Incidents from History and Matter of Fact, but then they must have that Probability and Likelihood which Art requires; for there are many Actions which have really been done, which are not probable; and then History will not justify the Poet in making use of them.

*The* Tragic *Action, to be just and right,*
Terror *and* Compassion *must excite.*

The Action that must be imitated in *Tragedy*, besides the former Properties, must excite *Terror* and *Compassion*, and not *Admiration*; which is a Passion too weak to have the Effect of *Tragedy*. *Terror* and *Pity* are rais'd by Surprize, when Events are produc'd out of Causes, contrary to our Expectation; that is,— when the Incidents produce each other, and not meerly follow after each other. For if it do not necessarily follow, it is no Incident for *Tragedy*.

*Two Kinds of* Fables, Tragedy *allows,*
*The* simple *this, the* implex *that avows.*
*The* simple *does no* Change *of Fortune know,*
*Or in the* End *does no* Discovery *shew.*
*The* implex *either one or both contains,*
*So greater Beauty and Perfection gains.*

As the *Actions* which *Tragedy* imitates, so are all its *Fables*, *simple* or *implex*. The *simple* is that, in which there is neither a *Change* of the Condition or State of the principal Person or Persons, or a *Discovery*; and the *unravelling* of the *Plot* is only a single Passage of Agitation, of Trouble, or Repose

poſe and Tranquility. The *implex Fable* in which the principal Perſon or Perſons have a Change of Fortune, or a *Diſcovery*, or both; which is the moſt beautiful and leaſt common. In the *Antigone* of *Sophocles*, the Argument of which we have before given you, there is the Change of the Fortune of *Creon*, and that produc'd by the Effect of his own Decree and Obſtinacy; but in his *Oedipus* and *Electra* there is both a *Change* and *Diſcovery*; the firſt to *Miſery*, the later to *Revenge* and *Happineſs*. *Oedipus*, with his Change of Fortune, diſcovers, that he is the Son of *Jocaſta* and *Laius*, and ſo is guilty of Inceſt and Parricide. But *Electra* diſcovers *Oreſtes* to be her Brother, and by that changes her Miſeries into Happineſs, in the Revenge of her Fathers Death. In the *Iphigenia* in *Tauris* of *Euripides* (written by Mr. *Dennis* in *Engliſh*) *Iphigenia* making a Diſcovery that *Oreſtes* is her Brother, changes both their Fortunes from Deſpair to a happy Eſcape from the barbarous Altars of *Taurica*. But the *Change* can neither be neceſſary nor probable (without which Qualities it is of no Value) if it be not the natural Reſult, or at leaſt the Effect of the foregoing Actions, or of the *Subject* it ſelf. As in *Oedipus*: For *Ægeon*, who comes to bring him agreeable News, and which ought to have deliver'd him from thoſe Apprehenſions into which the Fear of committing Inceſt with his Mother had thrown him, does quite the contrary, in diſcovering to him who and what he is. The Fact is thus—*A Meſſenger from* Corinth *brings* Oedipus *Word of the Death of* Polybus, *and invites him to take Poſſeſſion of that Kingdom; but he afraid of committing the Inceſt the Oracle had told him of, believing* Polybus *to be his Father, declar'd he wou'd never go to the Place where his Mother was. The* Corinthian *told him, that he did not know himſelf, and ſo diſturb'd himſelf about nothing; and ſo thinking to do* Oedipus *a ſignal Piece of Service, by delivering him from his Fears, informs him, that* Polybus *and* Merope *were not his Father or Mother*, which began the Diſcovery; that caſt him into the moſt terrible of his Misfortunes.

*What in the* Drama *we* DISCOVERY *call,*
*May in the Notion of* Remembrance *fall.*
*For, by* remembring, *the chief Perſons move*
*From Ignorance to Knowledge, which or Love*
*Or Hatred in them always muſt produce,*
*And all their Happineſs or Miſery induce.*

*Diſcovery* being here us'd for a Term of Art, and therefore ſignifying more than in its vulgar Acceptation, you muſt know, that here it means a Diſcovery, which is made by the principal Characters; by remembring or calling to Mind either one-another, or ſomething of Importance to their Change of Fortune, and is thus defin'd. — *The* DISCOVERY *is a* CHANGE, *which bringing us from Ignorance to Knowledge, produces either* LOVE *or* HATRED *in thoſe whom the Poet has a Deſign to make either Happy or Miſerable.* That is, it ought not to be in vain, by leaving thoſe who remember one-another in the ſame Sentiments they were in before; it muſt produce either *Love* or *Hatred* in the Principal, not inferiour Characters. But thoſe Diſcoveries which are immediately follow'd by the Change of Fortune, are the moſt Beautiful; as that of *Oedipus*, for the Diſcovery of his being the Son of *Jocaſta* and *Laius*, immediately makes him of the moſt Happy, the moſt Miſerable. And this *Cataſtrophe* or Ending, which has a *Change* of Fortune immediately after the *Diſcovery*, will always produce *Terror* and *Pity* in the End and Aim of *Tragedy*. We ſhall ſay ſomething of the ſeveral ſorts of Diſcoveries, after the *Manners*, on which they have ſome kind of Dependance.

*Reject that vulgar Error, which appears*
*So fair, of making* perfect Characters.
*There's no ſuch Thing in Nature, and you'l draw*
*A* faulty Monſter, *which the World ne'er ſaw:*
*Some Faults muſt be, which his Misfortunes drew,*
*But ſuch as may deſerve Compaſſion too.*

The next Thing which we are to conſider, are the *Characters*. Thoſe which are to compoſe a perfect *Tragedy*, muſt be neither *perfectly virtuous and innocent*, nor *ſcandalouſly wicked*. To make a perfectly virtuous and innocent Character unfortunate, excites *Horror*, not *Terror*, nor *Compaſſion*. To puniſh the Wicked, gives indeed a ſort of Satisfaction, but neither *Terror* nor *Pity*; which are the Buſineſs of *Tragedy*. For what we never think our ſelves capable of committing, we can never Pity. But the *Characters* of a *perfect Tragedy* ſhou'd be the Medium between both, but rather *good* than *bad*. Thus the *Dramatic Perſon* ſhou'd not draw his Misfortunes on himſelf by *ſuperlative Wickedneſs*, or Crimes *notoriouſly Scandalous*, but by involuntary Faults, that is Frailties proceeding from the Exceſs of Paſſion. We call them *involuntary Faults*, which are committed either by Ignorance,

norance, or Imprudence againſt the natural Temper of the Man, when he is tranſported by a *violent Paſſion*, which he cou'd not ſuppreſs; or by ſome greater or external Force, in the Execution of ſuch Orders, which he neither cou'd nor ought to diſobey. The Fault of *Oedipus* is of the firſt ſort, tho' he be alſo guilty of the ſecond. That of *Thyeſtes*, in the murdering his Nephews of the ſecond, *viz.* a violent Paſſion of Anger and Revenge. That of *Oreſtes*, in the killing of his Mother for the Death of his Father, of the third; being order'd to do it by the *Oracle* of the Gods. 'Tis true, our *Oedipus* is made ſovereignly Virtuous; but all that *Sophocles* gives him, are *Courage*, *good Fortune*, and *Judgment*; *Qualities* equally common to the *good* and the *bad*, and to thoſe who are made up of Virtues and Vices. *Sophocles* has indeed ſhewn him a Character that has a mixture of Virtue and Vice. His Vices plainly are, Pride, Violence, Anger, Raſhneſs and Imprudence; ſo that it is not for his Parricide and Inceſt that he is puniſh'd, for they were the Effect of his Curioſity, Raſhneſs, Pride, Anger, and Violence, and the Puniſhment of them. And thoſe are the Vices *Sophocles* wou'd correct in us by his Example.

*Two ſeveral Ends the* Fable *may obtain,*
*Either the Perſons happy may remain,*
*Or ſink beneath the cruel Hand of Fate;*
*Or elſe it may obtain a double State.*
Good *for the* Good, *and* Bad *for thoſe who err,*
*The ſingle and unhappy ſtill prefer.*

The *Fable* may have either a ſingle *End* or *Cataſtrophe*, or one that is *double*; one that is happy, or one that is unhappy; or one that is happy for the *Good*, and unhappy for the *Guilty*; but that which is beſt is the ſingle and unhappy, for that will moſt likely produce *Terror* and *Pity*.

*As* Incidents *the* Fable *do compoſe,*
*So ſtill we muſt conſider moſt in Thoſe*
*Which* Pity *will, and* Terror *moſt diſcloſe.*
*All ſuch Events 'twixt* Friends *are only found,*
*From Others nothing* Tragic *can redound.*
*When the* Friend's *Hand againſt a* Friend *is arm'd,*
*We find our Hearts on either ſide alarm'd.*
*Thus when we ſee the* Son's *unhallow'd Knife*
*With impious Rage aſſault a* Parent's *Life;*

*When* Ignorance *or* Rage *the* Parent *move*,
*To point the Steel againſt the* Child *they love*,
Fear *and* Compaſſion *every Breaſt will prove*.

*Terror* and *Compaſſion* being the chief End of *Tragedy*, and that being only produc'd by the *Fable*, let us conſider what Incidents (for ſuch compoſe every *Fable*) are the moſt productive of thoſe two Paſſions.

All *Incidents* are Events that happen between ſome-body or other; and all *Incidents* that are terrible, or pitiful, happen between Friends, Relations, or the like; for what happens betwixt Enemies, can have no Tragical Effect. Thus when a *Brother* is going to kill (or kills) a *Brother*; a *Father* his *Son*, or a *Son* his *Father*; the *Mother* the *Son*, or the *Son* the *Mother*; it is very terrible, and forces our Compaſſion. Now all theſe Actions or Events may be thus divided, — into thoſe which the Actor performs with an entire Knowledge of what he does, or is going to do; as *Medea*, when ſhe kill'd her Children; or *Oreſtes*, when he kill'd his Mother, and the like: Or thoſe, where the Actor does not know the Guilt of the Crime he commits, or is going to commit, till after the Deed is done, when the Relation of the Perſons they have deſtroy'd is diſcover'd to them. Thus *Telegonus* did not know it was his Father *Ulyſſes* whom he mortally wounded, 'till he had done it. The third ſort of *Incidents*, and which is the moſt beautiful, is when a Man or Woman is going to kill a Relation, who is not known to him or her, and is prevented by a Diſcovery of their Friendſhip and Relation. The *firſt* is the worſt, and the *laſt* beſt; the *ſecond* next in Excellence to the *third*, becauſe here is nothing flagitious, and inhumane, but the Sin of *Ignorance*; for then the Diſcovery is wonderfully pathetic and moving; as that of *Oedipus* killing his Father *Laius*.

*In* Manners *four Qualities we ſee*;
*They muſt* good, like, convenient, equal *be*.
*The* Manners *fully mark'd, we here call* good,
*When by their Words their Bent is underſtood*;
*What Reſolutions they will ſurely take*,
*What they will ſeek, and what they will forſake*.
LIKENESS *to well-known Characters relates*,
*For Hiſtory no Quality abates*.
Convenient *Manners we thoſe ever call*
*Which to each* Rank, Age, Sex, *and* Climate *fall*.
*Thoſe* Manners *Poets always equal name*,
*Which thro' the Drama always are the ſame*.

We

We come now to the *Manners*, which are in the next degree of Excellence to the *Fable*. The *Manners* diſtinguiſh the *Characters*; and if the *Manners* be ill expreſs'd, we can never be acquainted with them, and conſequently never be terrified by foreſeeing the Dangers they will produce to the *Dramatic Perſons*, nor melt into Pity by ſeeing their Sufferings. All *Dramatic* Perſons therefore ought to have the *Manners*; that is, their Diſcourſe ought to diſcover their Inclinations, and what Reſolutions they will certainly purſue. The Manners therefore ſhould have four Qualities, and they muſt be, (1.) *good*; (2.) *like*; (3.) *convenient*, (4.) *equal*. *Good* is when they are mark'd; that is, when the Diſcourſe of the Perſons makes us clearly and diſtinctly ſee their Inclinations, and what good or evil Reſolutions they are certain to take. *Like* only relates to known and public Perſons, whoſe Characters are in Hiſtory, with which our Poetic Characters muſt agree; that is, the Poet muſt not give a Perſon any Quality contrary to any of thoſe which Hiſtory has given him. We muſt remember, that the evil Qualities given to Princes, and Great Men, ought to be omitted by the Poet, if they are contrary to the Character of a Prince, *&c.* but the Virtues oppoſite to thoſe known Vices ought not to be impos'd, by making him generous, or liberal in the Poem, who was avaritious in the Hiſtory. The Manners muſt likewiſe be *convenient*; that is, they muſt be agreeable to the Age, Sex, Rank, Climate, and Condition of the Perſon that has them: For this you may look back to what is quoted out of my Lord *Roſcommon*'s Tranſlation of *Horace*, in what we have ſaid of Comedy. You muſt indeed ſtudy Mankind, and from them draw the Proprieties of Characters or Manners: It would be well if you ſtudied *Moral Philoſophy*, to lead you into the Study of Mankind.

They muſt be *equal*; that is, they muſt be conſtant, or conſiſtent, through the whole Character; or the Variety or Inequality of the Manners (as in Nature, ſo in this Draught) muſt be *equal*. The *Fearful* muſt not be *brave*, nor the *Brave* fearful: The Avaritious muſt never be liberal, and the like. *Shakeſpear* is excellent in this Diſtinction of Characters, and he ſhould be throughly ſtudied on this Head.

*One Quality eſſential does remain,*
*By which the greateſt Beauty they obtain.*

*The* Manners *muſt ſo regularly flow,*
*That to Neceſſity their Birth they owe.*
*No Vicious Quality muſt be their Lot,*
*But what is needful to promote the Plot.*

Beſides the four Qualities we have mention'd, there is a fifth eſſential to their Beauty, that is, that they be *neceſſary*: That is, that no vicious Quality or Inclination ought to be given to any Poetic Perſon, unleſs it appear to be abſolutely neceſſary, or requiſite to the carrying on of the Action; as all thoſe mention'd in *Oedipus* were, to the promoting that Fable.

*Three ſorts of* Diſcoveries *are found*
*In the* Dramatic Poets *to abound*;
*The* firſt *by certain* Marks *the Buſineſs do,*
*Whether from Chance or Nature they accrue*;
*As* Scars, *or* Moles, *that in the Body lye,*
*Or certain* Tokens *which thoſe Marks ſupply.*

Having run through the Manners, I now return to the Diſcoveries, becauſe (well manag'd) they add a wonderful Beauty to the Piece, tho' it is indeed a Beauty almoſt entirely unknown on our Stage. The *firſt* ſort of *Diſcovery* is by certain Marks in the Body, either *natural*, or *accidental*. Thus *Ulyſſes* having formerly, before the *Trojan* War, receiv'd a Wound in his Thigh, by a Boar, in the Mountain of *Parnaſſus*, when he return'd incognito home, the Nurſe who waſh'd his Legs diſcover'd him by the Scar of that Wound. Tho' theſe be the leaſt beautiful Diſcoveries, yet they may be us'd with more or leſs Art: As that we have juſt mention'd of *Ulyſſes*, was artful and fine; but when he is fain to ſhew it himſelf to the Shepherds, to confirm them that he is *Ulyſſes*, it is leſs artful.

The ſecond Way is by *Tokens*; as, the Casket of Things which the Prieſt had found with *Ion*, when he was expos'd, diſcovers *Creuſa*, whom he was going to kill, to be his Mother. And *Oreſtes*, when he had found out *Iphigenia* by her Letter, which ſhe was going to ſend to him by *Pylades*, is fain to tell particular Tokens in her Father's Palace, to make himſelf be believ'd to be *Oreſtes*. For theſe Tokens are no great matter of Invention, ſince the *Poet* might have made them twenty other ways.

Third

Third *from Remembrance takes its pleasing Rise,*
*And forces the Discovery from the Eyes.*
*The* fourth *sort we do in Reasoning find,*
*Which brings the Unknown Object to the Mind.*
*Thus when* Orestes *saw the fatal Knife*
*With impious Blow directed at his Life,*
*Thus to the Goddess in Despair did call,*
*Ah! must I then like* Iphigenia *fall?*

The third sort of Discovery is what is made by Remembrance; that is, when the sight, or hearing, of any thing makes us remember our Misfortunes, &c. Thus when *Ulysses* heard *Domodocus* sing his Actions at *Troy*, the Memory of them struck him, and drew Tears from his Eyes, which discover'd him to *Alcinous*. The fourth sort of Discoveries are made by Reasoning; as *Iphigenia* in *Æschylus*, *Hither is a Man come like me*; *no body is like me but* Orestes, *it must therefore be* Orestes. And in the *Iphigenia* of *Polyides*, a Greek Poet, *Orestes* kneeling at the Altar, and just opening his Bosom to receive the sacred Knife, crys out, *'Tis not sufficient that my Sister has been sacrific'd to* Diana, *but I must be so too.*

The finest sort is that which arises from the Subject, or Incidents of the Fable; as that of *Oedipus* from his excessive Curiosity, and the Letter that *Iphigenia* sent by *Pylades*; for it was very natural for her on that Occasion to send that Letter. We have been forc'd to make mention of Greek Plays, because we have not yet had any thing of this kind, but in those taken from those Poets; but our *Oedipus* and *Iphigenia* will shew this in some measure.

*The* Sentiments *here next assume their Place,*
*To which to give their just and proper Grace,*
*The Poet still must look within to find*
*The secret Turns of Nature in the Mind.*
*He must be sad, be proud, and in a Storm,*
*And to each Character his Mind conform.*
*The* Proteus *must all Shapes, all Passions wear,*
*If he wou'd have just* Sentiments *appear:*
*Think not at all where shining Thoughts to place,*
*But what a Man wou'd say in such a Case.*

Having done with the *Fable*, *Incidents*, and *Manners*, we come now to the *Sentiments*.

The *Poet* here must not be content to look into his Mind, to see what he himself wou'd think on such an Occasion,

but

but he muſt put himſelf into the Paſſion, Quality, and Temper of the Character he is to draw; that is, he muſt aſſume thoſe *Manners* he gives each Dramatic Perſon, and then ſee what Sentiments or Thoughts ſuch an Occaſion, Paſſion, or the like, will produce. And the *Poet* muſt change the Habit of his Mind, and aſſume a new Perſon, as a different Character or Perſon ſpeaks, or he will make all ſpeak alike, without any diſtinction of Character. But this can't be done, but by a ſtrong Imagination, and great Genius.

We ſhall ſay no more of the *Sentiments* here, becauſe they are to be learnt from the Art of *Rhetoric*; for the *Sentiments* being all that makes up the Diſcourſe, they conſiſt in proving, refuting, exciting, and expreſſing the Paſſions, as *Pity*, *Anger*, *Fear*, and all the others, to raiſe or debaſe the Value of a Thing. The Reaſons of *Poets* and *Orators* are the ſame, when they would make Things appear worthy of Pity, or terrible, or great, or probable; tho' ſome Things are render'd ſo by Art, and ſome by their own Nature.

*Wiſe Nature by Variety does pleaſe,*
*With differing Paſſions in a differing Dreſs:*
*Bold Anger in rough haughty Words appears,*
*Sorrow is humble, and diſſolves in Tears.*
*Make not your* Hecuba *with Fury rage,*
*And ſhew a canting Spirit on the Stage:*
*There ſwoln Expreſſions, and affected Noiſe,*
*Shews like ſome Pedant that declaims to Boys.*
*In Sorrow you muſt ſofter Methods keep,*
*And, to excite our Tears, your ſelf muſt weep.*
*Thoſe noiſie Words which in ill Plays are found*
*Come not from Hearts that are in Sadneſs drown'd.*
*To pleaſe, you muſt a hundred Changes try;*
*Sometimes be humble, then muſt ſoar on high;*
*In natural Thoughts muſt every where abound,*
*Be eaſie, pleaſant, ſolid, and profound.*
*To theſe you muſt ſurprizing Touches join,*
*And ſhew us a New Wonder in each Line.*

The *Diction*, or Language, is that which next comes under our conſideration; and tho' it is confeſs'd, that it is of the leaſt importance of all thoſe Parts, yet when the Elocution is proper and elegant, and varies as it ought, it gives a great, and advantageous Beauty to a Play; and therefore we will not paſs it over in ſilence. Some have been betray'd by their Ignorance of Art and Nature, to imagine that *Mil-*

*ton's*

*ton*'s Stile, because noble in the *Epic*, was best for *Tragedy*, never reflecting that he himself varied his Stile in his *Sampson Agonistes*. If you would therefore merit Praise, you must diversifie your Stile incessantly; too equal, and too uniform a Manner then is to no purpose, and inclines us to Sleep. Rarely are those Authors read, who are born to plague us, and who appear always whining in the same Ungrateful Tone. Happy the Man, who can so command his Voice, as to pass without Constraint from that which is *grave*, to that which is *moving*, and from that which is *pleasant*, to that which is *severe* and *solemn*. Every Passion has its proper Way of Speaking, which a Man of *Genius* will easily derive from the very Nature of the Passion he writes. *Anger* is proud, and utters haughty Words, but speaks in Words less fierce and fiery when it abates. *Grief* is more humble, and speaks a Language like it self, *dejected*, *plain*, and *sorrowful*.

Soliloquies *had need be very few,*
*Extreamly short, and spoke in Passion too.*
*Our Lovers talking to themselves, for want*
*Of others, make the Pitt their Confidant.*
*Nor is the Matter mended yet, if thus*
*They trust a Friend only to tell it us.*
*Th' Occasion shou'd as naturally fall*
*As when* Bellario *confesses all.*

There is nothing more common in our *Plays*, tho' nothing so inartificial and unnatural, as the Persons making long Speeches to themselves, only to convey their Intentions and Actions to the Knowledge of the Audience: But the *Poet* shou'd take care to make the Dramatic Persons have such Confidants, as may necessarily share their inmost Thoughts, and then they would be more justly, and with more Nature, convey'd to the Audience. A lively Picture of the absurd Characters and Conduct of our *Plays*, take from the Duke of *Buckingham*'s *Essays on Poetry*; which being in Verse, may be got by hart, and remember'd, and so always about you, for a Test of any new Hero.

*First a* Soliloquy *is calmly made,*
*Where every Reason is exactly weigh'd;*
*Which once perform'd, most opportunely comes*
*A Hero, frighted at the Noise of Drums,*
*For her sweet Sake, whom at first sight he loves,*
*And all in Metaphor his Passion proves.*

*But some sad Accident, tho' yet unknown,*
*Parting this Pair, to leave the Swain alone,*
*He strait grows* jealous, *yet we know not why,*
*And, to oblige his Rival, needs will dye:*
*But first he makes a Speech, wherein he tells*
*The absent Nymph how much his Flame excels,*
*And yet bequeaths her generously now*
*To that dear Rival, whom he does not know,*
*Who strait appears, (but, Who can Fate withstand?)*
*Too late, alas! to hold his hasty Hand,*
*That just has given himself a cruel Stroke:*
*At which this very Stranger's Heart is broke.*
*He more to his new Friend than Mistress kind*
*Most sadly mourns at being left behind;*
*Of such a Death prefers the pleasing Charms*
*To Love, and living in his Lady's Arms.*

## Of the EPIC, or HEROIC POEM.

*An* Epic Poem, *is a Discourse invented with Art, to form the* Manners *by Instructions, disguis'd under the* Allegory *of an* Action *which is important, and which is related in Verse in a delightful, probable, and wonderful manner.*

That is, it is a *Fable* which consists of two Parts, first of *Truth*, its *Foundation* and *Fiction*, which disguises that *Truth*, and gives it the Form of a *Fable*. The *Truth* is the *Moral* and the *Fiction* of the *Action* that is built upon it. Its Importance distinguishes it from the *Comedy*, and its Relation from the *Tragic Actions*. The *Action* here, as in *Tragedy*, must be *One*, and all its *Episodes*, or *under-Actions* are to be dependent on the *main Action*. It must be *entire*, that is, have a *Beginning*, *Middle*, and *End*. It must have the *Manners*, that is, the Characters must be distinguish'd, and *Manners* must be necessary, and have those Qualities inserted already in *Tragedy*. The *Incidents* ought to be *delightful*, and to that End *various*, and rightly dispos'd, and surprizing. The *Episodes* shou'd be pathetic. The *Sentiments* will fall under the same Rules as those of *Tragedy*, but the *Diction* is allow'd to be more lofty, and more figurative, as being a *Narration* and having *Admiration*, not *Terror* and *Pity*, for its End.

We need say no more of this Poem, the Rules at large wou'd be too extensive for this Treatise, and but of little Use; the Poem being not to be undertaken but by a *Master* and by a *Genius* that does not appear once in a Thousand Years.

RHETORIC

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OR,

# *The* ART *of* PERSUASION.

§ 1. RHETORIC *is the Faculty of diſcovering what every Subject affords of Uſe to* PERSUASION. And as every Author muſt invent, or find out Arguments to make his Subject prevail, diſpoſe thoſe Arguments, thus found out, into their proper Places, range them in their juſt Order, and to the ſame End give them thoſe Embelliſhments and Beauties of Language which are proper to each Subject; and, if his Diſcourſe be to be deliver'd in public, to utter them with that Decency, and Force, which may ſtrike the Hearer; So this *Art of Perſuaſion* is generally divided into four parts, *Invention*, *Diſpoſition*, *Elocution* or Language, and *Delivery* or Pronunciation.

§ 2. *Invention* is the finding out ſuch Motives, Reaſons, or Arguments as are adapted to *perſuade*, or gain the *Aſſent* or *Belief* of the *Hearer* or Reader.

Theſe Arguments may be divided into *artificial*, and *inartificial*. The *former* are the proper Object of the Invention of him who writes; the *later* the Author or Writer does not invent, but borrowing them from abroad, applys and accommodates them to his Subject.

The *artificial* Arguments are of three ſorts, *Reaſons* or Argumentations, the *Manners*, and the *Paſſions*. The firſt are to inform the *Hearer*'s Judgment; the ſecond, to ingratiate with him, or win his *Inclination* or *Favour*; the third, to *move*.

The *Student*, or *Writer*, is abundantly aſſiſted in finding out theſe *Arguments*, *Reaſonings*, or *Argumentations*, by conſulting ſuch *Heads*, as contain, by general Conſent, or the Rules of Art, ſuch *Proofs* or *Evidences* under them.

Some of theſe HEADS are *general*, others *particular*: The *General* contain thoſe Propoſitions which are common to all *Subjects* or *Cauſes*, and theſe the Maſters of this *Art*

*But ſome ſad Accident, tho' yet unknown,*
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have agreed to be *two* in number, under theſe two Titles; the firſt, *Poſſible*, or *Impoſſible*; for whether we *perſuade* or *diſſuade*, *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe*, *accuſe* or *defend*, we muſt prove that the Fact or Subject, has been, or is *poſſible* or *impoſſible* to be done.

The other Title is *Great* or *Small*, and to this all *Compariſons* relate; as when we ſhew, that *This* is more or leſs beneficial or pernicious, more uſeful or unuſeful, more honourable or diſhonourable, more juſt or equitable, unjuſt and illegal, than *That*.

Every Subject has, beſides theſe *general Heads* common to all, others *particular* to themſelves, from whence all Arguments are drawn, which are *peculiar* to each *Subject* or *Cauſe*; and for that Reaſon vary according to the Variety of *That*.

All *Cauſes*, or *Subjects* of any Weight, are recommended to the *Reader* or *Hearer* in one of theſe three Ways, *viz.* either by *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*; *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*; *Accuſation* or *Defence*. *And indeed, a Man can ſcarce write on any* Subject *that requires or falls under* Perſuaſion, *but in a more or leſs* important, *or* extenſive Degree, *falls under one of theſe Heads*.

But theſe differ from each other, as in the *Parts*, and *Office* or *Duty*, as we have juſt ſeen; and in the *End* doubly, (1.) In regard of the *Thing it ſelf*; (2.) and the *Hearer*. (1.) In regard of the *Thing*; for the *End* propos'd by the *Perſuaſive*, or *Diſſuaſive Diſcourſe*, is *Profit*, *Advantage* or *Benefit*; by the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*, *Honour*; and *Right* and *Equity* by the *Accuſation* or *Defence*. (2.) In regard of the *Hearer*, becauſe the Object of him who writes in *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*, is *Hope* and *Fear*; in *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*, *Pleaſure* and *Delight*; in *Accuſation* and *Defence*, *Clemency* or *Severity*.

The firſt has to do with the *future*, or *Time to come*; the ſecond moſt commonly with the *Preſent*; and the third with the *Paſt*. The *Hearers*, in the important Subjects of each Kind, may be conſider'd thus: a *Man*, or Men of *Power* in a State hear the *firſt*; *Men of Pleaſure*, or ſuch as are chiefly led by the Ear, the ſecond; and a *Judge*, or *Senate* the *laſt*.

§ 3. When the Deſign of our Diſcourſe is to *perſuade* or *diſſuade*, we muſt conſider the *Matter* or *Subject* of our Diſcourſe, or the Thing we wou'd render eligible or odious; and thoſe *Heads* from whence Motives, Reaſons, or Arguments are to be drawn, to bring about what we propoſe.

The

The *Subject*, or *Matter*, is whatever can be done either in a public or private Capacity. Thoſe Subjects which have Regard to a *public Capacity*, have been divided into five Heads. (1.) *Funds*, *Revenues*, and *Pecuniary Matters*. (2.) *Peace* or *War*. (3.) *Garriſons* or *Forces*, which are the Defence of Countries. (4.) *Trade* in Commodities, exported or imported: And, (5.) the Propoſal of *Laws* to be eſtabliſh'd or abrogated.

*Private Subjects* are whatever may be of Advantage or Detriment to *Particulars*.

The *Heads* from which Motives, Reaſons, or Arguments are to be drawn under this Diviſion of the Art of PERSUASION, are *ſix*. The chief and moſt peculiar to this, is the *Profitable*, or *Beneficial*. It farther borrows from the next *Kind*, the *Honourable*; and from *Accuſation* and *Defence*, the *Rightful* or *Legal*; and from the *common*, or *general Heads* the *Poſſible*; and frames from all theſe a Judgment, or Conjecture of the *Event*.

§ 4. We come now to *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*: And this ſort of Diſcourſe is threefold; the firſt of *Perſons* real, or imaginary; the ſecond of *Facts* or *Deeds*; and the third of *Things*.

In the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe* of *real Perſons*, the Order is either *Natural* or *Artificial*.

The *Artificial* is, when, without Regard to Time, we refer what we ſay to certain *Heads*; as the *Goods* of *Mind*, of *Body*, or of *Fortune*.

But the *Natural Method* is, when we ſtrictly confine our ſelves to the obſervation of the Order of Hiſtory. And this is divided into *three Times*. (1.) That which preceeded the Birth of the *Perſon*, who is the Subject of our *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*. (2.) The Time of his Life; and, (3.) What follows, his Death.

In the firſt *Time* we muſt conſider the *Prognoſtics*, *Omens*, *Prophecies*, and the like, if any ſuch there were, and his *Family* and *Country*; from which ariſes a twofold Praiſe: For if theſe were really illuſtrious, we ſay, that ſuch a Perſon has come up to the Ancient Honour of his *Country* and *Family*; or has done Deeds worthy ſuch a *Country* and ſuch a *Family*. On the contrary, if his *Country* or *Family*, or both were obſcure, we muſt ſhew, that he has ennobled and rais'd the Obſcurity of both, by his own proper *Virtues* and *Worth*.

In the next *Time*, which is that of his Life, we have four Things to conſider; firſt, The Nature of his *Body*, as *Health*, *Robuſtneſs*, *Activity*, *Beauty*; and of his *Mind*, as

*Wit, Capacity, Judgment, Memory,* &c. The ſecond is his *Fortune,* or *Riches.* The third his *Education, Inſtitution,* and *Conduct* of Life. The fourth his *Actions,* and their *Circumſtances* and *Rewards.*

In the laſt place, comes the *Manner* and *Kind* of his Death, the *Funeral Pomp,* and the like; chiefly the Loſs, and the Grief that attended that Loſs; to which may be ſubjoin'd a *Conſolation* for it. This is the Praiſe of the *Perſon,* let it be of an *Alexander,* a *Marlborough,* a *Peterborow,* or the like. From hence we may eaſily gather the Praiſe of what we call an *imaginary Perſon*; as of *Bucephalus,* or the like; but this is of little uſe, except a Sport of Fancy.

When we undertake to praiſe Deeds or Actions, we are to make uſe of thoſe *Heads* of Arguments which are recurr'd to in the former Diviſion; ſince we praiſe that here, which we wou'd recommend or perſuade in the other.

There are here eight *Heads,* from which we draw Materials of amplifying and ſetting off the Subject; for to the praiſe of *Deeds* or *Actions,* it very much imports, that the *Subject* of our Praiſe, *did* it either *firſt, ſingly* or *alone,* or with *few,* or *chiefly,* or *principally,* or at a neceſſary *Exigence* of *Time, Place,* or *juncture* of Affairs, or *often*: Or that the *Action* has a great Regard to the Benefit, Reputation, and Glory of his Country; or that he, firſt of all Men, gain'd his Country new, or freſh Honours, Dignity, Power, *&c.*

When Things are the Subject of our Praiſe, the Method is not the ſame in all: For in the *Praiſe* of *Countries, Cities,* and the like, we purſue very near the ſame Method, as in that of Perſons; for that which in *Men* is *Country* and *Family,* is in *Places,* are the *Founders,* and the *Princes* who have there govern'd; that which in the former is *Beauty* of *Body,* is in theſe the *Situation*: What in *thoſe* is the *Virtue* of the *Mind,* is the *Fertility, Wholſomneſs, wiſe Laws,* &c.

But in the Praiſe of *other Things,* as of *Arts* and *Sciences,* we have recourſe to the ſame Heads of Argument as in the Praiſe of *Actions.* The *Honourableneſs* is ſhewn in the efficient, or productive Cauſes and Antiquity; and the *Utility* or *Benefit* from the *Effect* and *Aim.*

§ 5. The laſt Kind or Sort of Subject of RHETORIC, is that which *Accuſes* or *Defends,* and the *Heads* of Arguments or Proofs in this, vary according to the variety of the State of the Cauſe, which is the Subject of our *Accuſation* or *Defence.*

There

There are four *States*; the firſt enquires *whether it be ſo, or not*; the ſecond, *what it is*; the third, *its Nature*; the fourth, *its Magnitude*, or *how great any Crime is.*

Every Speech, or Oration of this Kind, has one, or more of theſe *States.* If there be more than *One*, they muſt either be of the ſame Kind, as if they all enquire *whether it be or not*, or they muſt be of ſeveral ſorts; as, one of the firſt, and another of the ſecond.

§ 6. There are three *Heads* of Argument, which we conſult for Proofs in the firſt *State*, which we may call the *State of Ghefs*, or *Preſumption*, viz. The *Will*, the *Power*, and *Signs*, or *Tokens.*

The *Will* contains the *Motives* and *Reaſoning.* The *Motives* contain the *Affections* or *Paſſions*, which are urg'd as the *efficient Cauſe.* The *Reaſoning* is drawn from the *final Cauſes*; as from the Hope of Advantage, and the like: And to the *Power* or *Faculty*, the Strength of Body, the Inclinations of the Mind, Riches, Capacity, Time, Place, the Proſpect or Hopes of concealing the Fact, when committed, relate. Some of the *Signs*, or *Tokens* precede; ſome attend, and ſome follow the Fact.

§ 7. In the *State*, which enquires by *what Name* the Fact is to be call'd, we muſt endeavour to confirm and make out our own *Definition* of it, and confute that of the Adverſary. As when the *Accus'd* ſhall acknowledge that he had *taken* ſuch Goods from ſuch a Place, but not *ſtole* them; that he *ſtruck* ſuch a Perſon indeed, but made no *Aſſault* and *Battery.* Or ſhou'd he confeſs the Robbery, but deny the Sacrilege, and the like; in all ſuch Caſes the Nature of the Fact muſt be defin'd, and the Adverſary confuted on that Head by a Confirmation of your own *Definition.*

§ 8. The *State* which enquires into the *Nature of the Fact, Crime* or *Cauſe*, is twofold; the firſt treats of *what is to come*, and is therefore proper to *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion.* The later of what is already done, and is therefore agreeable to Courts of *Judicature*, or *Accuſation* and *Defence.* That which is properly *juridical*, has its Place either in *Judgment*, or before it; we divide the firſt into *Rational* and *Legal*: The *Rational* relates to the Fact, the *Legal* to the Senſe of the Laws, Statutes, or written Authorities.

The *Rational* is divided into the *Abſolute* and *Aſſumptive.* The *Abſolute* plainly, and ſimply defends the *Fact*; as when we allow it *done*, and aſſert it *laudibly done.* The *Aſſumptive* is when the Defence in it ſelf is weak, but is ſupported

or aſſiſted by ſomething Foreign, or out of the Cauſe aſſum'd. And this is done four Ways, by *Compariſon*, *Relation*, *Removing* and *Conceſſion*. *Compariſon* is when we ſhew, that there was a neceſſity of doing *One* of two Things; and that what was done was juſter, and more juſtifiably eligible than the *other* wou'd have been. *Relation* is when we throw the Fault on the very Perſon who has receiv'd the Injury. The *Removing* is, when we throw the Fault on ſome other Perſon than he who has receiv'd the Injury, or on a Thing that cannot come before the Court, as not falling under its Juriſdiction, as on the *Law*.

*Conceſſion* is uſually divided into *Purgation* and *Deprecation*. *Purgation* is when we defend not the *Fact*, but the *Will* or *Intention*; as when the Guilt or Fault is thrown on *Neceſſity*, *Fortune*, *Ignorance*, or *Inadvertence*.

*Deprecation* is when we acknowledge the Fault, or plead Guilty, and fly to *Pity* and *Mercy*.

§ 9. There are four *States* which enquire into the Nature of the Crime, or what it is. The firſt is of the *written Letter*, and the *Opinion* or *Intention*; as, when the *Writing* is one Thing, and the *Intention of the* Writer another; and one inſiſts on the *Letter*, and the other on the *Intention* of the *Writer*. Here *Equity* and the *Rigour* of the Law contend.

The next is *Reaſoning*, when from what *is* written, we gather another Thing that is *not* written, becauſe founded on the ſame Reaſon.

The third is the *Contradiction of the Law*; that is, when the Law either is contrary to it ſelf, or to ſome other Laws.

The fourth is *the Ambiguity of the Diſcourſe*; which ariſes either from the Change of the Tone or Accent, or from the Diviſion of the Diction; or the various Significations of the Words. To this we may add a Species of it, the examining the Force of the Word, which differs from the former *State*, which enquires into the Nature of the *Fact* and *Crime*, to ſee what Name is its due. We may here farther conſider Exceptions to the Court it ſelf: Firſt, the *Perſon*; as when he acts who ought not to act, or with him with whom he ought not. Secondly, the *Place*; as when the Action is brought in a wrong Court. Thirdly, to the *Time*; as when we ſay, we cou'd formerly have accus'd one whom we cannot at *this Time*. And, Fourthly, to the *Thing*; as when we deny that the *Indictment* can be gronnded on this Law, or requires ſuch a Puniſhment for ſuch a Crime.

§ 10. The

§ 10. The *State*, which enquires into the *Magnitude* or *Greatneſs* of the Crime, examines and informs us what are the *greateſt* and moſt *heinous* Injuries, and which are the *leaſt*. They are ſhewn to be *great*, either becauſe done on very ſlight *Grounds*, or *Provocation*; *or* becauſe they have drawn on in their Conſequences very great Damages; *or* becauſe he who receiv'd the Injury, was a Man of great Merit; *or* becauſe the *accus'd* was the firſt who did commit it, or the *only*; or *with a few*; or *often*; or on *Purpoſe*; or on many other Cauſes.

§ 11. Having thus curſorily ran over the *Artificial Arguments*, we come now to thoſe which are call'd *Inartificial*; which are ſuch as are not deriv'd from this *Art of Perſuaſion*, but being preſs'd in from abroad, are, however, *artificially* treated of: And theſe in the Accuſation and Defence, are five. (1.) The *Laws*. (2.) *Witneſſes*. (3.) *Contracts* or *Agreements*. (4.) *Queſtions*. (5.) *Oaths*. From all which, according to the Nature of the Cauſe, there are different Ways of arguing.

§ 12. We come now to the other Part of *Rhetorical Invention*, and that treats of the *Paſſions*. *The* Paſſions *are Commotions of the Mind, by means of which thoſe who are mov'd, judge differently from thoſe who are not; and this is attended either with Pleaſure or Pain.*

We muſt neceſſarily know three Things to be able to move the *Paſſions*. —— *Who*, and *to whom*, and *for what Cauſes* or *Reaſons* Men are us'd to be mov'd by this, or that *Paſſion*.

§ 13. *Anger is a certain Deſire of Revenge, accompany'd with Pain, which we ſeem to ourſelves able to execute, caus'd by a diſagreeable Contempt of our ſelves, or of ours.*

But this Contempt is of three ſorts: *Deſpiſing*, *incommoding*, and *Contumelious*. The firſt is a meer ſimple *deſpiſing*; the *Others* require that *One* oppoſe an *Other*, not to advantage *himſelf*, but meerly to oppoſe the *Other*. And *incommoding* is in Deſign, or by depriving him of, or hindring his Advantage; but the End of *Contumelies*, is *Shame* and *Ignominy*.

§ 14. The Oppoſite of *Anger* is *Lenity*, which is the *Ceaſing*, or *Remiſſion of Anger*.

§ 15. *Love* is a Paſſion by which we wiſh heartily well to ſome *One*, and wou'd do all the Good we cou'd to that *One*, not for our own ſake, but for his, or hers.

§ 16. *Ha-*

§ 16. *Hatred* and *Enmity* are oppos'd to *Love* and *Friendſhip*: But theſe differ from *Anger* in many Particulars. We are *angry* on account of Things which relate to our ſelves; but we *hate* without any Regard to our own Affairs, Intereſt or Advantage: *Anger* is directed to *Particulars*; but *Hatred* rages againſt *whole Kinds*; *Anger* is a ſhort-liv'd Fury, but *Hatred* and *Enmity* are laſting. He that is *angry* endeavours to give Pain to the Perſon with whom he is *angry*; for he wou'd have *him* feel Evil, on *whom* he wreaks his *Revenge*. He that *hates*, ſtudies to bring Damage or Ruin; but is not in Pain whether his Enemy feel it, or not.

§ 17. *Fear* is a certain Pain and Trouble of Mind ariſing from the Imagination of ſome impending Evil, which may either be attended with Deſtruction, or Inconvenience, or Trouble.

§ 18. *Boldneſs*, or *Confidence*, is oppoſite to *Fear*; it is a Hope join'd with an Imagination of Advantages, as if they were near, and all Things and Perſons, that might ſtrike us with Fear, being far remov'd, or not at all in Being.

§ 19. *Shame* is a ſort of *Grief*, *Pain*, or *Trouble* ariſing from an Opinion of *Infamy*, when the *Evils* are either *preſent* or *paſt*, or *imminent*. And *Impudence* is that by which we deſpiſe ſuch Things, and receive no Trouble from them.

§ 20. *Favour* is that, by which any one is ſaid to do a *Favour* or *Grace* to any one, who wants it; not for any Proſpect whatever, or that he may get any Thing by it, but that he whom he relieves, may receive a Benefit. *Favour* is amplify'd or enlarg'd on three Ways; from the Perſon who beſtows the *Favour*, from the Perſon to whom it is done; and from the Thing or Gift it ſelf. And the ſame is leſſen'd three Ways; firſt from the *Effects*; ſecondly, from the *Gift* it ſelf, and its *Qualities*; and, thirdly, from the Tokens and Signs of a Mind not truly benevolent.

§ 21. That *Pity*, which we here only define, is the *Pain* of *Good Men*, from the Opinion of an Evil that may bring Deſtruction or Trouble to one that does not deſerve it; and ſuch as any one may think may befal himſelf or his, and that ſeen to be impending over him, or coming upon him.

§ 22. *Indignation* is a *Pain* or *Trouble* for another's *Succeſs* or *Happineſs*, who does not ſeem to deſerve it.

In this it differs from *Pity*; *that* proceeding from the Sight of the *ill Fortune* of the *Good*; *this* from the *good Fortune* of the *Bad*.

§ 23 *En-*

§ 23. *Envy* is a Pain or Grief on account of real Honours or Benefits another enjoys, or which we can't obtain, exiſting between thoſe who are alike in Temper or Nature; not that another has them, but that we have them not.

It is contrary to *Contempt*, with which any one is affected againſt thoſe, in whom he ſees not thoſe *Goods*, or *Advantages*, which either he has himſelf obtain'd, or endeavours to attain.

§ 24. Having thus gone through a ſuccinct Account of the Paſſions, we come to the *Third Part of Invention*, which conſiders the *Manners*. That *Diſcourſe* therefore, or *Speech*, in which the *Manners* are well mark'd, we call *Moral*; for it diſcovers the *Habits of the Mind*, and the *Will* or *Inclination*. In this are ſeen *Convenience* and *Probity*.

The *Manners* regard either the *Perſon himſelf* who ſpeaks, the *Audience* to whom he ſpeaks, or the *whole City* or *Nation* in which he delivers his Diſcourſe.

The *Manners*, which ought to be conſpicuous in the *Speaker*, are threefold; *Prudence*, *Probity*, and *Benevolence*.

The *Manners* of the *Nation* are known by the Form of the Government: *Liberty* is in a *Democracy*; the *Diſcipline of the Laws* in an *Ariſtocracy*; *pompous Wealth* in an *Oligarchy*; *Guards* and *Arms* in a *Monarchy*.

The *Manners* in regard of the Audience vary four ſeveral ways, according to their fourfold Diſtinction: *1ſt*, When they differ in the Paſſions, as in *Anger*, *Lenity*, *Fear*, *Pity*, &c. *2dly*, When they differ in the *Habits*, as in *Virtues*, or *Vices*. *3dly*, In *Years* or *Age*, which is threefold, *Youth*, *Man's Eſtate*, *Old-age*. *4thly*, In *Fortune*, by which they are either Noble or Ignoble, Powerful or without Power, Rich or Poor, Fortunate or Unhappy.

§ 25. Beſides theſe *Seats* or *Heads* of Arguments, which are peculiar to each *Kind* of Cauſe, we muſt have Recourſe to thoſe which are common to *All*; and thoſe, as we have before obſerv'd, are two, *Poſſible* and *Impoſſible*, *Great* and *Small*, or of *Importance* and of little *Conſequence*.

We muſt conſider the *Head* of *Poſſible* and *Impoſſible* three ſeveral ways, — for we muſt ſhew a Thing *done* or *not done*, that *can* be done, or *can not* be done; or that *will* be done, or *will not* be done.

*Done* or *not done* is the Subject of our Proof moſt in that kind where we *accuſe* or *defend*; but in *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion* our Buſineſs is chiefly to prove, whether it *can* or *can not*, or *will* or *will not* be done.

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The *Important* or *Great*, and *Small* and of *little Conſequence*, belongs chiefly to *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe*.

§ 25. Having given the foregoing Rules for the *Invention of Arguments*, we naturally now proceed to deliver the Method of diſpoſing or marſhaling the whole in their proper Places and Order; for *Diſpoſition*, the ſecond Diviſion of this Art, is a proper placing, or ranging of the ſeveral Parts of the *Speech* or *Diſcourſe*. Theſe Parts are four in number, the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the Diſcourſe, the *Propoſition*, the *Proof*, and the *Concluſion*. Others make ſix Parts; as, the *Beginning*, *Narration*, *Propoſition*, *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, and *Concluſion*: Of which, the firſt is to *ingratiate* with the *Hearers*, the laſt to *move them*, and the middle to *inform* them.

The Order of theſe are either *Natural* or *Artificial*. We call that *Natural*, when the Parts are diſpos'd in the Order we have laid down.

The *Artificial* is, when the Nature of the Cauſe requires us to depart from this *Natural Order*.

§ 26. In the *Beginning* or *Opening* of the Diſcourſe we ſet forth the Aim and Scope of what we have to ſay; and the Minds of the Hearers are prepar'd for the reſt that is to come.

The Method of all *Beginnings* is not the ſame, but vary according to the Quality of the *Cauſe*.

For that is either *honourable* or *diſhonourable*, *doubtful* or *mean*, or *plain* or *clear*, or *obſcure*.

In an *honourable Cauſe* the *Goodwill*, *Attention*, and *Docility* of the *Hearers* are prepar'd plainly, and without Diſguiſe or Inſinuation.

In a Cauſe that is *diſhonourable*, we muſt take care to inſinuate into the *Hearers* Minds, and ſubtily prepare them to give us a Hearing: And this *Beginning* they call *Inſinuation*. But this kind of Beginning is ſometimes made uſe of in an *honourable Cauſe*, and that when the *Hearers* are either *tir'd* with hearing, or *prepoſſeſs'd* by the Diſcourſe of him who ſpoke firſt.

In the *dubious* or *doubtful* we make uſe of a Beginning drawn from the Nature of the Cauſe it ſelf; that is, from that Face of it which is *honourable*.

In a *low* or *mean Cauſe* we muſt endeavour to raiſe *Attention*; and in an *obſcure Cauſe*, a *Willingneſs* or *Deſire* to be inform'd.

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The Method of *Beginnings* is not the ſame in the three ſorts of Subjects, on which we may ſpeak: For in *Praiſe* and *Diſpraiſe* it muſt be taken from the five *Heads* of Arguments proper to that; from the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*; from *Perſuaſion* or *Diſſuaſion*; and from thoſe Things which relate to the *Hearers*.

In *Accuſation* and *Defence* there are four *Heads*, from which the Beginning is taken: For the Mind of the *Hearer* is prepar'd, as it were, by certain Medicines, taken either from the *Speaker* himſelf, or from the *Accuſed*; or from the *Hearer*; or from the *Accuſer*; or from the *Thing*.

They are taken from the *Accuſed*, or the *Adverſary*, by objecting, or diſproving a Crime; from the *Hearer*, by rendring him our *Friend*, or *angry*, *attentive* or *not attentive*, or *willing* to be inform'd: Laſtly, from the *Thing*, by declaring its *Nature*.

§ 27. The *Narration* is a Recital of the Things done, or that ſeem to be done, adapted to *Perſuaſion*.

This we make uſe of in *Accuſation* and *Defence*, when we do not agree with the *Adverſary* about the Manner of the *Fact*: But when we *perſuade* or *diſſuade*, there is ſeldom any Occaſion for this Part; nor is there any in *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe*, but what has its place in the *Confirmation*.

The *Narration* ought to be *perſpicuous*, that it may be underſtood; *likely* or *probable*, that it may be believ'd; diſtinguiſh'd by the *Manners*, that it may be heard with the greater *Willingneſs*: But to be ſo, it ought to expreſs thoſe Things which relate to the Proof of our own *Virtue*, and the *Improbity* of the *Adverſary*.

Care muſt likewiſe be taken, that what is ſaid may be pleaſing to the Judges; and it ought, beſides all this, to move the *Paſſions*.

This Part does not always follow the Beginning, but is ſometimes defer'd to another place, and muſt always be ſhorter for the Defendant than Plaintiff. We ſometimes ſupport the *Narration*, by giving it on the Credit of others, which promotes Security. Sometimes we make uſe of *Aſſeverations*, which ſtill procures Belief much ſtronger; and ſometimes we make uſe of *both*.

§ 28. The *Narration* being over, we propoſe the *State* of the *Speech* or *Diſcourſe*; and divide the Cauſe into certain Parts, if it conſiſt of *many States*.

This Diviſion is made either by *Separation* or *Enumeration*.

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We may likewiſe make *Compariſon*, and in our Compariſon introduce every thing to which our Subject is oppos'd; and this *Compariſon* and *Oppoſition*, are the ninth and tenth *Places*, or *Heads* of Arguments.

The eleventh is *Repugnance*, i. e. In diſcourſing upon a Subject, we muſt have an Eye upon thoſe Things that are repugnant to it, to diſcover the Proofs, with which that Proſpect may furniſh us.

'Tis of Importance to conſider all the *Circumſtances* of the Matter propos'd; but theſe Circumſtances have either *preceeded*, or *accompany'd*, or *follow'd* the Thing in Queſtion. So theſe *Circumſtances* make the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth *Places*. All the Circumſtances that can accompany an Action, are comprehended in theſe Words; *who? what? where? with what Help or Aſſiſtance, or Means? Why? how?* and *when?* That is to ſay, we muſt examin who *is the Author of the Action?* what *the Action is?* where *it was done?* *by* what *Means?* for *what End?* how? *and* when?

The fifteenth *Place* is the *Effect*; and the ſixteenth is the *Cauſe*: i. e. we muſt have regard to the *Effect*, of which the Thing in Diſpute may be the *Cauſe*; and to the Things of which it may be the *Effect*.

§ 32. We come now to what we call *Elocution*, or the *Language*, or *Diction* in which proper *Words* are adapted to the juſt Expreſſion of the Things which we have invented. It conſiſts of *Elegance*, *Compoſition* and *Dignity*: The firſt is the Foundation of this Structure; the ſecond joins, or ranges the Words in ſuch a manner, that the Speaker may riſe with Equality; the laſt adds the Ornaments of Tropes and Figures, to give Importance and Solemnity to what is ſaid.

*Elegance* comprehends the *Purity* of the *Language*, and the *Perſpicuity*: In the choice of Words we muſt have peculiar Regard to their *Purity*; that is, we muſt take Care that they be *genuine*, that is, free of our Tongue, not Foreign; that they be not Obſolete, or quite out of Uſe; for both theſe will not only affect the Perſpicuity of what you deliver, but diſcover either Ruſticity, or great Affectation, and often give a uncouth and rough Cadence to your Sentences, which a good Style refuſes; and Care muſt be taken to avoid vulgar and low Words, (the Language of the Mob.) This robbs what you ſay of that Dignity you ſhou'd aim at. Sir *Roger L'Eſtrange*, and ſome of our Divines too, have been guilty in Subjects of Importance and Majeſty. But as you

muſt

muſt not affect too great Brevity on one ſide, ſo on the other, you muſt not aſpire to too great a Loftineſs; both being Enemies to that Perſpicuity, which muſt always be your particular Care.

*Elegance* is gain'd by reading the beſt, or moſt polite Authors, by keeping the beſt Company, and by Practice; Uſe in all things being the beſt Inſtructor.

*Compoſition* is the apt and proper Order of the Parts adhering to each other; and this teaches partly Things that are common to Speakers in *public*, *Hiſtorians*, and *Poets*, and partly thoſe Things which are peculiar to a *public Speaker*.

The firſt *Compoſition* regards as well the artificial joining of the *Letters*, by which the Style is render'd *ſoft* and *ſmooth*, *gentle*, and *flowing*; or *full* and *ſonorous*, or the contrary of all theſe; as the *Order*, which requires, that we place the Grave after the Humble or Low; and that we ſet that which is of greater Dignity, and firſt in Nature, before that which is leſs, and of more inferiour Conſideration.

*Compoſition* relates to the *Period*, but having treated at the End of GRAMMAR on that Head, and forgot to put it in its right Place in this Second Edition, we ſhall refer you to that.

*Dignity* produces a figurative manner of Speaking, both in the *Words*, and in *Sentences*; thoſe which affect *Words alone*, have been ſo long call'd *Tropes*, that the Word is known almoſt to the very *Fiſhwives*. Thoſe which affect Sentences have been as long, and generally known to be call'd *Figures*.

§ 33. We ſhall begin the *Tropes* with *Tranſmutation*, or the exchange of one Name for another; as if we ſay, Peterborow *conquer'd* Spain; *every one reads* Milton; London *is in an Uproar*. 'Tis plain we mean, that Peterborow's *Army conquer'd* Spain, or *he with the help of his Army*; *every one reads* Milton's *Works*; *the People of* London *are in an Uproar*. The Relation is ſo ſtrong betwixt a General and his Army, an Author and his Works, a Town and its Inhabitants, that the Thought of one excites the Idea of the other, and ſo changing of Names produces no Confuſion.

The next is *Comprehenſion*. This is ſomething related to the former; for by this we put the Name of a *Whole* for a *Part*; as if we ſhou'd ſay *England* for *London*, or *London* for *England*; as, *the Plague is in* England, *when only in* London. Thus by this *Trope* we have the Liberty of putting the Name of a *Part* for the *Whole*, and that of the *Whole* for a *Part*; and to this we may likewiſe refer the Uſe of a certain Num-

ber, for an uncertain Number; as *an Hundred Avenues to the Houſe convey*, when there may be more or leſs; *an Hundred years old*, when he may want ſome Months, or perhaps Years.

*Exchange of Names* is another *Trope*, and akin likewiſe to the firſt call'd *Tranſmutation*; for by this we apply a Name proper to one, to ſeveral, and common Names to particular Perſons; as when we call a Luxurious Prince a *Sardanapalus*, or a cruel one a *Nero*. On the contrary, when for *Cicero*, we ſay the *Orator*; or for *Ariſtotle*, the *Philoſopher*; for *Virgil*, the *Poet*; and the like.

*Metaphor* is ſo well known, a Word in our Tongue now, that we ſcarce have need to explain it by *Tranſlation*. It is a *Trope*, by which we put a ſtrange and remote Word for a proper Word, by reaſon of its reſemblance with the Thing of which we ſpeak. Thus we call the King the Head of his Kingdom; becauſe as the Head commands the Members of the Natural, ſo the King commands the Members of the Political Body. Thus we ſay, the Vallies ſmile, or laugh upon us; becauſe there is a ſimilitude between the agreeable Appearance of one and the other.

*Allegory* is the joining of ſeveral *Metaphors* together, and ſo extends to ſeveral Words; 'tis likewiſe call'd *Inverſion*. But great Care muſt then be taken in an *Allegory*, that it ends as it begins; that the *Metaphors* be continu'd, and the ſame things made Uſe of to the laſt, from whence we borrow our firſt Expreſſions. The famous Speech of our celebrated *Shakeſpear*, is extreamly faulty in this particular.

*To be, or not to be, that is the Queſtion;*
*Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to ſuffer*
*The* Slings *and* Arrows *of Outragious Fortune,*
*Or to take Arms againſt a Sea of Troubles,*
*And by oppoſing, end them?*

Here the Poet begins the *Allegory* with *Slings* and *Arrows*, and ends it in a *Sea*, beſides the taking Arms againſt a Sea.

When theſe *Allegories* are obſcure, and the natural Senſe of the Words not obvious, they are call'd *Enigma*'s, or *Riddles*.

*Diminution*, or *Leſſening*, is the next *Trope*, and by this we ſpeak leſs than we think; as when we ſay, *you are not indeed to be commended*, it implies a ſecret Reproach, or Reprehenſion.

*Hyperbole*, or *Exceſs*, repreſents things greater or leſs than really they are; as, *This Horſe is ſwifter than the Wind*; *he goes ſlower than a Tortoiſe*.

By

By *Irony* we ſpeak contrary to our Thoughts, but 'tis diſcover'd by the Tone of our Voice; as when we ſay, Robert *is a very honeſt Man*, when we mean a *Rogue*.

By the *Trope*, call'd *Abuſe*, we may borrow the Name of a Thing, tho' quite contrary to what we wou'd ſignify, becauſe we can't elſe expreſs it; as when we ſay, an *Iron Candleſtick*, or a *Silver Inkhorn*.

Theſe are the moſt conſiderable *Tropes*, and to one or other of theſe, all others may be reduc'd. But before we diſmiſs this Point, we muſt give a few Rules to be obſerv'd in the Uſe of them. Firſt, therefore, we muſt uſe *Tropes* only where we cannot expreſs our ſelves perfectly without them; and, ſecondly, when we are oblig'd to uſe them, they muſt have two Qualities. (1*ſt*,) They muſt be clear, and contribute to the Underſtanding of what we intend; (2*dly*,) That they hold a Proportion to the Idea we wou'd paint to our *Readers*, or *Hearers*.

A *Trope* loſes its Perſpicuity three Ways: (1.) When 'tis too *remote*, not helping the Hearer to the Intention of the Speaker; as to call a *lewd Houſe* the *Syrtes of Youth*; the *Rock of Youth*, is nearer and more obvious; the former requiring our Knowledge and Remembrance, that the *Syrtes* were dangerous Banks of Sand on the Coaſt of *Africa*. A *Metaphor* is, therefore, beſt taken from ſuch ſenſible Objects as are moſt familiar to the Eye, which Images are apprehended without Enquiry or Trouble. The ill Connexion of theſe is the *ſecond* Thing that brings Obſcurity on the *Metaphor*, by uſing Words which are not commonly known, but relate to Places, perhaps at the fartheſt Parts of the Globe, from Terms of Art, Antiquities, or the like, which ought to be avoided. This *Connexion* is either *Natural* or *Artificial*. That we call *Natural*, when Things ſignify'd by their Proper and Metaphorical Names, have Natural Reſemblance to, or Dependance on each other; as when we ſay, *a Man has Arms of Braſs*, to ſignify their Strength, this Reſemblance between the *Trope* and proper Name, we may call *Natural*. The *Artificial* comes from *Cuſtom*; a wild untractable Temper has by *Cuſtom* been given to the *Arab*, which makes the Name *Arab* awake the Idea of an untractable Man.

The *third* Thing which renders *Tropes* obſcure, is a too frequent Uſe of them. Laſtly, *Tropes* muſt always be proportion'd to the Ideas they wou'd give.

§ 34. Having ſaid all that we thought neceſſary about the *Tropes*, their Nature, Virtues, Vices and Uſe, we now come to the Language of the *Paſſions*; which is of peculiar Uſe both in *Oratory* and *Poetry*, both which make Uſe of them in a particular manner.

We ſhall begin with the *Exclamation*, becauſe by that our Paſſions firſt flie out, and diſcover themſelves in Diſcourſe. *Exclamation*, therefore, is a violent extenſion of the Voice; as, *O Heavens! O Earth! good God! alas!* and the like.

*Doubting* is the next, or *Irreſolution*, is the Effect of Paſſion, as *what ſhall I do? ſhall I apply to thoſe I once neglected?* or, *ſhall I implore thoſe who now forſake me?* &c.

*Correction* is a Figure by which one in Paſſion, fearing he has not expreſs'd himſelf full enough, endeavours by a ſtronger Phraſe to correct that Error; as, *Nor was thy Mother a Goddeſs, nor perfidious Man was* Dardanus *the Author of thy Race, but rugged Rocky* Caucaſus *brought thee forth, and the* Hyrcanian *Tygreſs nurſt thee up.*

*Amiſſion*, in a violent Paſſion, permits us not to ſay all that we wou'd. When our Paſſions are interrupted, or directed another Way, the Tongue following them, produces Words that have no Reference to what we were ſaying before; as, *of all Men* — meaning, *the worſt of all Men.*

*Suppreſſion*, is a ſudden ſuppreſſion of the Paſſion, or rather the Threats of a Paſſion; as—*which I* — *but now we muſt think of the preſent Matter.*

*Conceſſion* ſeems to omit what we ſay; as, *I will not ſpeak of the Injury you have done me; I am willing to forget the Wrong you have done me; I will not ſee the Contrivances that you make againſt me*, &c.

*Repetition* is made two Ways: (1.) When we repeat the ſame Words, or (2.) the ſame Thing in different Words. The former, as — *You deſign Nothing, Nothing that is not viſible to me, what I do not ſee*, &c. The ſecond, as— *of our ſelves we can do nothing Well, whatever Good we do, is by the Divine Grace.*

*Redundance* makes us uſe more Words than are abſolutely neceſſary, and is emphatical, *I heard thee with theſe Ears, I ſaw thee with theſe Eyes.*

*Like Meanings*, are Words of the ſame Senſe, and put together to expreſs one Thing; as, *he departed, he went out, he's gone.*

*Deſcription* figures the Thing in ſuch lively Colours, as to make its Image appear before us.

*Di-*

*Diſtribution* is a kind of *Deſcription*, in which we enumerate the Parts of the Object of our Paſſion; as——*their Throat is an open Sepulchre, they flatter with their Tongues, the poiſon of* Aſps *is under their Lips; their Mouth is full of Curſing and Lyes, and their Feet are ſwift to ſhed Blood.*

*Oppoſites* place Contraries againſt one-another; as, *Flattery begets Friends, Truth Enemies.*

*Similies* bring a Likeneſs to the Thing we are ſpeaking of—as, *he ſhall be* like *a Tree plac'd by the Water-ſide*, &c.

*Compariſon.* The difference is not great between this and the former Figure, only this later is more ſprightly and emphatic——as, *the fineſt Gold to them looks wan and pale*, &c. But two Things are to be conſider'd in *Compariſons*; firſt, that we are not to expect an exact proportion betwixt all the Parts of the Compariſon, and the Subject of which we ſpeak; as when *Virgil* compares the young *Ligurian* to a Pigeon in the Claws of an Hawk; adding what relates more to the Deſcription of a Pigeon torn to pieces by a Hawk, than to the Subject compar'd. The ſecond Thing to be obſerv'd, is, That it is not neceſſary that the Thing compar'd to, be more elevated than the Thing compar'd; as the quoted Inſtance from *Virgil* ſhews.

*Suſpenſion* keeps the Hearer in ſuſpenſe, and attentive, by Expectation of what the Speaker will conclude in; as, *O God! Darkneſs is not more oppoſite to Light, Froſt to Fire, Rage and Hatred to Love, Tempeſts to Calms, Pain to Pleaſure, or Death to Life, than Sin to thee.*

*Repreſentation* gives a Tongue to Things inanimate, and makes them ſpeak in Paſſion; as, *Hear, thou ſtupid Creature, hear the very Walls of this ſacred Pile complaining of thy Wickedneſs: Have we,* ſay they, *ſo many hundred Years been conſecrated to the ſacred Rites of the Immortal Gods, and now at laſt to be polluted with thy Impieties? Have the moſt Valiant, and the moſt Wiſe, enter'd here with Awe and Veneration, and ſhall one ſo Worthleſs dare to contemn the Sanctity of this Place?* &c.

*Sentences* are but Reflections made upon a Thing that ſurprizes, and deſerves to be conſider'd; as, *Love cannot long be conceal'd where it is, nor diſſembled where it is not.*

*Applauſe* is a Sentence or Exclamation, containing ſome Sentence plac'd at the end of a Diſcourſe; as, *Can Minds Divine ſuch Anger entertain!*

*Interrogation* is frequently produc'd by our Paſſions to them we would perſuade, and is uſeful to fix the Attention of the Hearers; as, *Let me aſk you, the Men of* Athens, *is*

*it*

*it worthy the Glory of your City, or is it fit that* Athens, *once the Head of* Greece, *ſhould ſubmit to* Barbarians, *take Meaſures from a foreign Lord?* &c.

*Adreſs* is when in an extraordinary Commotion a Man turns himſelf to all ſides, and adreſſes Heaven, Earth, the Rocks, Fields, Things ſenſible and inſenſible; as, *Ye Mountains of* Gilboa, *let there be no Dew*, &c.

*Prevention* is a Figure, by which we prevent what might be objected by the Adverſary; as, *But ſome will ſay, How are the Dead rais'd up? And with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou ſoweſt is not quickned, unleſs it die*, &c.

*Communication* is when we deſire the Judgment of our Hearers; as, *What would you, Gentlemen, do in the Caſe? Would you take other Meaſures than*, &c.

*Confeſſion* is the owning of our Fault, ariſing from a Confidence of Forgiveneſs of the Perſon to whom it is acknowledg'd; as, *I confeſs my ſelf to have err'd, but I am a Man, and what is humane, is what we are all ſubject to; let him that is free from humane Error caſt the firſt Stone.*

*Conſent* makes us grant a Thing freely that might be deny'd, to obtain another Thing that we deſire; as, *I allow the* Greeks *Learning; I grant them the Diſcipline of many Arts, the Brightneſs of Wit, the Copiouſneſs of Diſcourſe; I will not deny them any thing elſe they can juſtly claim: But that Nation were never eminent for the Religion of an Oath in their Teſtimonies, or for Truth and Faith*, &c. And here it has always a Sting in the Tail; but on the contrary it has ſometimes a healing Cloſe; as, *Let him be Sacrilegious, let him be a Robber, let him be the Chief of all Wickedneſs and Vice, yet ſtill he is a good General.*

By this Figure we ſometimes invite our Enemy to do all the Miſchief he can, in order to give him a Senſe and Horrour of his Cruelty. 'Tis alſo common in Complaints between Friends; as, when *Ariſtæus*, in *Virgil*, complains to his Mother:

*Proceed, inhumane Parent, in thy Scorn;*
*Root up my Trees, with Blites deſtroy my Corn,*
*My Vineyards ruin, and my Sheepfolds burn,*
*Let looſe thy Rage, let all thy Spight be ſhown,*
*Since thus thy Hate purſues the Praiſes of thy Son.*

Dryd. Virg.

*Cir-*

*Circumlocution* is us'd, to avoid ſome Words whoſe Ideas are unpleaſant, or to avoid ſaying ſome things which may have an ill Effect; as, when *Cicero* is forc'd to confeſs that *Clodius* was ſlain by *Milo*, he did it with this Adreſs: "The "Servants of *Milo* (ſays he) being hinder'd from aſſiſting "their Maſter, whom *Clodius* was reported to have kill'd, "and believing it true, they did in his abſence, without his "Knowledge or Conſent, what every body would have "expected from his Servants on the like Occaſion. In which he avoids mentioning the Words *kill*, or *put to Death*, as Words ingrateful or odious to the Ear.

Thus much we have thought fit to ſay of the Figurative Expreſſions of the *Paſſions*; but they are indeed almoſt infinite, each being to be expreſs'd a hundred ways. We ſhall conclude this Diſcourſe of the *Art of Perſuaſion* with a few Reflections on *Style*, and fewer Remarks on other Compoſitions, in which the Learner ought to be exercis'd.

§ 35. What we mean by *Style*, is the Manner of expreſſing our ſelves, or of cloathing our Thoughts in Words: The Rules already given, as to *Elocution*, or the *Language*, regard (as we may ſay) only the Members of Diſcourſe, but *Style* relates to the entire Body of the *Compoſition*.

The *Matter* ought to direct us in the Choice of the *Style*. Noble Expreſſions render the *Style* lofty, and repreſent Things great, and noble; but if the Subject be *low* and *mean*, ſonorous Words and pompous Expreſſion is Bombaſt, and diſcovers Want of Judgment in the Writer. *Figures* and *Tropes* paint the Motions of the Heart, but to make them juſt, and truly ornamental, the Paſſion ought to be reaſonable. There's nothing more ridiculous than to be tranſported without Cauſe, to put one's ſelf in a Heat for what ought to be argued cooly: Whence 'tis plain, that the *Matter* regulates the *Style*. When the *Subject*, or *Matter*, is great, the *Style* ought to be ſpritely, full of Motion, and enrich'd with *Figures*, and *Tropes*; if our *Subject* contain nothing extraordinary, and we can conſider it without Emotion, the *Style* muſt be plain.

The *Subjects* of Diſcourſe being extreamly various in the Nature, it follows, that there muſt be as great a Variety in the *Style*: But the Maſters of this Art have reduc'd them all to *three* Kinds, which they call the *Sublime*, the *Mean*, or the *Indifferent*.

§ 36 Let

§ 36. Let the Subject of which we deſign a lofty *Idea* be never ſo noble, its Nobleneſs will never be ſeen, unleſs we have Skill enough to preſent the beſt of its Faces to the View. The beſt of Things have their Imperfections, the leaſt of which diſcover'd, may leſſen our Eſteem, if not extinguiſh it quite: We muſt therefore take care not to ſay any thing in one place, which may contradict what we have ſaid in another: We ought to pick out all that is moſt great and noble in our Subject, and put that in its beſt light, and then our Expreſſion muſt be noble and ſublime, capable of raiſing lofty Ideas: And 'tis our Duty to obſerve a certain Uniformity in our *Style*; tho' all we ſay have not an equal Magnificence, ſo far at leaſt as to make all the Parts of a piece, and bear a Correſpondence with the whole.

The Danger here is, leſt you fall into a puffy Style, which ſome call *Inflation*, or ſwell'd; for if you ſtretch Things beyond their Nature, and hunt only after great and ſounding Words, you ſeldom mind their Agreeableneſs to the Nature of the Subject. And this has been the Fault of many of our modern Tragic Writers, who yet with the Vulgar have gain'd Applauſe, and ſetled a Reputation.

§ 37. We come next to the *plain* Style; and this ſimple and plain Character of Writing is not without its Difficulties, not in the Choice of *Subjects*, thoſe being always ordinary and common, but becauſe there is wanting in this Style that Pomp and Magnificence which often hide the Faults of the Writer, at leaſt from the general Reader or Hearer. But on common and ordinary Subjects there is little room for *Figures* and *Tropes*, ſo we muſt make choice of Words that are proper and obvious.

When we call this *Style* ſimple and plain, we intend not *Meanneſs of Expreſſion*; that is never good, and ſhould always be avoided: For tho' the *Matter* or *Subject* of this Style have nothing of Elevation, yet ought not the Language to be vile and contemptible; Mob Expreſſions, and Vulgariſms, are to be avoided, and yet all muſt be clean and natural.

§ 38. The *mean* or *middle* Style conſiſts of a participation of the *ſublime* on one ſide, and of *ſimplicity* of the *Plain*, on the other. *Virgil* furniſhes us with Examples of all the three; of the *Sublime* in his *Æneids*, the *Plain* in his *Paſtorals*, and the *Mean* (or Middle) in his *Georgics*.

§ 39 Tho'

§ 39. Tho' the *Style* of an Orator, or one that ſpeaks in Public, of an Hiſtorian and Poet, are different, yet there are ſome Differences in Styles of the ſame Character; for ſome are ſoft and eaſie, others more ſtrong; ſome gay, others more ſevere. Let us reflect on the Differences, and how they are diſtinguiſh'd.

The firſt Quality is *Eaſineſs*, and that is when Things are deliver'd with that Clearneſs and Perſpicuity that the Mind without any Trouble conceives them. To give this *Eaſineſs* to a *Style*, we muſt leave nothing to the Hearer's or Reader's deciſion; we muſt deliver things in their neceſſary extent, with Clearneſs, that they may be eaſily comprehended; and here Care muſt be taken of the Fluency, and to avoid all Roughneſs of Cadence.

The ſecond Quality is *Strength*, and it is directly oppoſite to the firſt; it ſtrikes the Mind boldly, and forces Attention. To render a Style ſtrong, we muſt uſe ſhort and nervous Expreſſions, of great and comprehenſive Meaning, and ſuch as excite many Ideas.

The third Quality renders a Style pleaſant and florid, and depends in part on the firſt; for the third is not pleas'd with too ſtrong an Intention. *Tropes* and *Figures* are the Flowers of Style; the firſt give a ſenſible Conception to the moſt abſtruſe Thoughts; *Figures* awaken our Attention, and warm and animate the Hearer or Reader, by giving them Pleaſure. Motion is the Principle of Life and Pleaſure, but Coldneſs mortifies every thing.

The laſt Quality is *Severe*: It retrenches every thing that is not abſolutely neceſſary; it allows nothing to Pleaſure, admitting no Ornaments or Decorations. In ſhort, we are to endeavour that our Style have ſuch Qualities, as are proper to the Subject of which we diſcourſe.

§ 40. Having ſaid thus much of *Styles*, we ſhall only add a Word or two about other Exerciſes, in which the Learner ſhould be train'd up: The firſt and moſt general is the writing of *Letters*. Here an eaſie and genteel way of conveying our Mind in the ſhorteſt and moſt expreſſive Terms, is the greateſt Excellence. *Buſineſs* requires no Ornaments, and a plain and ſuccinct Information is all that is requir'd. Letters of *Complement* muſt have Gaiety, but no Affectation. *Eaſineſs* muſt ſhine thro' all, and a clean Expreſſion; here is no room for the Luxuriance of Fancy, or the Embelliſhments of longer Diſcourſes. The ſame may be ſaid of *Condoleance*, and even of *Perſuaſion*. The moſt

poignant

poignant and coercive Reaſons muſt be us'd, and thoſe that by want of Native Force require the Help of Art to recommend them, laid aſide.

ESSAYS have, in theſe later Ages, mightily prevail'd; and here, as in *Letters*, all muſt be eaſie, free, and natural, and written juſt as you think, ſometimes leaving the Subject, and then returning again, as the Thoughts ariſe in the Mind. At leaſt this has hitherto been the Practiſe; and *Montaigne*, who has got no ſmall Reputation by this Way of Writing, ſeldom keeps many Lines to the Subject he propoſes: Tho' it is our Opinion, that my Lord *Bacon* is a much better Pattern; for indeed they ſeem to us to be ſudden Reflections on ſome one particular Subject, not very unlike the common Themes given to Scholars in the Schools, with this difference, that the Author of theſe is ſuppos'd to have gain'd much from Obſervation and Reflection on thoſe Heads, and that therefore his Diſcoveries may be of Value; whereas the propoſing ſuch particular Moral Subjects to Boys, is requiring Impertinencies from them, who have no Fund of Obſervation to furniſh out the Entertainment.

As for the Subjects of Poetical Exerciſes, we have given ſufficient Rules for them, in our *Art of Poetry*.

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*The End of the* Art *of* Perſuaſion.

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# LOGIC;

OR,

# *The* ART *of* REASONING.

## PART I.

### CHAP. I.

### Of *Particular* IDEAS.

LOGIC *is the Art of* Reaſoning. The Art is divided into four Parts; the firſt treats of *Ideas*; the ſecond of *Judgments*; the third of *Method*; and the fourth of *Reaſoning*, or *Argumentation*.

An *Idea*, in General, we define—*The immediate Object of the Mind; or that Thought or Image of any Thing which is immediately ſet before the Mind.*

All *Ideas* become the Objects of our Mind, or are preſented to the Judgment by the Perception of the Senſes, which we call *Senſation*; or by the Meditation of the Mind, which we call *Reflection*.

1. *Ideas* are either *Simple* or *Compound*: We call thoſe *Simple*, in which the moſt ſubtile Penetration of the Mind it ſelf cannot diſcover any Parts, or Plurality; and we call thoſe *Compounded* which are made up, or compos'd of *two* or *more* of thoſe which are *Simple*. Examples of both we ſhall ſee hereafter.

2. There are *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, we know not what obſcure Subject, in which there are the Properties of Things which we know; and *Ideas* of *Modes* or *Manners*, which are the *Qualities* or *Attributes* of *Subſtances*, which we cannot conceive capable of ſubſiſting alone without their *Subſtances*.

3. There are certain *Relations* between *Subſtances* and *Subſtances*; *Modes* and *Modes*; and *Modes* and *Subſtances*; the Conſideration of one including the Conſideration of the other, from whence theſe *Relations* derive that Name.

4. There are *Ideas* which are to be conſider'd as the Images of ſomething Exiſtent, and which convey themſelves

to, and fix themſelves in the Mind, without any Operation of its own. But there are others, which by the *Mind* are join'd to new *Ideas* at Pleaſure, and ſeparated from them by Abſtraction.

5. Farther, there are *Ideas* of a larger, or leſs extent, or join'd to more or fewer *Ideas*, whence we call them *Singular*, *Particular*, or *Univerſal*.

6. There are ſome *Ideas* that are *clear* and *plain*, and others that are *obſcure*. All *clear Ideas* are *ſimple*, as are thoſe of the *compounded*, all whoſe Parts are diſtinctly plac'd before, or repreſented to, the Mind.

7. There are ſome *Ideas* that are *perfect*, or *adequate*; and others that are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*. Thoſe we call *perfect*, or *adequate*, which contain all the Parts of the Things whoſe Images they are, and offer them ſo to the *Mind*; thoſe are *inadequate*, or *imperfect*, which only contain and offer ſome Parts of the Things of which they are the Images. We call *Ideas* Images of the Things, becauſe there are ſome Things without us, which are like, and anſwers to them.

To theſe *particular Heads* of *Ideas* all others may be refer'd. Theſe therefore we ſhall particularly examine.

## CHAP. II.

## *Of ſimple Compound* IDEAS.

1. VEry many of the *ſimple Ideas* we have from, or by our *Senſes*, and very many from the Attention of the Mind turn'd inwards on it ſelf, without regard to *Senſation*.

2. To the *firſt* we muſt refer all our *Senſations*; the chief of which may be reduc'd to *five* Claſſes, Forms, or Heads, according to the *five* Parts of the Body, which are affected by them. For they come to us by the Means of our *Eyes*, our *Ears*, our *Noſe*, our *Tongue* or *Palate*, and by the *Touch*, or *Feeling* of all the other Parts of the Body. *Colours* are *ſimple Ideas* (we mean Colours themſelves, and diſtinct from colour'd Bodies which have Parts) as *Blue* for Example, of which the Mind can diſcover no Manner of Parts.

3. The *Ideas* of Sounds are likewiſe *ſimple*, as well as thoſe of *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Touch*. We ſpeak here of *One ſimple particular* Senſation conſider'd diſtinctly from the Variety of *Sounds*, *Smells*, *Taſtes*, and *Touches*. Thus——if any one ſmell to a Roſe without mixing any other Scent he will have a *Senſation*, in which he can diſtinguiſh no Parts; and this holds of the other *Senſations*.

4. *Pain*

4. *Pain* and *Pleaſure* are the chief, and moſt eminent *Senſations* we have, whoſe Kinds and Sorts vary according to the *Part* or *Member* affected; but there are no Parts to be diſtinguiſh'd in *Pain* and *Pleaſure*, which we can conceive to be ſeparated from each other. We ſpeak not of the *Duration* of *Pain* or *Pleaſure*, which evidently has Parts; but of the *ſimple* Senſation *of a prick with a Needle*, for Example, none can conceive any Parts of it, the concourſe of which ſhou'd produce *Pain*.

5. In the *Idea* of *Motion*, which comes to us by our *Senſes*, when conſider'd in *general*, we can conceive no Parts, tho' we may of its *Duration*, of the Line it deſcribes, and its Quickneſs or Slowneſs.

6. Thus in many *ſimple Ideas*, which ariſe from *Reflection*, we ſhou'd in vain ſeek for Parts, as in *Volition*, or *Willing*, &c. The ſame may be ſaid of *Exiſtence* conſider'd in *general*; tho' there are viſible Parts in the *Duration*.

7. *Compound Ideas*, we have ſaid, contain or comprehend ſeveral *ſimple Ideas*, which may be diſtinguiſh'd and ſeparately conſider'd. Thus the *Ideas* of all Bodies are *compound*; becauſe in them we can conſider ſome Parts without the others, or diſtinctly from the others. If we conſider a Body, we clearly and plainly diſtinguiſh the *higher* and *lower*, the *fore* and *hind*, the *left* and *right* Parts of it; and can diſtinctly think of one without the others. If we conſider the *Idea* of *Pity*, we find that it conſiſts of the *Ideas* of *Miſery*, of a miſerable Perſon, and of one who grieves for him. Such are the *Ideas* of all *Virtues* and *Vices*, tho' they come to us by *Reflection* of the Mind.

8. Tho' we ſhall not, in this Part of *Logic*, or *the Art of Reaſoning*, treat of thoſe *Judgments* we paſs upon *Ideas*, yet it is of importance to remember never to pretend to define what cannot be defin'd without making it more obſcure; for a Definition ought always to be made uſe of to make the Subject of our Diſcourſe more plain and clear, than the bare Name of the Thing wou'd make it; but in *ſimple Ideas*, we cannot better explain them, than by their very Name, or ſome Synonymous Words, the Knowledge of which depends on the Tongue we uſe, and the Senſe of him we ſpeak to. The contrary Method has made the *Ariſtotelians* fill us with unintelligible Jargon; as defining of *Motion*, they ſay, *'tis an Act of a Being in Power, as in Power*; nor have the *Moderns* much mended the Matter, by defining it the *change of Situation*. The firſt labours with inexplicable Obſcurity,

and the Terms of the later are not more clear or known, than the Word *Motion* it ſelf.

9. *Definition*, indeed, has only to do with *compound Ideas*, for its an Enumeration, or reckoning up of the ſeveral *ſimple Ideas*, of which that conſiſts.

## CHAP. III.

## *Of* IDEAS *of* Subſtances *and* Modes.

1. ANother ſort of *Ideas* are thoſe of *Subſtances* and *Modes*, for we conſider all Things ſeparately, and by themſelves, or elſe as exiſting in other Things ſo much, that we can't allow them Exiſtence without 'em. The firſt we call *Subſtances* and *Subjects*, the later *Modes* and *Accidents*; as when we reflect on *Wax* and *ſome Figure*, as Roundneſs, we conſider the *Wax* as a Thing which may ſubſiſt without that Roundneſs, or any other particular Figure; we therefore call *Wax* a *Subſtance*. On the contrary, we conſider *Roundneſs* ſo inherent to the *Wax* or ſome other Subſtance, that it can't ſubſiſt without it, for we are not capable of conceiving *Roundneſs* diſtinctly and ſeparately from a round Body. This therefore we call a *Mode*, or *Accident*.

2. We always conſider Bodies cloath'd, as I may ſay, in ſome certain *Modes*, except when we reflect on the Abſtract, or General. The *Subſtances* the *Grammarians* expreſs by the *Name*; the *Modes* may be render'd by the *Qualities*; as *Wax* and *Roundneſs* is expreſs'd by *round Wax*.

3. We have beſides, certain compound *Ideas*, which conſiſt only of *Modes*; and others which are compounded, or made up only with a ſort of Species, or kind of *Modes*. As a *Furlong*, as far as it expreſſes a Menſuration of the Road; for it comprehends uniform *Modes*, as *Paces* or *Feet*: Others conſiſt of ſeveral ſorts of *Modes*; as the *Idea* of *Pity*, which has been already defin'd, and of the other Paſſions, and Virtues and Vices.

4. We have, farther, *Ideas* compounded of a Collection of Subſtances of a like Nature, ſuch is the *Idea* of an *Army*, of a *City*, of a *Flock*; conſiſting of many *Soldiers*, *Citizens*, or *Sheep*, &c. or they are compos'd of a Collection of *Ideas* of unlike Subſtances; ſuch is the *Idea* of the Matter of which a *Houſe*, a *Ship*, or a *Deſert* is compounded. And in theſe *Ideas* we conſider not only Subſtances, as they are ſuch, but alſo as attended with certain *Modes*, which produce *Ideas* that are very much compounded.

5. We

5. We define Subſtances in *general*, *Things ſubſiſting by themſelves*, but then they are conſider'd abſtractly, or without regard to any particular Subſtance actually exiſting; and in that Senſe it is ſufficiently plain what is meant by the Word *Subſtance*; but ſince there is no Subſtance conſider'd in general which has any Exiſtence, but in our *Ideas*, where we conſider exiſting *Subſtances*, the Matter is alter'd. The *Ideas* of ſingle or particular Subſtances, are very obſcure; nor do we underſtand any thing by their ſeveral Names, but certain we know not what unknown Subjects, in which there are certain Properties which conſtantly coexiſt. Thus if any one ſhou'd ask what that Subſtance is which we call Body, we can only ſay, that it is an unknown Subject, in which we always diſcover *Extenſion*, *Diviſibility*, and *Impenetrability*.

6. 'Tis plain, that nothing more obſcure can be meant, than what is expreſs'd by theſe Terms, *extended Subſtances*. For all that is here meant, is, that there is an *unknown Subject*, one of whoſe Properties is to conſiſt of other unknown Subjects, or Subſtances plac'd cloſe to each other, and of that Nature, that we have no *Idea* of any one of thoſe Subſtances of which we ſay a Body conſiſts. For we cannot affirm of any *Idea*, that it is the *Idea* of any one Subſtance, of which a Body is compos'd, ſince we have no *Idea* of corporeal Subſtance, which do's not comprehend or contain innumerable Subſtances. If therefore we expreſs what we underſtand by the Name of *corporeal Subſtance*, we muſt ſay, that *it is a Compoſition of unknown Beings, ſome of whoſe Properties we know.*

7. The ſame we may ſay of other Subſtances, as of the *Spiritual* (we examine not here whether or not there be any more) as whoever will conſider with Attention, and not ſuffer himſelf to be amus'd and deceiv'd by empty Words, will experience. We find in our Mind various Thoughts, whence we form the *Idea* of Spirits; but we are ignorant of what that Subject, is in which theſe Thoughts are.

8. It will be of great Uſe to as perfect a Knowledge of Things as we are capable of obtaining, to diſtinguiſh in thoſe Subjects which we call Subſtances, thoſe Things, without which we can conceive thoſe Subjects or Modes from thoſe without which we cannot conceive them. For when we think with Attention on thoſe Subjects, we ſhall find that there are ſome Things ſo eſſential to them, that we can't deprive them of, without changing their Nature; and *other* Things which may be taken away from the Subject, and deſtroy its Nature.

9. *Modes* are commonly divided into *internal*, which we conceive, as it were, inherent in the Subſtance; as, *Roundneſs*, &c. Or *external*, as when we ſay any Thing is *deſir'd*, *lov'd*, *beheld*, and the like; which we call *Relations*.

10. There are likewiſe *Modes*, which are alſo *Subſtances*; as, *Apparel*, *Hair*, &c. without which the *Subject* can ſubſiſt, and they can likewiſe be without the *Subject*. As for theſe *Ideas*, which are compos'd of *Modes* and *Subſtances* variouſly join'd together, ſome are call'd *real*, as being the *Ideas* of Things that either realy *do*, or are at leaſt believ'd to exiſt; others *rational*, that is, when the Mind compounds various *Ideas* together; as when we conſider a Stick reaching up to the Stars themſelves.

11. In compound *Ideas* we ought carefully to obſerve how manifold, and of how many *Ideas* they conſiſt; as we ſhall more plainly ſee under the Head of the *Obſcurity* and *Perſpicuity* of *Ideas*.

## CHAP. IV.

## *Of* RELATIONS.

1. THere are, beſides *Subſtances*, and *Modes* which are inherent in *Subſtances*, certain external Denominations, which tho' they add nothing to the Subſtance, yet depend on ſome Mode or Manner of it; and theſe we call *Relations*, by which the Conſideration of one Thing includes the Conſideration of another. Thus when we call any one a *Father*, on this Expreſſion depends this, that he whom we call ſo has begot Children, and ſo comprehends and includes the Conſideration of Children.

2. Every *Idea*, conſider'd in a certain manner, may be the Foundation of a *Relation*, that is, may lead us by ſome Property of its own to the Conſideration of ſome other *Idea*. So that all Exiſtence may be divided into the *Creator* and the *Creature*; for the Name of the *Creator* includes the Thought of the *Creature*; and ſo on the contrary.

3. *Relations* are innumerable; for they may be between Subſtances and Subſtances, Modes and Modes, Modes and Subſtances, Relations and Subſtances, Relations and Modes, Relations and Relations; for there is nothing that cannot excite our Thoughts on ſomething elſe, ſince we can compound or join our *Ideas* together as we think fit. But avoiding too nice a Scrutiny, we ſhall only make our Obſervation

ons on thoſe of the greateſt moment, which regard *Relations* conſider'd in *general*.

4. We very often conſider *Ideas* as *abſolute*, or including no *Relations*, which yet have neceſſarily a Reference to Others. Thus we cannot call any thing *Great* or *Large*, but that the *Idea* which anſwers that Word, muſt be *relative*. For we call thoſe Things *great*, in a certain Kind, which are the *greateſt* among thoſe Things of the ſame Nature, which we have known. We call that *Hill* or *Mountain great*, which is as *great* as any *Hill* that we have ever ſeen. That Kingdom is *large*, which exceeds the Bounds of our own Country, or of thoſe Countries we have known, *&c.* That Tower we call *high*, which is higher than moſt of the ſame kind that we have known. In Number we call that *great*, than which there is not many greater in the ſame Kind: Thus ſixty Thouſand Men in Arms in *Greece* was call'd a *great* Army, becauſe *Greece* ſcarce ever had a greater; but it had been little in *Perſia*, where much larger were aſſembled. Thus likewiſe as to *Time*, we call it long or ſhort with Reference to another. We call a hundred Years Life, a long Life; *Jacob* call his (a 130) ſhort, becauſe his Anceſtors liv'd ſo many longer. Sickneſs, Pain, and Expectation, make that *Time* ſeem long, which to one in Action, Health, or Pleaſure, ſeems ſhort. That Burthen is heavy to a Child, a weak Woman, an old Man, the Sickly, which is light to a Man in Health and Vigour. Thus in the Ornaments of the Mind, we call that Wit great, that Learning profound, that Memory tenacious, that Prudence conſummate, which we find excel, after the Manners of our Country, all that we know among us; tho' by Foreigners they may be thought but of a moderate ſize. Thus *Great Learning* has a very different Signification in the Mouth of a Man of Letters, and of an ignorant Perſon; it is of a much larger extent in the former, than in the later.

5. In ſhort, all the Modes both of Mind and Body that admit of Encreaſe or Diminution, are the Prototypes of Relative *Ideas*. But this is to be obſerv'd with the utmoſt Attention, becauſe their Number is very large, which if confounded with *abſolute Ideas*, will give riſe to great Errors, and render us incapable of underſtanding the Diſcourſe of Others.

6. Here we muſt, in ſhort, remark, that the Judgments that we make are only the Perceptions of the *Relations* between various *Ideas*; in which *Relations* our Mind do's acquieſce,

quiesce. Thus when we judge that two times two make four, or that two times two do not make five: our Mind observes the *Relation* of Equality which is between two times two and four, and the Inequality which is between two times two and five; in which Perception, as evident, the Mind does acquiesce or is best satisfy'd, or gives it self no farther Trouble to consider of its Truth. But of this more at large in the second Part.

7. *Reasoning* also is a like Perception of the *Relations* join'd with that Acquiescence of the Mind. But it is not a Perception of the Relations which are among various Things, but of those Relations which the Relations themselves have among themselves. Thus when we gather from this, that 4 is a smaller Number then 6, and that twice 2 equals 4, that twice 2 is a less Number than 6; we perceive the Relation of Inequality, which is between the Relation of the Number twice 2 and 4, and the Relation of 4 and 6; acquiescing in which Perception, we conclude it a less Number than 6. But this belongs to the third and fourth Parts. yet we thought it proper to make this short remark here, that the Distinction we brought in the beginning of various Relations shou'd not be look'd on as empty and vain; for unless we retain this, we know not what our Mind do's in Judging and Reasoning. All our *Ideas* may be referr'd to *Substances*, *Modes* and *Relations*.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of* Ideas *which are offer'd to the Mind without any Operation of its own; and of those, in the forming which, some Operation of the Mind does intervene.*

1. THere are certain *Ideas* which are only consider'd by the Mind, without any manner of addition; such are all *Simple Ideas*, which have not any Dependance on the Will and Pleasure of the Mind, and in spight of that, are always the same. Thus the Mind has no Command over Pleasure, or Pain. Now the other simple *Ideas*, which we have enumerated before, we find to be of that nature, as that if the Mind endeavour to detract any thing from them, they utterly perish, and cease to be; nor can it add any thing, without the destruction of their Simplicity.

2. To

2. To this ſame Head we may refer thoſe *Compound Ideas* which offer themſelves to the Mind, without our thinking of the Matter, ſuch as the Ideas of Things that exiſt; which Things affect our Senſes, and excite certain Ideas of themſelves in our Mind.

3. Theſe *Ideas* are term'd *Real*, becauſe they proceed from Things exiſting without us. On the contrary, there are other *Compound Ideas*, which are not brought to the Mind from abroad, but are compounded by that, according to its Pleaſure. Thus, by joining the Ideas of *half a Man*, and *half a Horſe*, the *Idea* of a *Centaur* is form'd; which is done in no other manner, than by the Mind's Will to have the Image of a *Centaur* the Object of its View; or by conſidering at once the Body of a *Man* from the Waiſte to the Head, and the Body of a *Horſe* with the Head and Neck cut off: For ſuch is the Force of the Humane Mind, that it can joyn whatever is not contradictory, by its Contemplation, and reſcind whatever it pleaſes. Theſe *Ideas*, thus compounded by the Mind, we call *Phantaſtic*.

4. As the Mind can conſider thoſe Things together, which in Reality, and without it ſelf, are not joyn'd together in one Exiſtence; ſo can it conſider thoſe Things ſeparately, which do not in Reality exiſt ſeparately. And this ſort of Contemplation, which is call'd *Abſtraction*, is of great Uſe to the accurate Conſideration of *Compound Ideas*. For we cannot, if they conſiſt of a larger number of Parts, diſtinctly ſee them in our Mind all together; 'tis therefore an Advantage to us, that we can examine ſome of them ſeparately, a little delaying the Conſideration of the reſt.

5. *Abſtraction* is made principally three ways: *Firſt*, Our Mind can conſider any one Part of a Thing really diſtinct from it, as a *Man*'s *Arm*, without the Contemplation of the reſt of his Body. But this is not properly *Abſtraction*, ſince the *Arm* is, without the Interpoſition of the *Mind*, ſeparated diſtinct from the *Body*, tho' it cannot live, that is, be nouriſh'd, encreaſe, or move in that Separation.

6. *Secondly*, We think by *Abſtraction* of the *Mode* of a *Subſtance*, omitting the Subſtance it ſelf, or when we ſeparately conſider ſeveral Modes, which ſubſiſt together in one Subject. This *Abſtraction* the *Geometricians* make uſe of, when they conſider the Length of a Body ſeparately, which they call a *Line*, omitting evidently the Conſideration of its Breadth and Depth. And then its Length and Breadth together, which they call the *Surface*. By the ſame *Abſtraction* we

can

can diſtinguiſh the determination of a Motion, towards what Place directed, from the Motion it ſelf.

7. *Thirdly*, We, by *Abſtraction*, omit the *Modes* and *Relations* of any particular Thing, if from it we form a *Univerſal Idea*. Thus, when we wou'd underſtand a *Thinking Being* in general, we gather from our ſelf Conſciouſneſs what it is to *Think*, and, omitting the Conſideration of thoſe Things which have a peculiar Reference to the Humane Mind, we think of a thinking Being in general. By this means particular *Ideas* become general.

8. That we may not err in judging of the *Ideas* mention'd in this Chapter, we muſt make theſe Obſervations. *Firſt*, That thoſe *Ideas* which offer themſelves to the Mind without any Operation of its own, muſt of neceſſity be excited by ſome external Cauſe, and ſo are plac'd before the Mind as they are. But we muſt take heed that we do not think that there is always in thoſe Things themſelves which excite thoſe *Ideas*, any thing like them, becauſe it may happen that they are not the true and real Cauſes, but only the Occaſions by which thoſe *Ideas* are produc'd. And this Suſpicion ought to heighten by what we experience in our Dreams, when by the occaſion of the Motion of the Brain there are the Images of Things ſet before us, which are not preſent themſelves, and often have no Exiſtence in Nature. Whence we may gather from ſuchlike *Ideas*, that the *Cauſe* or *Occaſion* of their Production has an external Subſiſtence, and not in the Mind.

9. *Secondly*, As to thoſe *Ideas* which are compounded by the Mind, we eaſily imagine, firſt, that the Originals of ſuch *Ideas* may poſſibly ſomewhere exiſt; and then, that they realy do, unleſs we are manifeſtly convinc'd by Experience, that they never did realy exiſt conjunctly, and ſo join'd together. And on the contrary, that thoſe Things which the Mind conſiders ſeparately by *Abſtraction*, do realy exiſt in that ſeparate State. As the Mathematical *Point* without any Parts; and *Lines* conſiſting only of thoſe *Points* join'd together, without Breadth or Depth, and *Surfaces* without Depth; whereas Demonſtration ſhows the contrary, and thoſe Terms are only made uſe of by the Mathematicians for the ſake of the Inſtruction of the Learners of that Art.

10. We muſt here farther warn you againſt another Error too frequent among the *School Men*, that is, not to make thoſe realy diſtinct Things, or different Beings, which we have diſtinguiſh'd by *Abſtraction*.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Individual, Particular, and Univerſal* IDEAS.

1. WHat we have ſaid of *Abſtractions* leads us to the conſideration of *Ideas*, as they are *individual*, *particular*, and *univerſal*, for they are made *particular* and *univerſal* from *individual*, by *Abſtraction*; in which Matter we proceed in this manner. When we conſider our ſelves, in our Mind, or any one Man before us, then we have the *Idea* of an *Individual*, or an *Individual Idea*. But if we omit thoſe Things which are peculiar to us, or that one Man, and conſider what is common to us and many others; ſuch as to be born in the ſame Country, to be of the ſame Party, and the like, then is the *Idea* of ſome *Particular* Nation, or Family, *&c.* plac'd before us: But laſtly, if omitting theſe particular Diſtinctions common to us and a certain number of Men, we conſider what is common to us and all Mankind, we have then an *Univerſal Idea*.

2. The Names that ſignify *individual Ideas*, are call'd *proper*; as, *Alexander*, *Cæſar*. But thoſe which ſignify *particular* and *univerſal Ideas*, are call'd *Appellative*, or *Common*; as, a *Briton*, a *Chriſtian*, a *Man*.

3. Farther — We may diſtinguiſh in thoſe *Ideas* certain Properties which are conſtantly united in them, and external *Subjects* agreeable to thoſe *Ideas*, or ſuch as the *Ideas* agree with. Thus in the *Idea* of Man we diſcover or ſee a thinking Mind and a Body conſiſting of certain Organs; but this *Idea* agrees with the Inhabitants of *Europe*, *Aſia*, *Africa* and *America*.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Perſpicuity and Obſcurity of* IDEAS.

1. BEfore we can paſs any certain Judgment of an *Idea*, it is firſt neceſſary that it ſhou'd be *clear* or *perſpicuous*, otherwiſe if we ſhou'd happen to paſs a right Judgment on a Thing that is not known, or at leaſt not ſufficiently clear, it muſt be attributed to Chance, and not to Knowledge. The Obſcurity and Clearneſs of *Ideas* are therefore worthy our Conſideration in the *Art of Reaſoning*.

2. We call that a *clear Idea*, when all it comprehends is ſo diſtinctly plac'd before our Mind, that we can eaſily diſtinguiſh it from all others.

3. All

3. All *simple Ideas* are *clear*, such as *Sensations*; such therefore is the *Idea* of Light: For when we have that *Idea* before us, we see all that is in it, nor can we confound it with any other. We may say the same of Sounds, Scents, Tastes, Pleasure, Pain, &c. which can never be confounded or mingled with each other. And these *Sensations* encrease in their Clearness in proportion to the Liveliness of their striking on the Organ proper to them; for by how much more vehemently the Mind is strook, with so much the more Attention it applies to the Subject, and so this lively *Idea* is more clearly distinguish'd from all others.

4. These *simple Ideas* are also *perspicuous* or *clear*, which the Mind receives without the Interposition of the Body: Examples of which we have given under the Head of *simple Compounded Ideas*. But as we can consider the Parts of a *compound Idea* separately, so we view them singly, or one by one as *simple Ideas*, of which they are compounded: Thus also all *abstract Ideas* are *clear*, tho' the Subject in which they exist be unknown. We can in all Substances, of which we know any Properties, select some Property, which being by *Abstraction* separated from all the rest, becomes *simple*, and by consequence *clear*, altho' it exist in a Subject which we do not know. Thus *Humanity* generally consider'd, is made a *simple Idea*, and therefore indivisible.

5. But these same *Ideas* are often made obscure when they are consider'd without *Abstraction*, together with other *Ideas* that are obscure, and co-exist in the Subject. Thus when the Question is not, what Humanity or Reason is in general, but what Reason is in *Stephen*, or in *Thomas*, and what is its numerical Difference.

6. Those *compounded Ideas* are clear, *all* whose Parts, or *simple Ideas* of which they are compounded, are perfectly known to us. But those we call obscure of which we only know some Parts. Thus when we know all the *Unites* of which any Number consists, we certainly know the Number; but if we have gone through but some of the *Unites*, we cannot know how much the whole is; and have therefore a confus'd *Idea* of it.

7. Whenever, therefore, we are to judge of any Thing, we must first distinguish all its Parts, if it consist of Parts, and then give Judgment: Else we shall do as if we should give the Sum Total of an Accompt, and not know the particular Numbers or Figures which make it up. But more of this in the *Third Part*.

8. But

8. But if in the Things which fall under our Conſideration we cannot ſufficiently diſtinguiſh their Parts, and give a certain Enumeration of them, we muſt then fairly confeſs, that either they are not in the number of thoſe Things to which the Knowledge of Man can extend, or that it requires more Time to examine into the Matter.

9. It much conduces to the *clearneſs* of an *Idea* compounded by our ſelves or others, if the Parts which compoſe it are always of the ſame Number, and in the ſame Order; otherwiſe, if the Number of the *ſimple Ideas* of which it's compos'd, can be encreas'd or leſſen'd, or their Order inverted, the Memory, and ſo the Mind, is confounded. Thus if any one has with Care caſt up any Sums, and plac'd them in any certain Order, as often as he has a Mind to remember them, he eaſily does it, if there has been no Abſtraction or diſplacing in the Accompt. But on the contrary, the former Computation and Diſpoſition is deſtroy'd if the Numbers are diſturb'd, and thrown out of their Places.

10. In ſhort, the Nature of *Perſpicuity* or *Clearneſs*, is ſuch when it is at its height, that it compels our Aſſent. We cannot have the leaſt doubt but that Pleaſure is different from Pain, or that twice two make four. On the contrary, we find a Power in our Minds of ſuſpending our Judgment when there is any Obſcurity in the *Ideas*. But 'tis certain, that we often raſhly yield our Aſſent to obſcure *Ideas*, but ſtill we have Liberty to deny it; which we cannot do to an *Idea* which has a compleat *Perſpicuity* or *Clearneſs*.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Adequate and Inadequate, or Perfect or Imperfect* IDEAS.

1. WE have obſerv'd in the firſt Chapter, that *Ideas* are the Images of Things which are without us, by the Force or Occaſion of which they are excited in us; but they may be the Images of the whole Thing that excites them, or only of a part. When they repreſent the whole, they are call'd *Adequate*, or perfect; when but a part, they are call'd *Inadequate*, or imperfect. Thus if we ſee only the ſquare Surface of a *Cube*, then the Idea of a ſquare Figure, not of a *Cube*, is in our Mind; which, therefore, is call'd an *inadequate* or *imperfect Idea*. On the contrary, if

we behold a Triangle drawn on a piece of Paper, and think of a Triangle in Plane, we have an *adequate* or *perfect* Idea in our Mind.

2. All simple Ideas are *adequate* or *perfect*, because the Faculty (be it what it will) that excites them represents them entire. Thus the Pain that we feel signifies, that there is some Faculty of some Being without us, which excites that Idea in us against our Will. But we must proceed no farther, for a *simple Idea* represents a *simple Object*, but it does not inform us where it is, or whether that Faculty be united to any others. We may therefore, without fear of Error, gather from any Sensation, that there is something out of our Mind which is by Nature adapted to excite it in us.

3. The *Ideas* of *Modes* are also *adequate* or *perfect*, except of those *Modes* which are likewise Substances. For when we understand no *Modes* separately existing, they are only consider'd by us separately from the Substances by way of *Abstraction*; but all *abstract Ideas* are *adequate* or *perfect*, since they represent all that Part of the Subject which we then consider. Thus the *Idea* of *Roundness* is *perfect* or *adequate*, because it offers to our Mind all that is in *Roundness* in general. The *Idea* of a *Triangle* in general is *adequate* or *perfect*, because when it's before my Mind, I see all that is common to all the Triangles that can be.

4. Of the same kind are all *Ideas*, of which we know no original or external Object realy existing out of them, by the occasion of which those *Ideas* are excited in us, and of which we think them the Images. Thus, when a Dog is before us, it is the external Object without us, which raises the *Idea* in our Mind; but the *Idea* of an *Animal* in general has no external Object to excite it; 'tis created by the Mind it self, which adds to, and detracts from it whatever it pleases; whence it must of necessity be *adequate* or *perfect*.

5. But here again, we must take heed of what we have before caution'd, that is, that we do not suppose that there are any such Objects realy existing without us, because the Mind has been pleas'd to entertain it self with the *Ideas*: For that wou'd be as if a Painter that had drawn a *Centaur*, or Hundred-handed *Encelades*, shou'd contend, that there were such Beings realy existent in Nature.

6. The *Ideas* of all Substances are *inadequate* or *imperfect*, which are not form'd at the pleasure of the Mind, but gather'd from certain Properties which Experience discovers in them. This is sufficiently evident from what we have

said

ſaid of *Subſtances* in the third *Chapter*. For there we have ſhown that we only know ſome of the Properties of *Subſtances*, not all; and therefore their *Ideas* muſt be *imperfect*, or *inadequate*. Thus we know that Silver is white, that it can be melted, and be diminiſh'd by the Fire as it melts; that it can be drawn out into Wire, and diſſolv'd by *Aqua fortis*, &c. but we are wholly ignorant of the inward Diſpoſition or Conſtitution of the Particles of which Silver conſiſts, and from whence thoſe Properties proceed. Thus the *Idea* of Silver not repreſenting to the Mind all the Properties of Silver, is *inadequate* or *imperfect*.

7. Here the greateſt Danger is, leaſt we confound *inadequate* or *imperfect Ideas* with the *adequate* or *perfect*. For we are too apt to fancy, that when we know a great many Properties of any Thing, and cannot diſcover any more by all our Induſtry, we have the whole Subject. Thus ſome ingenious Men of our Times, imagin'd they had diſcover'd all the Properties of the Mind, becauſe they cou'd find nothing in it but Thoughts, and therefore ſaid, that the Mind was only a *Thinking Subſtance*; and ſo they contend that there is nothing elſe in Body but *Extenſion*, *Impenetrability*, and *Diviſibility*, becauſe they cou'd diſcover nothing elſe; but they cou'd never yet ſhew us what thoſe *Subſtances* were whoſe Properties were to think, to have Parts, &c. There is no Exiſtence of *Subſtance* in general; and tho' we underſtand this Word in *General*, it does by no means follow, that we underſtand it when 'tis ſpoke of any particular Subject, which we muſt be ſure to have a particular Regard to.

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*The End of the* Firſt Part *of the* Art *of* REASONING.

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# *The* Second Part *of* LOGIC; OR, *The* Art *of* REASONING.

## *Of* JUDGMENTS.

### CHAP. I.

### *Of* Judgment *in the* Mind, *and expreſs'd in* Words.

1. HAving conſider'd *Ideas* and their Properties particularly, we come now to treat of *Judgments*, in which various *Ideas* are compar'd with each other. We muſt firſt accurately diſtinguiſh the *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, from the Words in which it is expreſs'd, if we wou'd know what it is.

2. *Judgment*, as it is in the Mind and unwritten, is a Perception of the Relation that is between two or more *Ideas*. Thus when we judge that the Sun is greater than the Moon; having compar'd the two *Ideas* of the Sun and Moon, we find that the *Idea* of the Sun is greater than that of the Moon, and our Mind perfectly acquieſces in this Perception, nor makes any farther Enquiry into the matter. When we judge two Members to be unequal, by having obſerv'd the inequality of their *Ideas*, our Mind gives it ſelf no farther Trouble in their Examination in that reſpect, but only confines to its Memory, that thoſe two Members were found to be unequal.

3. We muſt here obſerve, That our Mind can give its Aſſent to *obſcure Ideas*, as well as to thoſe which are *clear*; or acquieſce in a Thing as perfectly diſcover'd, which yet it has no perfect Knowledge of, and can commit this to the Memory as a Thing perfectly known. Thus we may judge the fix'd Stars leſs than the Moon, by comparing the *obſcure Ideas* of thoſe Stars and the Moon, and then take it for a point

point not to be argu'd againſt, as clear and evident. The Mind has alſo a Faculty of ſuſpending its Aſſent, till by an accurate Examen of the *Ideas*, the Subject becomes clear and evident; or if it be of ſuch a Nature that we cannot arrive at a perſpicuous Perception, we continue in Doubt or Suſpenſe, and commend it to the Memory as a dubious matter. This *Faculty* which we obſerve in our Mind, of giving our Aſſent to *obſcure Ideas*, or denying it, is call'd *Liberty*.

4. But we cannot make uſe of this *Faculty* when the Subject of our Thoughts has the laſt and greateſt Perſpicuity that can be. For Example, we can by no Means in the World perſuade our ſelves, that twice two do not make four, or are equal to four; or that the Part is not leſs than the whole, and the like Maxims of the moſt evident Truths; for as ſoon as ever we hear them, the Mind cannot deny its Aſſent, but neceſſarily acquieſces, without finding in it ſelf the leaſt Deſire or Inclination of making any farther Enquiry into the Matter.

5. This is a *Judgment* as it is in the Mind, which when expreſs'd in Words, we call a *Propoſition*, in which ſomething always is affirm'd or deny'd. That part of the Propoſition of which ſomething is affirm'd or deny'd, is call'd the *Subject*; the other Part, which is ſaid by the Negation or Affirmation, is call'd the *Attribute*. Thus when we ſay that *Poverty is to be reliev'd*; or *Poverty is no Vice*; the Word *Poverty* is the *Subject*; *to be reliev'd*, and *Vice*, are the *Attributes*. But beſides theſe two Parts, we muſt conſider the *Copula*, or *connective Word*, by which, when 'tis alone, 'tis affirm'd that there is ſome Relation between the *Subject* and the *Attribute*, but by adding a Negative Particle, that ſome Relation is deny'd: In the preſent Inſtances we affirm in the firſt, that there is a Relation between the Idea of *Poverty*, and the Idea of *Relief*, ſo that the Idea of *Poverty* in our Mind includes the Idea of *Relief*; and in the later Inſtance we deny that the Idea of *Poverty* excites in us the Conſideration of any thing baſe or wicked.

6. *Propoſitions* are ſometimes expreſs'd in many Words, and ſometimes in few. *Henry rages*, is an entire Propoſition, for 'tis the ſame as if we ſhou'd ſay *Henry is raging*.

7. *Propoſitions* are either *Simple* or *Compound*, the *Simple* are expreſs'd in one Word; as, *God is good*: the *Compound* in many, as *God, who is good, cannot delight in the Miſery of Man*.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of Univerſal, Particular, and Singular* Propoſitions.

1. WE have in the former Part divided Ideas into *Univerſal*, *Particular*, and *Singular*, and ſaid that the Words by which they were expreſs'd, might be rang'd under the ſame Heads. Hence the *Propoſitions* have the ſame threefold Diviſion.

2. When the Subject is *Univerſal*, or taken in its whole extent, without excepting any ſubordinate Species or Sort, or any other Individual which is contain'd under it, then is the *Propoſition* call'd *Univerſal*. This *Univerſality* is expreſs'd by the Word *All* when the *Propoſition* is affirmative; and by that of *None* or *No*, when it is negative; *All Men are free*, is an univerſal affirmative Propoſition, and *No Man is free*, is an univerſal Negative.

3. But the *Subject* has ſome mark or note by which we ſhew, that not all the Sorts or Species, or Individuals, which are compriz'd under that Word, are meant; then is the Propoſition *Particular*; as, *ſome Man is free*. By the Word *ſome* we intimate that we do not here underſtand all that is ſignify'd by the general Word *Man*, but that we only deſign a Part by the Word *ſome*.

4. *Singular* or *Individual Propoſitions* are thoſe in which we affirm only of ſome one individual Perſon or Thing; as, *Alexander was choleric*. Theſe Propoſitions have a great Affinity to the *Univerſals* in this, that the Subject of both is taken in its full and whole extent. Hence the Individual Propoſitions in the common Rules of Argumentation are taken for Univerſals.

5. To paſs over the trifling of the Schools, which make *Logic* the *Art of Diſputing*, not *Reaſoning*, and have more Regard to make the Student talk of any thing *Pro* and *Con*, than to find out the Truth, we muſt obſerve, that an Obſervation flowing from what we have before ſaid of Subſtances, is of more Importance for the diſcovery of the Truth, the only juſt End of *Reaſoning*. That is, that Univerſal Propoſitions, when of the Kinds or Species, or of the Generals and Particulars of Subſtances, cannot be with any certainty made agreeable to the Things themſelves; becauſe ſince

we

we do not know the Eſſences of them, we cannot affirm that all Subſtances in which we diſcover ſome certain Attributes equaly to co-exiſt, are in thoſe of which we know nothing alike, or the ſame. As for Example, We diſcover and obſerve that there are certain ſingular Attributes conſtantly co-exiſting in all Men, yet who can aſſure us whether all their Minds are alike, ſo far as that, what difference betwixt Particulars is viſible, ariſes from external Cauſe in reſpect of the Mind, as from the Body, from Education, and the like; or that there is realy ſome real difference between them in the Subſtance of the Mind itſelf. The difference of the Wit and Genius of Men ſeems to perſuade the later Opinion, which is obſervable in two Brothers who have had the ſame Education; but ſince we know not whether the Brain in both is diſpos'd in the ſame manner, the Diverſity of the Wit and Ingenuity may proceed from that Cauſe.

5. Thus ſuch as with Aſſurance affirm, that the inmoſt Eſſence of all Bodies is the ſame; if they are in the right, they owe that more to Chance than to any clear Knowledge of the Matter: For there might be a plain difference betwixt the inmoſt Eſſence of various Bodies, altho' they agree in having ſeveral of the ſame Attributes, which we do know. We ſhou'd therefore take a particular Care, as to theſe general Propoſitions of Subſtances, not to give up our Aſſent to ſuch who pretend to have a perfect and clear Knowledge of their inmoſt Eſſence.

6. The *Modes*, whoſe entire Eſſence is known to us, fall under a different Conſideration; for we may form general Aſſertions of them, of indubitable Truth. Hence it is that *Geometry*, which is wholly converſant with the *Modes*, is built on the moſt certain Foundation, and delivers Univerſal Rules of all Figures and Magnitudes, which cannot be deſtroy'd or oppos'd.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of what is Truth and Falſhood, and whether there be any certain Difference between them.*

1. BY Reaſoning to find out the Truth, being the juſt Aim of this our Art, we ſhall paſs over the ſeveral Claſſes of Propoſitions ſet down by the common *Logicians*, and which are of little conſequence in any thing, but of no man-

manner of uſe to this more important End. We ſhall therefore here treat of the Truth and Falſhood in general of all Propoſitions, that we may learn to diſtinguiſh the one from the other.

2. That Propoſition is true which is agreeable, or anſwers to the Nature of the Thing, of which any thing is affirm'd or deny'd. Thus when we ſay that 4 is the one fourth part of twice 8. That Propoſition is true, becauſe agreeable to the Nature of theſe Numbers. If we ſay twice 4 is equal to twice 3, the Propoſition is falſe, becauſe it is not anſwerable to the Nature of thoſe Numbers.

3. Whoevever will ſpeak ſeriouſly what he thinks, will confeſs, that he neceſſarily believes that there is no Medium between *Truth* and *Falſhood*. It is certain, that all Propoſitions, conſider'd in themſelves, appear to us either true or falſe; for 'tis a *Contradiction to be agreeable or conſentaneous, and not conſentaneous and agreeable to the Things*. There are indeed ſome probable Propoſitions, or ſuſpected of Falſity, but this has nothing to do with the Nature of Propoſitions, which is in it ſelf determinately true or falſe; but to our Knowledge, which is not (in reſpect of theſe Propoſitions) ſufficient to enable us to determine with certainty. Of which hereafter.

4. There have been ſome who have aſſerted, that this only was certain, *that nothing was certain*, and that *Truth* had no Criterion or certain Mark to be known from *Falſhood* in any thing elſe but that one Maxim. But ſince they cou'd not deny but that they held this Maxim for a certain *Truth*, there muſt be, ev'n according to them, ſome mark of *Truth*, by which they excepted that Maxim from the uncertainty of all other Propoſitions. And they were of Opinion, that they had found the Marks of Uncertainty in all theſe Things, which the other Philoſophical Sects held for undoubted *Truths*. They therefore determin'd poſitively of all Things at the ſame Time that they pretended to doubt of all Things, while they aſſerted, that all that was ſaid by others, was uncertain. We cannot therefore condemn the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, as denying that Truth was not at all known to us, while they thought they did truly judge of the Uncertainty of all Things, in which they were as dogmatic and poſitive as any of the other Philoſophers.

5. But that we may ſatisfy our ſelves, we muſt make it the Object of our Enquiry to know, that what we affirm of Things is conſentaneous or agreeable to their Nature. If

we

we will give our ſelves the Trouble to look into our own Minds, we ſhall find, that there are ſome Things which compel our Aſſent; but other Things of which we can ſuſpend our Judgment. When we clearly and diſtinctly diſcover the certain Relation between two Ideas, we cannot but acquieſce in that Perception, or think our ſelves oblig'd to make farther Enquiries about it. Thus the Relation of Equality between twice 4 and 8, is ſo manifeſt and evident, that we cannot entertain the leaſt doubt of the matter.

6. But ſhou'd any Man affirm, *that there were Inhabitants in the Moon*, after a long conſideration of this Propoſition we ſhall find that we are by no means compell'd to give our Aſſent to it; the Reaſon of which is, that we do not diſtinctly and plainly diſcover any neceſſary Relation between the Moon, and any manner of Inhabitants, but that we can doubt of that Relation, till it be made evident to our Underſtanding.

7. Hence we may gather, that *Evidence* alone can remove all our Doubts. What remains is, that we enquire, whether it follows, that that Propoſition is true, of which we have no Reaſon to doubt?

8. We muſt firſt in this Queſtion obſerve, that it is entirely ſuperfluous among Men, becauſe whatever Judgment we make of it, we cannot change our Nature. We neceſſarily give our Aſſent to thoſe Things which are *evident*, and we ſhall always preſerve our Faculty or Pow'r of doubting in thoſe Things which are obſcure.

9. *Secondly*, If Evidence ſhou'd be found in Propoſitions that are falſe, we muſt neceſſarily be compell'd into Error, ſince we neceſſarily give our Aſſent to Evidence. Hence wou'd follow this impious Poſition, That God, who made us, is the Author of our Errors, ſince he has thus put us under a Neceſſity of falling into 'em. But it is only conſiſtent with a wicked Nature to oblige us to be deceiv'd, which in the leaſt to ſuſpect God, wou'd be the height of Impiety.

10. *Thirdly*, We neceſſarily love Truth, and hate Error; for there is no body who is not deſirous of knowing the Truth, and no body is willingly deceiv'd. But who can prevail with himſelf ſo much as to ſuſpect, that we are made in ſuch a manner by a Beneficent Deity, that we ſhou'd love that with the greateſt Vehemence, which we either cou'd not obtain, or not know whether we obtain'd it or not, which is much the ſame.

11. *Fourthly*,

11. *Fourthly*, If we ſhou'd err in Things that are evident, as well as in thoſe which are not ſo, we ſhou'd ſometimes in the evident Propoſitions find Contradictions, which are commonly found in thoſe which treat of Things that are obſcure. On the contrary, evident Things are always agreeable to each other, when frequently evident Things diſagree with thoſe that are obſcure: Whence we may conclude, that Evidence can not deceive, but Error is confin'd to Obſcurity.

12. *Evidence* is, therefore, the Criterion or Mark of *Truth*; and thoſe Things we ought to think true, to which we neceſſarily give our Aſſent. For this is likewiſe the Mark or Characteriſtic of Truth, that it neceſſarily compels our Aſſent. Whatever, therefore, we ſee *evidently* agreeable to the Things of which we ſpeak, that we muſt think true. On the other hand, when we find any Propoſition evidently contrary to the Nature of the Thing under our Conſideration, we may juſtly declare that to be falſe.

13. But to decide peremptorily in a Matter that is obſcure, is very raſh and inconſiderate, as we have obſerv'd in the Firſt Part, of the *clearneſs* or *obſcurity* of *Ideas*, which we ſhall not repeat. But ſince thoſe Things which are realy obſcure are often aſſerted to be evident, whoever wou'd avoid that Error, ought as much as he can to ſuſpend his Judgment; and nicely to examine whether he be not influenc'd by ſome Inclination, or Paſſion, or Party, when the finding out the Truth ought to be his whole Aim; and then he will never give his Aſſent to Things that are falſe or obſcure.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the ſeveral Steps or Degrees of Perſpicuity in Propoſitions, and of Veriſimilitude, or Probability.*

1. BEcauſe all that we believe is not built on any evident Knowledge, the Philoſophers have obſerv'd in our Knowledge ſeveral Degrees, all which however may be reduc'd to theſe two, *Science* and *Opinion*.

*Science* is a Knowledge deriv'd from the Introſpection or looking into the Thing it ſelf of which we diſcourſe, and which

which exclude all manner of Doubt. But it may ariſe from a ſimple Intuition or View of the Ideas; as, when we conſider this Propoſition—*The whole is greater than a Part*, and the like; whoſe Truth is known by Evidence alone, without any Reaſoning on the Point. Or by deducing certain Conſequences, and thoſe more remote, from evident Principles, ſuch as are innumerable Geometrical Demonſtrations, neceſſarily deduc'd by a long Chain of Arguments from their firſt Principles.

3. *Opinion* is the Aſſent of the Mind to Propoſitions not evidently true at the firſt ſight, nor deduc'd by neceſſary Conſequence from thoſe which are evidently true, but ſuch as ſeem to carry the face of Truth. Thus 'tis probable that the Writers of the Life of *Alexander* magnify'd too much his Exploits. 'Tis not probable, or likely, that he ever receiv'd the Queen of the *Amazons*, or paſs'd the Mountain *Caucaſus*.

4. Some here add *Faith* or *Belief*, which is an Aſſent given to any one that tells us any Thing which we have not ſeen our ſelves, nor found out by any Argument, or Ratiocination. But that Faith or Belief depends either on ſome neceſſary Concluſion deduc'd from evident Arguments, or only on a probable Opinion, and ſo may be referr'd to one of the two Heads already mention'd.

5. To theſe we might add *Doubting*, or a *doubtful Aſſent*, tho' this be likewiſe a Species or ſort of *Opinion*, and uſes to be contain'd under the general Name of Opinion. For the Aſſent is *doubtful* when the Probability is weak, which when ſtrong, produces *firm Opinion*. But to make theſe clearer to the Underſtanding, we will make a gradual Riſing from Probability to Evidence.

6. Since, as we have ſeen in the former Chapter, thoſe are call'd true Propoſitions, which agrees with the Nature of the Things of which they are ſpoken; and thoſe probable which only ſeem to agree to the Nature of the Thing under Conſideration; that Probability may be greater or leſs, and ſo produces either a ſtronger or weaker Opinion. But it is built, ſummarily conſider'd, on our Knowledge and Experience, whether True or Falſe.

7. But to riſe from the loweſt to the higheſt Probability, we muſt firſt obſerve, that the loweſt Degree of Probability is built on the Relation of another where that is the only Motive of Belief; in which yet many things are to be conſider'd.

8. If

8. If the Perſon who gives the Relation be wholly un known to us, altho' what he tells is not incredible, yet we cannot give an entire Credit to him, when there are no other Circumſtances to add a Weight to his Narration, becauſe we have had no other Experience of his Credibility; or whether he be worthy of Belief or not. But if we have ſome ſlight Knowledge of him, we are the more ready to believe him, eſpecially if he be a noted Man of great Authority with many, tho' we know not whether he has gain'd that Fame and Authority by his Merits or not. Nay, we rather believe a rich Man of indifferent Qualifications, than a poor Man, becauſe we ſuppoſe the former more conver ſant with Perſons skill'd in Affairs, than the later. An honeſt Countenance, and Diſcourſe full of Probity, eaſily win our Aſſent.

9. If any one with whom we are better acquainted, tells us any thing, the more known that is, the more Inſtances we have of his Veracity, the more ready he finds us to have aſſurance in the Truth of what he tells us, tho' he may deceive us ev'n in that very Narration. 'Tis with difficulty we can perſuade our ſelves, that we are deceiv'd by a Perſon whom we have known generally to be a Man of Veracity, ſince Men who have got a Habit of ſpeaking Truth, or any other Habit, ſeldom act contrary to the conſtant Diſpoſition of their Mind.

10. There are beſides, various Circumſtances which add Force to the Teſtimony of others, as if it were a Thing of that kind in which he cou'd ſcarce be deceiv'd; as if Men of Sobriety and Temper ſhou'd tell us, that they had ſeen, touch'd, and accurately examin'd ſome particular Thing, and not with a tranſient curſory View. The Probability is heighten'd, if the Belief of their Hearers be of no Advantage to them; or if they incurr a conſiderable Danger by telling it, which they might avoid by ſaying nothing of the Matter; if to theſe the number of the Witneſſes be encreas'd, the *Probability* will be ſo ſtrong, that unleſs the Narration be oppoſite to the Nature of the Thing, we can ſcarce be able to deny our Aſſent.

11. *Secondly*, what here affects our Minds, is drawn from the very Nature of the Thing, and our own Experience. Whoever will tell us Stories that are impoſſible, can never gain our Belief, as long as the Narration labours under that Character; for that is the Mark of Falſhood.

12. 'Tis

12. 'Tis firſt of all Things neceſſary, that what is ſpoken ſhou'd be thought poſſible: If we have never ſeen it, nor heard that any other has experienc'd the like, tho' the Matter it ſelf be not actually impoſſible, yet it will find but little Credit with us: For Example —— If any one ſhou'd tell us, That he had ſeen in the *Indies* a Brillant Diamond as big as a Man's Head; tho' in this our Mind can diſcover nothing plainly impoſſible, or contradictory, yet ſhou'd we ſcarce believe it, becauſe we never our ſelves ſaw one ſo large, or ever heard of any one elſe who had.

13. When we our ſelves have ſeen any Thing like it, or have known others who have ſeen the like, we then conſider how ſeldom, or how often it has happen'd, for the more frequent a Thing has been to our Eyes, or thoſe of others to our Knowledge, the eaſier Credit it finds with us; and on the contrary, the ſeldomer, the more difficultly believ'd. Thus if any one tell us, that he has ſeen a Stone Bridge over a River one or two hundred Paces long, he will find no difficulty in gaining our Belief: But we give Credit more hardly to him who ſhall tell us, that has ſeen a Bridge of ſolid Marble four mile in length, over an Arm of the Sea, and another Bridge of four hundred Foot in length, of only one Arch, as they ſay there are in *China*.

14. By the Teſt of the ſame Experience we examine the Circumſtances of the Manner of doing any thing, the Circumſtances of the Perſons, Place and Time, and if theſe agree with what we know, they add a Force to the Relation. We farther are apt to conſider and weigh the Cauſes or Motives which mov'd him to whom the Action is attributed to do it. For if the Thing be ſingular, uncommon, and out of the Way, we can ſcarce believe that it ſhou'd be done without ſolid and weighty Reaſons, of which, while we are ignorant, the Matter of Fact muſt at leaſt remain dubious in our Minds. But if theſe ſolid and cogent Reaſons are known, we ceaſe to doubt, or at leaſt, we eaſily believe the Matter of Fact, if withal it appear, that the Agent knew theſe Reaſons and Motives. Thus we eaſily believe the many Prodigies or Miracles of the Old Teſtament, done by God, becauſe they were of the moſt momentous Importance to preſerve at leaſt one Nation uncorrupted by Idolatry, which cou'd not have been done without thoſe Miracles. But we can ſcarce perſuade our Minds to believe, that God, after the Chriſtian Religion was eſtabliſh'd, ſhou'd work Miracles on every trifling Occaſion, as the Legends of the old Monks and modern Papiſts pretend.

15. We muſt ſeek the third Motive of our Belief in our ſelves: For there are ſome Events, the Truth of which cannot appear to any, but ſuch whoſe Minds are firſt qualify'd by ſome certain Knowledge: As for Example, theſe are ſome Events of Ancient Hiſtory. *There was a King of* Macedon, *whoſe Name was* Alexander, *who ſubdu'd* Aſia, *having vanquiſh'd King* Darius. Theſe are ſo well known to thoſe who are converſant with the *Greek* and *Roman* Hiſtory, that they can have no doubt of the Truth; but it is not ſo evident to a Man who is wholly unacquainted with Hiſtory; for the former has read many Writers of various Nations and Times, all concurring in the ſame Account; he knows the Series of the whole Hiſtory with which theſe are connected, and came to that Knowledge by degrees, by much Reading: To ſatisfy another in this Point, he muſt lead him up the ſame Steps by which he mounted, elſe he will find it difficult to make one obſtinate believe him.

16. In this Probability of Relations, the fewer or more of theſe Circumſtances occurring, makes it the weaker or ſtronger. Nay, when they all, or the greateſt part meet, ſo great is the Force of the joining of thoſe Circumſtances, that they affect our Mind like the *higheſt Evidence*. For Example; he who reads the *Roman* Hiſtory, can no more doubt, but that there was ſuch a Man as *Julius Cæſar*, and that he vanquiſh'd *Pompey*, than that two Lines drawn from the Centre to the Circumference are equal.

17. As *Evidence* is the Criterion, or Characteriſtic of Truth in Things of Speculation, which depend on Reaſoning, ſo in *Matters of Fact* the Concourſe of ſo many Circumſtances is an undoubted Proof and Mark of Truth. 'Tis certain, that we can no more deny our Aſſent to theſe concurring Circumſtances, than to the *higheſt Evidence*; they therefore either perſuade and recommend the Truth, or (which is abſurd) God has ſo form'd us, that we muſt neceſſarily be deceiv'd.

18. There is likewiſe a *Probability* which depends only on our own *Reaſoning*, or *Experience*, without the intervention of any elſe, and omitting thoſe Circumſtances, which we have enumerated. And here we may diſtinguiſh ſuch various Steps and Degrees of *Probability*, that when we come to the higheſt, it is no longer a meer *Probability*, but manifeſt Truth, and compels our Aſſent without any Reſerve or Doubt.

19. I. When

19. I. When we conſider Things, of which we have ſome manner of Knowledge, but not a clear and perfect one, we may make a probable Judgment of them, better than if we were wholly ignorant of the Subject; but this Probability is ſo weak, that we may be perſuaded we have been in an Error. But when the Subject is perfectly known to us, by Experiment, we may make more certain Judgment of ſome Property of that Subject, which is not ſo thoroughly underſtood by us. Thus a Goldſmith, or Refiner, who has often melted Gold, and work'd in it in diverſe Ways, can make better Judgment of ſome things which belong to that Metal, than a Man who has never been employ'd about it.

20. II. He who has ſome time doubted of a Thing, and judges not of it, but after a ſerious and long Scrutiny, will make juſter Judgment of it than he who (without Experience) gives a raſh and precipitate Judgment. 'Tis certain, we believe our ſelves more, after we have made a thorough Enquiry into it, than when we are oblig'd to make a haſty and unpremeditated Judgment. We call not that a diligent Enquiry or Scrutiny, which leaves us in no manner of Doubt; for the Nature of the Thing of which we judge, do's not always allow ſo nice an Introſpection, as to free us from all manner of Doubt; but ſuch an Enquiry we call diligent, which is all that the Nature of the Thing will admit. Thus we can examine few, or rather no Subſtances, ſo far, as to aſſure our ſelves that we have a certain Knowledge of moſt of its Properties. This makes all Natural Philoſophy (which is not built on Experiments) a meer conjectural Amuſement.

21. III. If we have been us'd to ſuch Experiments before we give our Judgment, and have frequently given the like Judgments of other Things which have been approv'd by Experiments, taking thence a certain Aſſurance of a particular Faculty of finding out the Truth, we hope that with little Pains we have hit the Point; yet this Aſſurance is often very fallacious, and leads us into Errors.

22. IV. Our Judgments of Things are either more certain or uncertain, as the Experiments were made a ſhorter or longer time, from that in which we call them to Mind. For when our Memory of any Experiment is freſh, as well as the whole Courſe and Reaſons of the Operation, our Judgments then ſeem more probable to us. But when we retain but a faint Memory of the Enquiry, then we are apt to entertain Doubts of our Diligence in the Courſe of the

Operation, and we dare not maintain our Judgments with any manner of Confidence.

23. V. When Experience has diſcover'd certain Properties in the Thing which we examine, which are commonly unknown, and only can be found out by Ratiocination, our Gheſs ſeems to us the more probable, or likely, the more it agrees with thoſe known Properties. If our Enquiry be which of the three Hypotheſes of the Diſpoſition of the Solar Vortex in which our Earth is, be moſt probable, that of *Ptolomy*, *Tycho*, or *Copernicus*; that of the laſt is preferr'd to the other two, becauſe it accounts for all the Appearances in the Planets and fixt Stars about us; whereas the other two leave many unaccounted for. In ſuch Enquiries as theſe, the Simplicity of the Hypotheſis is of very great weight; for the fewer Things we are oblig'd to ſuppoſe, for giving an account of the Appearances, ſo much the more plauſible is the Hypotheſis, provided that by it we are able to account for all Things relating to it.

24. VI. When the Subject of our Enquiry is the Object of our Senſes, when we have apply'd our Senſes rightly diſpos'd, then it is no longer a ſimple Probability, but an indubitable Truth. There are ſeveral Cautions to be us'd in this Affair, which are to be learn'd in Natural Philoſophy. We muſt farther obſerve, that our Senſes were given us, not to arrive at a perfect Knowledge of the Nature of Objects, but only of what is neceſſary to the Preſervation of our Lives.

25. But we give more Credit to ſome of our Senſes, than to others; thus we confide more in our Sight than our Hearing, becauſe the Objects of our Eyes ſtrike ſtronger on them, than thoſe of the Hearing on the Ears. But when ſeveral Senſes concur in the diſcovery of any Thing, as when we not only ſee, but hear and touch, then there can be no other Doubt remain of the Truth. Thus if we ſee, hear, and embrace our Friend, we cannot have the leaſt Doubt of the Truth or Reality of what we do. Therefore, this Conviction of the Senſes is no more to be reſiſted, than the Evidence ariſing from *Reaſoning*.

26. From all that we have ſaid it is plain, that there is this difference between a ſlight or weak Probability, and its ſtrongeſt or higheſt Degree; that we cannot deny our Aſſent to this, but we may in that ſuſpend our Judgment, or give it.

27. But

27. But the Uſe of theſe probable Propoſitions is different in common Life, and in Philoſophical, and meerly Speculative Enquiries. For in common Life we very rarely depend on evident Arguments, but eſteem it a ſufficient Warrant of our doing any Thing, if back'd by no contemptible Probability. For, ſhou'd we not undertake any Action till we had the utmoſt Evidence of what we ought to do, we might ſoon periſh; and yet common Prudence will not allow us always to act on the lighteſt Probabilities. We ought, as much as poſſibly we can, diligently to examine all Things, and to contract ſuch a Habit of judging rightly, that we may judge with all the Diſpatch and Adreſs imaginable. We ought to chooſe, of two Things that are not certain, that which may do us the leaſt damage, if we ſhou'd be deceiv'd.

28. But, in Philoſophical Things, we proportion our Aſſent to the Degree of Probability, ſo that to a weak Probability we give a weak Aſſent, a ſtronger to one that is of greater force, and a full and perfect one to that which comes up to Evidence. For to acquieſce entirely, as in Truth, in a Propoſition which is obſcure, by reaſon of ſome Appearance of Truth, is to throw our ſelves into manifeſt danger of Error.

29. But we muſt not in all Things require a *Mathematical Evidence*, ſince that can only have Place in abſtracted or general, and adequate or perfect Ideas; all whoſe Relations and Parts we know: But we ought in *Matters of Fact* to acquieſce in a *Moral Evidence*, or the higheſt Step or Degree of Probability, as we have deſcrib'd it in this *Chapter*.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of doubtful, ſuſpected of Falſity, and falſe Propoſitions.*

1. THoſe Things are *Dubious* in general, in which there are no evident Marks of Truth or Falſhood. We ſometimes diſcover ſome few Circumſtances in Things which uſe to produce Probability, without being join'd to any others which may excite any Suſpicion in us. Such are many ancient Hiſtories, which we cannot reject, becauſe we find in them ſome things which have the Appearance of Falſhood; nor yet admit as undoubted, becauſe they have not Evidences enow of Truth. Thus the *Chineſe* Hiſtory of

their moſt ancient Kings, eſpecially of *Fohi*, who liv'd ſoon after *Noah*, we cannot be certain of its Truth, nor accuſe them of Falſhood. In like manner we cou'd neither condemn as falſe, or aſſert as true, that there are in the Univerſe many Inhabitants more than Mankind, and that ſome Planets are the Reſidence of happier, and others of more unhappy Natives.

2. There are ſometimes certain Circumſtances which uſe to attend a Falſhood mixt with others, that are not improbable; but in ſuch a manner, that the later are either more numerous, or of greater weight. There occur in the Fables of the *Greeks*, the moſt ancient Account or Reports of that Nation; there are many manifeſt Lyes or Falſhoods, yet if we narrowly enquire into them, we ſhall obſerve many Circumſtances which ſhew, that it is highly probable that moſt of thoſe things happen'd to the old Inhabitants of ancient *Greece*, which gave occaſion to the Riſe of thoſe Fables; ſo that thoſe Things which are told by the Poets are not all Falſe, but that it is very difficult to diſtinguiſh the Truth from the Falſhood.

3. There are other Things in which the Reaſons for our believing their Truth or Falſhood are equal. Many Authors paſs this Judgment of the *Giants* and Gigantic Bones, which are ſaid to be found in many Places. Of the ſame kind are moſt of thoſe Stories of the Apparitions of Evil Spirits, *&c.*

4. Secondly, Thoſe Propoſitions are ſuſpected of Falſhood, in which there are more and more weighty Marks or Signs of Falſhood than of Truth, tho' ev'n thoſe Signs be not forcible enough to compel our Aſſent. Theſe Signs are oppoſite to thoſe of Probability, from whence they may be eaſily gather'd.

5. We muſt obſerve here the ſame Cautions, which we have deliver'd about the probable Propoſitions: That is, that we doubt of the doubtful, and maintain our Suſpicion of thoſe which are ſuſpected of Falſhood. It wou'd be equaly raſh and inconſiderate to confound them either with thoſe which are evidently falſe, or evidently true. Nor ought they to be confounded with each other, as if where-ever there were any light occaſion of Doubt, there were a neceſſity of ſuſpecting Falſhood.

6. We may juſtly call in doubt thoſe Propoſitions, which are oppoſite to any *Mathematical*, or *Moral Evidence*. It is therefore falſe, that a Humane Body, ſome feet in length, can

be

be contain'd in a thin bit of Bread; and of the ſame Nature wou'd that Propoſition be, which ſhou'd deny that there ever were ſuch a City as *Rome*.

7. But tho' this be the Nature of *falſe Propoſitions*, yet is it not always equaly known; and for that Reaſon, miſled by the liberty of giving our Aſſent to obſcure Ideas, we often aſſert that as a Truth, which is Falſe: Yet we can never own that for a Truth, the Falſity of which is fully known to us; for *Truth* and *Falſhood* are oppoſite.

8. The Univerſal Origin of the Error (and in which all others are contain'd) of believing that which is falſe to be true, is deriv'd from that Liberty we have mention'd, by means of which we give our Aſſent to Things that are obſcure, as if they were perſpicuous or plain: But there are other particular Cauſes of this Error, which are ſomething leſs general, and which are worth our notice, that we may be aware of them.

9. *Firſt*, Sometimes thoſe who are to deliver their Judgment think not of ſuch Reaſons, or Arguments, which yet are in the Nature of the Thing. If Judgment be given then, it is four to one but he errs. Thus, ſhou'd any one attempt to judge of the Elevation of the Pole, without proper Inſtruments, unleſs he had Information of it ſome other way, he may well be deceiv'd; or if he hit on the Truth, it will be more by Chance than any Certainty deriv'd from his Art. The ſame may be ſaid of determining of Nations without knowing the Hiſtory of them, and the like.

10. *Secondly*, The Ignorance of thoſe who argue, is another occaſion of Error, who often have not improv'd their Wit and Judgment by Study and Application. Theſe will not give their Aſſent, tho' the moſt weighty and forcible Reaſons are produc'd, which wou'd prevail with Men of Judgment and Skill, becauſe they have never learnt to reaſon well, nor ever apply'd their Minds to underſtand the Rules of Art. Thus we every day find, that moſt Mechanic Tradeſmen, who employ their Time in Manual Operations for the ſupport of Life, reaſon very fooliſhly on thoſe things which are out of their own Employments, admitting very ſilly and trifling Arguments, as ſolid; rejecting thoſe which are realy ſo, as vain and of no force. This is moſt obſervable in Religion and Party-matters, in which the Mob liſtens to any thing that is prodigious with thirſty Ears. Nay, Men of higher Stations, Men of Quality, who waſte their Lives in Luxury and Pleaſure, neglect their Judgment

ſo

so far, that they scarce know or remember any thing besides what they learn from that Instructress of Fools, *Experience*; and are easily drawn into the most absurd Opinions, by the Adress of cunning Men, who have Art and Knowledge; of which we have too frequent Examples, both Ancient and Modern.

The third Cause of Error is, that Men often will not make Use of those Arguments of *Truth* and *Falshood*, that are, or may be known, which arises from Passions. *Impatience of Labour* (for Example) will not let them give themselves the Fatigue of observing the long Connection of various Reasons and Arguments, which all make their dependance on each other, or wait for the necessary Number of Experiments, which a thorough Knowledge requires; and so they pass their Judgment before they are thoroughly acquainted with the Subject. Another Reason of this precipitate Judgment, is our *Lust of Fame and Reputation*, which we are over-hasty to enjoy, while we wou'd seem to be Learned, before we realy are so. The *Hate* of some particular Man or Sect, makes us condemn them, without Enquiry, or Hearing their Arguments on any Account whatever. Of this (not to go so far back as the Heathens) we have frequent Examples, both among the Ancient and Modern *Christians*.

12. The fourth Source of Error is the fallacious Rules of Probability, which may be principally refer'd to four Heads or Classes, which we transiently noted in our Discourse of *Probability*.

13. The first is *doubtful Opinions*, which when admitted as certain, produce various other Errors, when they prove to be false themselves. Thus, allowing that those were real Miracles which are told us by the Monks of former Ages, as being done at the Tombs or Images of some Saint, it follows, that they are in the right who make Pilgrimages to such Shrines, and Worship such Images. And from these many more Errors wou'd ensue, for many Consequences are deduc'd from one Principle.

14. The second is of *receiv'd Opinions*, which are suppos'd to be evidently certain, from our having found them from our Childhood admitted by all those with whom we have liv'd or convers'd, and whom we have lov'd. For 'tis no easy matter to eradicate, or ev'n render doubtful, an Opinion that has taken Root in us in our most tender years, before we cou'd form a Judgment of them. But Experience has shown

shown us, that very many Opinions, which have been generally, ev'n universally receiv'd, by the greatest and most extensive Nations and People, are guilty of the greatest Falshood; and whence by consequence is born a numerous Race of Fictions. Thus when most of the *Romans* believ'd that *Romulus* and *Remus* were nurs'd by a Wolf; that Folly being admitted, it prepar'd their Minds for the Reception of many other such Trifles. Thus *Trogus Pompeius* wou'd enforce the Belief, that one of the most ancient Kings of *Spain* was suckled by a Hart, from what the *Romans* held about *Romulus* and *Remus*.

15. The third may be refer'd to the *Passions*, which prepare us for the Belief of certain Opinions, or arm us against giving Credit to others. That often seems to us probable, to have which true, may be of Consequence to our Interest; for we easily believe what we desire, and as easily hope that others think as we do. This is easily discover'd in our Wars; we scarce ever believe the Blunders of our own Generals, or the Defeats of our own Armies; on the contrary, we magnify our Victories, and the Sloath or ill Conduct of our Enemies. And in these things we are so possess'd with Passion, that we grow angry at those who wou'd gently endeavour to shew us, on how weak a Bottom we have built those Opinions. Thus in pannic Fears, or any general Terror, every little Report is sufficient to throw a People into Consternation and Despair.

16. In *Speculative Opinions*, we believe those true from the Truth of which we derive Advantage, or imagine we do. There are, and have been, many among the *Heathens*, *Jews*, *Mahometans*, and not a few *Christians*, who pretend to believe, or realy do, several things, the belief of which conduces to their Benefit. If any Doubts or Scruples arise in their Minds about these Opinions, which we cannot disbelieve without Trouble or Danger, we stifle them in their very birth, by turning our Mind to, and employing it on, some other Object. We easily are perswaded to believe those things which will bring us Honour and Reputation, but with greater difficulty the contrary: Nay, Men are apt to betray this Passion of the Mind so far in Discourse, that tho' they profess that they see and know the Truth, yet they discover a Willingness to believe the contrary, provided they cou'd be defended by any Authority.

17. When any such Opinion is admitted by the choice of any Passion, that same Passion will easily persuade us, that whatever

whatever is agreeable to that Opinion, and of Use to its Confirmation, is most true. Thus the *Romans* having allow'd and receiv'd the Superstitious Opinion of Prodigies, they believ'd any thing of the same kind, especially in Times of Distress or Difficulty: And the *Papists* having declar'd for Image-Worship, or the *Popes* Supremacy, with eagerness catch hold of any Opinion which may conduce to the Proof of them. But there are infinite numbers of this sort of Error, which has its Source from our Passions.

18. The fourth ill Reason of *Probability*, is drawn from *Authority*, in our too great Credulity in that. We frequently find Men, who indeed ought to know perfectly well the Humane Understanding, and the Humane Faculties, giving Credit to another who assumes an Infallibility, tho' he has but very vain and empty Reasons for his rash Presumption. Certainly Men ought never to yield their Assent to simple Authority, unsupported by Reason, when the Point is of Things which we can only know by their Relation, ev'n when that Relation has the Marks of Truth.

19. We must lastly observe in all these Particulars, that there is a certain heap or complexion of Causes, which throw us into Error; and that we rarely fall into it by the Force of one alone. *Want of Arguments*; *Ignorance in our Enquiries* into those which we have; a *Neglect* of them, by which we are unwilling to consider them; *fallacious Reasons* of Probability; *taking dubious* Opinions on Trust for evident Truths; *Vulgar receiv'd* Opinions; the *Passions* of the Mind; *weak Authorities*; all these sometimes break in upon our Mind at once, and sometimes in divided Bodies, and so with Ease bear us down into Error.

20. Against all this there is one general Caution, which we have already laid down, and that is, That we never give our full Assent to any Proposition whilst it is dubious or obscure, but we shou'd, as long as we can, deny our Assent, and proportion our Belief of Probability to the Degree, or Approach to Certainty or Truth.

21. But there are some other particular Antidotes to be drawn from our Consideration of the Causes which lead us into Error; that is, we ought, with our utmost Care and Application, to examine, on our enquiry into the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition, whether our Inclination do admit or reject it, on account of some of those Causes which we have laid down. If we find then never so little Reason to suspect any such thing, we ought to suspend our Judgment

ment as long as possibly we can, and examine farther into the matter, and to consult some other, who has not allow'd of this Opinion, from which alone great Help has been deriv'd.

## CHAP. VI.

## *Of Faith, or Belief.*

1. WE have said that *Faith* or *Belief* may be referr'd to *Science* or *Opinion*, so that what we have said of these two, may likewise be apply'd to *Faith*.

2. *Faith* or *Belief* in general, is said to be that Assent we give to a Proposition advanc'd by another, the Truth of which we gather not from our own immediate Reasoning or Experience, but believe it discover'd by another. It may be distinguish'd into *blind* and *seeing*. That we call *blind Faith*, by which we give our Assent to a Proposition advanc'd by another, of whose Veracity we have no certain and evident Reason or Proof; and this Belief or Faith is altogether unworthy of a Wise Man. The *seeing* Faith is that by which we give our Assent to a Proposition, advanc'd by one who can neither deceive nor be deceiv'd; but the more evident the Proofs of this is, so much the more strong and vigorous is the Faith or Belief.

3. Faith has likewise been distinguish'd into *Divine* and *Humane*. By the first we believe what is affirm'd by *God*; by the later, what is told us by *Man*. When we are equally convinc'd they are the Words of God, as of Men, the *Divine* Faith is stronger than the *Humane*; because we have vastly stronger Reasons to believe, that God can neither deceive or be deceiv'd, than those which wou'd persuade us the same of any Man. But when there is any Doubt, whether or no any Proposition is declar'd by God; or that God has commanded, that we shou'd believe such a Thing; the Faith can be no stronger than the Reasons on which it is founded. Yet sometimes the Reasons or Motives of believing Men are of such Weight and Force, that being perfectly understood, they equal a Mathematical Evidence, and then the *Humane Faith* is as solid and unshaken as the *Divine*, because, on both sides, we find an equal necessity of giving our Assent.

4. But since that which is properly call'd *Divine Faith* is immediately directed to God himself affirming something,

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no Man can pretend to ſuch a Faith, but a Prophet, to whom God has immediately ſpoken. But all our preſent Faith depends on the Teſtimony of Men, of whoſe Veracity, however, we have the moſt certain Proofs, tho' much of their Force depend on our Knowledge of Hiſtory.

5. From hence we find, that all Faith or Belief has its Foundation on Reaſoning, which cannot deceive us when it neceſſarily compels our Aſſent. Thoſe to whom God immediately reveal'd his ſacred Will, believ'd him for certain Reaſons, and not with a *blind* Aſſent; that is, becauſe they knew he cou'd not deceive: We at this Day believe them, or rather their Writings, for certain Reaſons, which oblige us to believe all undoubted Hiſtories.

6. We might here go to farther Particulars about Faith in Revelations, which are neither unprofitable nor unpleaſant, but ſince they more properly belong to Divinity, we ſhall paſs them by.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Diviſion.*

1. WHen we diſcourſe of any compounded Thing, or Idea, we ought to conſider its Parts ſeparately; elſe while we confound the diſtinct Parts and Properties, we produce *Obſcurity*: But this is avoided by *Diviſion*, which enumerates the diſtinct Parts of the Thing that is the Subject of our Conſideration.

2. *Diviſion* is defin'd, *The Diſtribution of the* Whole *into all it contains*; but the *Whole* has a double Signification whence alſo *Diviſion* is double.

3. That is a *Whole* which conſiſts of integral Parts, as thoſe Subſtances which are compos'd of various Parts, ſuch as the *Humane* Body, which may be divided into its ſeveral Members; and this *Diviſion* is call'd *Partition*.

4. But there is another *Whole*, which is properly a certain abſtract Idea, which is common to more Things than one, as the *Univerſals*; or a compounded Idea, which comprehends the Subſtance and its Accidents, or at leaſt moſt of its Accidents. The Parts of this *Whole* are call'd *Subjective*, or *Inferiour*.

5. This *Whole* has a triple *Diviſion*. The firſt is, when the *Kind* or *General* is decided by its *Species*, or *Particulars*, or *Differences*; as when *Subſtance* is divided into *Body*, and *Spirit*

*Spirit* into *Extended* and *Thinking*. The ſecond, when any Thing is divided into ſeveral Claſſes or Formes, by oppoſite Accidents; as when the Stars are divided into thoſe which give their own proper and unborrow'd Light; and thoſe of Opake Bodies, which reflect the Light of the Sun. The third is when the Accidents themſelves are divided according to the Subjects in which they inhere; as when *Goods* are divided into the Goods of the Mind, Body, and Fortune.

6. There are three Rules of a good *Diviſion*: The firſt is, *That the Members of the* Diviſion *entirely exhauſt the whole Thing that is divided*. Thus, when all Numbers are divided into *equal* and *unequal*, the *Diviſion* is good.

7. The ſecond Rule is, *That the Members of the* Diviſion *ought to be oppoſite*; as the Numbers *equal* and *unequal* are. But this Oppoſition may be made by a ſimple Negation; as, *corporeal*, *not corporeal*; or by poſitive Members; as, *extended*, *thinking*. And this laſt *Diviſion* is eſteem'd the better of the two, becauſe by it the Nature of the Thing is better made known.

8. The third Rule is, *That one Member of the* Diviſion *ought not to be ſo contain'd in another, that the other can be affirm'd of it*; tho' otherwiſe it may be in ſome manner included in it, without any Vice or Fault in the *Diviſion*. Thus *Extenſion* (Geometrically conſider'd) may be divided into a *Line*, *Surface* and *Solid*; tho' the *Line* be included in the *Surface*, and the *Surface* in the *Solid*; becauſe the *Surface* can't be call'd the *Solid*, nor the *Line* the *Surface*. But Numbers wou'd be very faultily divided into *equal*, *unequal*, and the *ſixth*, becauſe ſix is an equal Number.

9. For the ſake of Order and Perſpicuity, when we have found the *Diviſion*, we muſt take care to conceive it ſo, that it do not produce Confuſion and Obſcurity. When we examine into the Nature of any Thing, — *The* Diviſion *muſt not be made into too many, or too general Members*; for by this means diſtinct Things wou'd be confounded together. Thus ſhou'd any one, who was about to enquire into the Nature of all the Bodies which are known to us, divide them into thoſe which are in this our Earth, thoſe without it, and then, without any other Subdiviſion, proceed to his Enquiry into their Nature, he muſt without doubt find himſelf confounded.

10. *The Members ought by no means, unleſs the Subject neceſſarily require it, to be too unequal*. Such a Diviſion is theirs who divide the Univerſe into *Heaven* and *Earth*; for

the Earth, in compariſon of that vaſt Expanſe in which the Planets and fixt Stars are contain'd, which is call'd Heav'n, is leſs than a Point: For 'tis plain, that ſuch a Diviſion wou'd diſturb the Mind, whether we were ſearching after Truth, or teaching Truth diſcover'd to another.

11. But we muſt take heed on the other hand, *leſt, while we endeavour to make the Parts equal, we do not, as we may ſay, offer violence to the Nature of Things, by joining thoſe which are realy ſeparate, and ſeparating thoſe which are realy join'd togeſher.* We muſt, therefore, have a nice Regard to the Connection of Things, leſt we violently break aſunder thoſe Things which are cloſely united; and join thoſe together which have no manner of Connection with one-another.

12. We muſt farther take Care not to make our Diviſion too minute, leſt the Number of the Parts burthen the Memory, and deſtroy the Attention; which is a Vice utterly to be avoided by thoſe who wou'd Reaſon well.

13. Another Fault of *Diviſion* is, when inſtead of dividing real Parts of a Thing, we only enumerate the different Signification of Words.

## CHAP. VIII.

## *Of* Definition; *and firſt, of the* Definition *of the* NAME.

1. *Definition* is double; one of the *Thing*, and one of the *Name*. The firſt we eſteem the Nature of the *Thing*; the ſecond explains what Signification we give to any *Word* or *Name*; of the laſt here, referring the firſt to the next Chapter.

2. Since we do not always think to our ſelves only, but are oblig'd frequently to convey the Sentiments of our Minds to others, either in Words ſpoken or written, or be inform'd in the ſame manner of thoſe of other People, which otherwiſe we know not; we may lead others, or be led our ſelves, by others, into Errors, by the ambiguity of the Terms or Words that are made uſe of by either, unleſs we explain what we mean by ſuch ambiguous Words, by others that are not ambiguous.

3. We mean not here by Definition of the *Name*, the declaring the Uſe, or Signification of Words according to Cuſtom: We ſeek not in what Senſe others uſe any Word, but in what Senſe we ſhall make uſe of it in our future Diſcourſe.

4. We

4. We ſhall obſerve, that the Signification which we deſign to give to any Word, depends entirely on our Will and Pleaſure; for we may affix what Idea we pleaſe to any Sound, which in it ſelf ſignifies nothing at all. But the Definition of the Thing ſignify'd by any Sound, has not this dependance on our Will and Pleaſure; for ſince its Nature is certain and determin'd in it ſelf, our Words cannot make any manner of Alteration in it.

5. *Secondly*, Since the *Definition* of the *Name* is entirely at our Will and Pleaſure, it cannot be call'd in Queſtion by any one elſe. But then we are to give always the ſame Senſe to the ſame Word, to avoid Miſtakes, for which End we define our Terms.

6. *Thirdly*, Since the *Definition* of the *Name* is not to be call'd in Queſtion, 'tis plain, it may be made uſe of, like an undoubted or ſelf-evident Maxim, as the *Geometricians* do, who, more than all Men beſide, make uſe of ſuch Definitions; but we muſt take care, leſt we think, therefore, that there is any thing in the Idea affix'd to that defin'd Term which may not be controverted. It is an undoubted Principle, that ſome one has defined ſome Word in ſuch a manner; but what he thinks of the Thing, is no undoubted Principle. Thus, if any one ſhou'd define *Heat to be that which is in thoſe Bodies which heat us, and that it is like that Heat which we feel*, no Man cou'd find fault with the Definition, as far as it expreſſes what he means by the Word *Heat*; but this does not hinder us from denying, that there is any Thing in the Bodies that warm us like what we feel in our ſelves.

7. From what has been ſaid, 'tis plain, that the Definition of the Name is of great Uſe in Philoſophy; yet we cannot conclude from thence that all Words ought, or indeed can poſſibly be defin'd; for there are ſome ſo clear (to ſuch who underſtand the Language we uſe) and of ſuch a Nature, that they cannot be defin'd; as the Names of all ſimple Ideas, as we have ſhown under that Head.

8. Moreover, where the receiv'd Definitions are ſufficiently clear, they ought not to be chang'd, becauſe thoſe who are accuſtom'd to the receiv'd Uſe, will underſtand us better, and we our ſelves run not ſo great a Riſque of Inconſtancy in not preſerving our Definition. It is manifeſt, that thoſe Words are better underſtood, to which we have been long us'd to affect certain Ideas, than thoſe to which new ones are to be join'd; and we better remember the Senſe of One, than of Two.

9. From hence likewiſe it follows, that we ſhould, as little as poſſible, depart from the receiv'd Senſe, when we are neceſſarily oblig'd to forſake it in ſome meaſure; for we ſooner, and with more eaſe, accuſtom our ſelves to Significations of Words which are near, or related to thoſe which are already admitted, than to thoſe which are plainly remote, or us'd in a quite contrary Senſe.

10. But this, as we have hinted, muſt be obſerv'd above all Things, that we always keep to the Definition which we have once made; elſe we confound our Hearers or Readers, and fall into ſeeming Contradiction, which renders our Diſcourſe unintelligible.

## CHAP. IX.

## *Of the* Definition *of the* THING.

1. THE *Definition* of the *Name* depends entirely on our Will and Pleaſure, but the *Definition* of the *Thing* we have no Power over; for we can by no means affirm that to be in a Thing or Idea which we conſider, which is not in it. *Definition* is uſually divided into *accurate*, and *leſs accurate*; the firſt is properly *Definition*, the ſecond *Deſcription*.

2. A *Definition*, properly ſo call'd, explains the Nature of the Thing defin'd by an Enumeration of its principal Attributes; of which thoſe that are common to others, with the Thing defin'd, is call'd the *Kind* or *General*; but thoſe which are peculiar the Thing defin'd, the *Difference*. Thus a Circle may be defin'd, *a Figure whoſe Circumference is every where equi-diſtant from the Centre*; the Word *Figure* is the *Kind* or *General*, as being a Name common to all other different Figures, as well as to a Circle; the reſt are the *Difference*, ſince they diſtinguiſh a Circle from all other Figures.

3. But *Deſcription* is an Enumeration of many Attributes, and ev'n thoſe which are accidental. Thus, if any one is deſcrib'd by his Deeds or Actions, or his Sayings or Writings, as if we ſhou'd inſtead of naming *Ariſtotle*, ſay, *The Philoſopher, who obtains a Monarchy among the School-men without a Partner.*

4. Individuals cannot be defin'd, becauſe tho' we know not their eſſential Properties by which they differ from others

of

of the ſame Species, we muſt remember likewiſe, that the inmoſt Nature of Subſtances is unknown, and therefore they cannot be defin'd. Hence 'tis plain, that only the *Modes* whoſe whole Nature is known to us, can only be explain'd by a certain and properly call'd Definition.

5. There are three common Rules of a *Definition*, the firſt is, *That the Definition ſhou'd be adequate to the Thing defin'd*; that is, agree to all thoſe Things which are contain'd in the Species which is defin'd. The ſecond, *That the Definition ſhou'd be proper to the Thing defin'd*; for when the Definition makes us know the Thing defin'd from all other Things, it muſt be proper and agreeable to the Thing defin'd. The third, ſince we make uſe of a Definition to make known a Thing to another which he knew not before, *The Definition ought to be clear, and more eaſie and obvious than the Thing defin'd.*

6. Here we muſt again admoniſh the Reader, not to confound the receiv'd Definition of the Name with the Definition of the Thing. For this Reaſon the Definition of the Thing cannot be expreſs'd in Words plainly ſynonymous; as if any one ſhou'd ask what is the Supream Deity? and we ſhou'd anſwer, the Supream God; ſince the later explains no more the Nature or Attributes of that God than the former.

7. From theſe Obſervations we find, that Definition can only have place in compound Ideas, and is only the Enumeration of the chief ſimple Ideas of which they are compounded; but ſimple Ideas cannot be defin'd, becauſe there can be no Enumeration. He who knows not what that is which we call *Heat*, will only learn it by Experience, or ſome ſynonymous Word, or ſome Word of another Language, or by Circumlucation, by which the Thing is ſhown, not defin'd; as if we ſhou'd ſay, *That it was a Senſation, which we find when we ſit by the Fire, or walk in the Sunſhine*: By this we ſhou'd ſhew what Thing it was to which we gave that Name, but never explain its Nature. For, ſhou'd any one want that Senſe by which we have that Senſation, he wou'd no more underſtand what we meant, than a Man born Blind what was a Green Colour, by telling him it was that Senſation we have when we behold the Graſs in the Fields.

# *The* Third Part *of* LOGIC;

## OR,

# *The* Art *of* REASONING.

## CHAP. I.

## *Of* METHOD, *both of* Reſolution *and* Compoſition.

1. HAving conſider'd our ſimple Perceptions, and the ſeveral ſorts of our Judgments, and ſhewn how in them we ſhou'd conduct our ſelves to avoid Errors; it remains, that we ſhew in what manner our Judgments ſhou'd be diſpos'd, that we may the ſooner, and with the greater ſafety, arrive at the Knowledge of Truth. This Part of *Logic* is call'd *Method*, which, contrary to the Cuſtom of the Schools, I ſhall treat with Diligence, as more conducive to the Knowledge of Truth than the following Part of Argumentation, on which, however, they were more prolix.

2. Since moſt Truths which fall under our Examination depend on the Knowledge of Others, from whence they are deduc'd by a certain Chain of Conſequences, it is not ſufficient to have deliver'd the Rules by which we know to what Propoſitions (ſeparately conſider'd) we may give our Aſſent; we muſt alſo ſhew how they are to be diſpos'd among themſelves, in regard of each other, that by them we may deſcend as it were by ſo many Steps to Truth, plac'd according to the old Proverb, in the bottom of a Well.

3. *Method* is twofold, one is of *Reſolution*, by which Truth is generally ſought after; the other of *Compoſition*, by which the Truth now found out is taught or imparted to another.

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4. In the Method of *Reſolution* we proceed from ſome particular known Truth, to others which belong to ſome particular or ſingular Thing. In the Method of *Compoſition* we propoſe ſome certain general Truths, from which we deduce particular Truths.

5. If in the Method of *Reſolution* we propoſe any Maxims, it is not immediately in the beginning, and all together, and but once, but only as they are neceſſary for the finding out the Truth; on the contrary, in the Method of *Compoſition* they are propos'd all together in the beginning, before there is any need of them.

6. Theſe two Methods differ from each other, as the Methods of ſearching our Genealogy, deſcending from the Anceſtors to their Poſterity; or on the contrary, by aſcending from the Poſterity to the Anceſtors. Both of them have this in common, that their Progreſſion is from a Thing known, to that which is unknown. Thoſe Things which are known, by both are ſet in the Front, or firſt Place, that by them we may (by certain Conſequences deduc'd from them) be able to arrive at thoſe which are not known; and then all this Chain of Conſequences in both, conſiſt of Propoſitions connected with each other.

7. And theſe following Things are ſummarily requir'd in both, that Error may be avoided. Firſt, That no Propoſition be admitted as true, to which you can deny your Aſſent, or which is not evident. Next, The Connection of the following Propoſition to the foregoing, in every Step of the Progreſſion be likewiſe evident or neceſſary; otherwiſe, if in a long Chain of Propoſitions we admit but one Propoſition or Conſequence that is doubtful or falſe, whatever was directly deduc'd from thence, muſt of neceſſity be either dubious or falſe.

8. To make this plainer, we ſhall firſt propoſe an Example of the Method of *Reſolution*, and then one of that of *Compoſition*. Let us ſuppoſe this to be the Queſtion, *Whether on the Suppoſition of Man's Exiſtence, we can prove, that God does exiſt?* To reſolve this, our Method muſt be thus: (1.) Humane Kind, which now inhabit the Earth, did not always exiſt, all Hiſtory whatever ſtill fixing a Beginning to Mankind: This they do not only aſſert in expreſs Words, but by the whole Series and Courſe of what they treat, make it manifeſt, ſince there is no Hiſtory which pretends to give us an Account of more than about 6000 Years. (2.) If Humane Kind did not always exiſt, but had a Beginning, there is a

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Neceſſity that there ſhou'd be ſome other Cauſe of its Exiſtence; for from nothing, nothing can ariſe. (3.) Whatever that Cauſe is, it muſt have at leaſt all thoſe Properties, which we find in our ſelves; for none can give what he has not himſelf. (4.) Farther, there is a Neceſſity that there ſhou'd be in this Cauſe Properties which are not in us, ſince he cou'd do that which we cannot do, that is, make Man exiſt, who before had no Being, or that the Mind and Body of Man ſhou'd begin to exiſt, which Power we by no means find in our ſelves. (5.) We find that we have the Power or Faculty of *Underſtanding* and *Willing*, and a Body which can be mov'd various ways. (6.) Therefore, there muſt be thoſe Properties, and many far more excellent in the Cauſe of Humane Kind, ſuch as the Power of drawing out of nothing or making ſomething to exiſt, which had before no Exiſtence at all. (7.) But this Cauſe either exiſts ſtill, or has ceas'd to be. (8.) If he do not ſtill exiſt, he did not exiſt from Eternity; for whatever exiſted from Eternity, can neither by it ſelf, or by any other Cauſe, be reduc'd to Nothing. (9.) If it did not exiſt, it muſt have been produc'd by ſome other, for whatever has a Beginning muſt be generated by ſome other. Then would the ſame Queſtion return of the Producer, which may be thus generally ſolv'd: All Things that are, had a Beginning, or they had none. Thoſe which had a Beginning, were produc'd by Cauſes which had none; therefore, if there be any Thing that does exiſt, there are eternal Cauſes. (10.) It muſt, therefore, be confeſs'd, that there is ſome eternal Being, which has in it ſelf all thoſe Properties which we find in our ſelves, and infinitely more, Whether he immediately created us by himſelf, or by any other Nature? which is not here the Queſtion. (11.) If this Cauſe of Humane Kind do ſtill exiſt, the ſame Reaſoning wou'd return which we us'd in the 9th and 10th Steps of our Progreſſion. (12.) Therefore, it neceſſarily follows from the Exiſtence of Humane Kind, that God does exiſt, or ſome eternal Cauſe, which mediately or immediately created Mankind.

9. Thus by the Method of *Reſolution* we prove, or rather find out the Exiſtence of a God. And we may teach or convey this Truth thus found out to others, by the Method of *Compoſition*, in this manner. (1.) All Beings have a Beginning of Exiſtence, or they have none. (2.) Nothing can come out of Nothing, or begin to exiſt by its own Power, when it had no Exiſtence. (3.) All thoſe Things, therefore,

ſore, which had a Beginning, muſt be produc'd by ſome Being that had no Beginning. (4.) Humane Kind had a Beginning. (5.) It was therefore produc'd mediately, or immediately by ſome eternal Cauſe. (6.) That Cauſe we call *God*; and, therefore, *Humane Kind were created by God.*

10. All theſe Propoſitions, as we have obſerv'd, ought in both Methods to be nicely examin'd, that none be admitted as certain, and known, which is not ſo; and that no Conſequence be ſlid in which is not neceſſary. Having ſo done, we may know that we have found the Truth, or are taught the ſame by Others.

11. There are ſome Helps to be had for the more eaſy performance of this Task, and which are to be taught more diſtinctly, or with greater care and conſideration, becauſe on them depend the whole eaſieneſs and certainty of ſuch Reaſons or Arguments as are alledg'd. Firſt, what ought to be the Diſpoſition of the Mind for the more happy diſcovery of Truth: Secondly, we ſhall deliver the Rules of the Method of *Reſolution*; and Thirdly, thoſe which belong to the Method of *Compoſition.*

## CHAP. II.

## *Of the Neceſſity of* Attention, *and the Means of obtaining it.*

1. WE have more than once aſſerted, that Evidence is the Main, or Criterion of Truth. But this Knowledge is not enough to direct our Enquiry after Truth, becauſe that Evidence is not always to be had, nor does the Mind diſcover it ſometimes, without a long Labour and Fatigue. We muſt, therefore, enquire by what Means we may obtain this Evidence in our Thoughts.

2. It is not enough that we can form Ideas of all Things, which we can conceive in our Minds to come at the Knowledge of Truth, but the Mind muſt conſider them with the greateſt and moſt lively Attention, if we wou'd obtain a thorough Knowledge of them.

3. We have ſhewn, that our Judgments are the Perceptions of certain Relations, in which the Mind does acquieſce, and that our Errors of Judgment ariſe from it, does acquieſce in obſcure Perceptions, as if they were clear, before it has with ſufficient Care examin'd into their Nature.

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4. In Judgments of the Mind we shou'd use the same Method as in Judgments of the Eyes, which approach the obscurer Objects nearer, and employ the help of artificial Lights, narrow looking into, to it; so shou'd the Mind in Judgments restrain its Assent, till it has with the utmost Attention consider'd according to the Nature of the Thing into which it enquires. Hence it appears of how great and necessary use Attention is, which is only a long and uninterrupted Consideration of any one Idea, without the Interposition of any others.

5. We find that we are much more attent, and with greater ease apply our Thoughts to the Consideration of those things which affect us by the Intervention of our Senses, certain Images of which are before the Mind, and such as excite some Affection or Passion, than to those which came into the Mind without any of these Things. Thus we are attent in the Consideration of any enlighten'd Body, in some Image of a corporeal Thing offer'd to the Enquiry of the Mind; and in the Consideration of a Thing that may bring us Advantage or Damage, which strikes us with Fear, or Desire.

6. Every one who has try'd it before Use has bred a facility, knows that 'tis much more difficult to fix the Mind on abstract Ideas for any Time. The Reason of the difference is plain, because the Mind in other Things finds assistance from the Intervention of the Body, as 'tis affected with more sprightly and lively Sensations and Images, which will thrust themselves on it whether it will or not: On the contrary, in abstract Contemplations, and which derive nothing from the Body, corporeal Motions obstruct the Attention while they perpetually recall the Mind to Bodies, at the same time that the Object of the Mind has nothing in it self that can much affect it, or engage the Attention; nay, when the Mind is employ'd in these abstract Considerations, it must with all its Force banish all corporeal Images which croud perpetually upon it. Nor can this be perform'd without Pain, since the Law of Nature has oblig'd the Mind to be in Pain, when Force is offer'd to the Body.

7. Having laid down this, we must try whether or no we cannot encrease the Attention by the help of the Senses and Imaginative Faculty, ev'n in things that are meerly incorporeal. By what Art this may be done, we shall shew hereafter; but above all things we shou'd take care that the Inconvenience do not arise, which usually follows the Commotions

motions of the Mind by the Senſes, Imagination, or Paſſions; that is, when the Mind is ſomething more vehemently affected, it is turn'd in ſuch a manner to the Object which affects it, that it takes notice of nothing elſe. Then is this Motion ſo far from aſſiſting the Attention to Ideas of incorporeal Things, that on the contrary it proves an Obſtacle to it.

8. Hence this important Conſequence in our Enquiry after Truth is drawn, that they, who wou'd ſeriouſly apply themſelves to the ſearch after Truth, ſhou'd avoid, as much as they poſſibly can, all the more ſtrong and vehement Senſations; ſuch as great Noiſes, Light too ſtrong and glaring, Pain, Pleaſure, *&c.* They ſhou'd likewiſe take Care that their Imagination be not too vehemently mov'd by any Object, which ſhou'd infect it ſo far, as to make them think of it whether they will or not; for by this means the Attention will frequently be interrupted. Firſt, they ought not to be accuſtom'd to the ſtronger Emotions of the Paſſions; for thoſe who experience frequently theſe Perturbations, contract ſuch a Habit of Mind, that they can ſcarce think of any think elſe but the Objects of the Paſſions, or thoſe things which have ſome Connection with them; but ſince, for Reaſons which we ſhall not touch on here, no Man can be entirely exempt from them, they muſt make it their Endeavours to ſeek ſome Aſſiſtance from thoſe unavoidable Evils to their Enquiries after Truth.

9. The Senſes may be of advantage to the promoting the Attention, if we make uſe of them as the *Geometricians* do, who expreſs inviſible Quantities by Lines, Numbers, and Letters; for by this means the Mind more eaſily adheres to, attends, and is fix'd to the Thing which it enquires after; for while the Eyes are fix'd on the Figures, the Mind contemplates the Thing whoſe Signs they are. And this is done with the more ſafety, becauſe there is no Danger of confounding the Figures with the Thing he ſeeks, there being no Relation between them, but what he makes. Thus the ſwiftneſs and duration of any Motion can be examin'd by the Deſcription of certain Figures, which the *Geometrician* can never believe to be the Thing that is the Subject of his Enquiry.

10. By this means we may without Danger make Uſe of our Senſes in Ratiocination. That is, that we may not be oppreſs'd by the multitude of the Relations that are to be conſider'd, they may be expreſs'd on Paper by certain Words. Beſides, we give more eaſie Attention to Propoſi-

tions

tions already expres'd, and set down on Paper, than to their Ideas. We can review more often, and with more ease our Marks in long Arguments, when we have fix'd the Signs of them on Paper, than when we have them only in our Minds.

11. But these ought to be look'd on as Helps which may be made use of by young Beginners, but shou'd not be offer'd to those of riper Understanding, lest they shou'd accustom themselves too much to them, so that it render them incapable of understanding any thing without the Assistance of some corporeal Image.

12. The Faculty which brings the Images of corporeal Things to the Mind, is most strictly united to the Senses; and therefore belongs to what is said of the Senses, and yet afford a particular help to assisting the *Attention*. For example, when we in silent Contemplation compare the Ideas with the external and corporeal Objects, we may observe the like in the Operations of the Eyes as in the Actions of the Mind.

13. If we are to explain to others what we have found out, they will give more Attention to a Comparison, than to a bare and naked Exposition of the Thing; they will sooner apprehend and understand us, and remember it better. Hence arose the manner in the remotest Antiquities of using Fables, which was long in Vogue among the Oriental Nations.

14. But here we must beware of the Error of the Ancients in this Particular, which was, while they with too much Zeal sought the Attention of the Unskilful, they had Recourse to so many Figures and Phrases drawn from corporeal Things, that they offer'd to their Minds scarce any Thing but the Ideas of corporeal Beings: So that the Truth being overwhelm'd with those Figures, was perfectly hid, and cannot without the utmost difficulty be freed from them by the Learned themselves.

15. We must, farther, be very cautious of avoiding an Error too common to the Ancients and Moderns, who fancy'd the Comparison, or some other Figure, which was only to illustrate the Things, was really an Argument to prove them.

16. That the Passions often are Enemies to the Knowledge of Truth no body can doubt, and we have shown; many have made a Doubt whether they are ever of any use to it; yet since they are not Evil in their own Nature, they may by good Management be of great help to the encreasing

the Attention; nay, perhaps we may ſay, that it is never extreamly ſharp without ſome Paſſion. Thus we may make a happy Uſe of the Deſire of Glory, if we keep it within its due Moderation. When this Paſſion is alone, it is dangerous; other Paſſions are therefore to be excited in us, which ſhou'd hinder us from ſuffering our ſelves to be born down by the Deſire of Glory: And this is the very Deſire of knowing the Truth, which is in the Minds of all Mankind; for there is no Man that loves to be deceiv'd, nor any Man that is pleas'd with Ignorance.

17. But we muſt, ev'n here, take Care that the Deſire of finding out the Truth be not the only Cauſe of our Judgments; for the Paſſions never give any Light to the Judgment, but only excite our Enquiry after what is advantageous for us to know: But the Judgment ought not to be given as long as we can withhold it, in things of which we can have an evident Knowledge.

## CHAP. III.

## *Of the Capacity of the* Mind, *and the Means of enlarging it.*

1. WE call that Mind *capacious* that has many Ideas before it at once; and the more of thoſe it can have a diſtinct Perception of at once, the larger, or more capacious is the Mind; and the fewer, the more narrow we eſteem it. The *Capacity* therefore of the Mind is enlarg'd by contracting a Habit or Cuſtom of conſidering many Ideas at once without Confuſion. We mean not all *together* and at *once*, that in one numerical individual Moment, and one only Perception of the Mind, many Things can be diſtinctly underſtood, ſince 'tis certain that few Things can be diſtinctly view'd together. But this Expreſſion is to be allow'd the Latitude of meaning a very ſhort Time; and the Reaſon we uſed the Term together, is, that there is no external Menſuration of Time to divide the Rapidity of the Minds motion from one Thought to another.

2. If any one ſhou'd demand, whether the Minds of all Men were alike, except what difference is made by Education? we ſhou'd only anſwer, That we do not certainly know, but that Experience gives us a certain Confirmation of two Things.

3. That ſome have ſo unhappy a Genius, that it is with Difficulty they conceive the Connection of two Propoſitions, unleſs they fall on Subjects with which their Experience has been converſant, but are perfectly blind in Contemplation, nor can in the leaſt diſcover any difference betwixt a good and bad Ratiocination. Others again have a Mind ſomething larger than this, and can by one View of the Mind comprehend more than one Connection of Propoſitions; but if the deduction of Conſequences be ſomething longer than ordinary, they cannot extricate themſelves. But then there are ſome happy Genius's which can with eaſe, if not at one view, yet in a very little Time, and few Thoughts, comprehend a long Chain of Propoſitions. They are neither fatigu'd nor diſturb'd with that Number of Propoſitions which wou'd abſolutely confound ſome Others.

4. It is apparent from Experience in the ſecond place, that the *Capacity* of the Mind can be enlarg'd by a frequent Uſe of thinking of many Things at once. 'Tis ſufficiently known, that the young Learners of *Geometry*, *Arithmetic*, or *Algebra*, are at firſt diſturb'd with the number of Ideas to be conſider'd together; nor can they, without a very painful Attention, underſtand what they read, or are taught, by reaſon of the number of Ideas which are to be conſider'd: As for Example, —— Thoſe who at firſt endeavour to learn the *Rule of Diviſion*, are confounded or puzzl'd by the manifold compariſon of the *Diviſor* and *Dividend*; and they are ſurpriz'd to conſider how the Maſter that teaches them ſhall be able at one View, or at leaſt with very few, to comprehend the Connection of ſo many Propoſitions as are form'd in a long Arithmetical Operation; yet the ſame Students of this Art, after they have apply'd themſelves to the Study of Accounts for ſome Months, comprehend many Operations with eaſe in their Mind, which before they cou'd not take one. Whence 'tis evident, that the Capacity of the Mind will admit of an Encreaſe.

5. If it ſhou'd farther be ask'd, whether the Capacity of all Men cou'd be improv'd by the ſame Method? we may anſwer, That Experience has ſhown us, that all ſuch who can that way improve their Minds, have by it enlarg'd their Capacity; for there are ſome who, from their firſt Application, cou'd never make any Progreſs in theſe Studies; but among thoſe who are not wholly incapable of theſe Studies, ſome make a ſwifter and greater Progreſs than others, ev'n from the beginning, whether this be the effect of the Nature of the Mind or the Body.

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6. To come to the point it self, whoever has a Desire to enlarge the Capacity of his Mind, must make it his endeavour to have his Attention at his Command, so as to apply it when, and to what he pleases, which may be obtain'd by the Means propos'd in the former Chapter. For he that cannot be attentive to a Few, will much less be capable of understanding Many together, and not be confounded by the Multiplicity of the Objects.

7. But since the Capacity of the Mind, as we have seen, is a Faculty within us by Nature, whatever we do to acquire it, as we have express'd it, comes only to this, that by frequent Exercise we render its Use easie to us. We must only examine on what Objects it is chiefly exercis'd.

8. Objects are of two kinds; one are Mathematical, the other cannot be treated Mathematically. Whatever can be examin'd in a Geometrical Method (which we shall deliver when we shall treat of the *Method* of Composition) are Mathematical; and of this kind are all things of which we can have a perfect Knowledge, that is, whatever belongs, or relates to *Modes*.

9. All who have apply'd themselves to the enlarging the Capacity of the Mind, tell us, that it is acquir'd by the Consideration of these Things. And 'tis certain, that in *Arithmetic* (to instance one part of the *Mathematics* for all) the manifold Parts of the Object are so distinctly noted, and so clearly perceiv'd, that provided the Attention be apply'd, there is no manner of danger of our being confounded. In Computation or Accompts, there are, first, as many *Objects* as *Unites*; next, certain *Names* are impos'd (for Brevity's sake) on certain Collections of *Unites*, without producing any Confusion, how great soever the Collection of *Unites* may be; as one *Hundred*, a *Thousand*, an *Hundred Thousand*, a *Million*, &c. Lastly, there are long Comparisons of Numbers made in the gross without coming to any one particular, or alone, but of many collectively together, and at once. For whether we add or substract, multiply or divide, to which all *Arithmetic* is reduc'd, many Numbers are consider'd at once, except only the Number *Two*, which consists only of two *Unites*; but in the Computation of that, there is not any need of Art.

10. In Computation therefore, we exercise the Faculty of distinctly understanding many Things together, which we call the *Capacity of Genius*; for we shou'd still remember, that this Capacity we speak of ought always to be join'd

with this diſtinct Perception, ſince a confus'd Underſtanding of Things is of no Uſe to the finding out of Truth.

11. The Conſideration of Subſtances cannot be Mathematically diſcuſs'd; and we ſhou'd in vain imagin, that in theſe the Capacity of the Mind cou'd ever be acquir'd; for ſince we have no clear Knowledge of particular Subſtances, much leſs can we know with Perſpicuity a Collection of Subſtances together, we can only conſider their Properties, and the Relations that there is between them.

12. Hence we may gather, that the Mind cannot be render'd more capacious by the Conſideration of *Genus* and *Species* of the old Philoſophers, who rang'd all Subſtances under thoſe Heads, becauſe it is an uncertain Diviſion of unknown Objects.

## CHAP. IV.

## *Of the Laws of the Method of* Reſolution.

1. BEfore we proceed to the Laws of the Method of *Reſolution*, we muſt recal to our Memory certain Maxims on which they are built. The firſt is what we have more than once taken notice of, *viz. That we muſt conſider Evidence in every Step or Degree of our Progreſſions in our Reaſoning or Arguments*; unleſs we wou'd run the Riſque of falling into Error.

2. The next is the Conſequence of this, *That we ought to Reaſon on thoſe Things only, of which we have clear and perſpicuous Ideas; or on obſcure Things only ſo far as we know them.* Whence we may gather, that our Reaſoning ought to be only converſant about the Properties and Modes of Subſtances and abſtract Ideas, and not about the inmoſt Nature of Things extreamly obſcure.

3. The third Maxim is, *That we ought always to begin from the ſimple and eaſie, and to dwell on them a while, before we proceed to Things compounded and more difficult*: For we ought firſt to have a clear Perception of ſimple Ideas, elſe we can never have a ſufficient Knowledge of the Compounded.

4. Theſe general Maxims are the common Principles of both the Method of *Reſolution* and *Compoſition*. For in both Methods are equally requir'd Evidence in the Degrees or Steps of Progreſſion, choice of the Subject of our Enquiries, and the Knowledge of Things ſimple before thoſe that are com-

compounded; as will appear from what follows. But now we ſhall proceed to thoſe Laws which are peculiar to the Method of *Reſolution.*

5. The firſt is, *That we muſt clearly and perfectly underſtand the State of the Queſtions propos'd.* If we propoſe any Thing as the Subject of our Enquiry, it is neceſſary to avoid rambling from the Point, that we have a diſtinct Knowledge or Idea in our Mind of the Thing we examine. If the Queſtion be propos'd by others in certain Words, we ought, before we proceed to the Solution, to have a diſtinct and clear Knowledge of the meaning of every Word, in which it is expreſs'd.

6. Having now a diſtinct Knowledge of the Subject of our Enquiry, and the Ideas which are contain'd in the Queſtion being now to be compar'd, another Law is, *That with ſome force and effort of the Mind, one or more middle Ideas muſt be diſcover'd, which ſhou'd be like a common Meaſure or Standard, by whoſe help the Relations between the Ideas to be compar'd be found out.*

7. But when the Queſtions are difficult, and ſtand in need of a long diſcuſſion, the third Law is, *That we cut off all, that has no neceſſary Relation to the Truth ſought after from the Thing which is the Subject of our Conſideration.*

8. When the Queſtion is reduc'd to its narroweſt Bounds, that is, when we diſtinctly perceive the Matter in diſpute, having rejected all that does not neceſſarily belong to it, the fourth Law is, *That the compounded Queſtion be divided into Parts, and thoſe to be ſeparately conſider'd in ſuch Order, that we begin with thoſe which conſiſt of the more ſimple Ideas, and never proceed to the more compounded, till we diſtinctly know the more ſimple, and by Reflection have render'd them eaſie to our Conſideration.*

9. When by Reflection we have obtain'd a diſtinct Knowledge of all the Parts of the Queſtion, and manage it with eaſe in our Minds, thus the fifth Law is, *That certain Signs of our Ideas comprehended in eſtabliſh'd Figures, or in the feweſt Words that can be, be imprinted in the Memory, or mark'd on Paper, leſt the Mind have any more trouble about them.* This Law ought chiefly to be obey'd when the Queſtions are difficult, and conſiſt of many Heads, tho' it be not unuſeful ev'n in thoſe that are more eaſie. By the help of this Law the Reaſoning is ſooner concluded, than if they were conceiv'd in many Words and other Signs; and we thus likewiſe ſooner diſcover the Connection of the Parts.

10. When thoſe Things which are neceſſary to the Queſtion are clear to us, and mark'd with compendious Signs, and diſpos'd in Order, Then *muſt the Ideas* (by the ſixth Law) *be compar'd with each other, either by Reflection alone, or by expreſs Words.* When more Things than one are to be compar'd, the Memory and Judgment receive great Aſſiſtance from Writing, which are eaſily otherwiſe confounded, and we can make but an ill Judgment of Things confus'd.

11. If after we have compar'd all the Ideas, whoſe Signs we have committed to Paper, we cannot yet find out what we ſeek, then the ſeventh Law ſuggeſts, *That we cut off all the Propoſitions, which after a full Examination we find of no Uſe to the Solution of the Queſtion, then we may again proceed in the ſame Order in the reſt, which is deliver'd in the ſix preceding Laws.*

12. If after we have repeated this Examination as often as it is neceſſary, nothing of what we have mark'd ſeems to conduce to the Solution of the Queſtion, we muſt confeſs, that, as to us, it is not to be reſolv'd, ſince whatever we cou'd diſcover in its Parts prove inſufficient to ſolve it. We ought therefore to throw it entirely aſide, or conſult ſome Perſon more knowing in the Subject, or better skill'd in Enquiries.

13. Theſe are the Laws of the Method of *Reſolution*, all which are not to be obſerv'd in all Queſtions; for one or two of them are ſufficient for ſimple Queſtions, or thoſe which conſiſt of but few Propoſitions. But when they are very much compounded and intricate, we muſt often come to the laſt, and that to be repeated more than once. But this being a Matter of very great importance, we ſhall diſcourſe of them ſeparately in ſeveral *Chapters.*

## CHAP. V.

## *Of the three Maxims on which all* Method *is built.*

1. WE ſhall ſay nothing more than we have already on the firſt Maxim about *preſerving Evidence in every Step or Degree of Knowledge*; but we cou'd not but take Notice of it in this place, both to make appear the Connection of thoſe that follow with it, and alſo becauſe it cannot be too much inculcated to Men who have been us'd to give their Aſſent to Things that are obſcure.

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2. The next, which is the Conſequence of the former, is, *That we ought not to Reaſon on Things of which we have no clear Ideas, or of obſcure Things, as far as they are obſcure.* We muſt not take this Maxim in a Senſe that ſhou'd exclude the Nature of all Things which are yet unknown to us from our Enquiries; for this wou'd be directly oppoſite to our Deſign, by which we aim to open a way to the Diſcovery of Truths unknown to us.

3. But we are of Opinion, that a Philoſopher ought not to Reaſon on obſcure Things, in a double Senſe: the firſt is, That he ought not to chooſe ſuch Objects of his Contemplation, which it is plain cannot be diſcover'd by evident Demonſtrations. (1.) Thus, as ſeveral *Geometricians* have demonſtrated, the *ſquaring of the Circle*, and the *doubling the Cube*, cannot be found out. (2.) Thus we cannot diſcover what is the inmoſt Nature of Things; all we can know of that, is, that Experience has ſhown us, that there do co-exiſt in Subſtances certain Properties: We ſhou'd therefore reject the Enquiry into Subſtances, and only conſider their Properties. (3.) If we cannot find out the inmoſt, or whole Nature of any one created Subſtance, much leſs muſt we pretend to diſcover the Subſtance of that Supream Nature which created all the reſt. We may gather, as it were by Experience, from thoſe Properties which we ſee in the Creatures, that they are in the Creator, ſince no body can give what he has not, yet we cannot conceive how all the real Properties of all Creatures can co-exiſt in God.

4. The other Senſe of this Maxim is, That no certain Conſequence can be drawn from a Principle that is unknown or uncertain. Tho', this be a Maxim allow'd by all Philoſophers, both ancient and modern, yet have they all offended againſt it, perſuading themſelves that they do know their Principles to be clear and certain, which yet are often very uncertain, and many times not known at all. Thus all that we have any clear Perception of in our Minds, is the Property of Thinking; and therefore we cannot poſſitively affirm, that there is any other in it; nor on the otherſide, can we deny that there is, becauſe there may be ſome, of which we are ignorant.

4. But it is here neceſſary to take notice (leſt any one ſhou'd wreſt what we mean by our Mind into another Senſe) that what we ſay is not to be underſtood as if we cou'd not deny Contradictions. For 'tis one thing to deny that any particular is not in a Subject beſides what we ſee, and

another to deny that the ſame thing can be, and not be, in the ſame Subject at the ſame Time. Thus we cannot affirm, that there is nothing elſe in our Mind beſides the Faculty of Thinking, becauſe we diſcover nothing elſe in it; but we may without danger of Error, deny that the Mind, whilſt it is thinking, is deſtitute of Thought, ſince we clearly perceive that one of theſe two Propoſitions is neceſſarily falſe.

5. To obſerve the ſecond Caution which we have mention'd, we muſt neceſſarily examine with our utmoſt Diligence into the Principles laid down, before we proceed to the Conſequences of them. We are taught by the third Maxim, *That we muſt begin with the ſimple and eaſie Things, and dwell on them ſometime, before we proceed to the compounded and difficult.* Thus to learn *Arithmetic*, the Student muſt be perfectly acquainted with, and fix in his Memory the firſt four Rules of, *Addition*, *Subtraction*, *Multiplication* and *Diviſion*, before he can to any purpoſe proceed to the Rule of *Three*, and the following Rules.

## CHAP. VI.

## *Of the firſt Rule of the Method of* Reſolution.

1. ALL our Judgments being only the Perceptions of Relations, in which Perceptions we acquieſce, it is manifeſt, that when we enquire into any thing which is unknown to us, we only ſeek after an unknown Relation. When therefore we ſay in the firſt Rule, *that we muſt perfectly and clearly know the State of the Queſtion propos'd*; 'tis the ſame thing as if we ſhou'd tell you, that you are to take particular Care leſt you ſuppoſe that Relation the Object of your Enquiry, which does by no Means come under our Conſideration; for unleſs the ſought Relation be mark'd with ſome certain Note, we ſhall neither know what we ſeek, nor know it when found out.

2. But if ſuch a Relation be plainly and clearly known, you may ſay, How can we then make any farther Enquiry about it? But then ſay we, can there be any Deſire of knowing any thing of which we have no manner of Knowledge? None at all. That which is ſought, therefore, ought neceſſarily to be diſtinguiſh'd from all things elſe, that we may know it when we find it, and ſo far know it, before we make any Enquiry about it. No Queſtion can ever be ſolv'd, whoſe Terms are not in ſome meaſure known to us. Thus

for

for Example, we enquire, *What thoſe two Numbers are between which there is ſuch a Relation, as if you take a Unite from one, and add it to the other, they ſhall be equal; but on the contrary, if you add the Unite taken from the other, to that from which you ſubtracted, the Number ſhall be double to the other?* Tho' the Numbers between which there is this Relation be not known, yet are they ſo far known, that that Relation ought to be between them, whence they are acknowledg'd as ſoon as ever they are found out.

3. When a Queſtion is conceiv'd in Words, thoſe Words ought to be diſtinctly underſtood; or the Ideas which are ſignify'd by every Word ought to be thoroughly known to us. All Equivocation in the Terms muſt therefore be entirely remov'd, leſt, for one Queſtion, as many ariſe as there are different Senſes of the Propoſition; nor can we apprehend what Senſe he that propoſes it (if propos'd by another) gives his equivocal Propoſition.

4. If we cannot underſtand all the Senſes of the Words in which a Queſtion is conceiv'd, we can never know whether we have given it a Solution in the Senſe in which it was propos'd, which often happens in general Queſtions, and the occaſion of which is not ſufficiently known: Thus we can only gheſs at the Places in old Authors, which cannot be ſolv'd but by the Series of the Context.

5. When we have render'd the Terms in which any Queſtion is conceiv'd as plain and clear to us as we can, we muſt apply our Attention to the Conſideration of the Conditions, if there be any in it. If we underſtand not them, the Queſtion remains obſcure; for they often ſhew us the way to ſolve the Queſtion. If there be none expreſs'd or underſtood, then is the Queſtion general, in which we muſt obſerve thoſe Things which we have already deliver'd on that Head: But if the Conditions are not expreſs'd, but underſtood, tho' neceſſary, it can never be ſolv'd, if we have not the Opportunity of asking the Propoſer of it what they are. If the Conditions added to the Queſtion be ſuperfluous and of no Uſe, they muſt be diſtinguiſh'd from thoſe which are neceſſary; for without this, we often run after things of no Moment, and leave thoſe which are of Importance and Neceſſary, without any Notice.

6. This Queſtion may be propos'd—*to find out two Numbers, one of which deſign'd by the Letter* A, *ſhall be two Unites greater than another deſign'd by the Letter* B; *ſo that taking a Unite from* B, *and adding it to* A, A *ſhall be doubled.* The Con-

Condition of this Question is conceiv'd in the Words *so that*, &c. those therefore must have our Attention, because without them the Question is not understood. For the Question is not simply, how a Number may be found out greater by two Unites than another, but such Numbers in which that occurs which is in the Condition, which are 7 and 5.

7. The necessary Condition wou'd be omitted in this Question, *Whether a Man, by putting his Finger in his Ear, cou'd be render'd so immoveable, as not to be able to walk till his Finger be taken out of his Ear?* A Question propos'd in these Words wou'd be deny'd, because the putting the Finger in the Ear cannot render any one immoveable. But this difficulty is remov'd by adding, *That the Man shall be so plac'd, that his Arm shall embrace a solid fixt Pillar, when he puts a Finger of that Arm into his Ear.*

8. Farther, sometimes there are idle Conditions annex'd to the Question propos'd, which conduce nothing at all to the Matter; as if we shou'd propose, *To make a Man, anointed with sweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland, not able to lie still, tho' he see not any thing that can move him.* Shou'd any one stop at, and consider the meaning of this part, which says, *anointed with sweet Oil, and crown'd with a Garland*, he wou'd spend his Pains to no purpose, since those Words have nothing to do with the Matter: But this is done by putting a Man into a Ship driven on by the Winds; or if he fall from a Tower, or any other high place; for he will of necessity be mov'd, tho' he see not what it is that gives that Motion, since he is driven on by a Matter that do's not fall under the Sense of Seeing.

9. Nor is this only to be regarded in such Questions as are only feign'd for the Exercise of the Mind, for the like Cases occur in Things drawn from the Critical Art, and from Natural Philosophy, and all other Parts of Learning. Thus if we examine, what any particular Word does signify generally consider'd? The Answer, tho' true, is very rarely of any Consequence to the Solution of the particular Question of, what that Word does signify in any one certain place. If, therefore, any one desires to know the later, he ought not to propose the Question in general Terms, but to repeat the Place in which the Sense of that Word, which is sought, occurs; for Words often vary their Sense by their Situation to another, which when they stand alone, they do not signify.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VII.

### *The Explanation of the ſecond and third Rules of the Method of* Reſolution.

1. ALL Queſtions may be refer'd to two Kinds, or Sorts; that is, Simple or Compounded. All that is neceſſarily requir'd to the Solution of the firſt, is a diligent compariſon of the Ideas of which they are compos'd. Thus when 'tis ſaid, that a Circle has this Property, that all the Lines that are drawn from its Centre to its Circumference, are equal: If any one doubt of the Matter of Fact, and wou'd enquire into the Truth or Falſhood of that Maxim, he need only compare the Idea of a Circle, with the Idea of this Property.

2. But Compounded Queſtions cannot be ſolv'd without comparing the Ideas of which 'tis compos'd, with ſome third Idea, or many Ideas; for no Man can find out the unknown Relations, which are the Subject of his Enquiry, by an immediate Compariſon of the Ideas of the Queſtion propos'd. There is, therefore, a Neceſſity of finding out ſome third Idea, or more, with which the Terms of the Queſtion muſt be compar'd; but theſe Ideas ought to be clear and perſpicuous, at leaſt, as to their Relation by which they are compar'd with others. And hence is drawn the ſecond Rule of the Method of *Reſolution*.

3. Examples will make this Matter more plain. If this Queſtion was propos'd, *Whether a Thief ought to ſuffer Death?* Since the Idea of a *Thief* cannot be immediately compar'd with the laſt Puniſhment, no Natural Connexion being between thoſe two Ideas; ſo that the Idea of a Thief ſhou'd neceſſarily excite the Idea of that capital Puniſhment: We can't ſolve that Queſtion without the Intervention of ſome third Idea, with which both the others ſhou'd be compar'd, and that is of *Vindicative Juſtice*, or the *Knowledge of the Law*. And when we have made this Compariſon, we ſhall ſay, 'tis Juſtice, for the good of the Commonwealth, that the Thief be put to Death, or undergo ſome milder Puniſhment.

4. If again we put the Queſtion, *Whether a Boy of fifteen, being guilty of Theft, ſhou'd be put to Death?* The former Queſtion is contain'd in this; for we muſt firſt enquire, whether

ther any Thief deſerve Death, before we ſee whether ſuch a Thief ſhou'd ſuffer in that manner. For unleſs the firſt Queſtion be ſolv'd, the later never can. But having found, by the Laws, that a Thief at Man's Eſtate, by the Law, is to be put to Death, we muſt farther enquire, whether a Thief of fifteen be liable to the ſame Puniſhment. Here, therefore, wou'd be another Compariſon, not of the Boy with the Puniſhment, but of the Puniſhment that is to be inflicted, with Juſtice, or the Law.

5. There may, in this very ſame Queſtion, occur ſeveral other Ideas, which muſt be compar'd, becauſe the Benefit of the Commonwealth is not a ſimple Thing; but here, for the ſake of Inſtruction, we make the Idea of Juſtice a ſimple Idea, and of the higheſt Clearneſs and Perſpicuity. We farther ſuppoſe, that there is no Enquiry into the Circumſtances of the Fact, which yet moſt commonly come into the Conſideration of the Thing.

6. But if the Queſtion was, *What Puniſhment ſhou'd be inflicted on* Peter, *who, without the Award of Law, had by force taken away what he pretends is his due?* Then, at firſt hearing, very many Things offer themſelves to our Conſideration. (1.) We muſt nicely examine, whether he were really the Creditor or not, of him from whom he had taken this Thing; in which Enquiry his Affirmation is to be compar'd with the Bond, Writing, or other Inſtrument, if there be any, or with the Affidavit, or Oath, or Witneſſes, &c. (2.) Next, we muſt examine, whether the Sum he lent be as great as he pretends, which is by comparing his Oath with the Words of the Deed, or Inſtrument, or of the Witneſſes, &c. (3.) We muſt enquire, whether he took it away, or not. (4.) Whether by Force, where we muſt hear Witneſſes, whoſe Evidence muſt be compar'd with manifold Ideas to make out the Truth. (5.) We muſt examine, whether the Laws condemn all manner of Force on ſuch an Occaſion, where we muſt compare the Fact with the Words of the Law. (6.) What Puniſhment the Laws inflict on that Force, which we here ſuppoſe to have been us'd, without the Intervention of the Sentence of the Judge. Before, therefore, we can ſolve this Queſtion, *What Puniſhment* Peter *muſt undergo?* We muſt many ways compare the middle Ideas with the Terms of the Queſtion.

7. But if in this Compariſon we take in Ideas that are not very clear, there is the greateſt Danger imaginable of Error, of which if any one ſlip in, all the following Propoſitions,

sitions are either false, or nothing to the purpose, and the Conclusion must be absolutely false.

8. The third Rule is, *To throw away every thing, from the Question to be consider'd, which doth not necessarily belong to the Truth that is sought after.* This Rule is of manifest Advantage and Use; because, whoever does not observe it, either wanders wide of the Matter, and finds not what he seeks, or forms his Judgment by Foreign Ideas, and gives his Mind a profitless Fatigue. Thus, in the former Question, if we shou'd enquire, whether *Peter* were a Denizen or Foreigner, or what are the Laws of other Countries; on that Head or the like, 'tis plain, there cou'd nothing be drawn thence to the solution of the Question.

9. We make use of this Caution in Questions that are conceiv'd in many Words, either by the Ignorance or Design of him who proposes them, to make them the more intricate; or those which are taken out of any Writing, which the Writer never design'd to propose with Clearness and Perspicuity.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *An Explanation of the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh Rules of the Method of* Resolution.

1. WHen we have taken away from the Question propos'd all that did not, or appear'd not necessarily to belong to the Thing enquir'd after, if it yet remains compounded so far as to fall under two or more Heads, since we cannot with Attention examine several Things at once, by the fourth Rule we are oblig'd (1.) *To divide the Question into its several Heads.* (2.) *To examine those Heads separately, in such a manner, as to begin with those which consist of the more simple Ideas*; (3.) *and never to proceed to those Heads which are more compounded, till we have by our Consideration made them more simple, perspicuous, and easie to our selves.*

2. The necessity of this Rule is manifest in the solution of compounded Questions; for, first, if we confound their several Heads, we can never have distinct Ideas of them; for Distinction and Confusion are inconsistent. By that means we can never compare the Ideas with each other, as they ought to be compar'd to find out the Truth; which if we shou'd otherwise hit on, it wou'd be more the Effect of Chance, than our Skill or Understanding.

3. We sometimes give the same Judgment of several Ideas, tho', generally speaking, the same Judgments will not agree to several. But if we form a Judgment of various

Things mixt together, without considering each singly, we give a general Judgment of different Things which is seldom free from Error in some thing or other. We may discover that an Author has neglected this Rule, when, upon a diligent perusal of his Works, we cannot (tho' the Argument he writes on be not unknown to us) reduce what he says to certain Heads: And this we may find in several of the Ancient as well as Modern Writers; who for that Reason are not read without difficulty and pain.

4. The same Inconveniences arise from the neglect of the second and third Cautions of this our fourth Rule. Having said something of this in the fifth *Chapter*, we shall only add here, that when we are grown familiar and acquainted with the more simple Principles of the Question propos'd, so far as to have them distinctly in our Minds, we never, in the least Consequences drawn from them, affirm any thing contrary to them. On the contrary, when we take but a transient View of the more simple, and pass on so swiftly to the more compounded, we surely forget them, and the last prove often contradictory to the first.

5. The fifth, sixth, and seventh Rules seldom come into Use in any Art but *Algebra*, Examples taken from whence wou'd soon and clearly declare their Use: But they being too difficult for those who are unacquainted with them, and because we are of Opinion that the same Rules can beneficially be adapted to other Arts, we shall draw our Examples elsewhere.

6. When we go about the solution of any propos'd Question, and to set down in Writing what seems to us, may be answer'd to it, it will be of the greatest use imaginable to write the Heads of the Question down in the fewest Words that may be, especially if they are many, left while we consider of one, the rest, as it often happens by the multiplicity of the Questions, slip out of our Mind. By this means ev'n a happy Memory, which with difficulty retains many Heads, wou'd find a great Assistance; and the Mind unincumber'd with other Things, with less Pain attends the Consideration of Particulars. 'Tis very seldom that all the Parts of a compounded and difficult Question, which must be consider'd, offer themselves together, and at once. Most commonly we must consider some time before we discover all, and then if we write not all that down which we have first found out, while we seek others, that slips out of our Memory. But because it wou'd be very troublesome to write down many things, therefore the various Relations which are to be consider'd, may be expres'd by some certain Words.

7. Hence arise two Advantages which are not by any means to be despis'd. The first is, that before we write down more fully what we have found out on any Question, either by Consideration, or that help'd by Reading, by this Art we easily conceive the Order of the things to be written, and change it with equal Ease, if perchance we find any thing amiss in it: The other is, that both the Order and Parts of our Treatise is so fixt in our Memory, by reading over sometimes what we have written, that when we come afterwards to set down our whole Dissertation, we do not depart from that Order, nor omit any thing which is worthy of our Consideration. Otherwise, by having too great a Confidence in our Memory we sit down to write with our Order and Heads of our Discourse only in our Mind, many things which occur to us while we are writing, like those which we have thought, insensibly divert us from the right Track which we design'd to pursue, and make us omit what we shou'd have discours'd of, and meddle with those things which have nothing to do in the Question before us.

8. When we have, according to the fifth Rule, expres's'd the Order we have conceiv'd with certain Marks and Signs, then, according to the sixth Rule, we diligently consider every Proposition that is to be examin'd. There are never more than two Terms of one Proposition to be compar'd, before we find what Relation is, or is not, between them. This thus found out, shou'd in few Words be written down, that the Memory be unburthen'd of it, that we may without any Pains read over our Traces, and see what we have found out, and what is the Connection of our Arguments.

9. When we have written down all the Propositions that were to be examin'd, and have not, however, found out what we sought; the seventh Rule ordains, that we with greater Application peruse what we have written, and cut off whatever we find of no Use to the solution of the Question; and commands us then to examine any thing that may seem of Use, according to the former Method: For we often, on the first View, imagine several Things to be plainly necessary to the solution of the Question, especially in those which are intricate, which afterwards we find on our Experiments, by an accurate comparing of the Ideas, to be of no manner of Use; and on the contrary, that some things, which at first seem'd of no Importance to the Question, on a repeating the Examination, to be of that Use, as to open the Way to our discovery of Truth. And this every one will better know by Experience, than by any Examples brought from others.

10. Lastly, If on a frequent Repetition we can discover no way of solving the Question propos'd, we ought to dash it out with our Pens, as beyond our Power. Or, if in our Enquiries we have discover'd, that there are no Ideas in it by which it can be solv'd, we ought to shew, that it is insolvable in its Nature, that no body throw away their Time any more about it.

11. Perhaps some may object to this Method, that it is difficult: But then they must reflect that there is no easier, and that all these Rules are not made use of in Truths more easy to be discover'd, but only in those which are more difficult and intricate. But it is much more difficult without this Method to find out the Truth, and to know it when discover'd, than to use this Method, and gather the Certainty of our Discoveries.

## CHAP. IX.

### *The Rules of the Method of* Composition.

1. WE hope 'tis plain from the Comparison we made betweeen the Methods of *Resolution* and *Composition*, in the first Chapter of this Part, what we mean by *Composition*. That is, that after we have found out the Principles of any Truth, or whole Art or Discipline, we must seek some Order, by which the Connection of its Parts may be easily understood, and the Thing it self so prov'd, that having granted the Beginning, you must of necessary consequence grant also all that follows.

2. There has been no better Way found out than, that the general Principles be first propos'd, and if Necessity require, to be prov'd, and that their Consequences be so dispos'd, that those which follow, seem to flow as much as possibly they can from those which went before. Besides the gaining by this means the Order and Force of a Demonstration, we avoid a great Inconvenience in teaching or conveying any Knowledge, which is the Necessity of Repetition: For if we shou'd begin from Particulars to come at last to the Generals, we must be forc'd to repeat what we know of its general, when we speak of every particular, because without the Knowledge of the *General*, you can never have a certain Knowledge of the *Particular*.

3. But we must here put you in Mind, that this Method can only be preserv'd in those Things whose Principles we perfectly know; as for Example, *Geometry*, which is wholly employ'd in the Consideration of abstract *Modes*, of which our Mind has clear and adequate Ideas; but when the Enquiry

quiry is into *Subſtances*, as in Natural Philoſophy, we cannot make uſe of the Method of *Compoſition*, becauſe the Kinds of *Subſtances* are not known to us, nor can we find out their inmoſt Eſſences.

4. This Method of *Compoſition* has been by none ſo juſtly and accurately obſerv'd hitherto, as by the *Mathematicians*, whoſe Principles are perfectly known; we can therefore draw its Rules from none better, than from the Teachers of *Geometry*.

5. Since they deſign'd to propoſe nothing that cou'd be contradicted, they thought they cou'd obtain this chiefly by three Ways. (1.) By offering nothing but what was couched in Words or Terms perfectly underſtood, and for this Reaſon they always carefully define the Words they make uſe of; of which we have ſpoken in the *Second Part*. (2.) By building only *on evident and clear Principles*, ſo that they cou'd not be controverted by any one who underſtood them. They, therefore, firſt of all propound their Maxims or Axioms, which they demand to be granted them, as being ſelf-evident, and in need of no Proof. (3.) By *proving demonſtratively* all their Conſequences, and for this Reaſon they only make uſe of in their Arguments or Proofs of *Definitions*, *Axioms* that have been granted, and *Propoſitions* which they have already prov'd, which are Principles to thoſe Things that come laſt.

6. To theſe three Heads may be referr'd all the Obſervations of the *Geometricians*, in the Demonſtration of thoſe Truths which they have diſcover'd.

7. Theſe are the Laws or Rules of Definitions: (1.) *Never to uſe any Word doubtful, or the leaſt obſcure, without a Definition.* (2.) *To make uſe of no Words but ſuch as are of a very known Signification, or ſuch as have been already explain'd.*

8. The Rule of their Maxims or Axioms, is, *To allow nothing for a Maxim or Axiom, but what is moſt evident.*

9. Theſe are the Laws or Rules of their Demonſtrations. (1.) *To prove all Propoſitions that have the leaſt Obſcurity, and to admit nothing to the Demonſtrations of them but conſtituted Definitions, granted Axioms, Propoſitions already prov'd, or the Conſtruction of the Figure which is under Conſideration, when any ſuch thing happens to be done.* (2.) *Never to abuſe the Ambiguity of a Word, by not affixing thoſe Definitions by which they are explain'd.*

10. Theſe are Rules which the *Geometricians* have thought neceſſary to be obſerv'd, to give thoſe Truths which they deſign'd to prove, the laſt and greateſt Evidence.

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## CHAP. X.

### *The Explanation of the Rules of* Definition.

1. WE have already discours'd of the Definition of *Names*, but it being a thing of no small Consequence, and without which the *Geometrical* Method cannot be understood, we shall add some few things on the same Subject, avoiding as much as possible a Repetition of what we have said.

2. The first Rule forbids us *admitting any Word that is the least obscure without a Definition.* The Necessity of this Rule is built on this Foundation: I. *That to prove any thing with Evidence, there is a necessity that what we say be perfectly understood.* For how can that Demonstration be evident, which we do not fully understand? But there are a great many Words which cannot be perfectly understood, unless they are defin'd, since the Use of the Tongue from whence they are taken, have not fixt any certain and determinate Sense upon them, and so leaves them obscure; as we may find in studying the Art of Criticism. But when Words of this Nature are made use of in the delivering, especially the Principles of Arts or Sciences, we understand neither the Principles themselves, nor the Consequences drawn from them, nor the Order of the Argumentation, or the Connection of the Propositions; whence it follows, that we cannot certainly conclude, whether what is said be true or false.

3. II. The Definitions of Words has this Effect on our selves, that it makes us more constant and consistent with our selves, by giving always the same Sense to the same Word. For when we have not a distinct Notion of that Signification which we have at first given to a Word, we are apt, by Inadvertence, to recede from it, especially in long Disputes, and when the Discourse is of things of different Kinds; for on these Occasions we our selves are not sufficiently conscious of what we mean, and of the Order of our Argumentation, much less can another understand us. But if we define our Terms or Words, their Signification makes a deeper Impression on our Minds, and by that we are the more easily brought into the right Path, if in our Discourse we have by Accident stray'd from it.

4. The second Rule of Definitions forbids *us to make use of any Words in them, whose Signification is not distinctly known,*

*or*

*or already explain'd.* The Reaſon of this is plain; for how can that which is obſcure be explain'd by what is obſcure?

5. But to avoid too great a multiplicity of Definitions, we muſt never make uſe of obſcure Words but when you cannot find any others; elſe we ſhall be oblig'd to make Definitions of Definitions.

## CHAP. XI.

### *An Explanation of the Rules of* Maxims, *or* Axioms.

1. THere are ſome Propoſitions of ſo great Perſpicuity and Evidence, and ſo univerſally known, that as ſoon as we hear the Words that expreſs it, we perfectly know and allow their Truth, as, *That Nothing cannot produce Something. No Cauſe can give what it has not it ſelf.* Theſe, and others of the ſame Nature, have no need of Demonſtration, becauſe no Demonſtration can be more evident than they are. And whatever has not this Evidence, is not to be admitted as a Maxim.

2. But we muſt be cautious of believing, that there is nothing clear and evident, but that which has never been deny'd, becauſe there are ſeveral that have been of old deny'd by the violence of ſome of the ancient Sects, eſpecially the *Pyrrhonians* and *Academics*, which are now beyond Controverſie. For, ſhou'd the majority of Mankind conſpire to deny that *One* is leſs than *Two*, no Man in his Senſes can deny that Truth.

3. There are two Rules of Maxims or Axioms, which contain all that belongs to this Matter. The firſt is, *Whenever we plainly and evidently ſee that any Attribute agrees with any Subject, as we ſee that of the Whole being bigger, than its Part, we have not need of any long Conſideration of the Attribute and Subject, for the Mind to diſcover that the Idea of the Attribute has a Connection with the Idea of the Subject; we may well, therefore, give the Name of a Maxim to ſuch a Propoſition.* But this may be put into fewer Words. *Whatever Propoſition expreſſes the immediate clear Compariſon of two Ideas, without the help of the third, is an Axiom.*

4. The other Rule, oppoſite to the former, is thus expreſs'd. *When the bare Conſideration of the Ideas of the Subject and the Attribute are not ſufficient to diſcover the Agreement of the Attribute to the Subject, ſuch a Propoſition is not to be admitted as an Axiom, but muſt be demonſtrated by the help of other Ideas.* In fewer Words, thus: *Every Propoſition, the Proof of which requires ſome third Idea, beſides the Attribute and the*

*Sub-*

speak plainly, we must put an End to the Dispute; for thence 'tis evident that he knows not what he won'd be at. By this means, those that hear us will discover the Man's Vanity who talks of things which he does not understand, and many Times leaves a Sting in the Mind of a Man otherwise too pertinacious.

6. Thirdly, If we bring him at last to speak plainly and clearly what he means, *We must ask him Questions on the Particulars of all the Parts of the Doctrine he advances, and their Consequences; not as reproving them, but for a fuller and more clear Information of the Matter; so that he shou'd appear the Instructor, and we the Learners.* The Absurdity of the Doctrine will appear from these Questions, if it labour with any, much better than by an open Opposition, provided it be done with Dexterity, and the Questions pretty numerous, and be oblig'd several Times to repeat the same thing, lest he shou'd afterward deny that he had said so. Here, that the Explanation may be the more ample, it wou'd not be amiss to make use of Examples and Similitudes, and ask him, whether he means this, or that? The more copious we are in this Particular, the more evident will the Falsity of the Opinion appear.

7. The perspicuous Exposition of any Doctrine, with its Consequences, if it be not true, shows generally its Absurdity: But if this be not sufficient, then we must ask him, *on what Arguments or Proofs he builds his Opinion*; and we must use the same Conduct in regard of the Arguments as to the other Parts. We are to enquire of him with whom we dispute, as if we were by him to be inform'd of a Point of which we are ignorant; but we must not allow him the least Obscurity. In short, we must hear the whole Series of his Argumentation in such a manner, that there remain no Difficulty either in understanding his Doctrine, or the Foundation on which it is built.

8. When we have done this with diligence, the Person who proposes his Doctrine, must plainly see its Falsity, or on what Proofs it depends. If Passion blind his Eyes, yet the Hearers will excuse any farther Dispute with a Man who is Angry, that we receive not his Opinion, tho' labouring with Absurdity.

9. We shall give one Example of this Method on a Modern Controversy, by which it will be better explain'd, betwixt a *Thomist* and another, disputing upon the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.

10. A. *I wonder you are so obstinate, as to deny that God has an* Efficacious Operation *in the Sins of Men, which the Scriptures in many places so openly and plainly testify.*

B. I only deny'd that I understood how this is done. Perhaps my Dulness makes that a Difficulty to me, which is obvious to another. But I wou'd willingly be inform'd by you, because I can neither believe, nor condemn what I do not understand; what, therefore, do you mean by an *Efficacious Operation in the Sins of Men?* do you mean that he makes them Sin?

A. *Far be it from me, for so God wou'd be the Author of Sin. 'Tis Man commits Sin, not God.*

B. Do you mean, that God *makes Men to commit Sin, or forces Men to commit Sin?*

A. *I wou'd not have express'd this in so rude a manner; but God, in a dark and unknown manner, so permits Sin, that it must necessarily be committed.*

B. You us'd before the Word *Operation*, now you use *Permit*; pray, do they mean the same thing?

A. *These Words do not absolutely mean the same thing, but they must be join'd together, so that what God does shou'd be call'd an* efficacious Permission; *for God neither makes Sin, nor does he simply permit it.*

B. You,

*B.* You, therefore, mean that God permits something, and does something, so that Sin necessarily follows?

*A. That is what I mean.*

*B.* Perhaps then God does in this, what he does who cutting down the Dykes, lets the Waters in to overflow the Fields. For he *does* something in breaking the Dyke, and he *permits* something in suffering the Sea to pass through the Breach.

*A. My Mind cou'd not have been expres'd by a more happy Similitude.*

*B.* But, according to our common way of Speaking, we shou'd say, that he who made a Breach in the Dyke, had let in the Waters; nor wou'd any one accuse the Dyke or the Sea of any manner of Fault; but you, if I mistake you not, accuse Man of the Fault, and say Man, not God, committed the Sin. Wherefore, your *efficacious Permission* seems unintelligible to me.

*A. Do you not observe, that as to the Things themselves, there is a vast difference between them? For Men are endow'd with Understanding and Will, which the Dyke and the Sea have not; and for that Reason, that is a Crime in the Man, which is not so in the Sea and the Dyke.*

*B.* But I ask of you, whether that which God *does* or *permits*, has that Efficacy (for that Word you have likewise us'd) that Men can no more not Sin when that has order'd it, than the Sea not overflow the Fields through the Breach which affords a free Passage?

*A. You have my Meaning?*

*B.* According therefore to you, there is the same Relation in that Sense between God and Sin, as there is between the Man who made a Breach in the Dyke, and the Destruction of the Fields.

*A. There is, as to the Event, for both are equally necessary.*

*B.* The Action therefore of both, according to the Custom of Speech, may be expres'd in the same manner: That is, —— as he who broke down the Dyke is call'd the Cause of the Loss of the Fields, because he did that which necessarily produc'd that Loss; so God is the Author of Sin, since he has put Man under a necessity of Sinning.

*A. I told you before, that I will not make use of those rude Expressions.*

*B.* But either I do not understand what you say, or it comes to that Point; for we must not regard the empty sounds of Words which signify nothing, but mind the Ideas to which they are annex'd.

*A. What, you'l prescribe Rules to me of Speaking; as if I did not know how to hold a Discourse.*

11. If the Dialogue once comes to this, there must be an end of it; and hence it will appear, that he (design'd by the Letter *A*) either knows not what he means, or else has a greater regard to Words than Things. That Opinion is look'd on as sufficiently confuted, which its Defender is asham'd to express in clear and intelligible Words. Having in the former Dialogue sufficiently explain'd the first and second Rule, to explain the third, we shall suppose the same Dispute again.

12. *A. You sufficiently understand, that my Opinion is, that God has to do with Evil; that he is not a meer bare Spectator, but is so far an Agent, that on his acting Man commits Sin.*

*B.* If God did nothing before the Sin, wou'd not the Sin be committed?

*A. No, for nothing is done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.*

*B.* What? do you believe that Man alone cannot violate Laws?

*A. That he can, I deny, when I deny, that any thing can be done without the Efficacy of the Divine Providence.*

*B.* God, therefore, helps us to do wickedly in the same manner, as he helps us to do well?

*A. You mistake, for in Evil we must distinguish the* Action, *and the* Viciousness *of the* Action. *God helps us to the doing the* Action, *but not to the*

Vice.

Vice. *But in good* Actions *he helps us to the* Good *that is in the* Actions.

*B.* I beg you, inform me, what you mean by the Words *an Action*, and what by the Viciousness of an *Action*?

*A. I will make it plain to you by this Example: In the* hatred of our Neighbour, *there is the Action of the* Hatred, *which in it self is indifferent, and is only call'd* bad, *when directed to an unlawful Object, and* good *when to a lawful. Next, there is the Relation of that Action to the Object, which is Evil. God does not concur to this Relation, tho' there is a necessity of his* concurring to the Action, *without which it cou'd not be done.*

*B.* By what you have said, I suppose you mean, that God first generates in the Mind of Man, Hatred in general; which is in it self neither Good nor Evil: Then there comes another Relation of the Hatred to the Object, as in the Example to our Neighbour. Do I understand you?

*A. Partly you do, but not entirely; for I do not think there is any such Existence as Hatred in general, which shou'd afterwards be determin'd to a certain Object; this is contrary to Experience.*

*B.* Does God then create that very Hatred that is directed against our Neighbour?

*A. Most certainly the Hatred, but not the Relation.*

*B.* But does that Hatred exist without that Relation?

*A. Not at all; for the very moment that it is created in our Minds, 'tis the Hatred of our Neighbour.*

*B.* According, therefore, to you, God creates such an Hatred which co-exists in such a manner with a vicious Relation, that it cannot be separated or distinguish'd from it but by Abstraction.

*A. He does so.*

*B.* Can this Hatred, thus generated in the Mind of Man, be by the Man directed to a lawful Object, as *Vice*, for Example?

*A. It cannot; for the Action of God being past, the certain Event must necessarily follow.*

*B.* I beseech you, Sir, if a Man shou'd put a Burthen on anothers Shoulder, which he that bore it cou'd not afterwards throw off, and by that means he shou'd break his Ribbs, wou'd not he that put on such a Burthen be look'd on as the breaker of his Ribbs, if he had known the Event of his Action?

*A. Most certainly.*

*B.* Shou'd a Man push another, walking by a River-side, into the Water, who shou'd there be drown'd, shou'd we not say that he who thrust him in drown'd him?

*A. Certainly.*

*B.* Yet there are some Men who wou'd say, that you are in an Error in this particular; that the *imposing*, and the *thrusting* was produc'd by both; but not the breaking the Ribbs, and the drowning, as God generates the Hatred which is directed against our Neighbour without that evil Relation.

*A. 'Tis indeed, most evident, that the Men instanc'd, were guilty of the Fracture and the Drowning; but the matter is otherwise with God; who is not oblig'd to give an account to poor miserable Men of his Administration.*

*B.* But if he did what you wou'd wickedly persuade us, either all Sinners must be acquitted of any Crime, or God himself who compels the Sins, condem'd.

*A. Don't you know*, that God's Ways are not our Ways, nor his Thoughts ours? *Shall the Pot complain, that it was not made in such and such manner?*

83. Hence it is evident to all that hear it, that the *Thomist* (noted by [illegible]) either knows not what he means, or makes God the Author of Sin.

The End of LOGIC.